Anderson v. Morrison et al

Filing 36

ORDER. Signed by the Honorable Manish S. Shah on 11/19/2014: Defendants' motion to dismiss 22 is granted. Terminate civil case. [For further detail see attached order.] Notices mailed by Judicial Staff. (psm, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
LEROY ANDERSON,
Plaintiff,

No. 13 CV 8622

v.

Judge Manish S. Shah

MATTHEW MORRISON and
MARCUS HOLTON,
Defendants.
ORDER
Defendants’ motion to dismiss [22] is granted. Terminate civil case.
STATEMENT
Two prison guards, defendants Morrison and Holton, ordered plaintiff
Anderson, an inmate, to descend slippery and garbage-covered stairs in Stateville
Correctional Center, while handcuffed behind his back. Knowing that the stairs were
slippery and dangerous, defendants did not assist Anderson, and Anderson fell down
head first. He suffered significant and lasting injuries. Anderson filed suit against
the guards, alleging, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a violation of his rights under the
Eighth Amendment. Defendants move to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a
claim.
The Eighth Amendment, applicable to the states through the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, protects prisoners from hazardous prison
conditions. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994); Pyles v. Fahim,
— F.3d —, No. 14-1752, 2014 WL 5861515, at *4 (7th Cir. Nov. 13, 2014) (citations
omitted). To state a claim, plaintiff must allege that the defendants “deliberately
ignored a prison condition that presented an objectively, sufficiently serious risk of
harm.” Pyles, 2014 WL 5861515, at *4. “Sufficiently serious” in this context means
that the conditions posed a substantial risk of serious harm. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834
(citation omitted).

Defendants argue that the slippery stairs did not pose the risk required for
liability under the Eighth Amendment.* Plaintiff’s response is that slippery stairs
are dangerous, and forcing an inmate to walk down them while handcuffed is akin to
forcing a prisoner to work outdoors with heavy tools, without gloves in winter—an
Eighth Amendment violation. See [28] at 2 (citing Smith v. Peters, 631 F.3d 418 (7th
Cir. 2011)); see also Smith, 631 F.3d at 420.
This case is more like Pyles than Smith. In Pyles, the court of appeals held that
slippery stairs in Menard Correctional Center did not create a sufficiently serious
risk of harm. 2014 WL 5861515, at *6. The plaintiff in Pyles fell down wet stairs, hit
his head, and lost consciousness, see id. at *1, much like Anderson did here.
Anderson’s claim is slightly different in that he was handcuffed behind his back
(adding to the difficulty in traversing slippery stairs), but I conclude that the risk of
falling down slippery stairs, even while handcuffed, is not sufficiently serious to state
an Eighth Amendment claim. See LeMaire v. Maass, 12 F.3d 1444, 1457 (9th Cir.
1993) (shackling inmates in slippery showers does not create an unconstitutionally
unsafe condition) (cited in Pyles, 2014 WL 5861515, at *6 n. 25).
Defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted. Because plaintiff has had one
opportunity to amend his complaint with the assistance of experienced counsel, this
dismissal is with prejudice.
ENTER:
Date: 11/19/14

Manish S. Shah
U.S. District Judge

Defendants do not dispute that the complaint alleges the requisite state of mind. Rightly
so, since the complaint adequately alleges that defendants knew of the condition of the
stairs, refused Anderson’s requests for assistance, and ordered him down the stairs anyway.
See [17] ¶¶ 3–5.
2

*