J&J Sports Productions, Inc. v. Salazar et al
Filing
34
MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Joan B. Gottschall on 11/18/2014. Mailed notice(ef, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
J&J SPORTS PRODUCTIONS, INC.,
Plaintiff,
v.
LAURA SALAZAR, individually and
d/b/a JOHNNY O’S INC. d/b/a JOHNNY
O’S PIZZA & ITALIAN BEEF and
JOHNNY O’S INC. d/b/a JOHNNY O’S
PIZZA & ITALIAN BEEF,
Defendants.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Judge Joan B. Gottschall
No. 13 CV 7883
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
Plaintiff J&J Sports Productions, Inc. (“J&J Sports”) filed a complaint on
November 4, 2013 against Laura Salazar (“Salazar”) individually and doing business as
Johnny O’s Pizza and Italian Beef, Inc. (“Johnny O’s”). J&J Sports alleges violations of
47 U.S.C. §§ 553 (the “Cable Act”) and 605 (the “Communications Act”), contending
that Johnny O’s improperly televised a boxing match despite J&J Sport’s exclusive
television distribution rights for the match. Defendant Salazar seeks to dismiss the
complaint against her pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For the
reasons stated below, the motion is denied.
I. FACTS
The court draws the following facts from J&J Sports’ complaint and accepts them
as true for purposes of the motion to dismiss. See Cincinnati Life Ins. Co. v. Beyrer, 722
F.3d 939, 946 (7th Cir. 2013).
J&J Sports, a California corporation, executed a contract and paid for the exclusive
nationwide television distribution rights for the November 12, 2011 Manny Pacquiao v.
Juan Manuel Marquez, WBO Welterweight Championship Fight Program (“Program”).
J&J Sports executed contracts with various entities that allowed the entities to pay to
exhibit the Program. Johnny O’s, a now-defunct Chicago bar, did not have authorization
to exhibit the Program.1 Regardless, it did so on November 12, 2011. Salazar was an
individual with supervisory capacity and control over the activities occurring at Johnny
O’s on the day of the Program and received financial benefit from Johnny O’s operations
on that date.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
“A motion under 12(b)(6) tests whether the complaint states a claim on which
relief may be granted.” Richards v. Mitcheff, 696 F.3d 635, 635 (7th Cir. 2012). A
complaint must include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The short and plain statement must “give the
defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell
Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citation omitted). To survive a motion to
dismiss, the complaint must have “facial plausibility,” which occurs “when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 622, 678
(2009). In addition, on a defendant’s motion to dismiss, a court must “accept as true all of
the factual allegations contained in the complaint.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94
(2007) (citations omitted).
Johnny O’s was dissolved as a corporation on February 10, 2012. (See Order, ECF No.
26.)
1
2
III. ANALYSIS
Salazar seeks to dismiss the complaint against her. She asserts that the “complaint
reveals no factual basis to hold [her liable] in her individual capacity for violations” of
the Cable Act and that “the complaint fails to state a claim against [her] in her individual
capacity.” (Def. Mtn., ECF No. 28.) This is the entirety of Salazar’s “argument” in her
motion to dismiss. In Salazar’s reply, she attempts to argue that “there is no allegation
that [she] actually did anything” and “there is no allegation of affirmative or specific
action taken by [her] against plaintiff or plaintiff’s rights.” (Id.)
Salazar’s contention that “a review of the complaint reveals no factual basis to hold
[her liable] in her individual capacity for violations of the Act” and that “[p]laintiff fails
to state a claim against [her] in her individual capacity upon which relief can be granted”
is unavailing. In her two-page motion, which consists of seven paragraphs – two of which
simply repeat the basis for the suit and one of which informs the court that it has
authority to dismiss cases under 12(b)(6) – Salazar offers neither authority nor analysis to
support her contention that the suit against her in her individual capacity should be
dismissed.
Instead, relevant authority counsels denying the motion to dismiss. Under the Cable
Act, no person shall “intercept or receive or assist in intercepting or receiving any
communications service offered over a cable system.” See 47 U.S.C. § 553. The
Communications Act similarly prohibits “anyone from receiving or assisting in receiving
certain communications without authorization.” See 47 U.S. § 605.2 Individual liability
2
Plaintiffs cannot recover under both Acts because § 605 applies to the unlawful
interception of cable programming transmitted through the air and § 553 applies to the
interception of cable programming transmitted over a cable system. See J&J Sports
3
for violations of either act may arise when an individual has a right and ability to
supervise the violations. See J&J Sports Prods. Inc. v. Ribeirao, 562 F.Supp.2d 498, 501
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“To hold Ribeiro vicariously liable in her individual capacity under
§ 605, J&J Sports must show that Ribiero had a right and ability to supervise the
violations, and that she had a strong financial interest in such activities.”).
A complaint states a plausible claim for relief against an individual when it alleges
that the individual had (1) a right and ability to supervise the violations and (2) a financial
interest in committing the violations (i.e., profits realized from exhibiting the fight to
customers). For example, in Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Hurley, David Hurley was
sued as an individual for violating the Cable Act or the Communication Act. Joe Hand
Promotions, Inc. v. Hurley, No. 11-0538-DRH, 2011 WL 6727989, at *2, (S.D. Ill. Dec.
21, 2011). The allegations in the complaint against him stated, in relevant part:
David Hurley is an individual and the principal, alter ego, officer, director,
shareholder, employee, agent, and/or other representative of a business entity,
DAVID HURLEY LTD. d/b/a HURLEY’S DANCE CLUB.
...
[E]ach and every of the above named defendants and/or their agents, servants,
workmen, or employees did unlawfully publish, divulge, and exhibit the
Program at the time of its transmission at the address of each of their
respective establishments, as indicated above. Such unauthorized
interception, publication, exhibition and divulgence by each of the defendants
was done wilfully [sic] and for purposes of direct or indirect commercial
advantage or private financial gain.
Id.
The court in Hurley found that these allegations in the complaint stated a claim for
relief against the plaintiff that was “plausible on its face.” Id. (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
Productions, Inc. v. Rezdndiz, No. 08-C-4121, 2008 WL 5211288, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 9,
2008). However, complaints that allege violations under both Acts are construed to mean
that a plaintiff is pleading in the alternative since discovery is usually necessary to
determine how the program is intercepted. Id.
4
556 U.S. 662). See also Rezdndiz, 2008 WL 5211288, at *2; Joe Hand Promotions, Inc.
v. Speakeasy GB, LLC, No. 12-C-0343, 2013 WL 64630, at *2 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 4, 2013)
(finding personal liability appropriate where the complaint alleged “upon information and
belief that the [named individual] was the individual with supervisory capacity and
control over the activities occurring [at the bar] and that she received financial benefit
from the operations [on the night the violation occurred.]”).
Here the complaint alleges that “Laura Salazar is an officer, director, shareholder
and/or principal of Johnny O’s Inc. d/b/a Johnny O’s Pizza & Italian Beef.” (Complaint
¶ 8, ECF No. 1.) It also alleges that Salazar “was an individual with supervisory capacity
and control over the activities occurring within the establishment of Johnny O’s . . . on
November 12, 2011,” and that she “received a financial benefit from the operations of
Johnny O’s Inc. . . . on November 12, 2011.” (Id. at ¶ 17.) The complaint also states:
With full knowledge that the Program was not to be intercepted, received and
exhibited by entities unauthorized to do so, each and every of the above
named defendants and/or their agents, servants, workmen or employees did
unlawfully publish, divulge and exhibit the Program at the time of its
transmission at the addresses of their respective establishments, as indicated
above. Said unauthorized interception, publication, exhibition and divulgence
by each of the defendants was done willfully and for purposes of direct or
indirect commercial advantage or private financial gain.
(Complaint at ¶ 17.)
Because the language in J&J Sports’ complaint precisely tracks language that has
been held to state a claim for relief that is “plausible on its face,” the court denies
Salazar’s motion to dismiss.
In sum, J&J Sports has clearly alleged that Salazar was an individual with
supervisory control over the establishment where the unauthorized broadcast was shown
and that she received a financial benefit from the operations of the establishment. Such
5
allegations are sufficient to survive the motion to dismiss.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth in this Order, the court denies Salazar’s motion to dismiss
the complaint against her.
ENTER:
/s/
JOAN B. GOTTSCHALL
United States District Judge
DATED: November 18, 2014
6
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?