Taylor v. City Of Chicago et al
Filing
844
MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable John Z. Lee on 9/27/21.(ca, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
DANIEL TAYLOR,
Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF CHICAGO, CHICAGO
POLICE OFFICERS ANTHONY
VILLARDITA, THOMAS JOHNSON,
BRIAN KILLACKY, TERRY
O’CONNOR, RICK ABREU, ROBERT
DELANEY, SEAN GLINSKI,
MICHAEL BERTI, and
UNIDENTIFIED EMPLOYEES OF
THE CITY OF CHICAGO,
Defendants.
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No. 14 C 737
Judge John Z. Lee
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Daniel Taylor and six co-defendants were tried and convicted of a double
homicide in 1995. More than twenty years later, Taylor was released from prison and
received a certificate of innocence from the State of Illinois. Taylor and multiple codefendants have sued the City of Chicago (“the City”) and the Chicago police officers
involved in the murder investigation, claiming that they were convicted of crimes
they did not commit through knowingly coerced confessions and fabricated evidence.
Based largely on the jury verdict reached in a case involving one of his co-defendants,
Taylor seeks partial summary judgment against two of the Defendants in this case,
Officers Sean Glinski and Michael Berti (collectively, “Defendants”). For the reasons
given below, the motion is denied.
I.
A.
Background1
Taylor and his co-defendants’ criminal trials
At approximately 8:43 p.m. on November 16, 1992, Jeffrey Lassiter and Sharon
Haugabook were murdered in Lassiter’s Chicago home. Pl.’s LR 56.1 Statement of
Material Facts (“PSOF”) ¶ 1, ECF No. 818. Chicago Police Department (“CPD”)
records indicate that Plaintiff Daniel Taylor was in police custody at that time on an
unrelated issue. Id. ¶ 1. The records noted that he had been arrested at 6:45pm that
day and released on bond at 10:00pm. Id. ¶ 11.
Taylor was arrested again by CPD officers on December 3, 1992. Id. ¶ 7. He
and six co-defendants were subsequently charged with the Lassiter and Haugabook
murders. Id. ¶ 9. Taylor and his co-defendants each made statements confessing to
the murders. Id. ¶ 7. Five out of seven of these statements represented at least two
things in common: Taylor was present at a 7:00 p.m. meeting on November 16, 1992,
during which the Lassiter murder was planned; and Taylor actively participated in
the murders at 8:43 p.m. Id. ¶ 8.
On December 6, 1992, the lead investigators on the case learned of the CPD
records indicating that Taylor had been in custody at the time of the murders. Id.
¶11. Two days later, the investigators interviewed a witness, Adrian Grimes. Grimes
told the detectives that he saw Taylor in the Clarendon Park Fieldhouse between 7:30
and 8:00 p.m. on the night of the murders. Id. ¶ 8.
1
The following facts are undisputed or deemed admitted, unless otherwise noted.
2
Defendant Officers Glinski and Berti prepared a report on December 14, 1992
(“the December 14 Report”) indicating that they had encountered Taylor at
approximately 9:30 p.m. on the night of the murders. Id. ¶ 17. This was thirty
minutes before Taylor’s bond slip indicated that he had been released from custody.
Id. ¶ 11. The December 14 Report was not signed by a supervisor. Id. ¶ 17.
At his criminal trial, Taylor argued that he could not have committed the
Lassiter and Haugabook murders, because he was in police custody at the time they
occurred. Id. ¶ 18. Officer Glinski testified to the facts in the December 14 Report as
a witness for the State. Id. ¶ 19.
Following trial, Taylor and his co-defendants were convicted and sentenced;
Taylor was sentenced to life in prison. Id. ¶ 21; See Pl.’s LR 56.1 Statement of
Additional Facts (“PSOAF”), Ex. 122, 1/23/14 Order Granting Certificate of
Innocence, People v. Taylor, No. 93 CR 7106(04) (Cir. Ct. Cook Cty.) (“Certificate of
Innocence”), ECF No. 500-21. More than twenty years later, however, his conviction
was vacated, and the Circuit Court of Cook County granted him and three of the codefendants certificates of innocence. Id. Taylor now claims that the confessions were
coerced, and he and at least one other co-defendant allege that evidence against them
was fabricated in violation of their constitutional rights. PSOF ¶ 10, 22.
B.
Patrick v. City of Chicago
Deon Patrick, one of Taylor’s co-defendants, brought suit against the City and
the officers who investigated the murders. See Patrick v. City of Chi., No. 14 C 3658
(N.D. Ill. filed May 19, 2014). Patrick’s case went to trial on March 8, 2017. PSOF
3
¶ 22. Like Taylor, Patrick alleged that that his confession was coerced. He also
testified that the officers responsible forced him to implicate Taylor as a coconspirator in the murders. Id. ¶¶ 22, 24. He further alleged that, in order to bolster
this coerced confession, Glinski and Berti authored the December 14 Report, falsely
claiming that they had encountered Taylor at 9:30 p.m. on the night of the murders.
Id. ¶ 24.
At trial, Patrick’s attorneys argued that Defendants fabricated the December
14 Report as part of a conspiracy to cover up the false confessions. Id. ¶ 24. At the
close of the evidence, Judge Guzman instructed the jury that a fabrication of evidence
claim had three elements: (1) “[t]he Defendant [ ] knowingly fabricated false evidence
or participated in fabricating false evidence,” (2) “[t]hat evidence was used to deprive
a Plaintiff of his liberty in some way,” and (3) “[t]he fabricated evidence proximately
caused the Plaintiff to be damaged.” Jury Instructions at 32, Patrick v. City of Chi.,
No. 14 C 3658 (N.D. Ill.) (“Patrick Jury Instructions”), ECF No. 369.
Based on these instructions, the jury in Patrick found Defendants liable for
fabrication of evidence. PSOF ¶ 28. Defendants appealed the verdict, based in part
on the jury instruction. Id. ¶ 29. Defendants argued that, in addition to finding that
the officers had knowingly fabricated evidence, the jury should have been instructed
that the fabricated evidence needed to be material and introduced against Patrick at
his criminal trial. See Patrick v. City of Chi., 974 F.3d 824, 835 (7th Cir. 2020).
Although the Seventh Circuit agreed with Defendants that the jury instruction was
incomplete, the panel affirmed the verdict, finding the error harmless because the
4
defendants also were found liable on other additional claims, “any of which [was]
independently adequate to support the jury's damages award.” Id. at 836.
C.
Taylor v. City of Chicago
Like Patrick, Taylor has brought suit against the City and the officers involved
in his criminal conviction, raising numerous claims. See Am. Compl., ECF No. 478.
As relevant here, Taylor alleges that Officers Glinski and Berti knowingly fabricated
evidence when they drafted the December 14 Report, in violation of his rights under
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. ¶¶ 72–78 (“Count II”);
Defs.’ LR 56.1 Statement of Additional Facts (“DSOF”) ¶¶ 5–6, ECF No. 824. At this
juncture, Taylor moves for partial summary judgment as to Count II, arguing that
the jury verdict in Patrick conclusively determined that Defendants had knowingly
fabricated the December 14 Report and that Defendants are collaterally estopped
from arguing otherwise. See Pl.’s Mot. Part. Summ. J. (“Mot.”), ECF No. 816. Taylor
further contends that it is uncontested that: the December 14 Report was introduced
against him at his criminal trial; the report was material to his conviction; and he
has suffered injury, thus satisfying all the elements of Count II.
II.
Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate when the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A party may move for summary judgment on
all, less than all, or even part of a claim or defense. Id.
5
The moving party has the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a
genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The
nonmoving party must then “come forth with specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial.” LaRiviere v. Bd. of Trs. of S. Ill. Univ., 926 F.3d 356, 359
(7th Cir. 2019). To satisfy that ultimate burden, the nonmoving party must “do more
than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,”
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986), and
instead must “establish some genuine issue for trial such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict in her favor,” Gordon v. FedEx Freight, Inc., 674 F.3d 769, 772–73
(7th Cir. 2012); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)
(“[S]ummary judgment will not lie . . . if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury
could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”).
III.
Analysis
A due process fabrication of evidence claim has three elements: (1) the
defendant knowingly fabricated evidence that was introduced against the plaintiff at
his criminal trial, (2) the evidence was material, and (3) the plaintiff was damaged as
a result. Federal Civil Jury Instructions of the Seventh Circuit § 7.14 (2017 rev.); see
also Patrick, 974 F.3d at 835.
Taylor’s position is two-fold.
First, he invokes the doctrine of collateral
estoppel,2 arguing that the jury verdict in Patrick and its subsequent affirmance by
the Seventh Circuit precludes Defendants from arguing that they did not knowingly
Collateral estoppel is also called issue preclusion. This opinion will use the terms
interchangeably.
2
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fabricate evidence when they prepared the December 14 Report. Second, Taylor
argues, the remaining elements of his due process fabrication of evidence claim—that
the December 14 Report was used against Taylor at his trial, that it was material,
and that he was damaged as a result—are undisputed on the record before the Court.
The Court takes each element in turn.
A.
Collateral Estoppel as to the December 14 Report
“Under the doctrine of issue preclusion, ‘a prior judgment . . . foreclos[es]
successive litigation of an issue of fact or law actually litigated and resolved in a valid
court determination essential to the prior judgment.’” Herrera v. Wyoming, 139 S.
Ct. 1686, 1697 (2019) (cleaned up). For a prior judgment to have issue preclusive
effect, four elements must be met: “(1) the issue sought to be precluded is the same
as an issue in the prior litigation; (2) the issue must have been actually litigated in
the prior litigation; (3) the determination of the issue must have been essential to the
final judgment; and (4) the party against whom estoppel is invoked must have been
fully represented in the prior action.” Adams v. City of Indianapolis, 742 F.3d 720,
736 (7th Cir. 2014).3
Here, the parties agree that the first element has been met—the question of
whether the December 14 Report constitutes fabricated evidence is the same issue
litigated in Patrick. They also agree that the fourth element has been satisfied—
In the past, courts also required a showing of mutuality; that is, both the party
invoking issue preclusion and the party against whom it is being invoked (or their privities)
must have been bound by the judgment in the prior case. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439
U.S. 322, 326 (1979). However, in this day and age, the federal courts do not strictly require
mutuality for collateral estoppel to apply. Id. at 331.
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Glinski and Berti were represented Patrick. PSOF ¶ 23. They disagree, however, on
the second and third elements.
1.
Whether the issue was fully and fairly litigated
Issue preclusion cannot apply to a previously litigated issue unless the party
against whom issue preclusion is invoked had a full and fair opportunity to litigate
the issue in the prior proceeding. As the Seventh Circuit has recognized, “a full and
fair opportunity to litigate includes the right to appeal an adverse decision.” Gray v.
Lacke, 885 F.2d 399, 406 (7th Cir. 1989). The right to appeal includes the opportunity
to be heard on the merits by the appellate court. See id. at 404 (collateral estoppel
could not apply to previously dismissed constitutional claims where the prior court of
appeals explicitly declined to reach the merits of the claims in affirming their
dismissal) (citing Gray v. Cty. of Dane, 854 F.2d 179 (7th Cir. 1988)). Put differently,
in order for an issue to have been fully litigated to trigger issue preclusion, it must
have been litigated on the merits at the trial level with an opportunity to be heard on
the merits of the issue on appeal.
Defendants had a full and fair opportunity during the Patrick trial to litigate
on the merits the issue of whether the December 14 Report was fabricated. From his
opening statements, Patrick made clear that his claim of fabrication of evidence
against Glinski and Berti was predicated on the December 14 Report. PSOF ¶ 24.
Furthermore, Glinski was examined on the report, and both parties addressed the
report, as well as its truthfulness, in their closing arguments. Id. ¶¶ 24–25.
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There was also a full opportunity to litigate the matter on appeal. Indeed, the
Seventh Circuit reached the merits of all three arguments raised by Defendants in
affirming the verdict. See Patrick, 974 F.3d at 831–36.
Despite this, Defendants argue that Gray controls and that issue preclusion
cannot apply to the jury’s factual determinations surrounding the December 14
Report, because the Seventh Circuit found the jury instruction on Patrick’s
fabrication of evidence claim to be erroneous. Id. at 835–36. This reliance on Gray is
misplaced. In Gray, the plaintiff “tried to appeal the district court’s ruling” that she
failed to state a First or Fourteenth Amendment claim, but the appellate court
“affirmed the district court on other grounds and expressly declined to reach those
issues.” 885 F.3d at 406–07. Thus, “for reasons beyond her control,” the plaintiff
“was not afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate those [merits] issues” on
appeal. Id. at 407. Here, by contrast, Defendants had the opportunity to appeal the
jury’s finding in the Patrick trial that they had fabricated evidence, but elected not to
do so, focusing instead solely on the jury instruction. In Gray, the plaintiff did appeal
the issue in question, but the appellate court declined to consider it. The rule in Gray
avoids the unfairness of precluding the plaintiff from relitigating the issue in such a
context. As a result, here, Defendants had a full and fair opportunity to litigate this
issue through appeal.
2.
Whether the issue was finally and necessarily decided
The next element of issue preclusion asks whether the determination that
Defendants fabricated the December 14 Report was essential to the final judgment
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in Patrick—in other words, whether the issue was both finally and necessarily
decided by the Patrick jury.4
“Collateral estoppel applies to factual inferences that necessarily flow from a
general verdict.” Williamson v. Ortiz, No. 18 C 2028, 2020 WL 7013970, *11 (N.D.
Ill. Nov. 28, 2020). For the inference to have been necessary, “a rational jury must
have made such findings en route to its general verdict. If there was another path
for the jury to reach the same conclusion, then collateral estoppel does not apply.” Id.
Thus, contrary to Defendants’ view, a special interrogatory is not required. Rather,
the Court can use context to establish what the jury must have found in reaching its
verdict. See, e.g., Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Sealy, Inc., 585 F.2d 821, 844 (7th
Cir. 1978) (reading a jury verdict “[u]nder the evidence and the instructions, and as
the case was argued” to determine the issues to which collateral estoppel could apply);
Kluppelberg v. Burge, 276 F. Supp. 3d 773, 777 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (“With respect to the
jury’s Monell finding, there is no other policy or practice that would have supported
the verdict, because all the Monell evidence and argument related to CPD’s use of
street files.”).
Taken together, the jury verdict, evidence, and trial transcript demonstrate
that in finding for Patrick on the fabrication of evidence claims, the Patrick jury must
have found that Defendants knowingly falsified the December 14 Report. First, the
Citing the rule that the elements of a vacated judgment are not finally decided for the
purposes of collateral estoppel, see Pontarelli Limousine, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 929 F.2d 339,
340 (7th Cir. 1991), Defendants contend at the outset that the jury’s findings as to their
fabrication of evidence do not constitute a final judgment. But as the Court has explained,
the jury’s verdict in Patrick was affirmed on appeal, and the Court’s finding of harmless error
did not disturb the jury’s finding that they fabricated the December 14 Report.
4
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instructions provided to the jury made clear that Defendants could only be found
liable for fabrication of evidence if they “knowingly fabricated false evidence or
participated in fabricating false evidence.” Patrick Jury Instructions at 32. What is
more, the sole piece of evidence that Patrick contended the Defendants had fabricated
was the December 14 Report. See PSOF, Ex. 39, 3/8/17, Tr., Patrick v. City of Chi.,
No. 14 C 3658 (N.D. Ill.), ECF No. 818-39 at 33:14–34:11 (Patrick’s attorneys
explicitly referring to the December 14 Report as a “fabricated . . . piece of evidence”
and attributing it to “the last two defendants in this case, officers Michael Berti and
Sean Glinski”); Id. at 615:9–635:25 (direct examination of Officer Villardita about
contacting Berti and Glinski to have the December 14 Report made and questioning
its lack of supervisor signature); Id. at 3495:10–3515:22 (direct examination of Officer
Glinski about the drafting of the December 14 Report); Id. at 3707:5–3708:21 direct
(examination in which Officer Berti is asked to explicitly deny fabricating the
December 14 Report in order to frame Patrick and his co-defendants); Id. at 3711:17–
3713:16 (cross examination of Officer Berti in which he is asked about the accuracy
of the time he saw Taylor in the December 14 Report); Id. at 4061:11–4063:22
(Plaintiff’s closing argument in which Patrick’s attorneys explicitly argue that
Defendants’ fabrication of evidence was the December 14 Report); 4095:5–23
(Defendants’ closing argument in which their attorneys argue that the December 14
Report is accurate). In light of the theories put forward in the opening and closing
statements, along with the emphasis on the December 14 Report in the examinations
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of Defendants, a rational jury could only have been referring to the December 14
Report in finding the Defendants liable for fabrication of evidence.
Defendants contend otherwise, maintaining that they had other involvement
with Patrick that could have formed the basis of the jury’s verdict finding them liable
for fabrication of evidence. But Defendants themselves conceded in their appeal in
Patrick that their “sole involvement [in Deon Patrick’s case] was on December 14,
1992, when they authored the [December 14 Report] documenting their encounter
with Taylor.” Appellant’s Br. at 58, Patrick v. City of Chi., No. 18-2759 (7th Cir. filed
Aug. 14, 2018) (emphasis added). And, indeed, the trial transcript from Patrick bears
out that concession. Defendants cannot have their cake and eat it too.
3.
Whether it is fair to apply issue preclusion
To be clear, what Plaintiff seeks to do here is preclude Glinski and Berti from
contesting the Patrick jury’s finding that they fabricated the December 14 Report. In
so doing, Taylor seeks to avail himself of offensive nonmutual issue preclusion
(offensive, because Taylor wants to establish a fact necessary to prove his claim; and
nonmutual, because Taylor was not a litigant in Patrick).
It is well-established that, even where all of the elements of issue preclusion
are proven, “[n]onmutual issue preclusion is not available as a matter of right.” 18A
Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice &
Procedure § 4465 (3d ed. 2017); see Rodriguez-Garcia v. Miranda-Marin, 610 F.3d
756, 772 (1st Cir. 2010); Chicago Truck Drivers, Helpers & Warehouse Union Pension
Fund v. Century Motor Freight, 125 F.3d 526, 530–31 (7th Cir. 1997). For example,
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the application of issue preclusion may not be appropriate when “the need to try
related issues requires consideration of much the same evidence as bears on the issue
tendered for preclusion . . . because it would not significantly expedite the second
trial.” Federal Practice & Procedure § 4465 (citing cases). See also Setter v. A.H.
Robins Co., 748 F.2d 1328, 1331 (8th Cir. 1984) (affirming a denial of nonmutual
offensive issue preclusion because judicial economy is not furthered where “the same
facts . . . would still have to come in and be considered by the court or jury [in the
second trial].”) Or when preclusion on one issue would “substantially distort decision
of the issues that remain open.” Federal Practice & Procedure § 4465 (citing cases).
Butler v. Stover Bros. Trucking Co., 546 F.2d 544, 551 (7th Cir. 1977) (finding that
the collateral estoppel analysis must determine fairness in light of “the practical
realities which surround the parties” and ultimately holding that collateral estoppel
should not apply because it would be “unfair to allow plaintiff to assume a position
better than that which he would have enjoyed . . .”). See also Restatement (Second)
of Judgments at § 29(6) (denial of collateral estoppel may also be appropriate where
“[t]reating the issue as conclusively determined may complicate determination of
issues in the subsequent action or prejudice the interests of another party thereto”).
Indeed, numerous courts have declined to apply issue preclusion when doing
so would result in substantial prejudice to co-defendants or confuse the jury. See,
e.g., Rodriguez-Garcia, 610 F.3d at 773 (affirming a district court’s decision not to
apply collateral estoppel because it “could lead the jury to make improper inferences
as to related issues remaining in the case” and “the instruction would not promote
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judicial economy because these remaining, closely intertwined issues would require
introduction of much of the same evidence at trial”); Whelan v. Abell, 953 F.2d 663,
669 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (affirming a denial of nonmutual collateral estoppel based on
“concern[s] about unduly swaying or confusing the jury”); In re Blue Cross Blue Shield
Antitrust Litig. (MDL No. 2406), No. 2:13-CV-20000-RDP, 2018 WL 1796257, at *4
(N.D. Ala. Apr. 16, 2018) (“Here, the court concludes that applying nonmutual
collateral estoppel is unwarranted [in part because] doing so would greatly prejudice
the interests of the Defendants . . . who did not participate in” the cases that would
have preclusive effect); AIG Ret. Servs., Inc. v. Altus Fin. S.A., No. CV 05-1035-JFW
(CWX), 2011 WL 13213602, at *6 (C.D. Cal. July 21, 2011) (“Because Artemis was the
only defendant found liable in the Garamendi action, . . . [only] Artemis would be
prohibited from arguing that it joined a conspiracy in this case while the other
defendants would be presenting evidence and vigorously arguing that the conspiracy
Artemis allegedly joined never existed, which would result in juror confusion even
with appropriate limiting instructions.”).
Here, Defendants argue that “conducting a trial where only some defendants
would be bound on some facts while others would be free to contest the same issues
would be impossible to fairly adjudicate.” Defs.’ Resp. Opp’n Mot. (“Defs.’ Resp.”) at
14, ECF No. 823. They rely on Judge Pallmeyer’s reasoning in denying a similar
motion, also based on the Patrick verdict, in Phillips v. City of Chicago. See 5/9/18
Tr., Phillips v. City of Chi., No. 14 C 9372 (N.D. Ill.), ECF No. 170. Defendants’
concerns are legitimate.
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Although applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel in this instance would
bind only two Defendants on only one claim, it would cause significant complications
for other Defendants that would persist throughout the trial. For example, under
Plaintiff’s theory of the case, Defendants Villardita and Johnson would be forced to
persuade the jury that the December 14 Report was not fabricated, in the face of a
Court instruction ordering the jury to consider it to have been so as to Glinski and
Berti. See Pl.’s Mem. Supp. Part. Summ. J. at 13 (arguing that the jury’s verdict
against Berti and Glinski on fabrication of evidence meant they “must have found, in
conformity with the instruction they were given, that Berti and Glinski[, in preparing
the December 14 Report,] knowingly joined a conspiracy with Villardita and Johnson
with whom they shared the common goal to violate Plaintiff’s rights by fabricating
evidence regarding Plaintiff’s whereabouts on November 16”). Such a posture would
inflict substantial prejudice upon Villardita and Johnson, making the application of
collateral estoppel in this instance fundamentally unfair.
This relates closely to the second factor that would make collateral estoppel
unfair in this circumstance—the significant potential for jury confusion. As Chief
Judge Pallmeyer noted in Phillips, a reasonable jury is unlikely to understand that a
fact can be decided as to certain defendants, but undecided as to others. Instead,
jurors are likely to believe that there is nothing left for them to decide, regardless of
what the jury instructions say. See 5/9/18 Tr., Phillips v. City of Chi., No. 14 C 9372
(N.D. Ill.), ECF No. 170 at 3:12–16 (“This issue has been decided with respect to
Defendants X and Y but not with respect to Defendant Z, and the evidence is the
15
same. I'm not sure that really puts them in any kind of a situation where they have
anything to decide.”). This is precisely the type of issue “distortion” that commentors
have identified. Accordingly, the significant potential for jury confusion also weighs
against the application of collateral estoppel in this case.
On the other side of the ledger, there is little benefit to be gained by the
doctrine’s application. Whether the December 14 Report was (or was not) fabricated
will be a significant issue that will be tried, regardless of whether Glinski and Berti
are precluded from contesting the issue. Both Plaintiff and the remaining Defendants
will introduce evidence to prove their respective positions.
And the parties
undoubtedly will ask the jury to make a finding as to this issue during their closing
statements.
As such, there is little judicial economy to be gained by applying
collateral estoppel here.
For these reasons, the Court finds that the application of nonmutual offensive
issue preclusion in this case against Defendants Glinski and Berti would
substantially prejudice the remaining Defendants at trial, result in significant risk
of jury confusion, and not materially enhance the doctrine’s goals—“protecting
litigants from the burden of religitating an identical issue” and “promoting judicial
economy by preventing needless litigation,” Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S.
322, 326 (1979). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s request that Glinski and Berti be precluded
from contesting the fabrication of the December 14 Report at trial is denied.
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B.
Summary Judgment Is Otherwise Inappropriate
For the sake of completeness, the Court notes that, even assuming, for the sake
of argument, that the Court were to apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel to
prohibit Glinksi and Berti from contesting the fabrication of the December 14 Report,
genuine issues of material fact nevertheless would forestall summary judgment. And
to assist the parties as they prepare for trial, the Court will address two of the
remaining issues raised in the briefs—whether the prosecution used the report
against Taylor during the criminal trial, and whether the summary judgment record
conclusively shows that the use was material to the jury’s verdict.
a.
Whether the Report was used against Taylor
In opposing summary judgment, Defendants argue that the December 14
Report was not used against Taylor in his criminal trial. Defendants are incorrect.
Although the report itself was not admitted into evidence, as the Court has previously
noted, the contents of the fabricated report certainly were. Taylor v. City of Chi., No.
14 C 737, 2019 WL 4597383, at *15 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 23, 2019). Indeed, the December
14 Report was discussed at length during Officer Glinski’s cross- and redirect
examinations, including by reference to the document itself, which was used to
refresh Officer Glinski’s recollection. See Mot., Ex. 37, 9/5/95 Trial Tr. at N-118:4–N122:4; N-138:24–N-149:24; People v. Taylor, No. 93-7106 (Cook Cty. Cir. Ct.), ECF
No. 808-40.
Nonetheless, Defendants maintain that, because the report itself was not
admitted in evidence, it was not “introduced against” a defendant for purposes of a
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fabrication of evidence claim. But it is no secret why the prosecution did not attempt
to admit the December 14 Report during Taylor’s criminal trial; police reports
typically are not admissible (and certainly not when offered by the prosecution) due
to the rule against hearsay.
See Ill. R. Evid. 803(8)(b); see also Fed. R. Evid.
803(8)(A)(ii) (providing the same exclusion).
More to the point, although the prosecution did not seek to admit the report in
evidence, the prosecution noted the existence of the report before the jury and
discussed the contents of the report during Glinski’s examination. In this way, the
prosecution did use the December 14 Report against Taylor, and that is all that is
required, even under the Seventh Circuit’s recent decision in Patrick. See Patrick,
974 F.3d at 835 (holding that the trial court’s fabrication-of-evidence instruction was
erroneous because “it failed to explain that Patrick had the burden to prove that the
fabricated evidence was used against him at this criminal trial and was material”)
(emphasis added).
b.
Whether the Report was material
To prevail on his fabrication-of-evidence claim, Taylor also must establish that
the December 14 Report was material to the verdict. That is, Taylor must show “a
reasonable likelihood the evidence affected the judgment of the jury.” Patrick, 974 at
835.
Plaintiff claims that the record is indisputable that the police report was
material to the jury’s verdict. This is incorrect.
During the criminal trial, the closing statements from both Taylor and the
state reflected the importance of Taylor’s location at the time of the murders. The
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State began its closing arguments with a focus on Taylor’s alibi and arguing that he
was not in police custody at the time of the murders. The State’s attorney explained
that “the issue for [the jury] to decide is where was Daniel Taylor,” in custody, or at
the scene of the murders; the state further suggested that the officers who signed
Taylor’s bond release form, the foundation of his alibi, were likely mistaken. PSOAF,
Ex. 142, 9/7/95 Trial Tr. at 226:1–228:16, People v. Taylor, No. 93-7106, ECF No. 50116. But the State’s closing argument did not emphasize the December 14 Report as
proof that Taylor was not in custody at the time of the murders. Instead, the State
relied primarily on Taylor’s confession, the possibility of a clerical error by the officers
who testified that Taylor was in custody, and the testimony of Adrian Grimes that
Taylor was not in custody at the time of the murders. Id at 228:17–232:9.
Based on this, a reasonable jury in this case could conclude that Glinski’s
testimony as to the December 14 Report was so thoroughly uncredible that the jury
in the criminal case gave it no weight, yet relied on the other evidence to reject
Taylor’s defense that he was in jail at the time of the murders. While this is not the
most likely scenario, it would not be an unreasonable one. Accordingly, the Court
concludes that there exists a genuine dispute of material fact as to the element of
materiality, and Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied on this
independent ground as well.5
Given this, the Court finds no need to prolong the discussion by analyzing whether
Taylor suffered injury as a result of the fabrications in the December 14 Report.
5
19
IV.
Conclusion
For the reasons given above, Taylor’s motion for partial summary judgment as
to Count II is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
ENTERED: 9/27/21
__________________________________
John Z. Lee
United States District Judge
20
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