Chessie Logistics Company LLC v. Krinos Foods Inc et al
Filing
177
MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order. The motion of plaintiff/counterdefendant Chessie Logistics Company, LLC to dismiss the counterclaim of 4545 James Place Realty, LLC 146 is denied. The parties' cross-motions for summary judgment and plaintiff's motion to supplement its exhibits remain under advisement. Signed by the Honorable Jorge L. Alonso on 3/31/2016. Notice mailed by judge's staff (ntf, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
CHESSIE LOGISTICS COMPANY, LLC,
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Plaintiff,
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v.
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KRINOS HOLDINGS, INC.,
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KRINOS FOODS, LLC,
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KRINOS REALTY, LLC, and
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4545 JAMES PLACE REALTY, LLC,
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)
Defendants.
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_______________________________________
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4545 JAMES PLACE REALTY, LLC,
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Counterplaintiff,
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v.
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CHESSIE LOGISTICS COMPANY, LLC,
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Counterdefendant.
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No. 13 C 8864
Judge Jorge L. Alonso
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is plaintiff/counterdefendant’s motion to dismiss the counterclaim
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), which is denied for the following reasons.
BACKGROUND
The reader’s familiarity with the case is presumed; the Court recounts only those aspects
of the case necessary for this ruling. Plaintiff, Chessie Logistics Company, LLC (“Chessie”),
brought this action for trespass, negligence, and violation of 49 U.S.C. § 10903 against
defendants Krinos Holdings, Inc.; Krinos Foods, LLC; Krinos Realty, LLC; and 4545 James
Place Realty, LLC (“4545 James Place”). Chessie is a common carrier by railroad that claims to
own in fee simple a lead railroad track in Melrose Park, Illinois that is adjacent to, as well as
easements for the use of a side track and spur track that cross over, property owned by 4545
James Place where one or more of the Krinos defendants operate an industrial facility.
The
Court previously dismissed with prejudice Chessie’s claim for violation of 49 U.S.C. § 10903,
leaving only the state-law claims.1
4545 James Place filed a counterclaim for declaratory judgment and ejectment and to
quiet title, asserting that Chessie was never granted the easements or, in the alternative, it
abandoned them. Chessie moves to dismiss the counterclaim on the ground that the relief sought
by 4545 James Place would have the effect of regulating rail transportation, which is within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Surface Transportation Board (“STB”).
DISCUSSION
Chessie’s motion is ostensibly brought under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction. Chessie argues that 4545 James Place’s counterclaim must be dismissed with
prejudice because the relief sought therein is “expressly and completely preempted by” Section
10501(b) of the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act (“ICCTA”). (ECF No. 146,
Chessie’s Mot. Dismiss at 1.) The ICCTA states in relevant part that the jurisdiction of the STB
over “transportation by rail carriers” and “the construction, acquisition, operation, abandonment,
or discontinuance of spur, industrial, team, switching, or side tracks, or facilities, even if the
tracks are located, or intended to be located, entirely in one State,” is “exclusive.” 49 U.S.C. §
10501(b). In Chessie’s view, because all counts of the counterclaim are based on the theories
that either Chessie never acquired easement rights in the spur track or it abandoned them, the
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Jurisdiction is also premised on diversity of citizenship.
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claims are preempted by the ICCTA and subject to dismissal with prejudice because this Court
lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over them.
Chessie’s argument confuses the concepts of subject-matter jurisdiction and primary
jurisdiction. The basis for the motion is that the STB has exclusive primary jurisdiction over
matters affecting rail transportation, including the “acquisition” and “abandonment” of spur
tracks. This is an invocation of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, which “is not, despite its
name, jurisdictional.” Baltimore & Ohio Chi. Terminal R.R. Co. v. Wis. Cent. Ltd., 154 F.3d
404, 411 (7th Cir. 1998); see also Gross Common Carrier, Inc. v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 51
F.3d 703, 706 (7th Cir. 1995) (“[P]rimary jurisdiction is quite different from subject matter
jurisdiction. It does not . . . concern a court’s power to hear a case in the first instance.”)
(citation omitted); Kendra Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Homco, Ltd., 879 F.2d 240, 242 (7th Cir. 1989)
(“‘Primary jurisdiction’ can’t be shoehorned into ‘subject-matter jurisdiction.’”). The doctrine
“is implemented by abstention—which means by staying rather than dismissing the litigation.”
Baker v. IBP, Inc., 357 F.3d 685, 688 (7th Cir. 2004). Accordingly, this Court has the power to
hear the counterclaim, so dismissal of the counterclaim with prejudice (the only relief sought by
Chessie) is inappropriate. See id. at 388. What Chessie is essentially saying is that although it
has chosen to resort to this court for resolution of claims that will require it to prove that it
possesses an easement for use of the spur track, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction completely
deprives 4545 James Place of its defenses to those claims and the ability to obtain the
corresponding relief it seeks. None of the authority cited by Chessie, however, stands for that
proposition.
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CONCLUSION
The motion of plaintiff/counterdefendant Chessie Logistics Company, LLC to dismiss
the counterclaim of 4545 James Place Realty, LLC [146] is denied. The parties’ cross-motions
for summary judgment and plaintiff’s motion to supplement its exhibits remain under
advisement.
SO ORDERED.
ENTERED:
March 31, 2016
__________________________________
JORGE L. ALONSO
United States District Judge
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