Haywood v. Lemke et al

Filing 28

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on 3/11/2015. Mailed notice (ao,)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ex rel.,
DONALD HAYWOOD, R47947,
Petitioner,
v.
TARRY WILLIAMS,1 Warden
STATEVILLE CORRECTIONAL CENTER,
Respondent.

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No. 13 C 5362
Judge Rebecca R. Pallmeyer

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Petitioner Donald Haywood is serving a 55-year sentence for first-degree murder at the
Stateville Correctional Center.

He now seeks relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on the

grounds that (1) his trial counsel was ineffective because she conceded his guilt in her closing
statement, and (2) his 55-year sentence violates the Eighth Amendment because Haywood was
just 17 years old at the time of the crime. Respondent Tarry Williams, the warden at Stateville,
contends that Haywood's Sixth Amendment claim is without merit and that his Eighth
Amendment claim is procedurally defaulted. The court agrees with Respondent, dismisses
Haywood's habeas petition [1] and declines to grant a certificate of appealability. Haywood
requested that the court appoint an attorney to pursue this petition [15], but the court denies that
motion: there is no right to post-conviction counsel in collateral proceeding, and appointing
counsel in this case could not save Haywood's meritless petition.
BACKGROUND
I.

Conviction
Petitioner was convicted of first-degree murder on an accountability theory on August
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During the pendency of this case, Tarry Williams replaced Michael Magana as
Petitioner's custodian at the Stateville Correctional Center. Williams has been substituted as
the proper Defendant. See FED. R. CIV. P. 25(d)(1).
1

10, 2015. (Petition [1], 1.) On habeas review, federal courts presume the factual findings made
by state courts are correct unless those findings are rebutted by clear and convincing evidence.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Coleman v. Hardy, 690 F.3d 811, 815 (7th Cir. 2012). Petitioner
does not contest the state court's factual findings, and the court, therefore, draws the facts that
follow from the Illinois Appellate Court's decisions affirming Haywood's conviction on direct
appeal and reviewing Haywood's state post-conviction petition. (People v. Haywood, Nos. 1-054075, 1-06-0200 (Consol.) (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. Jan. 23, 2008), Ex. A to State Ct. Record [201], hereinafter "Direct Appeal Op."; People v. Haywood, No. 1-11-1554 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist.
Dec. 24, 2012), Ex. G to State Ct. Record [20-2], hereinafter "Post-Conviction Appellate Op.")
On the evening of July 5, 2003, Donald Haywood and his older brother, Karl Haywood,
agreed to rob a taxicab driver. Petitioner planned to act as the lookout. Karl called and ordered
a cab to their residence at 7752 South Essex Avenue in Chicago. While waiting for the cab to
arrive, Karl gave Petitioner a gun to hide in the waistband of his pants. Once the cab arrived,
the brothers got in the vehicle, Karl in the front seat and Petitioner in the back. While riding,
Karl signaled to Petitioner, who handed the gun to him in the front seat. Karl pointed the gun at
the driver, Ruby Lasecki, and ordered her to pull into a parking lot. She complied, and Karl
ordered her to remove her jewelry, including a gold chain, a gold bracelet, and several rings.
Karl removed the money from Lasecki's wallet and handed the jewelry, the money, and the gun
to Petitioner. Karl walked to the driver's door, opened it, and rifled through a white bag he found
near the driver's feet. While Karl was looking through the bag, Petitioner exited the vehicle.
Karl instructed Petitioner to shoot the driver, but Petitioner refused. Karl repeated the order,
and Petitioner again refused. Karl grabbed the gun from Petitioner and as Petitioner walked
away, he heard the driver say, "don't shoot," and sound her horn. He then heard a single
gunshot. The brothers ran through an alley away from the cab. As they ran, Karl handed
Petitioner the gun, which Petitioner later threw away in a nearby park.
Later that evening, around 8:40 p.m., Officer David Hickey saw Petitioner standing on a
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porch holding a firearm. According to Hickey, when Petitioner realized he had been spotted,
Petitioner ran off the porch into the street and shoved the gun into the waistband of his pants.
Hickey began to chase him and called for assistance. A few minutes later, Hickey heard a
message that an individual matching Petitioner's description was being detained at 1428 South
Central Park. When Hickey arrived at that location, he saw Petitioner sitting in a squad car, no
longer in possession of a gun. Hickey contacted Officer James Rowan, a canine officer, to
search for the missing weapon.

Ten minutes after the search commenced, a .380 caliber

semiautomatic handgun was recovered in a vacant lot at 1426 South Central Park.
Following Petitioner's arrest, Sergeant Sam Cirone met with him in an interview room at
police headquarters. Sergeant Cirone observed that Petitioner was wearing a gold chain and
bracelet, which were removed and inventoried. After recovering the jewelry, at approximately
3:30 a.m. on July 6, 2003, Cirone interviewed Petitioner's brother, Karl Haywood, who was also
in custody. After speaking with Karl, Cirone returned to Petitioner's interview room. Assistant
States Attorney David Weiner joined Cirone in the interview room, informed Petitioner of his
Miranda rights, and explained the ways that Petitioner could memorialize his statements.
Petitioner chose to have his statement videotaped; in that statement, he admitted in detail to his
involvement in the robbery.
Petitioner's trial counsel moved to suppress the videotaped confession, arguing it was
involuntary because the police ignored his repeated requests for an attorney and because he
was subjected to physical and mental coercion. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the
motion, finding that the statement was given voluntarily. In addition to the confession, the
prosecution presented several other pieces of evidence. Two eyewitnesses testified, offering
accounts that substantially conformed to the version of events Petitioner admitted in his
confession. Moreover, each eyewitness had previously identified Karl Haywood in a lineup, and
one eyewitness had also identified Petitioner from a lineup as the person she saw fleeing the
scene of the crime. The dispatcher from the cab company, who had known the victim for 25
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years, testified that she had dispatched the cab to Petitioner's residence at 7752 South Essex
Avenue. The dispatcher was also able to identify the jewelry that had been recovered from
Petitioner as belonging to the victim.

A ballistics expert traced the bullet recovered in the

autopsy to the .380 gun retrieved from the park, which Petitioner admitted to discarding. The
parties stipulated that a trained forensic investigator, who recovered fingerprints from the cab,
would testify that those fingerprints matched Petitioner's.

Defense counsel cross-examined

each witness and made relevant objections during the State's presentation.
After the State's presentation, defense counsel moved for a directed verdict, arguing that
the State had failed to satisfy its burden of proof. The trial court denied the motion. Petitioner
declined to testify and defense counsel informed the court that she would not be presenting any
evidence. During her closing statements, defense counsel characterized the case as one about
"two brothers, two different people, two separate individuals, [Karl] who would shoot Ruby
Lasecki in cold blood and [defendant] who on orders from his brother two times would not pull
the trigger." (Direct Appeal Op. at 8) (alterations in original.) She urged that Petitioner did not
know that Karl intended to kill Lasecki and stated:
Now, [defendant's] statement, and it is a truthful statement, ladies and
gentlemen, he tells you what happened. If he was going to lie about his
statement, he wouldn't have said he had the gun at any point, he could have
taken himself out of, but he didn't, he told the truth, and he told the truth, he
never said he rifled through rub [sic] Ruby Lasecki's purse. [Defendant] said, 'I
am a look-out. [K]arl Haywood, my big brother, he's going to do the robbery,' and
in Donald Haywood's eyes, he is not part of the robbery, that's separate from
him, he's not part of the robbery, and he definitely, you heard from his statement,
he never agreed to be part of the shooting.
(Id. at 9) (alterations in original.) Defense counsel urged the jury to return a verdict of not-guilty.
The jury received instructions on the law of accountability, and after deliberation, found
petitioner guilty of first-degree murder.
At sentencing, the court considered a presentence report that showed that Petitioner
was a former member of the Four Corner Hustlers gang, but that he had no prior felony
convictions. Petitioner characterized his childhood as "OK" until the death of his father, after
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which his mother became addicted to cocaine.

Officer Hickey testified that he observed

Petitioner fire a semiautomatic handgun—the same one that had been used to shoot Lasecki
earlier that evening—at a witness named Benny Hunter. The State requested the 60-year
statutory maximum, arguing that Officer Hickey's testimony and Petitioner's membership in the
Four Corner Hustlers gang showed that Petitioner had no concern or feelings toward his fellow
human beings.

Defense counsel argued for the statutory minimum, 20 years, emphasizing

Petitioner's age at the time of the crime, the loss of his father at an early age, and his mother's
cocaine addiction. Petitioner was effectively raised by his older brother Karl, defense counsel
continued, who was "probably the worst influence somebody could have." Defense counsel
maintained that Petitioner only shot at Hunter because he felt he had something to prove after
defying Karl's orders to shoot Lasecki earlier. Haywood then apologized to the victim's family.
The court sentenced Petitioner to 55 years in prison, explaining that Petitioner's expression of
remorse supported a reduction from the 60-year maximum the court would otherwise have
imposed.
II.

Direct Appeal
Petitioner presented his ineffective assistance argument on direct appeal. He claimed

that trial counsel was ineffective under United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984), or
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), for effectively conceding Petitioner's guilt when
she told the jury that his confession was truthful. Strickland established a two-pronged test for
determining whether a defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel has been violated. A
defendant must show "that his counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness, and that he was prejudiced as a result." Jones v. Butler, No. 14-1638, –– F.3d
––, 2015 WL 430436, at *6 (7th Cir. Feb. 3, 2015) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–88).
Cronic carved out a narrow exception to the Strickland test in circumstances where counsel
"entirely fails to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing." Cronic, 466
U.S. at 659. In those circumstances, prejudice is presumed and the defendant need not make a
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separate showing under the second prong. Id.
The state appellate court affirmed Haywood's conviction on January 23, 2008, rejecting
his ineffective assistance of counsel claims. First, the Illinois court concluded that the Cronic
exception did not apply:
[A]lthough trial counsel conceded the veracity of defendant's statement, we
cannot say that she completely failed to subject the State's case to meaningful
adversarial testing. The record reveals that trial counsel filed various pre-trial
motions, including a motion to suppress defendant's incriminating statement,
made relevant objections at trial, cross-examined each of the State's witnesses,
moved for a mistrial when Officer Hickey offered testimony that violated the trial
court's prior ruling on a motion in limine, moved for a directed verdict at the
conclusion of the State's case, and delivered opening and closing arguments
urging the jury to find defendant 'not guilty.'
(Direct Appeal Op. at 14.) The court, therefore, analyzed Petitioner's claim according to the
Strickland test, but concluded that Petitioner had not satisfied either prong of that test. First, the
Appellate Court reasoned that trial counsel's decision to admit Petitioner's participation in the
robbery was an objectively reasonable strategy: "juries have the power to return verdicts which
defy the facts and the law, and . . . counsel may entertain a desperate hope that the jury will
acquit a defendant on the basis of extraneous factors." (Id. at 16) (quoting People v. Montanez,
281 Ill. App. 3d, 558, 564–65 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1996)) (internal quotations and alterations
omitted.)

Significantly, trial counsel's motion to suppress the confession had already been

denied. In her closing, counsel attempted to make the best of this, arguing that Petitioner’s
words established that his involvement was no more than minimal. This approach was not only
a prudent one; it may have been the only viable strategy available to Petitioner. (Id. at 13.) The
Illinois Appellate Court noted, further, that "[t]his is the same strategy upheld by our supreme
court in" People v. Williams, 192 Ill. 2d 548, 568 (2000) and People v. Shatner, 174 Ill. 2d 133,
148 (1996), and explained that such a strategy was particularly appropriate where, as here, "the
evidence against defendant was overwhelming." (Id. at 16.) The magnitude of evidence of
Petitioner's guilt also defeated the second prong of the Strickland test: "even if counsel acted
unreasonably, defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim necessarily fails because he
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cannot satisfy the prejudice prong." (Id. at 16–17.)
III.

Post-Conviction Review
On February 17, 2009, Petitioner filed a pro se post-conviction petition in Illinois Circuit

Court, which was subsequently amended in January 2011, by appointed post-conviction
counsel. (Post-Conviction Appellate Op. ¶ 8.) The amended petition argued that appellate
counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge petitioner's 55-year sentence as excessive in
light of petitioner's age and potential for rehabilitation. (Id.) The trial court granted the State's
motion to dismiss the post-conviction petition and Petitioner appealed, again arguing that
appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the sentence as excessive. (Id. ¶¶ 8–
9.)
On appeal, the Illinois Appellate Court again analyzed Petitioner's claims under
Strickland and concluded that it was reasonable for appellate counsel on direct appeal not to
argue that the 55-year sentence was excessive: a trial court has broad discretion in sentencing,
and the sentence fell within the statutory range. (Id. ¶¶ 14–15.) Moreover, the trial court was
presented with mitigating factors, including Petitioner's age and potential for rehabilitation. (Id.
¶¶ 16–17.) The court affirmed the dismissal of Haywood's post-conviction petition because it
could not "say that a prison sentence of 55 years was an abuse of discretion," and there was
"nothing in the record to indicate that the trial court did not take these factors into consideration
when determining his sentence." (Id. ¶¶ 16–17.) Indeed, the trial court explicitly reduced the
sentence in light of Petitioner's expression of remorse. Thus, appellate counsel's decision not to
raise that issue was objectively reasonable.
Petitioner filed a petition for leave to appeal (PLA) with the Illinois Supreme Court, urging
once more that appellate counsel on direct appeal was ineffective for failing to challenge the 55year sentence as an abuse of discretion. (Pet. for Leave to Appeal, Ex. K to State Ct. Record
[20-2].) The Illinois Supreme Court denied the PLA on March 27, 2013. (People v. Haywood,
No. 115455 (Ill. Mar. 27, 2013), Ex. L to State Ct. Record [20-3].)
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DISCUSSION
On July 26, 2013 Petitioner timely filed this pro se habeas petition. He has requested
that this court appoint counsel for these proceedings, but the court declines to do so. First, the
court notes that Petitioner has no right to counsel in his federal habeas proceedings. Kitchen v.
United States, 227 F.3d 1014, 1018 (7th Cir. 2000) ("[O]nce the direct appeal has been decided,
the right to counsel no longer applies."). Moreover, Petitioner's pro se filings sufficiently alerted
the court to the substance of his claims. Finally, as explained below, Petitioner's claims are
meritless and the court is confident that appointing counsel would not alter the outcome.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA") governs the standards for
federal habeas relief from a state-court conviction and sentence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Under
§ 2254, a federal court may grant a writ of habeas corpus to a petitioner in custody pursuant to
a state court judgment "only on the ground that [the petitioner] is in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Haywood raises two
claims: (1) that his trial counsel was ineffective, in violation of the Sixth Amendment, because
she conceded his guilt in her closing statement, and (2) that his 55-year sentence violates the
Eighth Amendment because Haywood was 17 years old at the time of the crime. As explained
below, neither claim supports habeas relief.
I.

Claim One: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Petitioner first urges that his trial counsel was ineffective for effectively conceding his

guilt in her oral arguments. (Petition at 5.) The Illinois Appellate Court considered and rejected
this argument on direct appeal. (Direct Appeal Op. at 14–17.) Under § 2254(d), a habeas
petitioner cannot prevail on a claim that was previously adjudicated on the merits in state court
unless the state court's adjudication "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States," § 2254(d)(1), or "resulted in a decision that was based on an
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unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court
proceeding." § 2254(d)(2). See Richardson v. Lemke, 745 F.3d 258, 273 (7th Cir. 2014). This
court's review of a previously adjudicated claim is highly deferential:

"A state court's

determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 'fairminded
jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision." Harrington v. Richter,
562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)).
Moreover, this court's review is limited to the record that was before the Illinois Appellate Court.
Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011).
The state court's analysis of Haywood's ineffective assistance of counsel claim easily
survives this deferential review. The state court correctly articulated and applied the Supreme
Court standards governing ineffective assistance of counsel claims. (Direct Appeal Op. at 10–
11) (addressing United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984) and Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668 (1984).) It reasoned that Strickland, not Cronic, governed its analysis because trial
counsel's performance did not amount to a complete denial of counsel. This is a reasonable
conclusion: The Supreme Court has held that a "concession of . . . guilt does not rank as a
failure to function in any meaningful sense as the Government's adversary," particularly in cases
such as this one where "the defendant's guilt is . . . clear." Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 190–
91 (2004) (internal quotations and alterations omitted). The Illinois Appellate Court's decision
appears to follow directly from the reasoning in Nixon, and is a reasonable application of federal
law.
Moreover, even if Nixon could be factually distinguished, the issue of whether the Cronic
exception applies in these circumstances is, at best, an open question. The Supreme Court has
cautioned that whether Cronic applies to a particular case is a fact-dependent question, and that
"[o]ur cases provide no categorical answer." Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 125 (2008).
Where there is "no clear answer to the question presented . . . it cannot be said that the state
court unreasonably applied clearly established Federal law."
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Id. at 126 (quoting Carey v.

Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 77 (2006)) (internal alterations omitted). Finally, the multiple Illinois
Supreme Court cases that the Illinois Appellate Court relied on establish, at a minimum, that
reasonable jurists could conclude that the Cronic exception does not apply here. The Illinois
court's conclusion that Strickland governs is not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of,
federal law.
Nor was the Illinois Appellate Court's application of Strickland unreasonable. First, the
state court correctly concluded that Petitioner's counsel provided objectively reasonable
representation.

Specifically, it reasoned that in light of the overwhelming evidence against

Petitioner, including his own videotaped confession, trial counsel's pursuit of jury nullification
was an acceptable strategy. This court agrees: trial counsel had to grapple with the confession
and she did her best to turn it to Petitioner's advantage.

The Illinois Appellate Court's

conclusion is, therefore, consistent with Nixon and the governing Supreme Court case law
applying Strickland. Second, regardless of whether counsel was ineffective, the state court's
conclusion that Petitioner was not prejudiced was amply supported by the record before it. To
show prejudice, Petitioner "must demonstrate a reasonable probability that had it not been for
his lawyer's ineffectiveness the outcome at trial would have been different." Price v. Thurmer,
637 F.3d 831, 839 (7th Cir. 2011). Moreover, the "determination that a defendant was not
prejudiced by his lawyer's ineffectiveness is entitled to great weight in a federal habeas corpus
proceeding, as emphasized with rather unexpected vigor by the Supreme Court [in Harrington v.
Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011)].”

Price, 637 F.3d at 839.

On the record before the Illinois

Appellate Court, proving prejudice was a monumental task for Petitioner: The evidence was, as
the state court observed, overwhelming—an eyewitness saw Petitioner fleeing the scene of the
crime, Petitioner's fingerprints were found inside the cab, the ballistics expert confirmed that the
fatal bullet came from the gun Petitioner admitted discarding, Petitioner provided a detailed
confession describing his involvement in the robbery, and he was found wearing the victim's
jewelry.

This court is confident that, regardless of trial counsel's closing statements, the
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outcome would have been the same. Petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim must
fail.
II.

Claim Two: Eighth Amendment Violation
Petitioner next asserts that his 55-year sentence amounts to cruel and unusual

punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Because Petitioner has raised this claim for
the first time in his federal habeas petition, the court will not consider it. See Coleman v.
Lemke, 739 F.3d 342, 349 (7th Cir. 2014). Ordinarily, when a petitioner seeks to raise, in his
federal petition, a claim that was not raised in state court (either on direct appeal or in the state's
post-conviction proceedings), that claim is procedurally defaulted and the federal court will not
review it. Richardson, 745 F.3d at 268. The court will excuse procedural default only if a
petitioner can demonstrate (1) "cause for and prejudice from the default," or (2) that the court's
failure to consider the claim will result in "a fundamental miscarriage of justice." Richardson,
745 F.3d at 272.
Petitioner did not challenge his sentence on direct appeal, and though he did object to
the length of his sentence in the post-conviction proceedings, he did not invoke the Eighth
Amendment. Rather, the basis for his post-conviction challenge was that the trial court abused
its discretion by imposing a 55-year sentence and that his appellate counsel was ineffective for
failing to challenge the sentence as an abuse of discretion. These allegations did not "fairly
present" his Eighth Amendment claim to the state court.
[F]our factors . . . bear upon whether the petitioner has fairly presented the claim
in state court: (1) whether the petitioner relied on federal cases that engage in
constitutional analysis; (2) whether the petitioner relied on state cases which
apply a constitutional analysis to similar facts; (3) whether the petitioner framed
the claim in terms so particular as to call to mind a specific constitutional right;
and (4) whether the petitioner alleged a pattern of facts that is well within the
mainstream of constitutional litigation.
Wilson v. Briley, 243 F.3d 325, 327 (7th Cir. 2001). None of these factors support Petitioner's
position. Petitioner did not cite relevant state or federal cases applying a constitutional analysis.
He framed each objection to his sentence in "abuse of discretion" language, making no mention
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of the Eighth Amendment or of "cruel and unusual" punishment. In his post-conviction appellate
brief, for example, Petitioner described the issue presented for review as whether there was a
substantial showing “that his appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to challenge his 55-year
sentence as an abuse of discretion given his limited participation in the robbery, young age,
troubled upbringing and lack of criminal history." (Brief and Argument for Petitioner-Appellant,
Ex. H to State Ct. Record [20-2], 2; see also id. at 11, 13–14, 16–22 (analyzing sentence under
"abuse of discretion" standard).) In his reply brief, similarly, Petitioner urged the Appellate Court
to reduce the sentence because the trial court had "abused its discretion." (Reply Brief and
Argument for Petitioner-Appellant, Ex. J to State Ct. Record [20-2], 1.) This is insufficient to
present an Eighth Amendment claim: "'Abuse of discretion' and 'improper factors' are not terms
that Illinois lawyers and judges, by quirk of local legal idiom, use to articulate constitutional
arguments." Wilson, 243 F.3d at 328. Petitioner failed to present his federal claim to the state
courts and has procedurally defaulted that claim. Petitioner has not alleged any cause for his
failure to present his Eighth Amendment claim and the default cannot be excused.
Finally, even if Petitioner had preserved his Eighth Amendment claim, he would not be
entitled to relief. The Eighth Amendment prohibits only death sentences and sentences of
mandatory life in prison without parole for juvenile offenders. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct.
2455, 2463–64 (2012).

The Eighth Amendment extends no further: It does not prohibit

discretionary life sentences for juveniles, Croft v. Williams, 773 F.3d 170, 171 (7th Cir. 2014), let
alone the discretionary 55-year sentence the trial court imposed here.

Haywood's Eighth

Amendment claim is meritless.
III.

Certificate of Appealability
The court declines to issue a certificate of appealability. A certificate may issue "only if

the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(2). A substantial showing exists only where "reasonable jurists could debate whether
(or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or
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that the issues presented were 'adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.'"
Resendez v. Knight, 653 F.3d 445, 446 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S.
473, 484 (2000)). The court's ruling is not one that jurists of reason would find debatable.
CONCLUSION
The court denies Haywood's habeas corpus petition [1] and declines to issue a
certificate of appealability.

Petitioner's motion for attorney representation [15] is denied as

moot.
ENTER:

Date: March 11, 2015

__________________________________
REBECCA R. PALLMEYER
United States District Court

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