Zhang v. Boeing Co., The

Filing 20

ENTER MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Signed by the Honorable Harry D. Leinenweber on 12/16/2013:Mailed notice(wp, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

JINHUA YANG and JINGTAO XIE, as
Guardians Ad Litem and Parents
of Minor JIAQI XIE,
Plaintiffs,
v.

Case No. 13 C 6846;
related to
Case Nos. 13 C 7418;
13 C 7421; 13 C 7422;
13 C 7424; 13 C 7428;
13 C 7432; 13 C 7434

THE BOEING COMPANY,
Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court are Plaintiffs’ Motions to Remand.

For the

reasons stated herein, the Motions are granted.
I.

BACKGROUND

These cases arise out of the July 6, 2013 crash of Asiana
Airlines Flight 214 into the seawall at San Francisco International
Airport (“SFO”). They are consolidated for purposes of the Motions
to Remand.
Flight 214 carried 291 passengers and 16 crew members from
Seoul, South Korea to San Francisco, California. Nearly all of the
eleven-hour flight occurred over the Pacific Ocean.
the

flight,

the

aircraft

was

approaching

SFO

At the end of
on

a

planned

seventeen-mile, straight-in approach over the San Francisco Bay
(the “Bay”).

At SFO, the water and the runway are separated by a

seawall; the ground is level with the top of the seawall, and water
level is some distance below.
On its approach, the plane was traveling too low and too slow.
Just before the plane reached the runway, the landing gear got
caught on the seawall, snapped apart from the plane, and fell into
the Bay.

A portion of the tail fell into the water as well.

plane skidded, out of control, onto the runway.

The

Many passengers

were injured, and three lost their lives.
The aircraft in question was a 777-200 jumbo jet manufactured
by Defendant Boeing (“Boeing”).

Of crucial importance for any

aircraft is the certification process. The 777 was first certified
by the Federal Aviation Administration (the “FAA”) and entered
commercial service in 1995.

The 777-200 is a longer-range 777,

also first produced and certified in 1995.

The accident aircraft

was delivered to Asiana in 2006.
Pursuant to its statutory authority, the FAA oversees the
certification process but delegates many certification functions to
private citizens who serve as “FAA delegates.”

The airplane

involved in the accident was certified by Boeing employees who,
while acting as FAA delegates, approved the aircraft as safe for
flight.

Defendant

explains

that

the

aircraft

at

issue

was

subjected to hundreds of different tests and certifications, all
conducted under FAA supervision, before the airplane was certified
as airworthy.

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Plaintiffs were passengers on the plane and brought these
lawsuits against Boeing alleging state law claims for product
liability, negligence, and willful and wanton conduct.
contend

that

defectively

designed

systems

–

They

including

the

autothrottle, the flight control system, and the low airspeed
warning – contributed to the accident.

Defendant removed these

cases

jurisdictional

to

admiralty

this

federal

jurisdiction

court
and

on

two

federal

officer

grounds:

jurisdiction.

Plaintiffs now move to remand and argue that neither of these
purported

bases

provides

the

Court

with

subject

matter

jurisdiction.
The remand motions pose difficult jurisdictional questions.
In cases such as these, whether the Court has admiralty or federal
officer jurisdiction can turn on details that are far removed from
the merits of the case. The Court appreciates the excellent briefs
provided by counsel for both sides.
II.

ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION

Any civil action brought in state court can be removed to
federal district

court

if

the

district

original jurisdiction over the action.

court would

have had

28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).

District courts have original jurisdiction over civil cases “of
admiralty or maritime jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1). A party
seeking to invoke federal admiralty jurisdiction over a tort claim
“must satisfy conditions both of location and of connection with

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maritime activity.” Grubhart v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513
U.S. 527, 534 (1995).

To fulfill the location requirement, the

tort must have occurred on navigable water, or if the injury was
suffered on land, it must have been caused by a vessel on navigable
water.

Id.

Historical cases illuminate what it means for a tort to occur
on the water.

In Smith & Son v. Taylor, the plaintiff represented

a decedent who was standing on a wharf (considered an extension of
land) and knocked into water by a sling operated from a ship.
Smith & Son v. Taylor, 276 U.S. 179, 182 (1928).

The tort occurred

on land because “the blow by the sling was what gave rise to the
cause of action,” and that blow “was given and took effect while
the deceased was upon the land.”

Id.

In another case, Minnie v.

Port Huron Terminal Co., the Court was presented facts converse to
Taylor.

Minnie v. Port Huron Terminal Co., 295 U.S. 647 (1935).

In Minnie, the plaintiff was standing on a boat when he was struck
by a crane that was operated on land.

Id. at 647.

Because the

injury was due to the hit that plaintiff sustained while standing
“on the vessel in navigable water,” the tort occurred on the water
and thus the court had admiralty jurisdiction.

Id. at 648.

In neither case did it matter where the victim ended up after
the tort – in fact, the Taylor decedent fell from the land to the
water, while the Minnie plaintiff fell from the boat onto land.
Similarly, it did not matter in Taylor that the negligence was
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caused by a person on the water, nor did it matter in Minnie that
the tort was caused by a person on land.

These cases teach that

the tort arises where and when the injury occurs, not where the
victim ends up and not at the situs of the operative negligence.
Courts today express this principle by explaining that, for the
“locality” inquiry, “the tort ‘occurs’ where the alleged negligence
took effect.”

Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland,

Ohio, 409 U.S. 249, 266 (1972).
Even with the understanding that the tort occurs where the
alleged negligence takes effect, courts have noted the difficulty
inherent in fixing the location of an airplane crash without
relying on the fortuity of whether a plane happened to crash into
water or land.

In Executive Jet, for example, the airplane struck

a flock of birds on takeoff and suffered a nearly total loss of
engine power.

Executive Jet, 409 U.S. at 250.

The semi-stalled

plane descended, struck a portion of the airport’s perimeter fence,
and then settled in Lake Erie.
“distinctions
significance

based
where

on

Id.

locality

aircraft,

.

The court explained that
.

which

restrained, are concerned.” Id. at 266.

.
are

entirely
not

lose

their

geographically

In that court’s view, the

location inquiry cannot turn on whether the crashing plane happened
to end up on land or in water.

Id.

The court declined to decide

whether, on the facts of the case, the location element was
satisfied, and resolved the case on other grounds.
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Id. at 267-68.

The Belle Harbor court did not have the luxury of deciding the
case on other grounds, and took the location inquiry head-on.

In

re Air Crash at Belle Harbor, New York, MDL 1448, 2006 WL 1288298
(S.D.N.Y. May 9, 2006).

That case arose out of the November 2001

crash of a commercial airplane just after takeoff from New York’s
John F. Kennedy airport.

Id. at *2.

Less than two minutes after

takeoff, while the plane was over the waters of Jamaica Bay, the
plane’s vertical stabilizer separated in flight and fell into the
water.

Id.

At that point, without a vertical stabilizer, “the

Aircraft no longer was capable of flight.”

Id.

The plane

deteriorated further, as the engines broke apart from the wings and
the fuselage pitched downward.

Id.

Moments later, the aircraft

crashed into a residential neighborhood.

Id.

The Court concluded that the tort occurred when the airplane
lost its vertical stabilizer and rudder over Jamaica Bay.
*12.

Id. at

It explained that “[f]rom that moment forward, the deaths of

all those aboard the Aircraft were inevitable.”

Id.

Because “the

whole wrongful agency was put in motion and took effect over
navigable water,” the accident met the locality requirement for
admiralty jurisdiction. Id. It did not matter that the passengers
made impact with land, because that result was “totally fortuitous”
for an out-of-control fuselage, and not the sort of factor that
should determine the boundaries of federal admiralty jurisdiction.
Id.
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The Belle Harbor court relied on The Strabo, a case in which
a worker was injured after he was thrown off a ship and landed on
a dock.

The Strabo, 98 F. 998, 999 (2d Cir. 1900).

In that case,

once the victim was thrown from the ship, he knew that he was
“subjected to conditions inevitably resulting in physical injury,
wherever he finally struck.”

Id. at 1000.

The cause of action

thus commenced on the ship from which he was thrown, and it was
“not of vital importance” whether the worker fell onto land or
water.

Id.

This case differs from Belle Harbor and The Strabo in several
important respects.

Notably, this airplane was capable of flight

up until the moment it made impact with the seawall.

Unlike the

doomed and out-of-control fuselage in Belle Harbor, and the victim
in The Strabo who faced certain injury, this airplane was on a
controlled path toward the runway and just made impact with the
ground too soon.

At no point before the crash was it inevitable

that the plane would crash.

For those injured in Belle Harbor and

The Strabo, the tort was consummated at the point when injury was
inevitable.

The passengers on Flight 214 never faced inevitable

injury, and thus their tort was consummated when the airplane
struck the terrain.

In addition, all of the injuries occurred on

the ground after the airplane struck the terrain.

There is no

basis to say that the tort took effect at any point before the

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plane struck the seawall.

Thus, the tort occurred and “took

effect” on land.
Defendant contends that, based on Belle Harbor, maritime
locality is satisfied any time “the events causing the accident
were set in motion over navigable water.”
(emphasis removed).

Def.’s Opp. at 6

The “in motion” language appears in Belle

Harbor, and is actually a quote from The Strabo.

In both of those

cases, the court focused on the point at which the tort was
complete because the accident was inevitable.

Belle Harbor, 2006

WL 1288298, at *12; The Strabo, 98 F. at 1000.

That language does

not support Defendant’s contention that locality is satisfied
whenever any event that causes the injury happens over water.
The better reading of those cases recognizes that locality is
established when the tort is complete, and a tort arising out of a
crash landing is complete either once the crash happens or once the
crash is inevitable. Here, causal factors contributed to the crash
at various times before the airplane struck the seawall, but there
is

no

indication

that

those

causal

factors

made

the

crash

inevitable. Defendants have not cited any authority to support the
idea that those “pre-inevitability” factors play a role in the
admiralty

locality

analysis.

Defendant

cites

to

Brown

v.

Eurocopter S.A., but that case supports remand because the court
explained that the wrong was “consummated on the high seas” where
the aircraft was over water when the aircraft “sustained a critical
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loss

of

tail

rotor

control.”

Brown

F.Supp.2d 515, 516-18 (S.D. Tex. 1999).

v.

Eurocopter

S.A.,

38

An approach that is too

low and too slow is not the same as an uncontrollable plummet – and
that distinction is critical because it affects the point at which
the tort takes effect.

In this case, the tort was neither

inevitable while the plane was over water nor completed when the
plane was over water.
Defendant argues that some passengers were aware that the
aircraft was coming in too low and slow just before the plane hit
the seawall.

If the crash were inevitable, this awareness on the

part of the passengers could have fixed the time of injury as
before the plane hit the seawall.

But, as explained above, this

crash was not inevitable, and the tort was not complete, until the
plane hit the seawall.
Finally, Defendant argues that when the plane crashed into the
seawall, many rows of seats were still over water.

This detail is

not a basis for admiralty jurisdiction because it does not change
the fact that the tort was consummated when the airplane crashed
into land.

The only parts of the airplane that touched the water

were the portions of the landing gear and the tail that broke off
and fell in after impact and separation from the rest of the plane.
No passenger touched the water, and no part of the plane touched
the water before it broke off from the portion of the plane that
still held all the passengers.

The tort was consummated by impact

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with land, and not even for the passengers in the plane’s last row
do the claims arising out of the crash fall within the Court’s
admiralty jurisdiction.
It is important to distinguish one superficial similarity
between this case and Belle Harbor:

in both cases, the flight was

almost entirely over navigable water.

The Executive Jet Court was

concerned with not just the fortuity of where the airplane crashlands, but also, for a flight that is partially over land and
partially over water, the fortuity of whether the negligence takes
place over water or land.

For such a flight, jurisdiction should

not “depend on whether the plane happened to be flying over land or
water when the original impact of the alleged negligence occurred.”
Executive Jet, 409 U.S. at 267.

Defendant appears to argue that

this Court has jurisdiction because the airplane crashed just past
the water, and it was mere chance that the plane did not crash in
the water.
The

Court

acknowledges

that,

to

a

limited

extent,

the

boundaries of this Court’s admiralty jurisdiction are governed by
the facts of the case, some of which are outside the control of the
parties and the result of mere happenstance.

But it is not enough

to say that this Court should have admiralty jurisdiction just
because the plane was near the water when it crashed, or because
some pieces of the airplane fell into the water after the crash
into land.

The party seeking to invoke this Court’s admiralty

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jurisdiction must satisfy the Court that the tort took place on
navigable water or was caused by a vessel on navigable water.
Grubhart, 513 U.S. at 534. The result Defendant seeks would ignore
the rule from Grubhart and contradict the reasoning in Taylor and
Minnie.

To put it simply, a crash into land cannot take place on

navigable water unless that crash was inevitable while the plane
was over water.

Unlike in Belle Harbor, this crash did not become

inevitable while the plane was over water.

Accordingly, the Court

lacks admiralty jurisdiction over these cases.
III.

FEDERAL OFFICER JURISDICTION

Boeing asserts that this Court has jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), which provides for removal in cases involving
federal officers.

Boeing must show it was a (1) “person”; (2)

“acting under” the United States, its agencies, or its officers;
(3) that has been sued “for or relating to any act under color of
such office”; and (4) has a colorable federal defense.
CBS Corp., 701 F.3d 1176, 1180-81 (7th Cir. 2012).

Ruppel v.

Although the

burden of proving federal jurisdiction under § 1442 is on the
defendant,

there

is

no

presumption

against

federal

officer

jurisdiction or preference for remand; the Supreme Court has
explained

that

“the

policy

favoring

removal

should

not

be

frustrated by a narrow, grudging interpretation of § 1442(a)(1).”
Arizona v. Manypenny, 451 U.S. 232, 242 (1981).

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The central issue raised by the pending Motion is whether
Defendant was “acting under” the United States when it took the
actions challenged in the Complaint.

As the Supreme Court has

explained, “the private person’s ‘acting under’ must involve an
effort to assist, or to help carry out, the duties or tasks of the
federal superior.” Watson v. Philip Morris Cos., 551 U.S. 142, 152
(2007). The Court clarified that, when it comes to a private firm,
compliance (or noncompliance) with federal
laws, rules, and regulations does not by
itself fall within the scope of the statutory
phrase ‘acting under.’ And that is so even if
the regulation is highly detailed and even if
the private firm’s activities are highly
supervised and monitored.
Id. at 153.
Production of airplanes is heavily regulated.

Under the

Federal Aviation Act, the Secretary of Transportation is tasked
with promoting air travel safety by establishing minimum standards
for aircraft design, materials, workmanship, construction, and
performance.

United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio

Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797, 804 (1984).

Through a

multi-step certification process, airplanes are reviewed by the FAA
and certified at no fewer than three distinct stages:

(1) the

“type” stage, where the plane’s basic design is evaluated; (2) the
“production”

stage,

where

the

manufacturer’s

quality

control

systems are scrutinized to ensure that each aircraft will meet the
design provisions from the first stage; and (3) the “airworthiness”

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stage, where the specific airplane is certified safe for flight.
Id. at 805-06.

Most importantly for the pending Motion, the Act

and its implementing regulations empower the Secretary to appoint
private

individuals

“to

serve

as

designated

engineering

representatives to assist in the FAA certification process.”

49

U.S.C. § 44702(d); 14 C.F.R. § 183.29.
Defendant

explains

that

many

of

its

employees

are

FAA

delegates who acted pursuant to the Secretary’s direction when they
certified the airplane in question. Defendant avers, and the Court
has no reason to doubt, that the 777 jumbo jet at issue here was
subjected to hundreds of tests performed by Defendant’s employees
acting as delegated representatives of the FAA.
view,

the

Court

has

federal

officer

In Defendant’s

jurisdiction

because

Plaintiff’s allegations challenge the work of Defendant’s employees
who, in their capacity as federal officers, certified the plane as
safe.
As an initial matter, private FAA delegates are treated as
legally distinct from their employers.

West v. A&S Helicopters,

751 F.Supp.2d 1104, 1109 (W.D. Mo. 2010).

As the West court

explained,

their

“when

employee-designees

act

in

capacity

as

designees, they are not the same legal entity as [their employer].”
Id.

Defendant cannot claim federal officer removal on the basis

that it has employees who are designated FAA authorized agents.

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Defendant argues that, nonetheless, the Court has federal
officer jurisdiction because the Complaint, when read fairly,
relies on various theories that Defendant’s employees erred in the
certification process while serving as the FAA’s representatives.
Defendant has submitted the declaration of Anngelique Bowen, who
explains that actions taken by FAA delegates “are overseen by FAA
certification engineers.”
Removal, ¶ 3.

No. 13 C 7418, Ex. C to Def.’s Notice of

In Defendant’s view, the Court has jurisdiction

because the process of manufacturing a jumbo jet is subject to
intense regulatory scrutiny and Defendant’s employees (who also
serve as FAA delegates) worked with the FAA to ensure that the
airplane met regulatory standards.
Federal courts have been presented with this situation before.
In Swanstrom v. Teledyne Continental Motors, Inc., 531 F.Supp.2d
1325, 1327-28 (S.D. Ala. 2008), an oft-cited case, the plaintiff
brought suit against the aircraft’s manufacturer after a crash.
The manufacturer argued that it acted under the direction of a
federal officer when its employees, acting as FAA delegates,
conducted tests and prepared FAA certifications. Id. at 1331. The
Court explained that whether a defendant is acting under the
direction

of

a

federal

officer

depends

on

the

detail

and

specificity of the federal direction of the defendant’s activities
and whether the government exercises control over the defendant.
Id. at 1331.

In that case, the complaint failed to name as a

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defendant any FAA authorized agent, and there was no indication
that the FAA exercised substantial and direct control over the
manufacturing process.

Id. at 1332.

The Court reasoned that even

though “manufacturing an airplane and its parts is highly regulated
by the FAA,” the removal statute was not intended to allow any
participant of a regulated industry to remove any case challenging
regulated conduct.

Id.

Thus, the Court lacked jurisdiction under

the federal officer removal statute.
A similar dispute arose in Magnin v. Teledyne Continental
Motors, 91 F.3d 1424, 1426 (11th Cir. 1996).

After a private plane

crashed, the plaintiff sued the manufacturer of the airplane and
one of the manufacturer’s employees.

Id.

that

inspection

the

defendants’

negligent

The plaintiff alleged
and

wrongful

certification of the aircraft’s engine was a proximate cause of the
accident.

Id.

The

complaint

described

the

employee

as

“a

designated manufacturing inspection representative (DMIR) that
certified

engines

‘airworthy’

installation on aircraft.”

Id.

or

safe

for

exportation

and

In the removal petition, the

defendants averred that the employee, in his capacity as an FAA
delegate, was “acting under an officer or agency of the United
States . . . when he did the act for which he was sued.”
1428.

Id. at

Removal was proper because the suit was brought against a

federal officer challenging actions taken within the scope of his
federal duties.

Id.
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Here, just as in Swanstrom but unlike in Magnin, Plaintiffs
have sued the corporate manufacturer only, and not the employees
responsible for certifying the plane.

The Complaints in these

cases seek damages for product liability and negligence, and do not
challenge certification – again, just as in Swanstrom but unlike in
Magnin.
In addition, the fact that the FAA oversees the work of
Defendant’s employees is not sufficient to show that the FAA
controlled Defendant’s day-to-day operations, which, as explained
above, is required for federal officer jurisdiction under Watson.
Ordinarily, “the FAA does not control the day-to-day operations of
designated airworthiness representatives,” nor does it “manage the
details of a designated representative’s work or supervise him in
his daily investigative duties.”

Charlima, Inc. v. United States,

873 F.2d 1078, 1081 (8th Cir. 1989). The Declaration of Anngelique
Bowen notes, consistent with the general rule, that delegates “are
overseen by FAA certification engineers.”

No. 13 C 7418, Ex. C to

Def.’s Notice of Removal, ¶ 3. But mere oversight is insufficient;
just as in Swanstrom, there is no contract or agency relationship
between Defendant and the FAA, nor was there “substantial and
direct

control”

over

the

Defendant

as

a

corporate

entity.

Swanstrom, 531 F.Supp.2d at 1331-32.
Defendant’s reliance on Scrogin v. Rolls-Royce Corp., No. 10
C 442, 2010 WL 3547706 (D. Conn. Aug. 16, 2010) is misplaced.
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In

that case, the three corporate defendants manufactured a specific
model of helicopter engine and, pursuant to a procurement contract,
sold that engine to the United States Army exclusively.

Id. at *2.

One of the defendants had delegated authority from the FAA, and
“[a]n FAA employee/advisor closely supervise[d] the [delegate] to
ensure it [was] performing its delegated functions” in accordance
with FAA regulations, policies and procedures.

Id. at *4.

In a

tort claim arising out of a helicopter crash, the court had federal
officer jurisdiction, even though no individual employee was named
as a defendant, because the corporation, as a military contractor,
“was subject to monitoring and/or supervision by the federal
authorities.”

Id. at *5.

These consolidated cases do not implicate work undertaken
pursuant to a government contract, and Defendant was not subjected
to

the

same

level

of

monitoring

contractor defendant in Scrogin.

and

supervision

as

was

the

Thus, Scrogin does not control

the result here. See also, Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487
U.S. 500, 506 (1988) (explaining that “civil liabilities arising
out of the performance of federal procurement contracts” implicate
a “uniquely federal interest”).
Defendant’s other supporting case is inapplicable.

In AIG

Europe v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., No. 02 C 8703, 2003 WL 257702,
at *1 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2003), the plaintiffs sued an airplane
manufacturer for damages incurred in a plane crash. The plaintiffs
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alleged that defendants “negligently failed to comply with the
process for certifying” the aircraft.

Id. at *2.

The Court found

that the defendant “was acting under a federal officer within the
meaning of § 1442(a)(1) when the plane at issue was certified.”
Id. at *4.

Here, in contrast, Plaintiffs do not assert negligent

certification or any other defects in the certification process.
Defendant acknowledges this distinction, yet insists that
there can be no challenge to airworthiness that is independent of
certification. But Defendant cites no authority for that argument,
and the Court is not persuaded that a suit against an airplane
manufacturer for product liability and negligence is necessarily
also a suit against the manufacturer’s employees for negligent
certification.

Defendant might have been correct if federal

aviation law preempted state tort law completely, but that is not
the case – federal aviation law preempts state law only to the
extent that the two conflict.

Vorhees v. Naper Aero Club, Inc.,

272 F.3d 398, 405 (7th Cir. 2001); see also, Britton v. Rolls Royce
Engine Servs., No. 05 C 1057, 2005 WL 1562855, at *4 (N.D. Cal.
June 30, 2005) (remanding where the complaint did not name any
individual defendants, did not specifically identify the defendant
as a federal officer, and did not allege that the defendant’s
issuance of an airworthiness certificate was a proximate cause of
the accident).

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Finally, Defendant appears to argue that it was “acting under
the United States” because it is an FAA delegate – apparently, the
FAA

has

authorized

Boeing

to

act

as

its

representative

in

performing delegated functions, including certification functions.
The phrase “acting under” is construed liberally. Watson v. Philip
Morris Cos., 551 U.S. 142, 147 (2007). However, Defendant does not
cite – and the Court could not find – any case that upheld federal
officer jurisdiction on the ground that the corporation itself is
the federal officer; in fact, Courts appear to go the other way.
See, O’Brien v. Cessna Aircraft Co., No. 09-C-40, 2010 WL 4721189
(D. Neb. July 21, 2010).

In O’Brien, the Defendant, Cessna

Aircraft Co., was an FAA delegate, and pursuant to its delegation
was “entitled to issue aircraft type certificates and police
compliance

with

minimum

standards.”

Id.

at

*6.

The

Court

explained that the defendant-manufacturer could not remove simply
because it was an FAA delegate.

Id. at *13.

Declining to reach a

result that would allow every airplane negligence claim to end up
in federal court, the Court held that it lacked jurisdiction under
the federal officer removal statute.

Id.

Ultimately, Plaintiffs have not challenged any of the actions
taken under color of law.

Defendant’s defense of compliance with

federal aviation regulations is insufficient to bring its rebuttal
within the scope of “acting under a federal official.” Watson, 551
U.S. at 153 (explaining that even close supervision and monitoring
- 19 -

of a private firm’s compliance with federal rules and regulations
does

not

permit

jurisdiction).

removal

on

the

basis

of

federal

officer

Defendant’s theory of this Court’s jurisdiction

would allow it to remove any case to federal court based on its
status alone, but that idea conflicts with the purpose of federal
officer removal: to protect federal officers only insofar as they
are

being

sued

for

acts

taken

under

color

Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 406 (1969).

of

their

office.

Accordingly, the

Court lacks federal officer jurisdiction.
IV.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, the Court lacks both admiralty
and federal officer jurisdiction.

The Motions to Remand are

granted.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge
United States District Court
Date:12/16/2013

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