Dyson, Inc. et al v. Euro-Pro Operating LLC et al

Filing 125

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order. Signed by the Honorable John W. Darrah on 9/2/2015. Mailed notice. (jl)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
DYSON, INC. and
DYSON TECHNOLOGY LIMITED,
Plaintiffs,
v.
SHARKNINJA OPERATING LLC and
SHARKNINJA SALES COMPANY,
Defendants.

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Case No. 14-cv-779
Judge John W. Darrah

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiffs Dyson, Inc. and Dyson Technology Limited filed a Second Amended
Complaint against Defendants SharkNinja Operating LLC and SharkNinja Sales Company1
(collectively, the “Defendants”), alleging three counts of design infringement associated with
United States Design Patents No. D577,163 (the “‘163 Patent”), No. D668,010 (the “‘010
Patent”), and No. 668,823 (the “‘823 Patent”). Defendants filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment of Noninfringement [65]. For the reasons set forth below, that Motion is denied.
LOCAL RULE 56.1
Local Rule 56.1(a)(3) requires the moving party to provide “a statement of material facts
as to which the party contends there is no genuine issue for trial.” Ammons v.
Aramark Uniform Servs., 368 F.3d 809, 817 (7th Cir. 2004). Local Rule 56.1(b)(3) requires that
“[a]ll material facts set forth in the statement required of the moving party will be deemed to be
admitted unless controverted by the statement of the opposing party.” Id. Local Rule

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At the start of this litigation, Defendants were named Euro-Pro Operating LLC and
Euro-Pro Sales Company but changed their names to the present designations.

56.1(b)(3)(C) permits the nonmovant to submit “any additional facts that require the denial of
summary judgment. . . .” To overcome summary judgment, “the nonmoving party must file a
response to each numbered paragraph in the moving party’s statement.” Schrott v.
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 403 F.3d 940, 944 (7th Cir. 2005). In the case of any disagreement,
the nonmoving party must reference affidavits, parts of the record, and other materials that
support his stance. Id. A nonmovant’s “mere disagreement with the movant’s asserted facts is
inadequate if made without reference to specific supporting material.” Smith v. Lamz, 321 F.3d
680, 683 (7th Cir. 2003). Legal conclusions or otherwise unsupported statements, including
those that rely upon inadmissible hearsay, will be disregarded. See First Commodity
Traders, Inc. v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 766 F.2d 1007, 1011 (7th Cir. 1985); see also
Eisenstadt v. Centel Corp., 113 F.3d 738, 742 (7th Cir. 1997). If the nonmovant’s response only
provides extraneous or argumentative information, the response will fail to constitute a proper
denial of the fact, and the fact will be admitted. See Graziano v. Vill. of Oak Park,
401 F. Supp. 2d 918, 936 (N.D. Ill. 2005).
BACKGROUND
The following facts are taken from the parties’ statements of undisputed material facts
submitted in accordance with Local Rule 56.1. 2
Plaintiff Dyson, Inc. is an Illinois corporation with its principal place of business in
Chicago, Illinois. (Def’s SOF ¶ 1.) Plaintiff Dyson Technology Limited is a private limited
company organized and existing under the laws of England and Wales with its principal place of
2

Defendants ask the Court to disregard several of Plaintiffs’ responses to their statements
of fact and several of Plaintiffs’ Local Rule 56.1(B)(3)(C) additional facts. To the extent that
any of the responses or additional facts do not conform with Local Rule 56.1, they will not be
considered.
2

business in Malmesbury, United Kingdom. (Id. ¶ 2.) Dyson sells a number of different
handheld vacuum cleaner products in the United States. (Id. ¶ 3.) Defendant SharkNinja
Operating LLC is a limited liability company organized under the laws of Delaware with its
principal place of business located in Newton, Massachusetts. (Id. ¶ 6.) Defendant SharkNinja
Sales Company is also a limited liability company organized under the laws of Delaware with its
principal place of business located in Newton, Massachusetts. (Id. ¶ 7.) SharkNinja sells
vacuum cleaners under the “Shark Rocket” brand. (Id. ¶ 8.)
On May 12, 2014 Dyson filed an Amended Complaint, asserting three counts of
infringement of the ‘163, ‘010, and ‘823 Patents. (Id. ¶ 11.) The ‘163 Patent, titled “Cleaning
Appliance,” was filed on January 18, 2007, and issued on September 16, 2008, and claims the
ornamental design for a cleaning appliance. (Id. ¶ 14.)

(Amend. Compl. Ex. A.) The ‘010 Patent, titled “Vacuum Cleaner,” was filed on
February 8, 2011, and issued on September 25, 2012, and claims the ornamental design for a
vacuum cleaner. (Def. SOF ¶ 16.)

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(Amend. Compl. Exh. B.) The ‘823 Patent, titled “Vacuum Cleaner,” was filed on
February 4, 2011, and issued on October 9, 2012, and claims the ornamental design for a vacuum
cleaner. (Def. SOF ¶ 19.)

(Amend. Compl. Exh. C)

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Dyson accuses three Shark Rocket vacuum series of infringement: the HV300 series, the
HV310 series, and the HV320 series. (Def. SOF ¶ 9.) Products within those series share the
same essential design features, and differ only in accent colors or accessory packages. (Id.)
SharkNinja began selling the HV300 product in the fall of 2013. (Id. ¶ 35). The HV310 and the
HV321 were first sold publicly in the fall of 2014. (Id. ¶ 45, 50.)
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment will be granted where “the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. Courts are required to view all facts and make reasonable inferences “in the
light most favorable to” the nonmoving party. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007). A
genuine dispute of material facts exists where “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986). The moving party has the initial burden of establishing that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). To overcome a
motion for summary judgment, “[t]he nonmoving party must point to specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial.” Stephens v. Erickson, 569 F.3d 779, 786 (7th Cir. 2009). The
nonmovant must show “that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”
Pugh v. City of Attica, Ind., 259 F.3d 619, 625 (7th Cir. 2001) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at
248).

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ANALYSIS
“A design patent is infringed if an ordinary observer would have been deceived: ‘if, in
the eye of an ordinary observer, giving such attention as a purchaser usually gives, two designs
are substantially the same, if the resemblance is such as to deceive such an observer, inducing
him to purchase one supposing it to be the other, the first one patented is infringed by the other.’”
Apple Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., 786 F.3d 983, 999 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quoting
Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. 511, 528 (1872)). In evaluating infringement, deception “arises
[a]s a result of the similarities in the overall design, not of similarities in ornamental features in
isolation.” Richardson v. Stanley Works, Inc., 597 F.3d 1288, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting
Amini Innovation Corp. v. Anthony Cal., Inc., 439 F.3d 1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).
The overall design comparison takes into account “significant differences between the
two designs, not minor or trivial differences that necessarily exist between any two designs that
are not exact copies of one another.” Int'l Seaway Trading Corp. v. Walgreens Corp., 589 F.3d
1233, 1243 (Fed. Cir.2009). However, the accused and the patented designs do not have to be
identical in order to find patent infringement. See Oddzon Prod., Inc. v. Just Toys, Inc., 122 F.3d
1396, 1405 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Similarities, as well as differences, in the design are relevant in
determining whether an ordinary observer would be deceived. See Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.
v. Hercules Tire & Rubber Co., 162 F.3d 1113, 1117 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
Defendants argue that summary judgment of noninfringement is proper because the
claimed designs are plainly dissimilar to the accused products. Summary judgment can be
granted when the patented design is plainly dissimilar from the accused design.
Competitive Edge, Inc. v. Staples, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 2d 997, 1012 (N.D. Ill. 2010) aff'd, 412 F.
App'x 304 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 678 (Fed.
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Cir. 2008) (en banc)). “When the patented design and the accused design are plainly dissimilar .
. . there is no need to look to the prior art.” Id. In this case, the patented designs are not plainly
dissimilar to the accused products. While there are some differences in design, the accused and
the patented designs do not have to be identical in order to find patent infringement; and the
overall design of the accused products is not plainly dissimilar to the patented design. Therefore,
the prior art must be taken into account. See Egyptian Goddess, 543 F.3d at 678 (“when the
claimed and accused designs are not plainly dissimilar, resolution of the question whether the
ordinary observer would consider the two designs to be substantially the same will benefit from a
comparison of the claimed and accused designs with the prior art”).
The parties disagree as to the role of prior art in the infringement analysis. The Federal
Circuit has specifically endorsed, “a test that asks how an ordinary observer with knowledge of
the prior art designs would view the differences between the claimed and accused designs.”
Egyptian Goddess, 543 F.3d at 677. For an infringement analysis, the asserted design must be
compared against the prior art: “[i]f the accused design has copied a particular feature of the
claimed design that departs conspicuously from the prior art, the accused design is naturally
more likely to be regarded as deceptively similar to the claimed design, and thus infringing.”
Apple Inc., 786 F.3d at 999 (quoting Egyptian Goddess, 543 F.3d at 678). The similarities of
departures from the previous art are not a test announced by the Federal Circuit, as suggested by
Plaintiffs; it is simply an observation. “The ordinary observer . . . will likely attach importance
to [differences from the prior art] depending on the overall effect of those differences on the
design.” Crocs, Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 598 F.3d 1294, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citing
Egyptian Goddess, 543 F.3d at 681).

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Defendants also argue that there is no design patent infringement when functional
elements are discounted. In general, “a product feature is functional if it is essential to the use or
purpose of the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the article.” Inwood Labs., Inc. v.
Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850 n. 10 (1982). To be considered functional, a product feature
needs to have some utilitarian advantage; taken as a whole, a trade dress is functional if it is in a
particular shape because it works better in that shape. Apple, 786 F.3d at 991. Functional
elements are “elements that are driven purely by utility.” Richardson., 597 F.3d at 1294.
However, in Apple, the Federal Circuit rejected Samsung’s argument that functional elements
should be entirely eliminated from the claim scope. Apple, 786 F.3d at 998 (rejecting Samsung’s
argument that functional elements should be “ignored” in their entirety from the design patent
claim scope). In evaluating infringement, the fact-finder determines whether deception “arises
[a]s a result of the similarities in the overall design, not of similarities in ornamental features in
isolation.” Richardson, 597 F.3d at 1295 (emphasis added). The parties disagree as to what
aspects of the design are actually functional. Whether certain aspects of the design are functional
is a question of material fact for the jury.
Because the accused product and the patent designs are not plainly dissimilar, the prior
art must be considered. Whether the designs are substantially similar in overall design such that
an ordinary observer would find them deceptively similar, and the determination of what aspects
of the design are functional, are questions of material fact for the jury.
Motions to Strike
Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Strike the Declaration of Alan Ball [81], which was denied;
but the substance of the motion was considered for this ruling. Defendants filed a Motion to

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Strike the Declaration of Charles Mauro [93]; that motion is similarly denied, with the substance
of the motion considered for this ruling. These issues may be raised again in motions in limine.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment of
Noninfringement [65] is denied.

Date:

September 2, 2015
JOHN W. DARRAH
United States District Court Judge

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Appendix A

‘163 Patent

HV300

HV310
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HV321

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Appendix B

‘010 Patent

HV 300

HV 310

HV 321
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Appendix C

‘823 Patent

HV 300

HV 310

HV 321
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