Velocity Patent LLC v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC et al
Filing
142
MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable John W. Darrah on 9/21/2016. Mailed notice (mc, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
VELOCITY PATENT LLC,
Plaintiff,
v.
MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC;
MERDECES-BENZ U.S.
INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
Defendants.
VELOCITY PATENT LLC,
Plaintiff,
v.
FCA US LLC,
Defendant.
VELOCITY PATENT LLC,
Plaintiff,
v.
AUDI OF AMERICA, INC.,
Defendant.
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Case No. 13-cv-8413
Judge John W. Darrah
Case No. 13-cv-8419
Judge John W. Darrah
Case No. 13-cv-8418
Judge John W. Darrah
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Velocity Patent, LLC (“Velocity”) filed a Complaint against Defendants
Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC and Mercedes-Benz U.S. International, Inc. and Amended
Complaints against FCA US LLC and Audi of America, Inc., each alleging one count of
infringement for several claims of U.S. Patent No. 5,954,781 (“the ‘781 Patent”). On
April 12, 2016, the Court held a claims-construction hearing, which included the argument of
counsel for each party and the submissions of written summations by each party. The Court also
considered the PowerPoint presentations presented by the parties at the hearing.
BACKGROUND
The ‘781 Patent was issued on September 21, 1999. The patent is entitled “METHOD
AND APPARATUS FOR OPTIMIZING VEHICLE OPERATION” and describes a system that
“notifies the driver of recommended corrections in vehicle operation and, under certain
conditions, automatically initiates selected corrective action.” (‘781 Pat. at 1:7-10.) The patent
generally claims several sensors, a memory subsystem, a processor subsystem, and notification
circuits.
2
The notification circuits provide warnings to the driver that certain conditions are present.
Velocity asserts Claims 1, 7, 13, 17-20, 28, 3-34, 40-42, 46, 53, 56, 58, 60, 64, 66, 69, 75-76, and
88 of the ‘781 Patent against Defendants. 1
LEGAL STANDARD
Claim construction is a question of law. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d
967, 970 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Claim construction involves “determining the meaning and scope of
the patent claims asserted to be infringed.” Id. at 976. In construing the claim, the court does
not “rewrite claims” but, rather, “give[s] effect to the terms chosen by the patentee.”
K-2 Corp. v. Salomon S.A., 191 F.3d 1356, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1999). The words of a claim are
“generally given their ordinary and customary meaning,” that is, “the meaning that the term
would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention.”
Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312-13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citations omitted.)
In interpreting claims, “the court should look first to the intrinsic evidence of record, i.e.,
the patent itself, including the claims, the specification and, if in evidence, the prosecution
history.” Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996). The
specification is “highly relevant to the claim construction analysis,” is “usually . . . dispositive”
and is “the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.” Id. However, limitations from
the specification describing embodiments must not be imported into a claim that does not recite
those limitations. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323.
The court may also consider extrinsic evidence, such as expert testimony, dictionaries
and learned treatises. Markman, 52 F.3d at 980. However, “[e]xtrinsic evidence is to be used for
1
Claims 28, 41, and 88 are not asserted against Mercedes.
3
the court’s understanding of the patent, not for the purpose of varying or contradicting the terms
of the claims.” Id. at 981.
ANALYSIS
“Fuel Overinjection Notification Circuit”
The parties dispute the proper construction of the term “fuel overinjection notification
circuit . . . , said fuel overinjection notification circuit issuing a notification that excessive fuel is
being supplied to said engine of said vehicle.” This term is located in Claims 1, 7, 13, 17, 28, 60,
69, and 76. The following are the parties’ proposed constructions:
Velocity’s Proposed Construction
Defendants’ Proposed Construction
A circuit that notifies a driver of a reduced
fuel economy condition at the time of the
condition.
Mercedes/FCA: The term “excessive fuel
is being supplied to said engine” is
indefinite. In the alternative, that term
means “more fuel than is proper is being
supplied to the engine.”
Audi: Indefinite
Indefiniteness
Defendants argue that this term is indefinite. A patent must “conclude with one or more
claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant
regards as [the] invention.” 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2. A lack of definiteness renders the patent or any
claim in suit invalid. 35 U.S.C. § 282, ¶ 2(3).1. “[A] patent is invalid for indefiniteness if its
claims, read in light of the specification delineating the patent, and the prosecution history, fail to
inform, with reasonable certainty, those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention.”
Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2124 (2014).
“Some modicum of uncertainty . . . is the ‘price of ensuring the appropriate incentives for
innovation.’” Id. at 2128 (quoting Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535
4
U.S. 722, 732 (2002)). However, “a patent must be precise enough to afford clear notice of what
is claimed, thereby appris[ing] the public of what is still open to them.” Id. at 2129. “The
properties and purpose of the invention, together with the examples provided by the
specification, [must] apprise an ordinary-skilled artisan of the scope of the invention.”
Delaware Display Grp. LLC v. Lenovo Grp. Ltd, No. CA 13-2108-RGA, 2015 WL 6870031, at
*6 (D. Del. Nov. 6, 2015). “[T]he burden of proving indefiniteness remains on the party
challenging [the patent’s] validity and that they must establish it by clear and convincing
evidence.” Dow Chem. Co. v. Nova Chemicals Corp. (Canada), 809 F.3d 1223, 1227 (Fed. Cir.
2015).
Plaintiff argues that the “fuel overinjection notification circuit” does not contain a term of
degree and is not indefinite because the claim provides for a notification. However, the
notification is activated when “excessive fuel” is being supplied to the engine and “excessive
fuel” is a term of degree. However, terms of degree are not “inherently indefinite.”
Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc., 766 F.3d 1364, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 136 S.
Ct. 59, 193 L. Ed. 2d 207 (2015). A term of degree provides insufficient notice of its scope if it
depends “on the unpredictable vagaries of any one person’s opinion.” Id. at 1371 (citing
Datamize, LLC v. Plumtree Software, Inc., 417 F.3d 1342, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). In
Interval Licensing, the patents described a system that selectively displayed generated images “in
an unobtrusive manner that does not distract a user of the display device . . . .”
Interval Licensing LLC, 766 F.3d 1364, 1368. The Federal Circuit found the claim term
“unobtrusive manner” indefinite, referencing the term’s highly subjective nature and its failure to
provide guidance to one of skill in the art. Id. at 1371. Whether an image was obtrusive
depended on the preferences of any particular viewer and the circumstances under which the
5
image was viewed. Id. Thus, the patent did not provide enough guidance to one practiced in the
art.
In Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 789 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2015), the claim
limitation at issue recited the term “molecular weight” without specifying the meaning of that
term. Teva, 789 F.3d at 1341. The patentee argued that average molecular weight had a
presumed meaning in the context of the patent. Id. However, the Court held that the claims
were indefinite because there were multiple relevant measures for molecular weight and that “the
claim on its face offers no guidance on which measure of ‘molecular weight’ the claims cover.”
Id. “The burden of proving indefiniteness includes proving not only that multiple measurement
techniques exist, but that one of skill in the art would not know how to choose among them.”
Dow Chem. Co., 809 F.3d at 1227.
The ‘781 patent describes itself as claiming an “[a]pparatus for optimizing operation of
an engine driven vehicle.” (‘781 Pat.) Further, the specification notes that “operating a vehicle
at excessive speed, excessive RPM and/or excessive manifold pressure will result in both
reduced fuel economy and increased operating costs,” and that the purpose of the invention is to
provide a system “which will enhance the efficient operation” of the vehicle. (’781 Pat. at 1:1518; 2:2-3). The intrinsic record also shows that the ‘781 patent was meant to promote efficient
operation of a vehicle in terms of fuel efficiency and fuel economy. See, e.g., (JA 112, 260,
337.)
Defendants argue that the patent “must identify (1) a standard to measure the relative
term (e.g., how the amount of fuel being supplied to the engine should be measured) and (2) an
objective boundary (e.g., a point of reference used to determine whether an amount of fuel [is]
‘excessive’).” (Defs’ Br. at p. 5.) However, a claim does not necessarily need to reference a
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precise numerical measurement. See Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Applera Corp., 599 F.3d 1325, 1335
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (“Because the intrinsic evidence here provides a general guideline and examples
sufficient to enable a person of ordinary skill in the art to determine [the scope of the claims], . . .
, the claims are not indefinite even though the construction of the term ‘not interfering
substantially’ defines the term without reference to a precise numerical measurement.”) (internal
citations and quotations omitted)). Furthermore, the lack of a standard to measure the amount of
fuel being supplied to the engine speaks to the breadth of the patent. A broad claim does not
“prevent the public from understanding the scope of the patent.” Ultimax Cement Mfg. Corp. v.
CTS Cement Mfg. Corp., 587 F.3d 1339, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2009); SmithKline Beecham Corp. v.
Apotex Corp., 403 F.3d 1331, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“[B]readth is not indefiniteness.” (quotation
and citation omitted)). “A broad claim can be definite even where there is no precise numerical
boundary so long as a person of skill in the art can determine the scope with reasonable
certainty.” GPNE Corp. v. Apple Inc., 108 F. Supp. 3d 839, 874 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (citing
Enzo Biochem, Inc., 599 F.3d at 1335; Nautilus, 134 S. Ct. at 2124).
Further, the patent itself contains examples of when the “fuel overinjection notification
circuit” should be activated. For example, the fuel overinjection notification circuit is activated
when: (1) road speed and throttle position for the vehicle are increasing; and (2) manifold
pressure for the vehicle is above the manifold pressure set point. (’781 Pat. at 2:19-27.) The fuel
overinjection notification circuit is activated if both (1) throttle position and manifold pressure
for the vehicle are increasing; and (2) road speed and engine speed for the vehicle are decreasing.
(Id. at 2:28-36). “[A] patent which defines a claim phrase through examples may satisfy the
definiteness requirement.” Interval Licensing LLC, 766 F.3d at 1373; see also
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DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“For other terms
like, for example, terms of degree, specific and unequivocal examples may be sufficient to
provide a skilled artisan with clear notice of what is claimed.”). These examples provide a
method of measurement or assessment.
The patent provides a general guideline and examples sufficient to enable a person of
ordinary skill in the art to determine the scope of the claims. Defendants have not shown, by
clear and convincing evidence, that the ‘781 Patent fails to inform, with reasonable certainty, an
individual skilled in the art about the scope of the invention in light of the specification and the
prosecution history. The term “excessive fuel” is not indefinite under the Nautilus test.
Construction
Mercedes and FCA argue that, in the alternative to the term being indefinite, “excessive
fuel” should be construed as “more fuel than is proper is being supplied to the engine.” The
entire phrase would be “fuel overinjection notification circuit . . . , said fuel overinjection
notification circuit issuing a notification that more fuel than is proper is being supplied to the
engine of said vehicle.” Plaintiff’s proposed construction is: “A circuit that notifies a driver of a
reduced fuel economy condition at the time of the condition.”
The words of a claim are “generally given their ordinary and customary meaning,” that is,
“the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the
time of the invention.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312-13. Additionally, a “claim construction that
gives meaning to all the terms of the claim is preferred over one that does not do so.”
Merck & Co. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 395 F.3d 1364, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Plaintiff argues
that Mercedes and FCA’s construction would read out the preferred embodiment of the claim
because there is no description of a way to measure the amount of fuel being supplied to the
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engine. Defendants respond that the fuel does not need to be measured directly but can be
measured indirectly by proxies, i.e., the various sensors described in the patent. This is one of
the arguments Plaintiff makes as to why the notification of excessive fuel use is not indefinite,
because it is based on data measured by the sensors. Defendants’ construction does not read out
the preferred embodiment.
Specifications are the “primary basis for construing the claims.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at
1315 (quoting Standard Oil Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448, 452 (Fed.Cir.1985)).
However, limitations from the specification describing embodiments must not be imported into a
claim that does not recite those limitations. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323. Therefore, it would be
improper to read a notification of fuel efficiency, which is only located in dependent Claim 42 2,
into a claim that does not recite that limitation. According to the Merriam-Webster dictionary,
excessive is defined as “exceeding what is usual, proper, necessary, or normal.” However,
Defendants’ use of the word “proper” does not adequately describe the claim. Efficiency is
based on how much of something is necessary to complete a particular task.
The Court adopts the following construction for the term “fuel overinjection notification
circuit . . . , said fuel overinjection notification circuit issuing a notification that excessive fuel is
being supplied to said engine of said vehicle”: A circuit that notifies a driver that more fuel is
being supplied to the engine than is necessary.
2
Claim 42 recites an: “Apparatus for optimizing operation of a vehicle according to
claim 1, wherein said notification that excessive fuel is being supplied to said engine of said
vehicle notifies a driver that the vehicle is not being operated fuel efficiently.” (JA 670, 2:9-12.)
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“Insufficient Engine Speed”
The parties dispute the proper construction of the term “insufficient engine speed” in
Claims 7 and 13. The following are the parties’ proposed constructions:
Velocity’s Proposed Construction
Defendants’ Proposed Construction
Engine rotation speed falls below a threshold
Indefinite
Defendants argue that this term is also indefinite because there is no objective boundary.
As previously discussed, a “claim can be definite even where there is no precise numerical
boundary so long as a person of skill in the art can determine the scope with reasonable
certainty.” GPNE Corp., 108 F. Supp. 3d at 874. Further, other parts of the patent make
reference to manufacturers’ guidelines for engine-specific thresholds. While the patent does not
point to specific threshold, “[s]ome modicum of uncertainty . . . is the ‘price of ensuring the
appropriate incentives for innovation.’” Nautilus, Inc., 134 S. Ct. at 2128 (quoting Festo Corp.,
535 U.S. at 732.) For the reasons discussed above, Defendants have not shown, by clear and
convincing evidence, that the ‘781 Patent fails to inform, with reasonable certainty, an individual
skilled in the art about the scope of the invention in light of the specification and the prosecution
history.
The Court adopts the following construction for the term “insufficient engine speed”:
Engine rotation speed falls below a threshold.
“A Processor Subsystem . . . Said Processor Subsystem Determining . . .”
The parties dispute the proper construction of the phrase, “a processor subsystem . . . said
processor subsystem determining . . .” in Claims 1, 7, 13, 17, 60, 69, and 76. The following are
the parties’ proposed constructions:
10
Velocity’s Proposed Construction
Defendants’ Proposed Construction
The term is not governed by 35 U.S.C.
The term is governed by 35 U.S.C. § 112
§ 112 ¶ 6. The term does not require further ¶ 6.
construction.
Defendants argue that the term “processor subsystem” is governed by 35 U.S.C. § 112(f),
formerly § 112 ¶ 6, which states:
An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step for
performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in
support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding
structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.
35 U.S.C. § 112(f).
When a claim term lacks the word “means,” 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) is presumed to not apply
unless “the challenger demonstrates that the claim term fails to ‘recite sufficiently definite
structure’ or else recites ‘function without reciting sufficient structure for performing that
function.’” Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quoting
Watts v. XL Sys., Inc., 232 F.3d 877, 880 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). The standard for whether the meansplus-function limitation applies is “whether the words of the claim are understood by persons of
ordinary skill in the art to have a sufficiently definite meaning as the name for structure.”
Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1349. Defendants argue that “processor subsystem” is a nonce term that
can mean anything. However, “[e]ven if a patentee elects to use a ‘generic’ claim term, such as
‘a nonce word or a verbal construct,’ properly construing that term (in view of the specification,
prosecution history, etc.) may still provide sufficient structure such that the presumption against
means-plus-function claiming remains intact.” Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1299
(Fed. Cir. 2014) overruled on other grounds by Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339
(Fed. Cir. 2015).
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Sufficiently Definite Structure
For the purposes of § 112(f), “it is sufficient if the claim term is used in common parlance
or by persons of skill in the pertinent art to designate structure, even if the term covers a broad
class of structures and even if the term identifies the structures by their function.”
Lighting World, Inc. v. Birchwood Lighting, Inc., 382 F.3d 1354, 1359-60 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
overruled on other grounds by Williamson, 792 F.3d 1339. “[T]he Federal Circuit only requires
. . . that the claim recite some structure to avoid § 112(6) and has repeatedly rejected as ‘unduly
restrictive’ the argument that ‘specific structure’ is necessary.” GoDaddy.com, LLC v.
RPost Commc’ns Ltd., No. CV-14-00126-PHX-JAT, 2016 WL 212676, at *55 (D. Ariz. Jan. 19,
2016) (citing Lighting World, 382 F.3d at 1359-60). As the court in GoDaddy.com found, “one
of ordinary skill in the art would understand that ‘processor’ encompasses a microprocessor or
microcontroller ̶ structural terms.” Id. at *56. Indeed, the patent specifications provide a
microprocessor as an example of a processor subsystem. (‘781, 5:54.) The patent recites a
sufficiently definite structure.
Sufficient Structure for Performing a Function
However, the presumption against application of § 112(f) may also be overcome if the
claim recites “function without reciting sufficient structure for performing that function.”
Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1349 (quoting Watts, 232 F.3d at 880). The patent provides for several
different functions that may be generally described as receiving information from the sensors,
exchanging data with the memory subsystem, and determining whether to activate a notification
circuit.
If a processor provides general functions, then the term “processor” may provide
sufficient structure for performing those functions. See In re Katz Interactive Call Processing
12
Patent Litig., 639 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding that functions such as “processing,”
“receiving,” and “storing” that can be achieved by any general purpose computer without special
programming do not require disclosure of more structure than the general purpose processor that
performs those functions). However, the claim language states that the processor subsystem
“determines” whether to activate a notification circuit. This implies that the processor subsystem
must compare data, in conjunction with the memory subsystem, in order to determine whether or
not to activate a notification circuit, which requires additional programming of the processor.
See GoDaddy.com, LLC, 2016 WL 212676, at *56 (“. . . the Court concludes that ‘associating’
two sets of data in order to ‘generate’ a third set of data is not a typical function found in a
general purpose processor and requires additional programming of the processor to
implement.”). Because the claim does not provide sufficient structure for performing those
functions, the presumption is overcome, and § 112(f) applies.
Means Plus Function Construction
Because the patent calls for a processor to perform more than a general function, an
algorithm is required. See EON Corp. IP Holdings LLC v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 785 F.3d 616,
623 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“A microprocessor or general purpose computer lends sufficient structure
only to basic functions of a microprocessor. All other computer-implemented functions require
disclosure of an algorithm.”). The algorithm that transforms the general purpose processor into a
special purpose processor that performs the claimed function is required. See Aristocrat, 521
F.3d at 1333. Plaintiff argues that the Defendants’ constructions would render several dependent
claims superfluous. However, as Defendants argue, “[a] means-plus-function limitation is not
made open-ended by the presence of another claim specifically claiming the disclosed structure
which underlies the means clause or an equivalent of that structure.” Laitram Corp. v.
13
Rexnord, Inc., 939 F.2d 1533, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1991). Further, Plaintiff provides no alternate
constructions for a means-plus-function construction.
The Court adopts the Defendants’ constructions:
“Processor” Subsystem
“a processor subsystem . . . said processor
subsystem determining, based upon data
received from said plurality of sensors,
when to activate said fuel overinjection
circuit and when to activate [said upshift
notification circuit [claim 1] / said
downshift notification circuit [claim 7] /
said upshift notification circuit and said
downshift notification circuit [claim 13]]”
Claims
1, 7,
13
Construction
Function: determining, based upon data
received from said plurality of sensors,
when to activate said fuel overinjection
circuit and when to activate:
• [said upshift notification circuit
[claim 1] /
• said downshift notification circuit
[claim 7] /
• said upshift notification circuit and
said downshift notification circuit
[claim 13]]
Corresponding Structure: a
microprocessor programmed to perform
the algorithm described at 11:13-13:35
and Figs. 2A-2B. Specifically, the
algorithm includes:
[Claims 1, 7, and 13] Activating the Fuel
Overinjection Notification Circuit When:
1. Road speed is increasing; and
2. Throttle position is increasing; and
3. Manifold pressure is above a manifold
pressure set
point;
Or
1. Road speed is decreasing; and
2. Throttle position is increasing; and
3. Manifold pressure is increasing; and
4. Engine speed is decreasing.
[Claims 1 and 13] Activating the Upshift
Notification
Circuit When:
1. Road speed is increasing; and
2. Throttle position is increasing; and
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“Processor” Subsystem
Claims
Construction
3. Manifold pressure is at or below a
manifold pressure set point; and
4. Engine speed is at or above an engine
speed set
point.
“a processor subsystem . . . said processor
subsystem determining, based upon data
received from said radar detector, said at
least one sensor and said memory
subsystem, when to activate said vehicle
proximity alarm circuit, when to activate
said fuel overinjection circuit and when to
activate said upshift notification circuit”
17
[Claims 7 and 13] Activating the
Downshift
Notification Circuit When:
1. Road speed is decreasing; and
2. Throttle position is increasing; and
3. Manifold pressure is increasing; and
4. Engine speed is decreasing.
Function: [Claim 17] determining, based
upon data received from said radar
detector, said at least one sensor and said
memory subsystem, when to activate said
vehicle proximity alarm circuit, when to
activate said fuel overinjection circuit, and
when to activate said upshift notification
circuit
Corresponding Structure: a
microprocessor programmed to perform
the algorithm described at 9:29-10:50 and
11:13-13:7 and Figs. 2A-2B. Specifically,
the algorithm includes:
Activating the Vehicle Proximity Alarm
Circuit When:
1. The distance to the object is less than
the stopping distance retrieved from the
selected speed/stopping distance table;
and
2. The vehicle brake is off; and
3. The vehicle speed is > 35 mph.
Activating the Fuel Overinjection
Notification Circuit When:
1. Road speed is increasing; and
2. Throttle position is increasing; and
3. Manifold pressure is above a manifold
pressure set point;
15
“Processor” Subsystem
Claims
Construction
Or
1. Road speed is decreasing; and
2. Throttle position is increasing; and
3. Manifold pressure is increasing; and
4. Engine speed is decreasing.
“a processor subsystem . . . said processor
subsystem determining whether to activate
said vehicle proximity alarm circuit based
upon separation distance data received
from said radar detector, vehicle speed
data received from said road speed sensor
and said first vehicle speed/stopping
distance table stored in said memory
subsystem”
60, 69,
76
Activating the Upshift Notification Circuit
When:
1. Road speed is increasing; and
2. Throttle position is increasing; and
3. Manifold pressure is at or below a
manifold pressure set point; and
4. Engine speed is at or above an engine
speed set point.
Function: determining whether to
activate said vehicle proximity alarm
circuit based upon separation distance
data received from said radar detector,
vehicle speed data received from said road
speed sensor and said first vehicle
speed/stopping distance table stored in
said memory subsystem
Corresponding Structure: a
microprocessor programmed to perform
the algorithm described at 9:29-10:50 and
Figs. 2A-2B. Specifically, the algorithm
includes:
“a processor subsystem . . . said processor
subsystem determines whether to activate
said fuel overinjection circuit based upon
at least the data received from said road
speed sensor”
60
Activating the Vehicle Proximity Alarm
Circuit When:
1. The distance to the object is less than
the stopping distance retrieved from the
selected speed/stopping distance table;
and
2. The vehicle brake is off; and
3. The vehicle speed is > 35 mph.
Function: determines whether to activate
said fuel overinjection notification circuit
based upon at least the data received from
said road speed sensor
Corresponding Structure: a
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“Processor” Subsystem
Claims
Construction
microprocessor programmed to perform
the algorithm described at 11:13-13:7 and
Figs. 2A-2B. Specifically, the algorithm
includes:
Activating the Fuel Overinjection
Notification Circuit When:
1. Road speed is increasing; and
2. Throttle position is increasing; and
3. Manifold pressure is above a manifold
pressure set
point;
Or
1. Road speed is decreasing; and
2. Throttle position is increasing; and
3. Manifold pressure is increasing; and
4. Engine speed is decreasing.
“Plurality of Sensors. . .”
The parties dispute the proper construction of the term “plurality of sensors coupled to a
vehicle having an engine, said plurality of sensors, which collectively monitor operation of said
vehicle, including a road speed sensor, [(Claims 1, 13) an engine speed sensor,] a manifold
pressure sensor and a throttle position sensor.” This term is located in Claims 1, 7, 13, and 28.
The following are the parties’ proposed constructions:
Velocity’s Proposed Construction
Defendants’ Proposed Construction
Two or more sensors that are coupled to
and collectively monitor the operation of a
vehicle with an engine, said two or more
sensors are from the group of a road speed
sensor, [(Claims 1, 13) an engine speed
sensor,] a manifold pressure sensor and a
throttle position sensor.
At least a road speed sensor, [(Claims 1,
13) an engine speed sensor,] manifold
pressure sensor, and throttle position sensor
coupled to a vehicle with an engine and
that collectively monitor the vehicle’s
operation.
17
The parties also dispute the related term “at least one sensor coupled to said vehicle for
monitoring operation thereof, said at least one sensor including a road speed sensor, a manifold
pressure sensor, a throttle position sensor and an engine speed sensor” in Claim 17.
Velocity’s Proposed Construction
Defendants’ Proposed Construction
One or more sensors that are coupled to
and monitor the operation of a vehicle with
an engine said one or more sensors are
from the group of a road speed sensor, a
throttle position sensor and an engine speed
sensor.
At least a road speed sensor, a manifold
pressure sensor, a throttle position sensor,
and an engine speed sensor coupled to a
vehicle and that collectively monitor the
vehicle’s operation.
Defendants argue that both “said plurality” and “said at least one” must refer to each
sensor listed. Plaintiff contends that these terms may refer to combinations of sensors within the
group of sensors listed. As stated above, the words of a claim are “generally given their ordinary
and customary meaning,” that is, “the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary
skill in the art in question at the time of the invention.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312-13.
Plaintiff argues that the doctrine of claim differentiation means that “and” should be
construed as disjunctive because to construe “and” conjunctively would make several dependent
claims superfluous. “To the extent that the absence of such difference in meaning and scope
would make a claim superfluous, the doctrine of claim differentiation states the presumption that
the difference between claims is significant.” Tandon Corp. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 831
F.2d 1017, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1987). Defendants argue that dependent claims cannot broaden an
independent claim from which they depend, citing Enzo. See Enzo, 780 F.3d at 1156
(“. . . dependent claims cannot broaden an independent claim from which they depend.”).
However, in the patent at issue, the dependent claims do not broaden the independent claims.
They do not add a limitation to the independent claim. In Enzo, the Federal Circuit held that a
18
dependent claim could not add “direct detection” to an independent claim that included only
“indirect detection.” Id. at 1157. In the patent at issue, the dependent claims do not add sensors
that were not already included in the independent claims. Interpreting “and” disjunctively is
more faithful to the claim language and the specifications.
Defendants also argue that there was a prosecution disclaimer in that the language
containing “and” was added during the prosecution. However, the addition of this language was
not an unambiguous disclaimer. Omega Eng., Inc, v. Raytek Corp., 334 F.3d 1314, 1324 (Fed.
Cir. 2003) (noting Federal Circuit has “declined to apply the doctrine of prosecution disclaimer
where the alleged disavowal of claim scope is ambiguous”).
The Court adopts the following construction for “plurality of sensors coupled to a vehicle
having an engine, said plurality of sensors, which collectively monitor operation of said vehicle,
including a road speed sensor, [(Claims 1, 13) an engine speed sensor,] a manifold pressure
sensor and a throttle position sensor”: Two or more sensors that are coupled to and collectively
monitor the operation of a vehicle with an engine, said two or more sensors are from the group of
a road speed sensor, [(Claims 1, 13) an engine speed sensor,] a manifold pressure sensor and a
throttle position sensor. The Court adopts the following construction for “at least one sensor
coupled to said vehicle for monitoring operation thereof, said at least one sensor including a road
speed sensor, a manifold pressure sensor, a throttle position sensor and an engine speed sensor”:
One or more sensors that are coupled to and monitor the operation of a vehicle with an engine
said one or more sensors are from the group of a road speed sensor, a throttle position sensor and
an engine speed sensor.
19
“Said at Least One Sensor”
The parties dispute the proper construction of the term “said at least one sensor” in
Claims 69 and 76. The following are the parties’ proposed constructions:
Velocity’s Proposed Construction
Defendants’ Proposed Construction
Two or more sensors from the group of a
road speed sensor, an engine speed sensor,
and a brake sensor.
Indefinite
Defendants argue that this term is indefinite because there is no antecedent basis for the
term. Claims 69 and 76 both recite a “plurality of sensors including a road speed sensor, an
engine speed sensor, and a brake sensor” and then recite that a processor subsystem is “coupled
to . . . said at least one sensor.” A claim may be indefinite “if a term does not have proper
antecedent basis where such basis is not otherwise present by implication or the meaning is not
reasonably ascertainable.” Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc. v. M-I LLC, 514 F.3d 1244, 1249
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing Energizer Holdings, Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm’n, 435 F.3d 1366, 1370-71
(Fed. Cir. 2006)). The claim must be “insolubly ambiguous.” Id.
Plaintiff argues that “said at least one sensor” must be read in context and that one skilled
in the art would know that it referred to the plurality of sensors 3. Plaintiff further states that this
was a drafting error that went uncorrected. “When the meaning of the claim would reasonably
be understood by persons of ordinary skill when read in light of the specification, the claim is not
subject to invalidity upon departure from the protocol of ‘antecedent basis.’”
3
This argument is supported by their expert, Mr. Nranian. See (Nranian Decl. ¶ 70.).
20
Energizer Holdings, Inc., 435 F.3d at, 1370. The term “said at least one sensor,” when read in
light of the specification, would reasonably be understood by persons of ordinary skill to refer to
the “plurality of sensors” listed just above. The meaning is not insolubly ambiguous.
The Court adopts the following construction for “said at least one sensor”: Two or more
sensors from the group of a road speed sensor, an engine speed sensor, and a brake sensor.
“First Vehicle Speed/Stopping Distance Table”
The parties dispute the proper construction of the term “first vehicle speed/stopping
distance table” in Claims 17, 66, 69, and 76. The following are the parties’ proposed
constructions:
Velocity’s Proposed Construction
Defendants’ Proposed Construction
First data structure for organizing vehicle
speed and stopping distance information.
A table used to look-up the stopping
distance for any given vehicle speed.
Defendants argue that the patent specifically claims a table. Plaintiff argues that a “lookup table” is a particular type of data arrangement and that the limitation should not be read into
the claim. The patent description states that the speed/stopping distance table “provide[s] the
relationship between the speed at which a vehicle is travelling and the distance which the vehicle
will require to come to a complete stop if travelling at that speed.” (‘781 Pat., 9:11-13.) The
patent also states that the speed/stopping distance table allows the processor subsystem to “lookup the stopping distance for that speed.” (Id. at 9:14-15.)
Plaintiff’s construction would not give meaning to the term “table.” A “claim
construction that gives meaning to all the terms of the claim is preferred over one that does not
do so.” Merck & Co. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 395 F.3d 1364, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Further,
the intrinsic evidence supports Defendants’ construction. While Plaintiff argues that a “look-up
21
table” is a specific type of table, Defendants’ construction does not limit the table specifically to
a “look-up table.” The Court adopts the following construction for “first vehicle speed/stopping
distance table”: A table used to look-up the stopping distance for any given vehicle speed.
“Set Point”
The parties dispute the proper construction of the terms “manifold pressure set point” in
Claims 1, 7, 13, and 17 and “[RPM/engine speed] set point” in Claims 1, 13, 17, and 76. The
following are the parties’ proposed constructions:
Velocity’s Proposed Construction
Defendants’ Proposed Construction
A value set for [manifold pressure/engine
speed]
The threshold above which the [manifold
pressure/engine rotation speed] for the
vehicle should never exceed
Defendants argue that the patent specification contains a lexicographic definition for
manifold pressure set point and RPM/engine speed set point. The patent description states that
manifold pressure set point and RPM set point “represent thresholds above which the manifold
pressure and engine rotation speed, respectively, for the vehicle should never exceed.”
(‘781 Pat., 6:66-7:4.) Plaintiff argues that this is only a description of the preferred embodiment
and would render dependent claim 44 superfluous.
There is “an inherent tension . . . as to whether a statement is a clear lexicographic
definition or a description of a preferred embodiment. The problem is to interpret claims ‘in view
of the specification’ without unnecessarily importing limitations from the specification into the
claims.” E-Pass Techs., Inc. v. 3Com Corp., 343 F.3d 1364, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2003). “[T]he
presence of a dependent claim that adds a particular limitation gives rise to a presumption that
the limitation in question is not present in the independent claim.” Aspex Eyewear, Inc. v.
Marchon Eyewear, Inc., 672 F.3d 1335, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Phillips, 415 F.3d at
22
1315). “That presumption is especially strong when the limitation in dispute is the only
meaningful difference between an independent and dependent claim, and one party is urging that
the limitation in the dependent claim should be read into the independent claim.”
SunRace Roots Enter. Co. v. SRAM Corp., 336 F.3d 1298, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Further, the
Federal Circuit has stated that “although the specification often describes very specific
embodiments of the invention, we have repeatedly warned against confining the claims to those
embodiments.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323.
The description of the manifold pressure set point and RPM set point is not a clear
lexicographic definition or disavowal, and Defendants have not overcome the presumption
against reading the limitation into the claim. The Court adopts the following construction for
“manifold pressure set point” and “[RPM/engine speed] set point”: A value set for [manifold
pressure/engine speed].
“Notification”
The parties dispute the proper construction of the phrase “a notification” in Claims 1, 7,
13, 17, 53, 60, 69, and 76. The following are the parties’ proposed constructions:
Velocity’s Proposed Construction
Defendants’ Proposed Construction
An act or instance of notifying, making
known or giving notice to the operator of
the vehicle.
Mercedes/FCA: A warning notifying the
operator of the vehicle.
Audi: An alert for notifying the driver of
the vehicle of recommended corrections in
vehicle operation and alerting the driver to
unsafe operating conditions.
Defendants essentially argue that notification should be construed as a warning or an
alert. “[T]he words of a claim are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning.”
Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312. There is no reason why “a notification” should not be given its
23
ordinary and customary meaning. Warnings and alerts are types of notifications, but there is no
reason to limit the term “a notification” to warnings and alerts. Further, “[w]hen different words
or phrases are used in separate claims, a difference in meaning is presumed.” Nystrom v.
TREX Co., 424 F.3d 1136, 1143 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The claims include both notification and
alarms as terms. For example, the specification provides for “a fuel overinjection notification
circuit for issuing notification that excessive fuel is being supplied to the engine of the vehicle
and a vehicle proximity alarm circuit for issuing alarms if the vehicle is too close to the object.”
(‘781 Pat. at 4:45-49 (emphasis added).) The patent also includes the term “warning” as a type
of proximity alarm circuit: “The proximity alarm circuit may include one or more visual and/or
audible warning devices such as lights and/or horns. For example, the proximity alarm circuit
may include a warning light and a warning horn.” (Id. at 7:34-38.)
The Court adopts the following construction for “a notification”: An act or instance of
notifying, making known or giving notice to the operator of the vehicle.
“Not Being Operated Fuel Efficiently”
The parties dispute the proper construction of the phrase “not being operated fuel
efficiently” in Claim 42. The following are the parties’ proposed constructions:
Velocity’s Proposed Construction
Defendants’ Proposed Construction
Term does not require construction
Indefinite
Defendants repeat their indefiniteness arguments from the discussion of “fuel
overinjection notification circuit.” For the reasons discussed above, “not being operated fuel
efficiently” is not indefinite. Defendants have not shown, by clear and convincing evidence,
that the ‘781 Patent fails to inform, with reasonable certainty, an individual skilled in the art
about the scope of the invention in light of the specification and the prosecution history. Further,
24
it is not a term with special meaning in the art or in this patent. Indeed, as argued by Plaintiff,
Defendants’ user manuals for vehicles reference fuel efficiency. See (PA 186-87, 191, 193, 197,
200, 203-205, 209, 213-14, 218.) Accordingly, the term “not being operated fuel efficiently”
does not require construction.
“Excessive Engine Speed”
Velocity and Audi dispute the proper construction of the phrase “excessive engine speed”
in Claims 1, 13, 17, 23, and 40. The following are the parties’ proposed constructions:
Velocity’s Proposed Construction
Defendants’ Proposed Construction
Engine rotation speed that exceeds a
threshold
Audi: Indefinite
Audi argues that this term is also indefinite because there is no objective boundary. As
previously discussed, a “claim can be definite even where there is no precise numerical
boundary so long as a person of skill in the art can determine the scope with reasonable
certainty.” GPNE Corp., 108 F. Supp. 3d at 874. Further, other parts of the patent make
reference to manufacturers’ guidelines for engine-specific thresholds. While the patent does not
point to a specific threshold, “[s]ome modicum of uncertainty . . . is the ‘price of ensuring the
appropriate incentives for innovation.’” Nautilus, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2128 (quoting
Festo Corp., 535 U.S. at 732). Audi has not shown, by clear and convincing evidence, that the
‘781 Patent fails to inform, with reasonable certainty, an individual skilled in the art about the
scope of the invention in light of the specification and the prosecution history.
The Court adopts the following construction for “excessive engine speed”: Engine
rotation speed that exceeds a threshold.
25
“Too Close”
Velocity and Audi dispute the proper construction of the phrase “too close” in Claims 17,
26, 69, and 76. The following are the parties’ proposed constructions:
Velocity’s Proposed Construction
Defendants’ Proposed Construction
A distance that falls below a threshold
Audi: Indefinite
Audi argues that this term is also indefinite because there is no objective boundary.
Again, a “claim can be definite even where there is no precise numerical boundary so long as a
person of skill in the art can determine the scope with reasonable certainty.” GPNE Corp., 108
F. Supp. 3d at 874. The patent describes a vehicle speed/stopping distance table in several
claims. As construed above, this table contains information used to look-up the stopping
distance for any given vehicle speed. Claims 17, 26, 69, and 76 reference the “first vehicle
speed/stopping distance table.” Therefore, the term “too close” is determined in reference to the
information stored in the “first vehicle speed/stopping distance table.” Audi has not shown, by
clear and convincing evidence, that the ‘781 Patent fails to inform, with reasonable certainty, an
individual skilled in the art about the scope of the invention in light of the specification and the
prosecution history.
The Court adopts the following construction for “too close”: A distance that falls below
a threshold stored in the first vehicle speed/stopping distance table. 4
4
This construction was not advanced by any party. “[T]he judge’s task is not to decide
which of the adversaries is correct” but instead to “independently assess the claims, the
specification, and if necessary the prosecution history, and the relevant extrinsic evidence, and
declare the meaning of the claims.” Exxon Chem. Patents v. Lubrizol, Corp., 64 F.3d 1553, 1555
(Fed. Cir. 1995); see also MEMS Tech. Berhad v. Int'l Trade Comm’n, 447 Fed. App’x 142, 143
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[T]he fact that neither party advanced the claim construction adopted by the
Commission is not legal error.”).
26
“Corrective”
Velocity and Audi dispute the proper construction of the phrase “corrective” in Claims 40
and 75. The following are the parties’ proposed constructions:
Velocity’s Proposed Construction
Defendants’ Proposed Construction
Term does not require construction
Audi: Indefinite
Claim 40 recites: “Apparatus for optimizing operation of a vehicle according to claim 1,
wherein said notification that the engine is being operated [at] an excessive speed comprises an
automatic corrective action by the vehicle.” (‘781 Pat. Reexamination, 2:1-4.) Claim 75 recites:
“Apparatus for optimizing operation of a vehicle according to claim 69, wherein said processor
subsystem tracks the number of vehicle proximity alarms issued before corrective action
eliminates a hazardous condition.” (Id. at 5:59:62.) Corrective action is defined in the claims as
correcting excessive engine speed and vehicle proximity. The intrinsic evidence provides
general guidance and examples sufficient to enable a person of ordinary skill in the art to
determine the scope of the term “corrective.” See Enzo, 599 F.3d at 1335. Audi has not shown,
by clear and convincing evidence, that the ‘781 Patent fails to inform, with reasonable certainty,
an individual skilled in the art about the scope of the invention in light of the specification and
the prosecution history.
“Corrective” is not a term with special meaning in the art or in this patent. Accordingly,
this term does not require construction.
27
“Hazardous Condition”
Velocity and Audi dispute the proper construction of the phrase “hazardous condition” in
Claim 75 5. The following are the parties’ proposed constructions:
Velocity’s Proposed Construction
Defendants’ Proposed Construction
A condition that is risky or dangerous
Audi: Indefinite
Claim 75 recites: “Apparatus for optimizing operation of a vehicle according to claim
69, wherein said processor subsystem tracks the number of vehicle proximity alarms issued
before a hazardous condition is corrected.” Audi argues that the term “hazardous condition” is
indefinite. In the specification, hazardous condition is referred to in the context of the “vehicle
proximity alarm circuit.” The intrinsic evidence provides general guidance and examples
sufficient to enable a person of ordinary skill in the art to determine the scope of the term
“hazardous condition.” See Enzo Biochem, Inc., 599 F.3d at 1335. Audi has not shown, by clear
and convincing evidence, that the ‘781 patent fails to inform, with reasonable certainty, an
individual skilled in the art about the scope of the invention in light of the specification and the
prosecution history. However, Audi is correct that Plaintiff’s construction is overbroad and
encompasses more than the intrinsic evidence supports.
The Court adopts the following construction for “hazardous condition”: Condition where
the vehicle’s distance falls below the safe stopping distance stored in the first vehicle
speed/stopping distance table.
5
The claim construction briefs and the Joint Appendix state that the term “hazardous
condition” is in Claim 42. However, Claim 42 does not contain the term “hazardous condition.”
28
CONCLUSION
Therefore, the disputed terms are constructed as follows:
Term
Construction
“fuel overinjection notification circuit . . .
, said fuel overinjection notification circuit
issuing a notification that excessive fuel is
being supplied to said engine of said
vehicle” (Claims 1, 7, 13, 17, 28, 60, 69,
76)
“insufficient engine speed” (Claims 7, 13)
A circuit that notifies a driver that more
fuel is being supplied to the engine than is
necessary.
“a processor subsystem . . . said processor
subsystem determining . . .” (Claims 1, 7,
13, 17, 60, 69, 76)
“plurality of sensors coupled to a vehicle
having an engine, said plurality of sensors,
which collectively monitor operation of
said vehicle, including a road speed
sensor, [(Claims 1, 13) an engine speed
sensor,] a manifold pressure sensor and a
throttle position sensor” (Claims 1, 7, 13,
28)
“at least one sensor coupled to said
vehicle for monitoring operation thereof,
said at least one sensor including a road
speed sensor, a manifold pressure sensor,
a throttle position sensor and an engine
speed sensor” (Claim 17)
Engine rotation speed falls below a
threshold.
Claim is governed by § 112(f).
See Appendix 1.
Two or more sensors that are coupled to
and collectively monitor the operation of a
vehicle with an engine, said two or more
sensors are from the group of a road speed
sensor, [(Claims 1, 13) an engine speed
sensor,] a manifold pressure sensor and a
throttle position sensor.
One or more sensors that are coupled to
and monitor the operation of a vehicle
with an engine said one or more sensors
are from the group of a road speed sensor,
a throttle position sensor and an engine
speed sensor.
Two or more sensors from the group of a
road speed sensor, an engine speed sensor,
and a brake sensor.
“first vehicle speed/stopping distance
A table used to look-up the stopping
table” (Claims 17, 66, 69, 76)
distance for any given vehicle speed.
“manifold pressure set point” (Claims 1, 7, A value set for [manifold pressure/engine
13, 17)
speed].
“said at least one sensor” (Claims 69, 76)
“[RPM/engine speed] set point” (Claims
1, 13, 17, 76)
“a notification” (Claims 1, 7, 13, 17, 53,
An act or instance of notifying, making
29
Term
60, 69, 76)
“not being operated fuel efficiently”
(Claim 42)
“excessive engine speed” (Claims 1, 13,
17, 23, 40)
“too close” (Claims 17, 26, 69, 76)
“corrective” (Claims 40, 75)
“hazardous condition” (Claim 75)
Date:
Construction
known or giving notice to the operator of
the vehicle.
Term does not require construction.
Engine rotation speed that exceeds a
threshold.
A distance that falls below a threshold
stored in the first vehicle speed/stopping
distance table.
This term does not require construction.
Condition where the vehicle’s distance
falls below the safe stopping distance
stored in the first vehicle speed/stopping
distance table.
September 21, 2016
JOHN W. DARRAH
United States District Court Judge
30
Appendix 1
“Processor” Subsystem
“a processor subsystem . . . said processor
subsystem determining, based upon data
received from said plurality of sensors,
when to activate said fuel overinjection
circuit and when to activate [said upshift
notification circuit [claim 1] / said
downshift notification circuit [claim 7] /
said upshift notification circuit and said
downshift notification circuit [claim 13]]”
Claims
1, 7,
13
Construction
Function: determining, based upon data
received from said plurality of sensors,
when to activate said fuel overinjection
circuit and when to activate:
• [said upshift notification circuit
[claim 1] /
• said downshift notification circuit
[claim 7] /
• said upshift notification circuit and
said downshift notification circuit
[claim 13]]
Corresponding Structure: a
microprocessor programmed to perform
the algorithm described at 11:13-13:35
and Figs. 2A-2B. Specifically, the
algorithm includes:
[Claims 1, 7, and 13] Activating the Fuel
Over-Injection Notification Circuit When:
1. Road speed is increasing; and
2. Throttle position is increasing; and
3. Manifold pressure is above a manifold
pressure set
point;
Or
1. Road speed is decreasing; and
2. Throttle position is increasing; and
3. Manifold pressure is increasing; and
4. Engine speed is decreasing.
[Claims 1 and 13] Activating the Upshift
Notification
Circuit When:
1. Road speed is increasing; and
2. Throttle position is increasing; and
3. Manifold pressure is at or below a
manifold pressure set point; and
4. Engine speed is at or above an engine
speed set
31
“Processor” Subsystem
Claims
Construction
point.
“a processor subsystem . . . said processor
subsystem determining, based upon data
received from said radar detector, said at
least one sensor and said memory
subsystem, when to activate said vehicle
proximity alarm circuit, when to activate
said fuel overinjection circuit and when to
activate said upshift notification circuit”
17
[Claims 7 and 13] Activating the
Downshift
Notification Circuit When:
1. Road speed is decreasing; and
2. Throttle position is increasing; and
3. Manifold pressure is increasing; and
4. Engine speed is decreasing.
Function: [Claim 17] determining, based
upon data received from said radar
detector, said at least one sensor and said
memory subsystem, when to activate said
vehicle proximity alarm circuit, when to
activate said fuel overinjection circuit, and
when to activate said upshift notification
circuit
Corresponding Structure: a
microprocessor programmed to perform
the algorithm described at 9:29-10:50 and
11:13-13:7 and Figs. 2A-2B. Specifically,
the algorithm includes:
Activating the Vehicle Proximity Alarm
Circuit When:
1. The distance to the object is less than
the stopping distance retrieved from the
selected speed/stopping distance table;
and
2. The vehicle brake is off; and
3. The vehicle speed is > 35 mph.
Activating the Fuel Over-Injection
Notification Circuit When:
1. Road speed is increasing; and
2. Throttle position is increasing; and
3. Manifold pressure is above a manifold
pressure set point;
Or
1. Road speed is decreasing; and
2. Throttle position is increasing; and
3. Manifold pressure is increasing; and
32
“Processor” Subsystem
Claims
Construction
4. Engine speed is decreasing.
“a processor subsystem . . . said processor
subsystem determining whether to activate
said vehicle proximity alarm circuit based
upon separation distance data received
from said radar detector, vehicle speed
data received from said road speed sensor
and said first vehicle speed/stopping
distance table stored in said memory
subsystem”
60, 69,
76
Activating the Upshift Notification Circuit
When:
1. Road speed is increasing; and
2. Throttle position is increasing; and
3. Manifold pressure is at or below a
manifold pressure set point; and
4. Engine speed is at or above an engine
speed set point.
Function: determining whether to
activate said vehicle proximity alarm
circuit based upon separation distance
data received from said radar detector,
vehicle speed data received from said road
speed sensor and said first vehicle
speed/stopping distance table stored in
said memory subsystem.
Corresponding Structure: a
microprocessorprogrammed to perform
the algorithm described at: 9:29-10:50 and
Figs. 2A-2B. Specifically, the algorithm
includes:
“a processor subsystem . . . said processor
subsystem determines whether to activate
said fuel overinjection circuit based upon
at least the data received from said road
speed sensor”
60
Activating the Vehicle Proximity Alarm
Circuit When:
1. The distance to the object is less than
the stopping distance retrieved from the
selected speed/stopping distance table;
and
2. The vehicle brake is off; and
3. The vehicle speed is > 35 mph.
Function: determines whether to activate
said fuel overinjection notification circuit
based upon at least the data received from
said road speed sensor
Corresponding Structure: a
microprocessor programmed to perform
the algorithm described at: 11: 13-13:7
and Figs. 2A-2B. Specifically, the
algorithm includes:
33
“Processor” Subsystem
Claims
Construction
Activating the Fuel Over-Injection
Notification Circuit When:
1. Road speed is increasing; and
2. Throttle position is increasing; and
3. Manifold pressure is above a manifold
pressure set
point;
Or
1. Road speed is decreasing; and
2. Throttle position is increasing; and
3. Manifold pressure is increasing; and
4. Engine speed is decreasing.
34
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