Arteaga et al v. Castaneda et al

Filing 53

ORDER Signed by the Honorable Manish S. Shah on 10/14/2014: Defendants' motion to dismiss 40 is granted. Count 1 of the first amended complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim. Defendants' motion to dismiss 19 , filed prior to the first amended complaint, is terminated as moot. [For further detail see attached order.] Notices mailed by Judicial Staff. (psm, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
KEVIN ARTEAGA, and
MARIA ARTEAGA,
No. 14 CV 255

Plaintiffs,

Judge Manish S. Shah

v.
RAQUEL CASTANEDA, and
DAVID FALARDEAU,
Defendants.
ORDER

Defendants’ motion to dismiss [40] is granted. Count 1 of the first amended
complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim. Defendants’ motion to dismiss [19],
filed prior to the first amended complaint, is terminated as moot.
STATEMENT
Defendants move to dismiss count one of the first amended complaint for
failure to state a claim. That count is brought under § 1983 as a substantive due
process claim, more specifically, a claim that defendants violated the minor plaintiffs’
right to familial relations when defendants entered plaintiffs’ father’s home on
March 15, 2013, and demanded that he surrender the plaintiffs to their mother. The
complaint alleges that defendants forced the father to surrender the plaintiffs to
their mother.
Both sides agree that in order to state a substantive due process claim, the
complaint must allege other conduct beyond the seizure. Doe v. Heck, 327 F.3d 492,
518 n. 23 (7th Cir. 2003). The Fourth Amendment provides the specific right to be
secure from unreasonable seizures and the children’s substantive due process rights
do not provide a separate basis for liability unless the conduct is distinct from the
seizure. Hernandez v. Foster, 657 F.3d 463, 474 (7th Cir. 2011), Xiong v. Wagner, 700
F.3d 282, 289–290 (7th Cir. 2012), and Brokaw v. Mercer County, 235 F.3d 1000,
1017–18 (7th Cir. 2000), make this distinction clear. Brokaw, for example,
distinguished the initial removal of a child (a Fourth Amendment claim) from the
four months of government-forced separation endured by the child (a substantive due
process claim).

Defendants argue that the allegations of the complaint involve a seizure of the
plaintiffs by the defendants and no other personal involvement by the defendants. As
such, the claim is a Fourth Amendment claim (brought as Count 3 of the first
amended complaint).
Plaintiffs argue that the defendants’ precise purpose in seizing the children
was to interfere with their familial relations and that the absence of justification for
the removal of the children from the home, namely, imminent harm, is a classic sign
of a substantive due process violation.
The question is whether the conduct, not the subjective intent of the officers,
amounts to “other conduct” beyond a Fourth Amendment seizure. It does not. The
complaint alleges no conduct by the defendants occurring after March 15, 2013. The
sum total of the allegations of the complaint is that defendants seized the plaintiffs.
These defendants were not involved in anything other than the seizure, and without
other conduct involving the plaintiffs’ relationship to their father, the complaint does
not state a substantive due process claim.
Defendants’ motion to dismiss, [40], is granted. Count 1 is dismissed for failure
to state a claim. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss earlier in the case, [19], prior to
the filing of the first amended complaint. That motion is terminated as moot.
ENTER:
Date: 10/14/14

Manish S. Shah
U.S. District Judge

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