Horton v. City Of Chicago et al

Filing 181

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order. Signed by the Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr on 1/26/2016. Mailed notice(sxw, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
JARROD HORTON, as Independent
Administrator of the Estate of MARLON
HORTON, Deceased,
Plaintiff,
v.
The CITY OF CHICAGO, a municipal
corporation, CHICAGO POLICE
OFFICER KENNETH F. WALKER, Star
No. 9191, SHAQUILA R. MOORE, The
CHICAGO HOUSING AUTHORITY,
H.J. RUSSELL & COMPANY, and
MAVERICK SECURITY, INC.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 13-cv-6865
Judge Robert M. Dow, Jr.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant City of Chicago’s motion [101] to: (1) bifurcate Plaintiff’s
claim under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1976), from Plaintiff’s other
claims; (2) stay all discovery and trial on the Monell claim; and (3) enter the City’s proposed
“Limited Consent to Entry of Judgment Against Defendant City of Chicago.” Also before the
Court are Defendant Chicago Housing Authority’s partial joinder [109] and Defendant H.J.
Russell & Company’s partial joinder [108] in the City’s motion [101]. For the reasons set forth
below, the Court grants the City of Chicago’s motion [101] and the Chicago Housing Authority’s
partial joinder [109]. Discovery and trial on Plaintiff’s Monell claims (Counts IX and X of the
Fourth Amended Complaint) will be stayed until the other claims are resolved. The Court enters
the City’s proposed “Limited Consent to Entry of Judgment Against Defendant City of

Chicago.” H.J. Russell’s partial joinder [108] is denied as moot because Plaintiff removed the
Monell claim against H.J. Russell from its governing Fourth Amended Complaint [128].
I.

Background1
This lawsuit arises from an incident on September 7, 2013 in which Marlon Horton

(“Horton”) was fatally shot by an off-duty Chicago Police Officer, Kenneth Walker (“Walker”),
on the grounds of a Chicago Housing Authority (“CHA”) residential building located at 1815 W.
Monroe St. in Chicago (the “Property”). The lawsuit is brought by Horton’s surviving brother,
Jarrod Horton (“Plaintiff”), as Independent Administrator of Horton’s estate.
Plaintiff alleges that on September 7, 2013, Horton was in a CHA residential building
located on the Property. At that time, Walker and Shaquila Moore (“Moore”) were working on
the Property as security guards. Walker and Moore were jointly employed by CHA, Maverick
Security, Inc. (“Maverick Security”), and H.J. Russell & Company (“H.J. Russell”). Walker was
also employed as a police officer by the City of Chicago (“City”). Walker and Moore asked
Horton to leave the residential building. Horton left the building. Walker, with the aid and
support of Moore, then shot Horton with a firearm. 911 was called. Moore and Walker were
directed by the 911 operator to provide medical care to Horton by applying a clean sheet to his
wound and applying pressure. Walker and Moore did not follow this instruction and did not
provide medical care to Horton. Horton died from his injuries on the same day.
Plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit against Walker, Moore, the City, CHA, Maverick
Security, and H.J. Russell. Plaintiff’s governing Fourth Amended Complaint [128] contains the
following claims: a Section 1983 claim against Walker for excessive force (Count I); a Section
1983 claim against Moore for failure to intervene (Count II); a Section 1983 claim against
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For purposes of this order, the Court assumes as true the allegations in Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended
Complaint [128].

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Walker and Moore for failure to provide medical care (Count III); a Section 1983 claim against
Walker and Moore for conspiracy (Count IV); a state law claim against Walker and Moore for
intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count V); a claim against Walker and Moore under
Illinois’ Wrongful Death Act (Count VI); a claim against Walker and Moore for battery (Count
VII); a claim against H.J. Russell and Maverick Security for negligent supervision (Count VIII);
a Monell claim against the City based on its alleged failure to adequately investigate and
discipline its officers who have been involved in shootings of civilians (Count IX); a Monell
claim against CHA based on its alleged failure to adequately investigate, train, monitor, and
discipline security guards, security guard companies, and property management companies who
provide services at CHA properties (Count X); a claim against the City and CHA for
indemnification (Count XI); and a respondeat superior claim against the City, CHA, H.J. Russell,
and Maverick Security (Count XII).
Before Plaintiff was granted leave to file his Fourth Amended Complaint [128], the City
filed a motion [101] to bifurcate Plaintiff’s Monell claims and stay discovery and trial on those
claims. Along with its motion, the City filed a “Limited Consent to Entry of Judgment.”
Without admitting to liability, the City agrees to “waive[] its right under Monell not to be found
liable for damages pursuant to Section 1983 without proof that the City by its ‘policy, custom, or
practice,’ and with the requisite degree of culpability, caused the alleged constitutional
violation.”

[101-2] at 4.

The City also “consent[s] to entry of judgment against it for

compensatory damages and, to the extent allowed by the court, reasonable attorney fees pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, if the finder of fact in this case finds that Defendant Walker is liable for a
violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights as alleged in the Complaint.” [101-2] at 3. The City
further consents to entry of judgment against it in the event that the trier of fact finds that

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Defendant Walker violated Horton’s constitutional rights but is, nonetheless, “not liable to
Plaintiff because he is entitled to qualified immunity.” Id. at 3-4. The City’s consents “also will
apply if Defendant Walker is found liable to Plaintiff on a motion for summary judgment, or
found liable to Plaintiff pursuant to any other court procedure not involving a finder of fact that
determines, based on the merits of this case, that Defendant Walker is liable for a violation of
Plaintiff’s constitutional rights as alleged in the Complaint.” [101-2] at 3.
CHA and H.J. Russell join in the City’s motion to bifurcate ([108] and [109]), but do not
join the City’s request for entry of the Limited Consent to Entry of Judgment. After Plaintiff
filed his Fourth Amended Complaint, Plaintiff and the City filed status reports ([135] and [137])
explaining how the Defendants’ bifurcation motions are affected by Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended
Complaint.
II.

Legal Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b) authorizes federal courts to order a separate trial of

one or more separate issues or claims if separation (or bifurcation) is warranted “[f]or
convenience, to avoid prejudice, or to expedite and economize.” Bifurcation may be appropriate
if “the separation would prevent prejudice to a party or promote judicial economy.” Chlopek v.
Fed. Ins. Co., 499 F.3d 692, 700 (7th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). “If one of these criteria is
met, the district court may order bifurcation as long as doing so will not prejudice the nonmoving party or violate the Seventh Amendment,” which guarantees a jury trial for civil cases in
federal court. Id. The Court enjoys “considerable discretion” over its decision. Treece v.
Hochstetler, 213 F.3d 360, 364-65 (7th Cir. 2000) (internal quotations omitted). Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 26(d) also permits a court to stay discovery on Monell claims. See, e.g., Carr v.
City of N. Chicago, 908 F. Supp. 2d 926, 927 (N.D. Ill. 2012). A Monell claim, named after the

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Supreme Court’s decision in Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs. of the City of New York, 436
U.S. 658 (1978), is a claim brought against a municipality to hold it liable for constitutional
violations that allegedly occurred as a result of the municipality’s policy or practice. Hobley v.
Burge, 2004 WL 2658075, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 13, 2004).
“Monell claims are most often bifurcated in this district when a case is rooted in
allegations of excessive force.” Carr, 908 F. Supp. 2d at 934. Such motions and the inclination
of many judges to grant them stems in large part from the recognition that, often, “claims of
municipal liability require an extensive amount of work on the part of plaintiff’s attorneys and
experts, and an extraordinary amount of money must be spent in order to prepare and prove
them.” Moore v. City of Chicago, 2007 WL 3037121, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 15, 2007). This work
ultimately may be for naught because in “many if not most cases, disposition of the individual
claims will either legally or practically end the litigation.” Medina v. City of Chicago, 100 F.
Supp. 2d 893, 895 (N.D. Ill. 2000). If the plaintiff fails to prove that he suffered a constitutional
injury at the hands of a municipal employee, this typically will be fatal to his Monell claim
against the municipality. Id. And if the plaintiff prevails on his constitutional claim against the
municipal employee, he “is likely not to want or need to proceed any further, at least in this
district and state” (id.), because Illinois law requires a “local public entity * * * to pay any tort
judgment or settlement for compensatory damages * * * for which it or an employee while acting
within the scope of his employment is liable” (745 ILCS 10/9-102).
The Court evaluates each motion to bifurcate on its own merits. The undersigned judge
has both granted and denied motions to bifurcate filed by municipal defendants. Compare Terry
v. Cook County Dep’t of Corr., 2010 WL 2720754 (N.D. Ill. July 8, 2010) (denying motions to

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bifurcate), with Cruz v. City of Chicago, 2008 WL 5244616 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 16, 2008) (granting
motion to bifurcate).
III.

Analysis
A.

The City’s Motion to Bifurcate

In his Monell claim against the City (Count X), Plaintiff alleges that the City’s policy and
practice of failing to adequately investigate and discipline its officers who have been involved in
shootings of civilians encouraged Wilson’s misconduct on September 7, 2013. The City argues
that the Court should bifurcate the Monell claim (Count X) for purposes of discovery and trial
because bifurcation would serve the interests of efficient litigation and judicial economy, would
help prevent undue prejudice to the City and Wilson, and would not affect Plaintiff’s recovery of
compensatory damages. In response, Plaintiff argues that bifurcation would be inconvenient and
inefficient due to the overlap of evidence that is relevant to both the Monell claim and the
individual defendants, that the City’s concerns about prejudice are premature and unfounded, and
that Plaintiff is pursuing the Monell claim for non-economic benefits beyond compensatory
damages, such as deterring future violations of citizens’ constitutional rights.
1.

Efficiency and Judicial Economy

As courts in this Circuit have recognized, the bifurcation of Monell claims “is generally
likely to bring about an earlier disposition of the suit because bifurcation allows a bypass of
discovery relating to the Monell claim, which can add significant, and possibly unnecessary,
time, effort, cost, and complications to the discovery process.” Lopez v. City of Chicago, 2002
WL 335346, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 1, 2002). The Court finds that these considerations also weigh
in favor of staying Plaintiff’s Monell claim against the City.

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A stay of the Monell claim would allow the parties to more quickly reach the merits of
Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Walker. These claims focus on “the specific incident” that
occurred on September 7, 2013. Medina, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 894. By contrast, the Monell claim
against the City “obviously entails elements of proof that are not involved when the plaintiff sues
only the officers claimed to have been directly involved in the deprivation of his rights” and
covers a significant time period leading up to the date of the shooting. Id. Although Plaintiff has
attempted to narrow his Monell claims, Plaintiff still seeks documents from a nine-year period
(2007 to the present) on all shootings of criminal suspects by Chicago police officers. The City
explains that, in order to defend itself from the Monell claims, it would need to produce its full
investigative files for all shootings, which would “put[] at issue 400 police-involved shooting
investigative files created since 2007.”

[137] at 2.

The City estimates that each file is

approximately 750 pages, that it would need to produce an estimated 375,000 pages of
documents to respond to Plaintiff’s discovery requests, and that it would take its Independent
Police Review Authority (“IPRA”) approximately 15,000 hours to review these documents.
[137] at 3. Even if the City’s estimates are exaggerated, there is no question that Plaintiff’s
requests would place a heavy financial and administrative burden on the City.
In addition, the trial of Plaintiff’s individual claims against Defendant Walker would be
longer and more legally and factually complex if the Monell claim is not bifurcated. Although
the parties have not estimated the number of additional trial days that would be needed for the
Monell claim, it undoubtedly would take a significant amount of time to present evidence
concerning the City policies and practices that allegedly led to Defendant Walker violating
Horton’s constitutional rights. On balance, therefore, the Court finds that bifurcation of the

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Monell claim for discovery and trial would “promote judicial economy.” Chlopek, 499 F.3d at
700.
A stay of the Monell claim until after the claims against Wilson are resolved may also
avoid the need for Monell discovery. If Plaintiff prevails on his claims against Defendant
Walker, then the City’s Limited Consent to Entry of Judgment would, as a practical matter, allow
Plaintiff to collect judgment from the City without going to the time and expense of litigating the
Monell claim. Plaintiff “seeks only monetary relief” and the City has stipulated that it will
“indemnify [Walker] for compensatory damages as well as an award of attorney’s fees and
costs.” Id. See also [101-2] at 3. Under such circumstances, the Seventh Circuit has observed
that bifurcation of Monell claims is “sensible,” especially “in light of the volume of civil-rights
litigation that district courts must manage.” Swanigan v. City of Chicago, 775 F.3d 953, 962 (7th
Cir. 2015).
Both parties recognize that Plaintiff could proceed with his Monell claims against the
City if he prevails on his constitutional claims against Wilson. But the parties disagree about
whether bifurcation would avoid—as opposed to merely delay—discovery on the Monell claim
(Count X) in the event that Plaintiff fails to establish that Wilson violated Horton’s constitutional
rights. The City argues that bifurcation would allow it to “avoid burdensome and potentially
unnecessary discovery and litigation costs should Plaintiff fail to establish a constitutional
violation and thus, as a matter of law, be unable to prove any Monell violation.” [101] at 4.
Plaintiff responds that even if the fact-finder determined that the individual defendants are not
liable, Plaintiff still might succeed on his Monell claim against the City. Specifically, Plaintiff
argues that “where—like here—Defendant Officers have asserted an affirmative defense such

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that a jury may find a constitutional violation but decline to find the officers liability, Plaintiff
may still obtain a liability finding against the City.” [113] at 8.
The Seventh Circuit has acknowledged that “a city’s liability is derivative of its police
officer’s liability,” such that “a municipality’s liability for a constitutional injury ‘requires a
finding that the individual officers are liable on the underlying substantive claim.’” Treece, 213
F.3d at 364 (citations omitted). Nonetheless, the Seventh Circuit has also recognized that “a
municipality can be held liable under Monell, even when its officers are not, unless such a
finding would create an inconsistent verdict.” Thomas v. Cook Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 604 F.3d
293, 305 (7th Cir. 2010). “[T]o determine whether the [City]’s liability is dependent on its
officers, we look to the nature of the constitutional violation, the theory of municipal liability,
and the defenses set forth.” Id. Here, Plaintiff’s Monell claim against the City alleges that the
City encouraged Wilson’s excessive use of force by failing to investigate or discipline officers
who use excessive force and shoot civilians. A jury could not consistently find that Walker did
not use excessive force but that the City’s policies encouraged Walker’s use of excessive force.
However, a jury could consistently find that Walker did use excessive force, but that he was
entitled to qualified immunity and therefore not liable for his actions. If that were to occur, and
Plaintiff decided to proceed with the Monell claim against the City, then Plaintiff would,
hypothetically, still need to conduct Monell discovery. But here, the City has consented to entry
of judgment against it in the event that the trier of fact finds that Defendant Walker violated
Horton’s constitutional rights but is, nonetheless, “not liable to Plaintiff because he is entitled to
qualified immunity.” [101-2] at 3-4. Thus, on balance, the Court finds that bifurcating the
Monell claim against the City would promote the goals of efficiency and judicial economy.

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2.

Prejudice to the City and Defendant Walker

The City argues that bifurcation is also warranted because trying the Monell claim along
with the excessive force claim against Defendant Walker will prejudice both Walker and the
City. The City asserts that it would be prejudiced because “[a] jury that finds liability against the
individual officer may incorrectly and unfairly find that the City should be liable under Monell
and its progeny, misconstruing evidence or the complicated law around Monell.” [101] at 9.
Defendant Walker allegedly would also be prejudiced by “the introduction at trial of extensive
evidence” against the City that is not relevant to Plaintiff’s conduct on September 7, 2013. Id.
While the City’s argument has surface appeal, the Court finds that it is premature to
decide whether bifurcating the Monell claim is necessary to prevent prejudice to the City or to
Defendant Walker at trial. The City’s prejudice arguments, on their face, could “apply to
virtually every case that involved both individual liability and Monell policy claims, because the
nature of a Monell claim requires evidence that goes beyond the actions of the individual
defendant.” Elrod v. City of Chicago, 2007 WL 3241352, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 1, 2007).
“Without knowing what the evidence is and the actual prejudice being faced, the Court cannot
properly assess the potential for any undue prejudice” against Defendant Walker or the City by
“having to present” their cases together. Estate of McIntosh v. City of Chicago, 2015 WL
5164080, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 2, 2015). Therefore, the Court finds that the avoidance of unfair
prejudice would not, by itself, warrant bifurcation at this time.
3.

Prejudice to Plaintiff

Since the City has established one of the criteria for bifurcation under Rule 42(b)—”to
expedite and economize” the litigation—the Court may order bifurcation if “doing so will not
prejudice the non-moving party or violate the Seventh Amendment.” Chlopek, 499 F.3d at 700.

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Here, the Seventh Amendment—which grants a plaintiff in a civil case a right to a jury trial2—is
not implicated because Plaintiff will still be able (if he chooses) to pursue his Monell claim
against the City if the trier of fact finds that Defendant Wilson violated Horton’s constitutional
rights.
The remaining question, then, is whether bifurcation would prejudice Plaintiff in other
ways. The Court is not persuaded that it would. Plaintiff would benefit from bifurcation because
his claims against Defendant Walker likely would reach trial sooner—and at much less expense
in the form of attorneys’ fees—than if they were joined with the Monell claim. Bifurcation also
would not affect Plaintiff’s recovery for compensatory damages. Through its “Limited Consent
to Entry of Judgment,” the City has consented to entry of judgment against it for compensatory
damages and reasonable attorneys’ fees in the event that the trier of fact finds that Wilson
violated Horton’s constitutional rights. This consent applies even if the trier of fact finds that
Wilson violated Horton’s constitutional rights but is nonetheless entitled to qualified immunity.
“The City’s submission of similar stipulations has been cited as justifying bifurcation orders in
several cases.” Elrod, 2007 WL 3241352 at *4.3
While not disputing the City’s argument that bifurcation “will not affect Plaintiff’s
recovery for compensatory damages” ([113] at 6), Plaintiff argues that his Monell claim against
the City also serves the valuable goal of deterring further constitutional violations by the City

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U.S. Const. amend. VII (“In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise
reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.”).

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Although the City does not agree to indemnify Plaintiff for the award of punitive damages against
Defendant Wilson, this is irrelevant to the prejudice analysis because “municipalities cannot be liable for
punitive damages.” Cadiz v. Kruger, 2007 WL 4293976, at *8 n.6 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 29, 2007). See also
City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981) (“[A] municipality is immune from
punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”).

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and its officers. The Court recognizes that the potential to deter future official misconduct is “a
proper object of our system of tort liability.” King v. Evans, 2015 WL 4397761, at *2 (N.D. Ill.
July 17, 2015) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Nonetheless, since the City has stipulated
that it will pay any judgment against Defendant Wilson, a judgment against Wilson could have a
similar deterrent effect on City policies and procedures that promote similar misconduct. See
Castillo, 2012 WL 1658350 at *6.4
For these reasons, the Court finds that bifurcating the Monell claim against the City
(Count IX) for purposes of discovery and trial is warranted under Rule 42(b). The City’s motion
[101] is granted.
B.

CHA’s Partial Joinder In the City’s Motion to Bifurcate

In his Monell claim against CHA (Count X), Plaintiff alleges that CHA’s failure to
adequately investigate, train, monitor, and discipline security guards, security guard companies,
and property management companies who provide services at CHA properties encouraged the
misconduct committed by Defendants Walker, Moore, Maverick, and H.J. Russell. CHA filed a
partial joinder [109] in the City’s motion to bifurcate [101]. CHA asserts that bifurcation of the
Monell claim will best serve the interests of efficiency and judicial economy and will help
prevent undue prejudice to CHA and the other Defendants. CHA does not, however, join in the
City’s Limited Consent to Entry of Judgment. CHA maintains that neither Defendant Walker
nor Defendant Moore was acting as an agent of CHA and that CHA is not liable in any way for
the actions of Walker or Moore on September 7, 2013. Plaintiff responds that the Court should
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In regard to the potential non-monetary consequences of Plaintiff’s desire to take Monell-related
discovery relating to shootings by Chicago Police Department (“CPD”) Officers, the Court notes that last
month the United States Department of Justice opened what it called a “pattern or practice” investigation
into the CPD that likely will examine some, if not all, of the same activity. See Press Release, Justice
Department Opens Pattern or Practice Investigation into the Chicago Police Department (U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, Office of Public Affairs, Dec. 7, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-openspattern-or-practice-investigation-chicago-police-department.

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deny bifurcation of the Monell claim against CHA for the same reasons it should deny
bifurcation of the Monell claim against the City. In addition, Plaintiff argues that because CHA
has not submitted a consent to judgment, CHA would be able to argue that Walker and Moore
were not its agents “and in such case Plaintiff would be denied recovery from CHA * * *,
including the possibility of recovering punitive damages from entities who can afford to pay
them,” and would have to have a second trial to establish CHA’s liability. [113] at 10.
The Court finds that bifurcating the Monell claim against CHA (Count X) for purposes of
discovery and trial would promote efficiency and judicial economy. A stay of the Monell claim
against CHA would allow the parties to more quickly reach the merits of Plaintiff’s non-Monell
claims, which focus on the events of September 7, 2013. Although the parties disagree on how
burdensome it would be for CHA to respond to Monell discovery, the Court finds that trying the
Monell claim with the other claims would greatly increase the scope of discovery and the burden
on CHA. Plaintiff’s Monell claim against CHA is very broad, alleging that CHA failed to
adequately investigate, train, monitor, or discipline security guards, security guard companies,
and property management companies who provide services at CHA properties. CHA states that
it would cost up to $22,750 to hire a third-party vendor to prepare and produce documents that
Plaintiff has requested on his Monell claim so far, and that this cost does not include attorneys’
fees and costs associated with reviewing, redacting, and producing the documents, or the cost of
fact and expert discovery on the Monell claim. CHA asked Plaintiff if he would pay half of the
cost of hiring the third-party vendor but Plaintiff has not agreed to do so. The financial and
administrative burden it would impose on CHA to respond to Monell discovery is significant,
especially given CHA’s purpose to provide affordable housing to low-income City residents.

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The Court also finds that, on balance, bifurcation of the Monell claim against CHA would
not prejudice Plaintiff. The Court recognizes that because CHA has not consented to entry of
judgment against it, in the event that Defendant Moore or Defendant Walker is found to have
violated Horton’s constitutional rights, Plaintiff still would need Monell discovery and
potentially a second trial to obtain compensation from CHA for these violations. However, since
the City has already consented to pay the potential judgment against Defendant Walker, CHA’s
refusal to consent to pay a judgment against Walker has no effect on Plaintiff’s ability to recover
damages. Neither the City nor CHA has agreed to pay the judgment that might be awarded
against Moore. Nonetheless, to the extent that Moore is found to be an employee of CHA or the
City, Illinois law would require the applicable “local public entity * * * to pay any tort judgment
or settlement for compensatory damages * * * for which [Moore] while acting within the scope
of h[er] employment is liable.”

745 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 10/9-102.5

“[T]he CHA, as a

municipal corporation, is a ‘local public entity’” that is subject to this requirement. Barnes v.
Chicago Hous. Auth., 761 N.E.2d 283, 288 (Ill. App. 2001). Plaintiff also expresses concern
that, without a consent to judgment from CHA, Plaintiff may be unable to recover “punitive
damages from entities who can afford to pay them.” [113] at 10. But Plaintiff would not be
entitled to collect punitive damages against CHA in any event because CHA is a municipal
corporation and therefore not subject to punitive damages. See City of Newport, 543 U.S. at 271;

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The term “local public entity” includes “a county, township, municipality, municipal corporation, school
district, school board, educational service region, regional board of school trustees, trustees of schools of
townships, treasurers of schools of townships, community college district, community college board,
forest preserve district, park district, fire protection district, sanitary district, museum district, emergency
telephone system board, and all other local governmental bodies” and “also includes library systems and
any intergovernmental agency or similar entity formed pursuant to the Constitution of the State of Illinois
or the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act as well as any not-for-profit corporation organized for the
purpose of conducting public business.” 745 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 10/1-206.

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Crump v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 1998 WL 164869, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 2, 1998) (dismissing
plaintiff’s claim against CHA for punitive damages because “the CHA is a municipal corporation
under 310 ILCS 10/1 et seq.”).
For these reasons, the Court finds that bifurcating the Monell claim against CHA (Count
X) for purposes of discovery and trial is warranted under Rule 42(b). CHA’s motion [109] is
granted.
C.

H.J. Russell’s Partial Joinder In the City’s Motion to Bifurcate

H.J. Russell’s partial joinder [108] is denied as moot because Plaintiff’s governing
complaint [128] no longer includes a Monell claim against H.J. Russell.

See [145] at 1

(Plaintiff’s status report explaining that in his Fourth Amended Complaint he “has dropped his
Monell claims against Defendants Maverick Security and H.J. Russell”).
IV.

Conclusion
The Court concludes that (1) the scope of Monell discovery and its associated burdens is

significant, (2) there is a realistic possibility that staying trial on the Monell claims will avoid the
need for a trial on these claims altogether, and (3) none of the parties would be meaningfully
prejudiced by a separate trial on these claims. For these reasons, the Court grants the City of
Chicago’s motion [101] and the Chicago Housing Authority’s partial joinder [109]. Discovery
and trial on Plaintiff’s Monell claims (Counts IX and X) are stayed until the other claims are
resolved. The Court enters the City’s proposed “Limited Consent to Entry of Judgment Against
Defendant City of Chicago.” H.J. Russell’s partial joinder [108] is denied as moot.

Dated: January 26, 2016

_________________________________
Robert M. Dow, Jr.
United States District Judge
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