Poole v. Saddler et al
Filing
43
MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 2/14/2014:Mailed notice(kef, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
DAVID POOLE,
Plaintiff,
v.
MICHELLE R. B. SADDLER, et al.
Defendants.
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Case No. 13-cv-4984
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
AMY J. ST. EVE, District Court Judge:
Plaintiff David Poole is an incarcerated patient at the Chester Mental Health Facility in
Chester, Illinois. (R. 1, Compl. ¶ 4.) Plaintiff asserts Section 1983 claims against thirty-six
individuals and state entities related to their alleged mistreatment of Plaintiff at the Chester
Mental Health Facility, the Pontiac Correctional Facility, and the Menard Correctional Facility.
The Court has three motions pending before it. First, Plaintiff moves for the Court to order the
Illinois Department of Human Services to relocate Plaintiff to a mental health facility near
Chicago pending the outcome of this litigation. (R. 10, Mot. to Relocate.) Second, Defendants
Todd Loss, Michelle Saddler, Salvador Godinez, Donald Jones, Travis Nottmeier, Christopher
Roberts, and Jared Brooks (the “Moving Defendants”) move to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against
them and to transfer the case to the Southern District of Illinois pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
(R. 19, Mot. to Dismiss.) Third, in response to the Moving Defendants’ motion to dismiss,
Plaintiff moves for leave to file a proposed Amended Complaint. (R. 29, Mot. to Amend.) For
the following reasons, the Court denies Plaintiff’s motion to relocate (R. 10), grants the Moving
Defendants’ motion to dismiss but denies their motion to transfer venue (R. 19), and denies
Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend (R. 29).
BACKGROUND
The State of Illinois, through its Department of Corrections (“IDOC”) and Department of
Health Services (“IDHS”), has held Plaintiff in a number of correctional and mental health
facilities since at least 1977. (See Compl. ¶¶ 17-20.) Plaintiff served time at the Pontiac
Correctional Center from 1977 to 1979 (id. ¶¶ 17-18) and at the Menard Correctional Facility
from 1979 to 1982. (Id. ¶ 19.) From around 1990 to 1995, Plaintiff was a patient at the Elgin
Mental Health Facility. (R. 29-1, Proposed First Am. Compl. ¶ 24.) Plaintiff is now a patient at
the Chester Mental Health Facility in southern Illinois. (Id.)
Plaintiff alleges that during his incarceration at Menard Correctional Facility, “he was
incorrectly diagnosed with a mental illness, [and] then force-medicated to treat it.” (Compl.
¶ 19.) Plaintiff’s forced-medication allegedly caused him to develop a dependency on the
medications administered to him. (Id.) According to Plaintiff, “[h]is treatment while at the
Menard Correctional Facility followed him to various mental institutions which continued to
treat the plaintiff for his forced-medication induced mental illness. To this day, [Plaintiff] is
subjected to demeaning treatment and abuse stemming from an incorrect initial diagnosis.” (Id. ¶
20.) Plaintiff pleads that “years of initially unneeded psychotropic drug therapy” caused him to
get into confrontations with other residents at the Chester Mental Health Facility and left him
susceptible to physical attacks, sexual harassment, and mental abuse from residents and facility
employees. (Id. ¶¶ 21-48.) Plaintiff alleges several examples of abuse he purportedly suffered at
Chester Mental Health Facility over the last ten years. (Id.)
2
Based on these allegations, Plaintiff asserts fifteen counts against thirty-six Defendants:
(i) seven counts for violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against twenty-eight current or former
employees of the IDOC, Chester Mental Health Facility, Menard Correctional Facility, and
Pontiac Correctional Facility, in their individual capacities (Counts II-VII and XV); (ii) four
counts of respondeat superior liability against Menard Correctional Facility, Pontiac
Correctional Facility, Chester Mental Health Facility, and Chester Mental Health Facility’s
superintendent (Counts I and IX-XI); (iii) one count for conspiracy to interfere with Plaintiff’s
right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment against all Defendants (Count VIII); and (iv)
and three counts adding the State of Illinois, the IDOC, and the IDHS as necessary parties
pursuant to 745 ILCS 10/9-102 (Counts XII-XIV). The seven Moving Defendants move to
dismiss Counts IX-XIV for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, Counts VII-VIII for failure to
state a claim, and Counts II-VI and IX-XIV as barred by the statute of limitations. (R. 19.)
Additionally, the Moving Defendants move to transfer this case to the Southern District of
Illinois pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). (Id.)
Plaintiff did not file a response brief opposing the Moving Defendants’ motion to dismiss
and transfer venue. Rather, on the deadline for his response brief, Plaintiff moved for leave to
file a proposed Amended Complaint, which, according to Plaintiff, addresses several of the
issues raised in the Moving Defendants’ motion. (See R. 29.) Plaintiff also has moved for the
Court to order the IDHS to relocate Plaintiff to a mental health facility near Chicago pending the
outcome of this litigation. (R. 10.)
3
ANALYSIS
I.
The Moving Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
The Moving Defendants seek dismissal of (i) all claims against Defendants Saddler,
Godinez, and Jones pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), (ii) all claims against the State of Illinois, the
IDHS, the IDOC, Pontiac Correctional Facility, Menard Correctional Facility, and Chester
Mental Health Facility based on sovereign immunity, and (iii) all claims and allegations based on
acts or omissions that occurred outside the statute of limitations period. (R. 20, Defs. Mem. at 510.)
A.
Legal Standard
“A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) tests whether the complaint states a claim on which relief
may be granted.” Richards v. Mitcheff, 696 F.3d 635, 637 (7th Cir. 2012). Under Rule 8(a)(2), a
complaint must include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The short and plain statement under Rule 8(a)(2) must
“give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell
Atl. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 126 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007) (citation omitted).
Under the federal notice pleading standards, a plaintiff’s “factual allegations must be enough to
raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Put differently, a
“complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d
868 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “In evaluating the sufficiency of the complaint,
[courts] view it in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, taking as true all well-pleaded factual
allegations and making all possible inferences from the allegations in the plaintiff’s favor.”
AnchorBank, FSB v. Hofer, 649 F.3d 610, 614 (7th Cir. 2011).
4
B.
Motion to Dismiss Claims Against Defendants Saddler and Godinez
In Count VIII, the only count naming Saddler and Godinez as Defendants, Plaintiff
asserts that Saddler and Godinez, in their individual capacities, conspired with other Defendants
to interfere with Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual
punishment. (See Count VIII.) Section 1983 imposes civil liability upon “person[s]” who
“under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State or Territory,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1983;
see also Parker v. Franklin Cnty. Cmty. Sch. Corp., 667 F.3d 910, 925 (7th Cir. 2012) (“A cause
of action under § 1983 requires a showing that the plaintiff was deprived of a right secured by
the Constitution or federal law, by a person acting under color of law.” (emphasis and internal
quotations omitted)). To plead a Section 1983 conspiracy claim, a plaintiff must allege that
(1) the individuals at issue reached an understanding to deprive the plaintiff of his constitutional
rights, and (2) those individuals were willful participants in joint activity. See Lewis v. Mills,
677 F.3d 324, 333 (7th Cir. 2012); Logan v. Wilkins, 644 F.3d 577, 583 (7th Cir. 2011).
The Complaint contains no allegations linking Saddler or Godinez to the alleged
conspiracy to deprive Plaintiff of his constitutional rights. With respect to Saddler, Plaintiff
alleges that Saddler is the secretary of the IDHS (Compl. ¶ 5) and that throughout her time as
secretary, Saddler “failed to put into place policies that would protect the patients in her charge
from abuse by the individuals who work for her.” (Id. ¶ 49.) Plaintiff’s sole allegation with
respect to Godinez is that he is the director of the IDOC. (Compl. ¶ 6.) These allegations fail to
establish that Saddler and Godinez reached an understanding with each other or other Defendants
5
to deprive Plaintiff of his constitutional rights and that Saddler and Godinez willfully
participated in joint activity with their alleged co-conspirators.
Even if the Court assumes, based on their positions, that Saddler and Godinez had some
form of supervisory authority over other Defendants, the mere exercise of supervisory authority
over individuals who allegedly violated Plaintiff’s rights is insufficient to create Section 1983
liability. See Kelly v. Municipal Courts of Marion Cnty., 97 F.3d 902, 909 (7th Cir. 1996); see
also Matthews v. City of E. St. Louis, 675 F.3d 703, 708 (7th Cir. 2012). For a supervisor to
incur individual liability under Section 1983, he or she “must know about the [alleged] conduct
and facilitate it, approve it, condone it, or turn a blind eye for fear of what [he or she] might see.”
Matthews, 675 F.3d at 708 (quoting Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985, 992-93 (7th Cir.
1988)); Backes v. Village of Peoria Heights, 662 F.3d 866, 870 (7th Cir. 2011). Furthermore,
“one can[not] infer a supervisor’s participation in a conspiracy simply on the basis of his
supervisory position.” See Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1256 (7th Cir. 1984) (citing
Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 96 S. Ct. 598, 46 L.Ed.2d 561 (1976)), overruled on other
grounds by Russ v. Watts, 414 F.3d 783 (7th Cir. 2005); Beaman v. Souk, --- F. Supp. 2d ---,
2014 WL 31810, at *16 (C.D. Ill. Jan. 3, 2014) (“[A] person’s supervisory position cannot be the
basis for an inference that he was involved in the conspiracy.”). Plaintiff, therefore, fails to
allege facts that state plausible Section 1983 claims against Saddler and Godinez, either
individually or as part of a conspiracy. Accordingly, the Court grants the Moving Defendants’
motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against Saddler and Godinez without prejudice.1
1
Paragraph 71 of the Complaint alleges a purported conspiracy among individuals not involved in this
case to interfere with a restaurant’s business by harassing potential customers. (Compl. ¶ 71.) This
allegation is irrelevant to the issues in this case and appears to have been inadvertently included in the
Complaint. The Court, therefore, sua sponte strikes paragraph 71 from the Complaint. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(f)(1).
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C.
Motion to Dismiss Claims Against Defendant Jones
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Jones, an IDOC employee, violated Plaintiff’s Fourteenth
Amendment right to due process by failing to provide all Plaintiff’s medical records with the
IDOC in response to Plaintiff’s Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) request. (See Compl.
¶¶ 13, 30-31, 50(g).) Plaintiff alleges that he submitted a FOIA request for his medical records
to the IDOC in order to substantiate his allegations of forced-medication and physical and mental
abuse. (Id. ¶¶ 30-31.) In response to Plaintiff’s request, the IDOC provided Plaintiff’s medical
records with the IDOC dating back to 1985, but no records from before 1985, “despite the fact
that IDOC Administrative Directive 04.03.100 requires discharged inmate medical records to be
permanently stored in the Records Office.” (Id. ¶ 30.) Plaintiff asserts two claims against Jones,
in his individual capacity, based on these allegations: (1) a Section 1983 claim for violation of
his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process (Count VII); and (2) a Section 1983 conspiracy
claim alleging that Jones conspired with other Defendants to violate Plaintiff’s Eighth
Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment (Count VIII).
Plaintiff’s Section 1983 conspiracy claim against Jones fails for the same reason as his
conspiracy claim against Saddler and Godinez fails—i.e., because the Complaint lacks any
allegations linking Jones to a purported conspiracy to violate his constitutional rights. See Lewis,
677 F.3d at 333; Logan, 644 F.3d at 583. Furthermore, Plaintiff cannot state an individual
Section 1983 claim against Jones based on his alleged FOIA violation. The Illinois FOIA—not
the federal FOIA—governs Plaintiff’s request for records from an Illinois state agency like the
IDOC. See 5 ILCS 140/2(a) (defining “public body” under the Illinois FOIA); 5 U.S.C. § 552(f)
(defining “agency” under the federal FOIA). Because “[s]tate law cannot be enforced through §
1983,” Bond v. Atkinson, 728 F.3d 690, 693 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing Archie v. Racine, 847 F.2d
7
1211, 1215-18 (7th Cir. 1988)), Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim based on a violation of the Illinois
FOIA fails. Moreover, the Illinois FOIA, like the federal FOIA, creates a comprehensive
remedial scheme, which also precludes liability under Section 1983. Cf. Moorer-Bey v. Federal
Bureau of Prisons, No. 12-212-GPM, 2012 WL 1409500, at *5 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 22, 2012)
(collecting cases); Neff v. Walker, No. 09 0386, 2009 WL 498071, at *1 n.1 (D.C. Feb. 26, 2009)
(“The comprehensive nature of the federal FOIA forecloses a claim against individuals under
§ 1983.” (citation omitted)); Barger v. FBI, No. 1:13-cv-00535, 2013 WL 6173781, at *2 (E.D.
Cal. Nov. 21, 2013) (“[T]he FOIA provides a comprehensive remedial scheme for alleged
violations, and Plaintiff can pursue a remedy directly under FOIA.”). The Court, therefore,
dismisses Counts VII and VIII against Jones with prejudice.
D.
Motion to Dismiss Claims Against the State of Illinois and State Agencies
The Moving Defendants move to dismiss all claims against the State of Illinois, the
IDHS, the IDOC, Menard and Pontiac Correctional Facilities, and Chester Mental Health
Facility on the basis of sovereign immunity.2 (Defs. Mem. at 7-9.) Under the Eleventh
Amendment, states are immune from suits in federal courts unless the state consents to the suit or
Congress has abrogated the states’ immunity through legislation. See McDonough Assocs., Inc.
v. Grunloh, 722 F.3d 1043, 1049 (7th Cir. 2013); Tucker v. Williams, 682 F.3d 654, 658 (7th Cir.
2012). A state’s sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment extends to state agencies,
as “arms of the state,” and state officials acting in their official capacities. See Joseph v. Board
of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 432 F.3d 746, 748 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing Will v. Michigan Dept.
of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 76, 109 S. Ct. 2304, 105 L. Ed. 2d (1989)).
2
Plaintiff asserts claims against Menard Correctional Facility, Pontiac Correctional Facility, and Chester
Mental Health Facility for respondeat superior liability (Counts IX-XI) even though he has not named
them as Defendants in this action.
8
Because Section 1983 does not abrogate the states’ sovereign immunity, see id. (citing
Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 341-45, 99 S. Ct. 1139, 59 L. Ed. 2d 358 (1979)), the Eleventh
Amendment bars Plaintiff’s claims against the State of Illinois and its agencies—the IDHS and
the IDOC. See, e.g., Thomas v. Illinois, 697 F.3d 612, 613-14 (7th Cir. 2012) (affirming
dismissal of Section 1983 claims against the State of Illinois and the IDOC); Weston v. Illinois
Dept. of Human Servs., 433 Fed. App’x 480, 482 (7th Cir. 2011) (“As a state agency, IDHS . . .
is immune from a suit for damages under the Eleventh Amendment . . . .” (citations omitted));
Glispie v. Illinois Dept. of Corrections, No. 12-2060, 2012 WL 6761522, at *1 (C.D. Ill. Oct.
24, 2012) (dismissing Section 1983 claim against the IDOC); Spain v. Elgin Mental Health Ctr.,
No. 10 CV 1065, 2011 WL 1485285, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 18, 2011) (“IDHS is entitled to
dismissal both because it is not a ‘person’ amenable to suit under §§ 1982 and 1983 claims, and
because the Eleventh Amendment grants it sovereign immunity.”). Plaintiff’s contention that the
State, the IDHS, and the IDOC are necessary parties to this action does not allow Plaintiff to
thwart the State’s sovereign immunity. See Republic of Philippines v. Pimentel, 553 U.S. 851,
866-67, 128 S. Ct. 2180, 171 L. Ed. 2d 131 (2008) (holding that a litigant may not join an entity
entitled to sovereign immunity as a necessary party); Lac Du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior
Chippewa Indians v. Norton, 327 F. Supp. 2d 995, 1000-01 (W.D. Wis. 2004) (“The principle of
sovereign immunity overrides plaintiffs’ interests in suing.”); Gottlieb v. Krozel, No. 12 C 3902,
2013 WL 4565431, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 26, 2013) (“The fact that a litigant wishes to obtain
relief from a state defendant does not, by itself, allow him to avoid sovereign immunity.”); see
also Stoner v. Wisconsin Dept. of Agric., Trade & Consumer Prot., 50 F.3d 481, 483 (7th Cir.
1995) (“Case law in this Circuit has rejected the notion . . . that a state which chooses to
indemnify its employees for damages threatens its Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit.”).
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The Court, therefore, dismisses Plaintiff’s claims against the State of Illinois, the IDHS, and the
IDOC with prejudice.
Furthermore, even if Plaintiff had properly named Menard Correctional Center, Pontiac
Correctional Center, and Chester Mental Health Facility as Defendants (see note 2, supra), the
Eleventh Amendment would bar claims for money damages (but not injunctive relief) against
them. See Hughes v. Joliet Correctional Ctr., 931 F.2d 425, 427 (7th Cir. 1991) (“The prison is
insulated from suit by the Eleventh Amendment, . . . and so was properly dismissed.” (citation
omitted)). Those claims also would fail for the separate reason that the facilities are not
“persons” within the meaning of Section 1983. See Adams v. Smith, No. 13-cv-985-JPG, 2013
WL 5698861, at *2 (S.D. Ill. Oct. 18, 2013) (“[T]he Menard Correctional Center is not a
‘person’ within the meaning of the Civil Rights Act, and shall be dismissed from this action.”);
Johnson v. Vienna Correctional Ctr., No. 13-cv-697-GPM, 2013 WL 5436267, at *1 (S.D. Ill.
Sept. 30, 2013) (“[T]he Vienna Correctional Center, which is a division of the Illinois
Department of Corrections, is not a ‘person’ within the meaning of the Civil Rights Act, and is
not subject to a § 1983 suit.”). Accordingly, the Court dismisses Counts IX-XI with prejudice.
E.
Motion to Dismiss Claims Based on the Statute of Limitations
The Moving Defendants move to dismiss Counts II-VI and Count VIII, in full or in part,
as untimely. (Defs. Mem. at 9-10.) Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not
require a plaintiff to plead facts in the complaint to anticipate and defeat affirmative defenses,
“when a plaintiff’s complaint nonetheless sets out all of the elements of an affirmative defense,
dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate.” See Independent Tr. Corp. v. Stewart Info. Servs.
Corp., 665 F.3d 930, 935 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 579 (7th Cir.
2009)); Logan, 644 F.3d at 582. “[I]n § 1983 actions, federal courts apply the statute of
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limitations governing personal injury actions in the state where the injury took place.” Serino v.
Hensley, 735 F.3d 588, 590 (7th Cir. 2013). In Illinois, the statute of limitations period for
Section 1983 claims is two years, and the claim accrues “when the plaintiff knows or should
know that his or her constitutional rights have been violated.” Draper v. Martin, 664 F.3d 1110,
1113 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing 735 ILCS 5/13-202).
The two-year statute of limitations on many of the constitutional violations alleged in the
Complaint expired well before Plaintiff filed this suit on July 11, 2013. (See Compl. ¶¶ 18-19,
32-33, 50(a)-(f).) Indeed, several of the alleged violations occurred decades earlier, dating all the
way back to 1977. (See id. ¶¶ 18-19, 32, 50(a)-(f).) Plaintiff’s claims based on these allegations
are clearly time-barred.3 The Court, therefore, dismisses Counts III-VI in full and Counts II and
VIII to the extent they assert claims based on the conduct alleged in paragraphs 17-19 and 32-33
of the Complaint.
II.
The Moving Defendants’ Motion to Transfer Venue
The Moving Defendants seek to transfer Plaintiff’s remaining claims to the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Illinois pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). (Defs. Mem.
at 10-12.) Under § 1404(a), “[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of
justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it
3
The continuing violation doctrine, which “allow[s] a suit to be delayed until a series of wrongful acts
blossoms into an injury on which suit can be brought,” cannot save Plaintiff’s untimely claims. See
Limestone Dev. Corp. v. Village of Lemont, 520 F.3d 797, 801 (7th Cir. 2008). The doctrine “does not
revive discrete injuries falling outside of the limitations period,” such as the injuries alleged in paragraphs
18 and 32-33 of the Complaint. See Watkins v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 527 Fed. App’x 504, 506 (7th Cir.
2013); see also Heard v. Sheahan, 253 F.3d 316, 319-20 (7th Cir. 2001). Furthermore, even if the
continuing violation doctrine applies to Plaintiff’s claims regarding his alleged continuing forcedmedication, it does not delay the accrual of Counts IV-VI beyond the date that Plaintiff left Menard
Correctional Center. See Heard, 352 F.3d at 318 (alleged constitutional violations continued “for as long
as the defendants had the power to do something about [the plaintiff’s] condition, which is to say until
[the plaintiff] left the jail”); see also Jervis v. Mitcheff, 258 Fed. App’x 3, 5-6 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Deliberate
indifference to a serious medical need is a continuing violation that accrues when the defendant has notice
of the untreated condition and ends only when treatment is provided or the inmate is released.”).
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might have been brought . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). A transfer under § 1404(a) is appropriate if
(1) venue is proper in both the transferor and transferee court,4 (2) transfer is for the convenience
of the parties and witnesses, and (3) transfer is in the interests of justice. See Methode Elecs.,
Inc. v. Delphi Auto. Sys. LLC, 639 F. Supp. 2d 903, 907 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (citations omitted)).
District courts have substantial discretion in deciding motions for transfer. See Research
Automation, Inc. v. Schrader-Bridgeport Int’l, Inc., 626 F.3d 973, 977-78 (7th Cir. 2010).
Courts look to a number of private and public factors in determining whether venue
transfer will serve the convenience of the parties and witnesses and promote the interests of
justice. See Atlantic Marine Constr. Co., Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court for the W. Dist. of Tex., --- U.S.
---, 134 S. Ct. 568, 581 n.6 (2013); Research Automation, Inc., 626 F.3d at 978. The private
interests include (i) the relative ease of access to sources of proof, (ii) the availability of
compulsory process for attendance of unwilling witnesses, (iii) the cost of obtaining attendance
of willing witnesses, (iv) the location of material events, and (v) “all other practical problems
that make trial of a case easy, expeditious, and inexpensive.” See Atlantic Marine Constr. Co.,
134 S. Ct. at 581 n.6 (quoting Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 n.6, 102 S. Ct. 252,
70 L. Ed. 2d 419 (1981)); Research Automation, Inc., 626 F.3d at 978. Relevant public-interest
factors include (i) docket congestion and likely speed to trial in the transferor and potential
transferee courts, (ii) each court’s relative familiarity with the relevant law, and (iii) the local
4
In civil actions brought in federal court, venue is proper in
(1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the
State in which the district is located; (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of
the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property
that is the subject of the action is situated; or (3) if there is no district in which an action
may otherwise be brought as provided in this section, any judicial district in which any
defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to such action.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).
12
interest in having localized controversies decided at home. See Atlantic Marine Constr. Co., 134
S. Ct. at 581 n.6 (quoting Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 241 n.6, 102 S. Ct. 252, 70 L. Ed. 2d
419); Research Automation, Inc., 626 F.3d at 978. Additionally, courts must give some
deference to the plaintiff’s choice of forum. See Atlantic Marine Constr., 134 S. Ct. at 561 n.6.
The amount of deference courts give to the plaintiff’s choice of forum lessens where the
plaintiff’s choice is not his home forum or bears little connection to the litigation. See, e.g., Body
Sci. LLC v. Boston Scientific Corp., 846 F. Supp. 2d 980, 992 (N.D. Ill. 2012); Lewis v. Grote
Inds., Inc., 841 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1053 (N.D. Ill. 2012).
The Moving Defendants argue that the Court should transfer this case to the Southern
District of Illinois because “the only arguable basis for filing this case in the Northern District of
Illinois is the purported domicile of Defendants Godinez and Saddler” and Plaintiff’s claims
against those Defendants lack merit. (See Defs. Mem. at 11-12.) The Moving Defendants,
however, do not identify Plaintiff’s “home forum”5 or the residences of the remaining
Defendants. Furthermore, because the Moving Defendants have moved to transfer this case “for
the convenience of parties and witnesses[] [and] in the interest of justice” pursuant to
§ 1404(a)—not because Plaintiff filed it in the wrong venue pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a)—
the Moving Defendants must address the private and public-interest factors relevant to
determining whether transfer to the Southern District of Illinois is appropriate under § 1404(a).
See Research Automation, Inc., 626 F.3d at 978 (discussing factors). The Moving Defendants
5
“[S]ince domicile is a voluntary status, a forcible change in a person’s . . . residence does not alter his
domicile; hence, the domicile of [a] prisoner before he was imprisoned is presumed to remain his
domicile while he is in prison.” Sullivan v. Freeman, 944 F.2d 334, 337 (7th Cir. 1991); see also Holmes
v. U.S. Bd. of Parole, 541 F.2d 1243, 1249-50 (7th Cir. 1976) (“We see no reason for purposes of venue
under section 1391 to ascribe to [the defendant] the residence of his district of incarceration rather than
the district of his domicile.”), overruled on other grounds by Arsberry v. Sielaff, 586 F.2d 37 (7th Cir.
1978); Grinnell Mut. Reins. Co. v. Ferando, No. 09-3224, 2009 WL 4021 351, at *5 (C.D. Ill. Nov. 17,
2009) (similar).
13
bear the burden of proof on their motion to transfer. See Ace Hardware Int’l Holdings, Ltd. v.
Masso Expo Corp., No. 11-cv-3928, 2011 WL 5077686, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 25, 2011) (citing
Coffey v. Van Dorn Iron Works, 796 F.2d 217, 219-20 (7th Cir. 1986)). The Moving Defendants
have failed to meet this burden, and the Court, therefore, denies their motion to transfer venue
without prejudice.
III.
Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend
On December 3, 2013, rather than respond to the Moving Defendants’ motion to dismiss
and transfer, Plaintiff moved for leave to file a proposed Amended Complaint. (R. 29.) Under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2), a plaintiff may amend his complaint “only with the
opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). “Although leave
to amend should be ‘freely give,’ that does not mean it must always be given.” Hukic v. Aurora
Loan Servs., 588 F.3d 420, 423 (7th Cir. 2009); see also Crest Hill Land Dev., LLC v. City of
Joliet, 396 F.3d 801, 804 (7th Cir. 2005) (noting that despite the liberal nature of Rule 15(a),
“leave to amend is not automatically granted”). District courts “‘have broad discretion to deny
leave to amend where there is undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure
deficiencies, undue prejudice to the [non-moving party], or where the amendment would be
futile.’” Hukic, 588 F.3d at 432 (quoting Arreola v. Godinez, 546 F.3d 788, 796 (7th Cir. 2008));
see also Independent Tr. Corp., 665 F.3d at 943 (“[I]t is well settled that a district court may
refuse leave to amend where amendment would be futile.”). An amendment is futile if the
amended claims could not survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). See Arlin-Golf,
LLC v. Village of Arlington Heights, 631 F.3d 818, 822-23 (7th Cir. 2011).
14
Plaintiff’s proposed Amended Complaint adds three additional defendants: the unknown
superintendent, psychologist, and psychiatrist at the Elgin Mental Health Facility from 1990
through 1995. (See Mot. to Amend at Ex. 1, Proposed Am. Compl. ¶¶ 16-18.) Plaintiff alleges:
[w]hile at the Elgin Mental Health Facility in or around 1990 to 1995, the plaintiff
was misdiagnosed as being more dangerous than he in fact was. As a direct result
of that misdiagnosis, [he] was sent to the Chester Mental Health Facility, a
maximum security facility, where his maltreatment intensified. To this day, the
plaintiff is subjected to demeaning treatment and abuse stemming from an
incorrect initial diagnosis.
(Id. ¶¶ 24-25.) Based on these scant allegations, Plaintiff asserts Section 1983 claims for
violation of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights against the three new defendants, in
their individual and official capacities. (Id. ¶¶ 50(j)-(k), 78-83.) Plaintiff also adds the three new
defendants to his claim for civil conspiracy (Count VIII) and asserts a claim against Elgin Mental
Health Facility—which the proposed Amended Complaint fails to name as a defendant—for
respondeat superior liability (Count XVI). Finally, Plaintiff amends his allegations against
existing individual Defendants to include claims against them in their official capacities, as well
as their individual capacities. (Id. ¶¶ 5-14, 18.)
Plaintiff’s proposed amendments are futile. The two-year statute of limitations period
has long run on Plaintiff’s proposed claims against the unknown superintendent, psychologist,
and psychiatrist at the Elgin Mental Health Facility from 1990-1995 (see Part I.E., supra.), and
the Elgin Mental Health Facility is immune from suits for money damages under the Eleventh
Amendment and not a “person” within the meaning of Section 1983. (See Part I.D., supra.)
Furthermore, several Defendants against whom Plaintiff seeks to assert claims in their official, as
well as their individual, capacities appear to have served as state officials during the relevant
time period. It is well-settled that state officials acting in their official capacities are not
“persons” amenable to suit under § 1983. See Will, 491 U.S. at 70-71, 109 S. Ct. 2304, 105 L.
15
Ed. 2d 45; Joseph, 432 F.3d at 748. The Court, therefore, denies Plaintiff’s motion for leave to
file the proposed Amended Complaint.
IV.
Plaintiff’s Motion for Relocation
Plaintiff moves for the Court to order the IDHS to relocate him to a facility near Chicago
pending the outcome of this litigation. (Mot. to Relocate at 1.) In support of his motion,
Plaintiff argues that because some Defendants in this case are responsible for his care at Chester
Mental Health Facility, his continued residence at the facility leaves him vulnerable to increased
abuse by those Defendants and that his medical care at the facility might be compromised
because those Defendants cannot speak to him except through his attorney. (Id.) Plaintiff also
claims that his continued residence at Chester Mental Health Facility may harm him in this
litigation because he might inadvertently reveal information that undercuts his case to
Defendants and because the facility’s location near the southern border of Illinois limits his
access to his attorney in Chicago. (Id. at 1-2.)
The IDHS opposes Plaintiff’s motion for relocation. In its brief, the IDHS provides the
following information regarding Plaintiff’s criminal and mental health background:
On April 7, 1992, [Plaintiff] was readmitted to Elgin Mental Health Center as
unfit to stand trial on the charge of Attempted Murder. While hospitalized there,
he sexually assaulted a nurse precipitating his transfer to Chester Mental Health
Center on June 21, 1992. Plaintiff was subsequently charged with Aggravated
Criminal Sexual Assault. The Attempted Murder charge was resolved before the
sexual assault charge. With treatment provided, Plaintiff was recommended to
return to Cook County Court as fit for trial for Attempted Murder. Plaintiff was
found guilty, and sent to Menard Correctional Center with a life sentence. While
in the Department of Corrections serving his life sentence for Attempted Murder,
Plaintiff was tried for Aggravated Criminal Assault. He was transferred to the
Kane County Jail to stand trial. While in Kane County, Plaintiff was determined
to be unfit to stand trial, and was transferred to Chester Mental Health Center . . .
because of his violent, uncooperative, hostile and threatening demeanor while in
the county jail. He was ultimately determined to be not guilty by reason of
insanity on August 29, 1996. [Plaintiff] continues to ruminate about his attack on
the nurse in Elgin [Mental Health Center].
16
(R. 18, IDHS Resp. Br. at 2-3 (citations omitted).)6
Plaintiff’s treatment team at the Chester Mental Health Facility evaluates Plaintiff on a
monthly basis to determine his readiness to transfer from maximum to medium security. Due to
Plaintiff’s history of aggressive behavior, Plaintiff must meet certain criteria for one year before
his treatment team will consider recommending him for transfer to a less restrictive facility:
He must exhibit an ability to inhibit any significant impulses of violence toward
himself or others including any inappropriate sexual stalking behaviors. He must
express a genuine desire for transfer, to be cooperative in his adjustments as
exhibited by his statements, the taking of medications deemed as essential, and
the making of reasonable plans.
(R. 18-2, Treatment Plan Review at 13.) The last time Plaintiff’s treatment team recommended
him for transfer was in April 2012. (Id.) In June 2012, an IDHS forensic expert, who was not a
member of Plaintiff’s treatment team or an employee of Chester Mental Health Facility,
performed an independent risk assessment and decided not to transfer Plaintiff to a medium
security facility at that time. (Id.) According to Plaintiff’s Treatment Plan Review, Plaintiff has
not met the criteria for transfer since his risk assessment in June 2012. (Id.) As of September
16, 2013—the date of Plaintiff’s most recent Treatment Review at the time the IDHS filed its
response brief—Plaintiff “was last in seclusion on 6/28/13 and in [r]estraints on 07/24/13.” (Id.)
Plaintiff’s treatment team did not recommend Plaintiff for transfer during his September 16,
2013 Treatment Plan Review.
Plaintiff argues that the IDHS should have transferred him to the Elgin Mental Health
Facility in May 2012 when his treatment team recommended him for transfer to a less restrictive
facility. (Mot. to Relocate at 2.) Plaintiff, however, offers no reason for the Court to question
the IDHS expert’s clinical determination denying Plaintiff’s request for transfer. Indeed,
6
The Court considers these uncontroverted facts only with respect to Plaintiff’s motion for relocation.
17
Plaintiff’s continued failure to meet the criteria for transfer since his June 2012 risk assessment
supports the IDHS expert’s determination that Plaintiff was not ready for transfer to a less
restrictive facility. The IDHS must balance Plaintiff’s desire to transfer to a less restrictive
facility with its responsibility to protect the safety of the staff and other patients at the Elgin
Mental Health Facility and other Illinois facilities. Under the circumstances, the Court will not
substitute its judgment for the judgment of the IDHS’s trained expert and the professionals on
Plaintiff’s treatment team who are more familiar with Plaintiff’s medical conditions and history
of aggressive behavior and who, in the latter case, evaluate Plaintiff in person on a monthly
basis. Cf. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321-22, 106 S. Ct. 1078, 89 L. Ed. 2d 251 (1986)
(“Prison administrators should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and
execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order
and discipline and to maintain institutional security. . . . It does not insulate from review actions
taken in bad faith and for no legitimate purpose, but it requires that neither judge nor jury freely
substitute their judgment for that of officials who have made a considered choice.”); Parham v.
J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 609, 99 S. Ct. 2493, 61 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1979) (“Common human experience
and scholarly opinions suggest that the supposed protections of an adversary proceeding to
determine the appropriateness of medical decisions for the commitment and treatment of mental
and emotional illness may be more illusory than real.”).
Furthermore, Plaintiff’s argument that the Court should relocate him to Chicago to
facilitate his access to counsel is unpersuasive. An incarcerated individual has a constitutional
right of access to the courts, which includes the opportunity to confer confidentially with his
counsel. See Stone v. Morris, 546 F.2d 730, 735 (7th Cir. 1976). That right, however, does not
mean that the State must facilitate in-person meetings between an incarcerated individual and his
18
counsel or relocate the individual to a facility near his counsel. See Ivey v. Harney, 47 F.3d 181,
186 (7th Cir. 1995) (“[Although] Ivey could prosecute this litigation better if he were a free man,
or if he were imprisoned in Chicago rather than Taylorville, . . . that reality does not make him
free, require his relocation to the prison most favorably situated to his pending litigation, or
compel his custodian to act as his chauffeur. Lawful incarceration curtails many opportunities.”
(citing Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 109 S. Ct. 1874, 104 L. Ed. 2d 459 (1989)); see also
Stone, 546 F.2d at 735 (“As long as the inmate and his counsel are afforded adequate opportunity
to confer confidentially and to petition the courts about matters in controversy, the right of access
is satisfied.”).
Plaintiff complains that he must have the opportunity to meet with his counsel in person
because “telephone access is tightly controlled by the [Chester Mental Health Facility], making
attorney call security uncertain.” (Mot. to Relocate at 1-2.) Plaintiff, however, provides no
evidence—only uncorroborated speculation—that employees of Chester Mental Health Facility
are eavesdropping on his telephone conversations with counsel. The record before the Court
suggests that Plaintiff’s alleged lack of access to his counsel is of Plaintiff’s own making.
Plaintiff chose to file this suit in the Northern District of Illinois, and Plaintiff selected counsel
located hundreds of miles away from Chester Mental Health Facility to represent him in this suit.
Without evidence that employees of Chester Mental Health Facility are interfering with his
access to counsel, the Court cannot spare Plaintiff from the inconvenience that his own choices
created. Furthermore, even if Plaintiff comes forward with evidence that employees of Chester
Mental Health Facility are interfering with Plaintiff’s access to counsel, Plaintiff fails to explain
why less drastic measures—ones that do not require overriding the professional judgment of
IDHS experts and Plaintiff’s treatment team and potentially jeopardizing the safety of the staff
19
and other patients at Elgin Mental Health Facility—could not address Plaintiff’s concerns. The
Court, therefore, denies Plaintiff’s motion for relocation.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained above, the Court grants the Moving Defendants’ motion to
dismiss, in part with prejudice and in part without prejudice. The Court dismisses (i) Counts IIIVII and IX-XIV, in full, with prejudice; (ii) Counts II and VIII, with prejudice, to the extent they
rely on allegations falling outside the two-year statute of limitations period; and (iii) Count VIII,
without prejudice, to the extent it asserts a § 1983 conspiracy claim against Defendant Saddler.
The Court denies without prejudice the Moving Defendants’ motion to transfer venue.
Additionally, the Court denies Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend and his motion for
relocation.
DATED: February 14, 2014
ENTERED
______________________________
AMY J. ST. EVE
U.S. District Court Judge
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