GARCIA v. Calica
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION Signed by the Honorable Samuel Der-Yeghiayan on 10/29/2013: Mailed notice (mw, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
S.G. and T.G. by and through their
adoptive mother, AMY GARCIA,
Plaintiff,
v.
RICHARD H. CALICA, Director of the
Illinois Department of Children and
Family Services,
Defendant.
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No. 13 C 5405
MEMORANDUM OPINION
SAMUEL DER-YEGHIAYAN, District Judge
This matter is before the court on Defendant’s motion to dismiss. For the
reasons stated below, the motion to dismiss is granted in part, and the remaining
state law claims are dismissed without prejudice.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Amy Garcia is the adoptive mother of S.G., age 14, and T.G., age 13,
and is bringing the instant action on behalf of S.G. and T.G.. Plaintiff contends that
S.G. and T.G. require mental health treatment. Plaintiff indicates that she previously
brought an action against DCFS in case number 13 C 4974, and that she agreed to
dismiss the claims brought against DCFS based on DCFS’s promise in a settlement
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agreement (Settlement Agreement) entered into in July 2013 to pay for the medically
necessary long-term residential care for S.G. and T.G. Relying upon the alleged
promise by DCFS, Plaintiff allegedly enrolled S.G. and T.G. to Change Academy at
Lake of the Ozarks (CALO), a residential treatment facility in Lake of the Ozarks,
Missouri. DCFS, however, has allegedly refused to pay for the treatment at CALO.
Plaintiff brought the instant action and includes in her complaint a breach of contract
claim (Count I), Medicaid Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396 et seq. claims (Counts II and III),
an injunctive relief claim (Count IV), and an Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. claim (Count V). Defendant now moves to
dismiss the instant action.
LEGAL STANDARD
In ruling on a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) (Rule 12(b)(6)), the court must draw all reasonable inferences
that favor the plaintiff, construe the allegations of the complaint in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, and accept as true all well-pleaded facts and allegations in
the complaint. Appert v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, Inc., 673 F.3d 609, 622 (7th
Cir. 2012); Thompson v. Ill. Dep’t of Prof’l Regulation, 300 F.3d 750, 753 (7th Cir.
2002). A plaintiff is required to include allegations in the complaint that “plausibly
suggest that the plaintiff has a right to relief, raising that possibility above a
‘speculative level’” and “if they do not, the plaintiff pleads itself out of court.”
E.E.O.C. v. Concentra Health Services, Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir.
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2007)(quoting in part Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007));
see also Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, Inc., 673 F.3d at 622 (stating that “[t]o survive
a motion to dismiss, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” and that “[a] claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged”)(quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009))(internal quotations
omitted).
DISCUSSION
Defendant moves to dismiss the instant action for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. Defendant also moves in the alternative to dismiss the claims in Counts
II, III, and V, based on a failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
I. Medicaid Act Claims
Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to state a claim under the Medicaid Act.
Defendant contends that DCFS is not the state agency entrusted with the
administration of the Medicaid Act in Illinois. Plaintiff alleges in the complaint that
Defendant violated the Medicaid Act by failing to provide necessary benefits, and by
failing to have proper procedures, practices, and policies to ensure that the Medicaid
Act is properly administered. (Compl. Par. 27-30). The Medicaid Act provides that
a state must designate a “single State agency to administer or to supervise the
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administration of the” Medicaid Act. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(5). As Plaintiff
acknowledges in the complaint, in Illinois the Department of Healthcare and Family
Services (HFS) is the sole state agency designated to administer the Medicaid Act
program and distribute Medicaid Act funds. (Compl. Par. 9); see also N.B. ex rel.
Buchanan v. Hamos, 2012 WL 1953146, at *1 (N.D. Ill. 2012)(indicating that HFS is
the sole agency responsible for administration of Medicaid in Illinois). Plaintiff
alleges in the complaint that Defendant is the Director of DCFS. (Compl. 1).
Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant works for HFS or has been delegated
authority by HFS. The court can also take judicial notice of the public record that
DCFS and HFS are separate state agencies. General Elec. Capital Corp. v. Lease
Resolution Corp., 128 F.3d 1074, 1080 (7th Cir. 1997)(stating that a court can “take
judicial notice of matters of public record without converting a motion for failure to
state a claim into a motion for summary judgment”). Therefore, since the allegations
in the complaint fail to suggest that Defendant had the authority to control the
administration of Medicaid or the disbursement of Medicaid funds, Defendant’s
motion to dismiss the Medicaid claims (Counts II and III) is granted.
II. ADA Claim
Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to state a
valid ADA claim. A private plaintiff generally has the right to assert an ADA claim
for injunctive relief against a state official in federal court. See, e.g., Radaszewski ex
rel. Radaszewski v. Maram, 383 F.3d 599, 606-07 (7th Cir. 2004). Pursuant to Title
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II of the ADA, the Attorney General has promulgated a regulation providing that “[a]
public entity shall administer services, programs, and activities in the most integrated
setting appropriate to the needs of qualified individuals with disabilities.” Id.
(internal quotations omitted)(quoting 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d)). In the instant action,
Plaintiff is complaining about the refusal to pay for the care at CALO. However,
Plaintiff cites no precedent indicating that DCFS had any statutory right to make
such a payment. See N.B. ex rel. Buchanan, 2012 WL 1953146, at *2 (indicating
that in Illinois, HFS is “tasked by the State to provide streamlined access to
integrated services to those with serious mental illness or developmental
disabilities”). As indicated above, in regard to funds such as Medicaid funds, DCFS
is not the statutory appointed agency that administers such funds. Plaintiff’s
contention that DCFS is obligated to pay for the care at CALO is premised on an
alleged contractual obligation under the Settlement Agreement. Such a contractual
obligation is not a valid basis to support an ADA claim. See Shapo v. Engle, 463
F.3d 641, 643 (7th Cir. 2006)(indicating that a district court cannot retain jurisdiction
to enforce a settlement agreement after the entry of final judgement);
Dupuy v. McEwen, 495 F.3d 807, 809 (7th Cir. 2007)(explaining that in Shapo the
Court held “that when a suit is dismissed with prejudice, it is gone, and the district
court cannot adjudicate disputes arising out of the settlement that led to the dismissal
merely by stating that it is retaining jurisdiction”); Grossinger Motorcorp., Inc. v.
Thomas, 2013 WL 1787825, at *3 (N.D. Ill. 2013)(indicating that the plaintiff could
bring a breach of contract claim in state court to enforce the settlement agreement at
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issue); Tineybey v. Jumper, 2012 WL 1965391, at *1 (C.D. Ill. 2012)(explaining that
“[a] claim for breach of a settlement agreement is a state law claim, not a federal
claim”). Therefore, under Rule 12(b)(6), Plaintiff has failed to state a valid ADA
claim.
III. Remaining Claims
Defendant argues that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the
remaining state law claims. Defendant contends that the court lacks jurisdiction to
enforce the terms of the settlement agreement and that such claims are barred by the
Eleventh Amendment. Plaintiff argues that this court has supplemental jurisdiction
of the breach of contract claim relating to the Settlement Agreement. (Ans. Mot. 6).
Once the federal claims in an action no longer remain, a federal court has
discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any remaining state
law claims. See Wright v. Associated Ins. Cos., 29 F.3d 1244, 1251-52 (7th Cir.
1994)(stating that “the general rule is that, when all federal-law claims are dismissed
before trial, the pendent claims should be left to the state courts”). The Seventh
Circuit has indicated that there is no “‘presumption’ in favor of relinquishing
supplemental jurisdiction. . . .” Williams Electronics Games, Inc. v. Garrity, 479
F.3d 904, 906-07 (7th Cir. 2007). The Seventh Circuit has stated that, In exercising
its discretion, the court should consider a number of factors, including “the nature of
the state law claims at issue, their ease of resolution, and the actual, and avoidable,
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expenditure of judicial resources. . . .” Timm v. Mead Corp., 32 F.3d 273, 277 (7th
Cir. 1994). The court has considered all of the pertinent factors and, as a matter of
discretion, the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining
state law claims. The instant action is in the initial pleading stage and there is not
sufficient justification to proceed solely on the remaining state law claims. The
breach of contract claim and injunctive relief claims are therefore dismissed without
prejudice.
Although Plaintiff has attempted to make this a federal case by referencing
various federal statutes in the complaint, the true essence of this case relates to a
disagreement as to whether Defendant is complying with its alleged contractual
obligations under the Settlement Agreement. Such a contractual dispute does not
belong in federal court merely because the settlement was entered into in a federal
court proceeding. See Leforge v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, 2013 WL
1296788, at *2 (S.D. Ind. 2013)(stating that “[t]he [p]laintiffs’ remedy for a breach
of the settlement agreement is to bring an action for breach of contract in state court
—‘a state claim belonging in state court’”)(quoting in part Ventre v. Datronic Rental
Corp. 482 Fed.Appx. 165, 169 (7th Cir. 2012)).
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis, Defendant’s motions to dismiss the Medicaid
Act claims (Counts II and III), and the ADA claim (Count V) are granted. Plaintiff’s
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breach of contract claim (Count I) and claim for injunctive relief (Count IV) are
dismissed without prejudice.
___________________________________
Samuel Der-Yeghiayan
United States District Court Judge
Dated: October 29, 2013
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