Ha v. Northwestern University
Filing
25
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Signed by the Honorable Harry D. Leinenweber on 11/13/2014:Civil case terminated. Mailed notice(wp, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
YOONA HA,
Case No. 14 C 895
Plaintiff,
Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber
v.
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
I.
BACKGROUND
On February 11 and 12, 2012, the Plaintiff, a freshman at
Northwestern
University
(hereinafter,
the
“Defendant”
or
“Northwestern”), was sexually assaulted by Peter Ludlow (“Ludlow”),
one of her professors.
The assault took place off campus at
Ludlow’s apartment in the evening or early morning hours, and
occurred after Ludlow caused her to become intoxicated by plying
her with drinks.
Although her level of consciousness was as she
described it “in and out,” she recalls being kissed and groped by
Ludlow at his apartment and recalls waking up in his bed with his
arms around her.
Plaintiff told one of her professors about the
incident with Ludlow.
Plaintiff then confronted Ludlow who begged
her not to tell anyone and told her he could either mentor her
academically or pay her money.
The
professor,
to
whom
Plaintiff
reported
the
incident,
informed the University’s Director of Sexual Harassment Prevention
the next day.
began
an
The Director, Joan Slavin (“Slavin”), immediately
investigation
of
Plaintiff’s
complaint.
While
the
investigation was ongoing Slavin directed Ludlow to have no father
contact with Plaintiff and informed Plaintiff of this directive.
The investigation itself consisted of reviewing documents and other
information, and interviewing Plaintiff, Ludlow and several other
witnesses.
At
summarized
the
the
conclusion
information
of
the
reviewed
investigation,
and
her
Slavin
findings
and
recommendations in a 21-page memorandum to the Dean of the Weinberg
College of Arts & Sciences, dated April 10, 2012.
Slavin also e-
mailed Plaintiff a copy of her memorandum.
Based on the totality of the evidence Slavin concluded that
Ludlow had, in fact, engaged in unwelcome and inappropriate sexual
advances toward Plaintiff. She also found that, as a result of the
heavy consumption of alcohol purchased for Plaintiff by Ludlow,
that Ha “was unable to offer meaningful consent.”
Slavin told
Plaintiff that she had made the Dean’s Office aware of her findings
and would work with that office on implementing needed corrective
and remedial actions.
She did, however, tell Plaintiff that
Northwestern would not share details of disciplinary and corrective
actions
taken
against
Ludlow
because
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of
their
confidential
personnel nature, other than he was to refrain from having any
contact with her.
Plaintiff contends that as a result of the stress and trauma
of the events with Ludlow she was diagnosed with Post Traumatic
Stress Disorder and was hospitalized after attempting to commit
suicide.
Shortly thereafter, she retained attorneys to represent
her with regard to the matters related to the sexual assault.
Later Plaintiff
found
out that
Ludlow
was
still
employed
by
Northwestern. Because he had not been removed from the campus, she
felt unsafe which caused her to experience panic attacks.
On April 24, 2012, Plaintiff’s counsel sent out a demand
letter
to
Ludlow
requesting
that
resulting from his sexual assault.
he
pay
Plaintiff’s
damages
On May 4, 2012, Ludlow, in a
letter to Plaintiff’s attorney written by his own attorney, denied
the allegation of sexual assault and accused plaintiff of making
false statements about him. He further threatened to sue Plaintiff
for defamation and ordered her to cease and desist from making
further false statements against him.
Plaintiff reported this
threat to Ms. Slavin because she construed it as retaliation for
her
complaints.
University’s behalf.
Ms.
Slavin
promptly
investigated
on
the
When the investigation concluded, Plaintiff
was informed by Ms. Slavin that Ludlow’s letter did not violate
University policy against retaliation because the letter stated a
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legal position and was in response to Plaintiff’s attorney’s demand
letter.
Plaintiff claims that the University retaliated against her
for complaining about Ludlow by denying her a fellowship and, when
she dropped out of a study abroad program, was denied a “nonrefundable”
refund
of
her
deposit.
She
also
alleges
that
Defendant’s Center for Awareness, Response, and Education (“Care”)
decided to stop working with her because of what it stated was
“conflicts of interest” based on her threat to sue Northwestern.
Finally,
after
suing
Northwestern,
Plaintiff
claims
that
she
experienced, what she termed as “inconvenience and difficulties,”
such as she had not been automatically registered for a class.
complained about it and she was subsequently registered.
She
Lastly,
she claims that Ludlow’s threat to file a defamation lawsuit
against her constituted retaliation.
II. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff claims in Count I of her suit that she is entitled
to damages because Northwestern violated Title IX of the Education
Amendment Act of 1972. She claims that the failure of Northwestern
to fire Ludlow and allowing him to remain on campus created a
hostile enrolment that effectively deprived her of the education
opportunities and benefits provided by the school.
contends
that
the
inconvenience
and
described above constituted retaliation.
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difficulties
She also
which
she
The Complaint does not
allege what actions Northwestern actually took against Ludlow,
although Northwestern sets forth in its Answer and its Affirmative
Defenses a laundry list of actions it took against Ludlow.
Plaintiff’s problem with attempting to establish Title IX
liability for hostile environment against Northwestern is that an
institution must have actual knowledge of the harassment and have
exhibited deliberate indifference to it in order to be liable for
damages.
According
to
the
Supreme
Court,
Congress
did
not
contemplate payment of damages where the institution is unaware of
the hostile environment.
Nor does Title IX permit recovery for a
teacher’s sexual harassment of a student based on the principles of
respondeat superior or constructive notice, i.e., without actual
notice to the school official.
Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent
School Dist., 118 S.Ct. 1989 (1998).
It is only where the school
has actual notice of the harassment and does nothing about it or
takes insufficient actions to stop it that it shows deliberate
indifference.
sexual
Here, the Plaintiff complained to Northwestern of
harassment
Northwestern
on
the
immediately
part
of
conducted
Ludlow
an
after
it
investigation
allegations and issued a report finding them well taken.
occurred.
into
the
It took
remedial action which consisted at least in part by instructing
Ludlow not have any contact with Plaintiff.
Ha does not allege
that Ludlow violated that instruction, so Northwestern took timely,
reasonable,
and
successful
measures
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to
end
the
harassment.
Therefore, it is not liable under Title IX for Ludlow’s harassment.
If Northwestern had learned that its response was proven to be
inadequate to prevent further harassment by Ludlow, it would have
been required to take further steps to avoid liability.
Brown University, 184 F.3d 20, 26 (1st Cir. 1999).
Wills v.
However, the
Complaint does not allege any subsequent acts of harassment on
Ludlow’s part so there was no further action required to be taken
by Northwestern to avoid Title IX liability.
The problem with Plaintiff’s argument that Northwestern should
be liable for indifference because it did not fire Ludlow, is that
it flies in the face of Supreme Court precedent established in
Davis Next Friend LaShonda D. v. Monroe, 119 S.Ct 1661, 1674
(1999).
Although
that
case
involved
student-on-student
sex
harassment, it nevertheless interpreted the requirements of Title
IX.
The Supreme Court specifically held that Title IX does not
give the victim the right to make particular remedial demands. “In
fact
.
.
.
courts
should
refrain
from
second-guessing
the
disciplinary decisions made by school administrators. . . . School
administrators will continue to enjoy the flexibility they require
so
long
as
funding
recipients
are
deemed
‘deliberately
indifferent’ . . . only where the recipient’s response to the
harassment or lack thereof is clearly unreasonable in light of the
known circumstances.”
Id.
Here so far as the Complaint is
concerned to Plaintiff’s knowledge, the Defendant took disciplinary
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action against Ludlow without disclosing the specifics other than
instructing him to have no contact with Plaintiff.
Ludlow acceded
to this instruction, and, other than an occasional glimpse of him
on the campus, there was no other contact between the two, other
than the attorney correspondence.
So as far as Plaintiff herself
is concerned, according to the Complaint, there was no other
contact.
She, however, claims that knowledge of Ludlow’s presence
on the campus caused her considerable grief.
However, this is not
actionable under Title IX.
Plaintiff has also alleged a Title IX retaliation claim as
described above.
None of the occurrences could be classified as
retaliation. She claimed that she applied for a fellowship but was
denied the fellowship.
She does not allege that the denial was
causally related to her threats to bring suit.
She also does not
state who the decider was on the fellowship matter.
She dropped
out of a study abroad program and was denied a refund of a nonrefundable deposit. She, however, does not allege that the failure
to refund the deposit was occasioned by Northwestern.
She alleges
that “the company in charge” of the program was making the demand
for payment.
This would seem to imply that it was not Northwestern
who made the decision, but some unnamed company.
She claims that
the Northwestern Advocacy Center for Sexual Assault Victims stopped
working for her after she threatened suit through her attorney,
citing a conflict of interest, constituted retaliation.
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However,
Plaintiff herself likewise notified the Center that she wished to
terminate her relationship.
Her complaint about the threatened
suit does not constitute retaliation either.
Mlyncxak v. Bodman,
442 F.3d 1050, 1061 (7th Cir. 2006) (“The lawsuit-at least in the
absence of a showing not made here that it was independently an
abuse of process-was not the kind of adverse action that the
retaliation statute reaches.”) Plaintiff’s remaining complaints at
best amount to inconveniences which are not considered “adverse”
actions.
Hilt-Dyson v. City of Chicago, 282 F.3d 456, 465 (7th
Cir. 2002).
III.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, Defendant’s Motion for Judgment
on the Pleadings is granted.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge
United States District Court
Date:11/13/2014
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