Buchanan v. Dart et al

Filing 55

MEMORANDUM Order issued sua sponte because of one problematic aspect of defendants' responsive pleading -- its several purported Affirmative Defenses that follow the Answer itself. Signed by the Honorable Milton I. Shadur on 6/8/2015:Mailed notice(clw, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

RAEFELL M. BUCHANAN,
Plaintiff,
v.
THOMAS DART, et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 14 C 27

MEMORANDUM ORDER
Several of the defendants (collectively self-characterized as "the County Defendants") in
this action brought by Raefell Buchanan ("Buchanan") have just filed their Answer to
Buchanan's Second Amended Complaint ("SAC"). This memorandum order is issued sua sponte
because of one problematic aspect of that responsive pleading -- its several purported
Affirmative Defenses ("ADs") that follow the Answer itself. Here are the problems that this
Court has noted: 1
1.

AD 1 cites the seminal opinion in City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, 453
U.S. 247 (1981) for the proposition that "Local governments are immune
from punitive damages liability under § 1983." To begin with, the
"County Defendants" include a number of individuals as well as Cook
County itself, so that the global statement about immunity does not apply
across the board -- but more importantly, SAC ¶ 83 seeks punitive

1

What is said here is not intended to be exhaustive -- if Buchanan's counsel were to raise
other issues not addressed in this memorandum order, those issues would of course be dealt with
in the regular course.

damages only "against individual Defendants." So AD 1 asserts nothing
of consequence at all, and it is stricken.
2.

AD 2 addresses the totally speculative premise that Buchanan may have
failed to mitigate damages. That boilerplate objection (its boilerplate
nature is perhaps best evidenced by the AD's reference to "Plaintiffs" in
plural terms in a one-plaintiff case) is not really a present AD at all. It too
is stricken.

3.

AD 3 is likewise boilerplate and totally speculative (it begins "To the
extent . . .," a sure tipoff to its wholly hypothetical nature). AD 3 is
stricken as well.

4.

AD 6 invokes 745 ILCS 10/4-105 to claim immunity for the County
Defendants as to "Plaintiff's state law claim." Because four of the SAC's
five counts are framed in federal-question terms, it would appear that
purported AD 6 targets only SAC Count V, which advances an
intentional- infliction-of-severe-emotional-distress theory against a single
defendant, Pca Baza -- and even as to that defendant the SAC allegations
(which must be taken as true for AD purposes, see App'x ¶ 5 to State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Riley, 199 F.R.D. 276, 279 (N.D. Ill. 2001)) make
that statutory section inapplicable. Hence AD 6 is stricken too.

5.

Lastly, AD 7 asserts a reserved right to name further affirmative defenses
"as they become known through further discovery or otherwise in this
action." That "reservation" is simply meaningless and adds nothing to the
corpus juris -- if, as and when future proceedings in the case may create a
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legitimate possibility of an AD, that issue can be tendered by an
appropriate motion. For the present, though, AD 7 plays no appropriate
role in the pleadings, and it too is stricken.
One final observation is in order. Pleading is an important and integral part of the
litigation process -- in the federal system of notice pleading it serves to identify any areas in
which the litigants are on the same page as well as their areas of difference. For ADs to be
presented in a thoughtless form or because they are a part of a form arsenal, as several aspects of
the current ADs would appear to indicate, is indeed troubling.

__________________________________________
Milton I. Shadur
Senior United States District Judge
Date: June 8, 2015

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