Graham v. Econ Inc. et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: the Court grants Defendants' motions to dismiss the complaint [25, 27]. If Plaintiff believes that she can overcome the pleading deficiencies identified above, she may file an amended complaint against E-COM by January 6, 2015. Signed by the Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr on 12/9/2014. Mailed notice(tbk, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
STEFANIE GRAHAM,
Plaintiff,
v.
E-COM DISPATCH CENTER and,
TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION 700,
Defendants.
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Case No. 14 CV 182
Judge Robert M. Dow, Jr.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ motions to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint
[25, 27]. Plaintiff alleges race discrimination against her former employer and a union under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. For the reasons that follow,
the Court grants both motions to dismiss.
I.
Factual Background1
Plaintiff Stefanie Graham was employed by Defendant E-COM Dispatch Center (“E-
COM”) and was affiliated with Defendant Teamsters Local Union 700 (“Local 700”). She was
terminated from her employment on February 26, 2013.
Plaintiff filed a seven-paragraph
complaint that alleges three incidents involving her supervisor, Ms. Chiapano, prior to Plaintiff’s
termination.
First, on March 7, 2011, Ms. Chiapano gave Plaintiff a notice of insubordination; the
notice was rescinded four days later. Second, on August 11, 2012, Plaintiff was suspended by
Ms. Chiapano without cause after Plaintiff was temporarily absent from work for a surgery.
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The facts are drawn from Plaintiff’s complaint. For purposes of Defendants’ motions to dismiss, the
Court assumes as true all well-pleaded allegations set forth therein. See Killingsworth v. HSBC Bank
Nevada, N.A., 507 F.3d 614, 618 (7th Cir. 2007).
Finally, on February 18, 2013, Ms. Chiapano told Plaintiff to remove her tee-shirt because Ms.
Chiapano found it “offensive.” Plaintiff’s tee-shirt read “black girls rock.” About a week later,
Plaintiff was terminated, supposedly, because she wore ear phones on the job and failed to
follow orders. E-COM informed Plaintiff’s union representative at Local 700 of the disciplinary
action without Plaintiff’s knowledge. Local 700 failed to contact Plaintiff about her termination,
allegedly in violation of an unspecified duty owed to Plaintiff.
As to Defendant E-COM, Plaintiff avers that she was “the victim of disparate treatment
* * * of workplace harassment, of humiliation, [ ] workplace embarrassment and * * * of
intentional infliction of emotional distress.” Compl. 2, ¶ 3. Plaintiff seeks $100,000 as well as
her lost wages since being terminated. Id. at ¶ 4. As to Defendant Local 700, Plaintiff seeks
$50,000 for “lack of union representation.” Id. at 3, ¶ 3.
II.
Legal Standard
Defendants have moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). The purpose of a motion to dismiss is not to decide the merits of the case,
but instead to test the sufficiency of the complaint. See Gibson v. City of Chi., 910 F.2d 1510,
1520 (7th Cir. 1990). As previously noted, when reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6), the Court takes as true all factual allegations in the complaint and draws all reasonable
inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Killingsworth, 507 F.3d at 618.
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the claim first must comply with Rule 8(a)
by providing “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief” (Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)), such that the defendant is given “fair notice of what the * * *
claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). Second, the factual allegations in the
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claim must be sufficient to raise the possibility of relief above the “speculative level,” assuming
that all of the allegations in the complaint are true. E.E.O.C. v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc.,
496 F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “A pleading that offers
‘labels and conclusions’ or a ‘formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not
do.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
However, “[s]pecific facts are not necessary; the statement need only give the defendant fair
notice of what the * * * claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551
U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555) (ellipsis in original). The Court reads the
complaint and assesses its plausibility as a whole. See Atkins v. City of Chi., 631 F.3d 823, 832
(7th Cir. 2011).
III.
Analysis
Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to state a claim because she does not provide
sufficient allegations to support a plausible right to relief under Title VII. Defendant Local 700
also argues that Plaintiff may not bring suit against it because Plaintiff failed to file a charge
against it or obtain a right-to-sue letter from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC”), as required. For the reasons that follow, the Court agrees with Defendants and
concludes that the complaint must be dismissed.
Twombly established “two easy-to-clear hurdles” for a complaint in federal court: (1) the
complaint must describe the claim in sufficient detail to give the defendant fair notice of the
claim and the grounds upon which it rests, and (2) the allegations must suggest a plausible—not
merely speculative—right to relief. Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1084 (7th Cir. 2008)
(quoting EEOC v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir. 2007)). Applying
Twombly to employment discrimination claims, the Seventh Circuit in Tamayo “acknowledg[ed]
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that a complaint must contain something more than a general recitation of the elements of the
claim,” but “reaffirmed the minimal pleading standard for simple claims of race or sex
discrimination.”
526 F.3d at 1084.
Specifically, a complaint alleging employment
discrimination “need only aver that the employer instituted a (specified) adverse employment
action against the plaintiff on the basis of her [race].” Id. The complaint, however, “must
actually suggest that the plaintiff has a right to relief,” as “it is no longer sufficient for a
complaint to avoid foreclosing possible bases for relief.” Id. (quoting Concentra Health Servs.,
496 F.3d at 776) (emphasis in original). A complaint should also “contain information that one
can provide and that is clearly important” in order to give the defendant fair notice of the claim.
Concentra Health Servs., Inc., 496 F.3d at 780 (emphasis in original). Plaintiff does not meet
this pleading standard.
With respect to Defendant E-COM, Plaintiff does not allege that she was terminated
because of her race, as is required to state a valid employment discrimination claim. See
Tamayo, 526 F.3d at 1084. The complaint relays three incidents with Plaintiff’s supervisor prior
to her termination: a notice of subordination, a temporary suspension, and being asked to remove
a tee-shirt that referenced race, which the supervisor allegedly found to be offensive. Plaintiff
does not allege that her supervisor was motivated by racial animus or that the incidents had
anything to do with Plaintiff’s race. Nor does Plaintiff allege that the person who terminated her
(who is unnamed in the complaint) acted on the basis of Plaintiff’s race.
These allegations do not clear the two hurdles that Twombly described. See Tamayo, 526
F.3d at 1084. First, the complaint does not provide E-COM with sufficient notice of the grounds
upon which Plaintiff’s claim rests. Missing from the complaint is basic information about the
claim, such as Plaintiff’s own race, whether Plaintiff believes that she was terminated because of
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her race, whether the stated reasons for termination were pretextual, and whether Plaintiff
believes that her supervisor’s actions were motivated by race.
Second, without factual
allegations that suggest that Plaintiff’s experienced racial discrimination, the claim is not
plausible.
Plaintiff’s allegations with respect to Defendant Local 700 are likewise deficient. Under
Title VII, it is unlawful for a labor organization:
(1) to exclude or to expel from its membership, or otherwise to discriminate
against, any individual because of his race[;]
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify its membership or applicants for membership, or
to classify or fail or refuse to refer for employment any individual, in any way
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities, or would limit such employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee or as an applicant for employment,
because of such individual’s race[;] or
(3) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an
individual[.]
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c). The only allegation that Plaintiff makes with respect to Local 700 is
that Plaintiff’s “union representative was contacted by [E-COM] and informed of disciplinary
action” but “[Plaintiff] was never contacted by the union with respect to disciplinary action,
firing, or any representation thereto.” Compl. 2–3, ¶¶ 1–2. Again, Plaintiff fails to allege that
any action was taken because of Plaintiff’s race.
This is insufficient to state a plausible
discrimination claim or to give Local 700 adequate notice of the claim.
Additionally, Plaintiff did not file a charge with the EEOC against Local 700.
“Ordinarily, a party not named as the respondent in an EEOC charge may not be sued under Title
VII.” Tamayo, 526 F.3d at 1089. The purpose of this rule is to provide the charged party with
warning of the alleged violation and to give the EEOC an opportunity to attempt conciliation
before resort to the courts. See id. An exception applies where an unnamed party had adequate
notice of the charge and had the opportunity to participate in conciliation proceedings. See Metz
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v. Joe Rizza Imports, Inc., 700 F. Supp. 2d 983, 989 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (quoting Schnellbaecher v.
Baskin Clothing Co., 887 F.2d 124, 126 (7th Cir. 1989)). Here, Plaintiff did not name Local 700
in the charge of discrimination that she filed with the EEOC on October 21, 2013. See [32], Ex.
A. Nor does Plaintiff allege or argue that Local 700 was provided adequate notice of the charge,
such as to invoke the exception to the general requirement of naming a defendant in an EEOC
charge.
Plaintiff’s claim against Local 700 also is time-barred at this point.
A charge of
employment discrimination must be filed with the EEOC within 300 days of the alleged unlawful
employment practice. Bass v. Joliet Public School Dist. No. 86, 746 F.3d 835, 839 (7th Cir.
2014) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1)). If a charge is not filed within the 300-day window, the
claim is time-barred and the plaintiff may not recover. Id. For Ms. Graham, the 300-day
window for filing a charge related to Local 700’s actions following her February 2013
termination has long passed.
In conclusion, the Court finds that Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Defendants ECOM and Local 700. Additionally, any claim against Local 700 under Title VII is now timebarred. Accordingly, the complaint is dismissed with respect to E-COM, but with leave to
replead within 28 days, and dismissed with prejudice with respect to Local 700.
IV.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants Defendants’ motions to dismiss the complaint
[25, 27]. If Plaintiff believes that she can overcome the pleading deficiencies identified above,
she may file an amended complaint against E-COM by January 6, 2015.
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Dated: December 9, 2014
____________________________
Robert M. Dow, Jr.
United States District Judge
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