Goldberg v. Chicago School for Piano Technology NFP et al
Filing
30
Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 2/3/2015: Defendants' motion to dismiss 22 is granted in part and denied in part.Mailed notice(mad, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
JERROLD GOLDBERG,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
CHICAGO SCHOOL FOR PIANO
)
TECHNOLOGY, NFP; PAUL REVENKO- )
JONES, ROBERT GUENTHER; and
)
OKSANA REVENKO-JONES,
)
)
Defendants.
)
Case No. 14 C 1440
Judge Joan H. Lefkow
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Jerrold Goldberg filed suit against defendants alleging violations of Title III of
the Americans with Disabilities Act (“the ADA”) and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
(“the Rehabilitation Act”). Goldberg also alleges two state law claims: a violation of the Illinois
Human Rights Act (“the IHRA”) and a breach of contract claim. Defendants filed a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (Dkt. 22.) For the reasons
stated below, defendants’ motion is granted in part and denied in part.
BACKGROUND 1
The Chicago School for Piano Technology (“the School”) teaches students how to tune
and repair pianos. (Dkt. 3 (“Compl.”) ¶ 17.) Paul Revenko-Jones is the School’s director and
Robert Guenther is the School’s president and one of its instructors. (Id. ¶¶ 7–8.) Oksana
Revenko-Jones is an administrator and secretary. (Id. ¶ 9.) Goldberg enrolled in classes at the
1
Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are taken from the amended complaint and are
presumed true for the purpose of resolving the pending motion. Active Disposal, Inc. v. City of Darien,
635 F.3d 883, 886 (7th Cir. 2011).
1
School in the fall of 2011. (Id. ¶ 19.) He spent over $28,000 on tuition and related expenses.
(Id.)
Goldberg suffers from Attention Deficit Disorder and test anxiety. (Id. ¶ 13.) Upon
enrollment, Goldberg disclosed his disabilities to Paul and Oksana Revenko-Jones. (Id. ¶ 20.)
He told Guenther about his disabilities after his first class. (Id.)
While enrolled at the School, Goldberg made several requests to defendants for
reasonable accommodations for his disabilities, including extended time to complete exams and
the use of an electronic tuning device to assist him in tuning pianos. (Id. ¶ 21.) On each
occasion, defendants denied his requests. (Id. ¶ 22.) Goldberg claims that, as a result, he did not
pass a practical tuning exam. (Id. ¶ 23.) On April 18, 2012, after being denied another request
for accommodation, Goldberg told Paul Revenko-Jones that, although he did not plan to report
the School to the Department of Education yet, he would “put things in motion” that coming
Friday. (Id. ¶ 24 (internal quotation marks omitted).) Also on April 18, the School notified
Goldberg that he had been placed on academic probation six weeks earlier. (Id. ¶ 61.)
On May 11, 2012, after defendants denied his request to retake the tuning exam,
Goldberg told Paul Revenko-Jones that he was going to “contact the right people” about the
School’s treatment of him. (Id. ¶ 25.) In response, Paul Revenko-Jones revoked Goldberg’s
academic probation and “dismissed him”—effectively expelling Goldberg from the School. (Id.)
According to the student handbook, if the School places a student on academic probation, it must
provide the student with “a variety of remedial options.” (Id. ¶ 64.) The handbook also states
that a student on academic probation will have “until the end of the following quarter” to
improve his academic standing. (Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).)
2
Almost a year later, on February 19, 2013, Goldberg filed a charge of discrimination
against defendants with the Illinois Department of Human Rights. (Id. ¶ 26.) The Department
dismissed his claim for lack of jurisdiction on December 5, 2013 (id. ¶ 27), and Goldberg filed
the present suit on February 28, 2014 (see dkt. 1.) Goldberg brings claims under the ADA, the
Rehabilitation Act, the IHRA, and also alleges breach of contract. Goldberg seeks $1,000,000 in
compensatory damages and $2,000,000 in punitive damages plus costs and attorney’s fees. He
does not request injunctive relief.
ANALYSIS
Defendants bring their motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), alleging
that Goldberg fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Not all of defendants’
arguments, however, are correctly presented. Defendants’ objections to Goldberg’s IHRA claim
are jurisdictional and should have been brought under Rule 12(b)(1). 2 Defendants’ arguments
concerning Goldberg’s ADA claim are not jurisdictional, despite defendants’ use of the term
“subject-matter jurisdiction,” and are properly considered under Rule 12(b)(6). Thus, the court
will consider Goldberg’s IHRA claim under Rule 12(b)(1) and his ADA claim under Rule
12(b)(6). The court will consider Goldberg’s remaining claims under Rule 12(b)(6).
I.
Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
A.
Legal Standard
Ensuring the existence of subject-matter jurisdiction is the court’s first duty in every
lawsuit. McCready v. White, 417 F.3d 700, 702 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a
Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 118 S. Ct. 1003, 140 L. Ed. 2d 210 (1998)). Rule 12(b)(1) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows defendants to assert a “lack of subject-matter
2
One of defendants’ objections to Goldberg’s IHRA claim, however, is properly analyzed under
Rule 12(b)(6) and thus will be considered according to that standard.
3
jurisdiction” defense to a plaintiff’s claims. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). These challenges can be
facial (that the plaintiff’s allegations, even if true, fail to support jurisdiction) or factual
(conceding that the allegations are sufficient but offering contrary evidence). Apex Digital
Inc. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 572 F.3d 440, 443–44 (7th Cir. 2009).
Defendants do not specify whether their challenge is facial or factual. Because their
arguments address Goldberg’s allegations without offering contrary evidence, the court construes
defendants’ challenge as facial. Thus, the court will “not look beyond the allegations in the
complaint, which are taken as true for purposes of the motion.” Id. at 444; see also Wolfram v.
Wolfram, No. 14 C 04105, 2015 WL 231808, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 16, 2015).
B.
IHRA Claim
Goldberg claims that defendants violated the IHRA by denying him full access to the
School’s services. (Compl. ¶ 54–55.) Defendants argue that the court does not have subjectmatter jurisdiction over the claim and insist that the court “should not permit Plaintiff to
disregard the comprehensive scheme of procedures set forth within the IHRA.” (Dkt. 22 at 10.)
Instead, defendants argue that the court should “send Plaintiff back to [the] Department and the
Commission to pursue further proceedings, if any.” (Id.)
The IHRA prohibits unlawful discrimination “in connection with employment, real estate
transactions, access to financial credit, and availability of public accommodations.” 775 Ill.
Comp. Stat. 5/1-102; Blount v. Stroud, 904 N.E.2d 1, 6, 232 Ill. 2d 302, 328 Ill. Dec. 239 (2009).
To achieve this objective, the IHRA created the Department of Human Rights (“the
Department”) and the Human Rights Commission (“the Commission”). See 775 Ill. Comp. Stat.
5/1–103(E), (H). The Department investigates charges and the Commission reviews the
Department’s findings and adjudicates complaints. Blount, 904 N.E.2d at 7. Together, the
4
IHRA, the Department, and the Commission “establish comprehensive administrative procedures
governing the disposition of alleged civil rights violations.” Id. at 7 (citing 775 Ill. Comp. Stat.
5/ arts. 7A, 7B, 8A, 8B; 56 Ill. Adm. Code § 2520.10 et seq.; 56 Ill. Adm. Code § 5300.10 et
seq.).
The IHRA requires that a complainant file a charge with the Department within 180 days
of the alleged violation. See 775 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/7A–102(A). Once the Department
investigates the charge and issues a report, the complainant has the option, which must be
exercised within ninety days of receiving the report, of proceeding before the Commission or
commencing a civil action in circuit court. See id. 5/7A–102(D).
On February 19, 2013, Goldberg filed a charge of discrimination against defendants.
(Compl. ¶ 26.) On December 5, 2013, the Department dismissed the claim for lack of
jurisdiction. (Id. ¶ 27.) The notice of dismissal stated that if Goldberg disagreed with the
Department’s finding, he could seek review before the Commission or he could “commence a
civil action in the appropriate state circuit court within ninety days” after receipt of the notice.
(Dkt. 22-4 at 2–3.) 3 Goldberg timely filed the present case on February 28, 2014. (See dkt. 1.)
Defendants argue that the court does not have subject-matter jurisdiction over Goldberg’s
IHRA claim because Goldberg disregarded the statute’s administrative procedures by bringing
the claim in federal court. (Dkt. 22 at 10.) Defendants’ argument is incorrect and outdated.
Under an earlier version of the IHRA, judicial review of an alleged violation was available only
3
Although the court considers defendants’ challenge to its subject-matter jurisdiction facial, and
therefore limits itself to the allegations set forth in the complaint, the court still takes judicial notice of
matters of public record. Henson v. CSC Credit Servs., 29 F.3d 280, 284 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v.
Wood, 925 F.2d 1580, 1582 (7th Cir. 1991). This includes records of the Illinois Department of Human
Rights. See, e.g., Anderson v. Ctrs. for New Horizons, Inc., 891 F. Supp. 2d 956, 959–60 (N.D. Ill. 2012)
(taking judicial notice of a right-to-sue letter); see also McGee v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 2002 WL
449061, *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 22, 2002) (“the court may take judicial notice of matters of public record,
including records of administrative bodies such as the IDHR”).
5
after the Commission issued a final order. See Flaherty v. Gas Research Inst., 31 F.3d 451, 458
(7th Cir. 1994). In 2008, the Illinois legislature amended the IHRA to grant original jurisdiction
over IHRA claims to both the Commission and Illinois circuit courts. See Pub. Act 95–243; 775
Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/7A–102; De v. City of Chicago, 912 F. Supp. 2d 709, 731 (N.D. Ill. 2012).
Although the Seventh Circuit has not addressed the issue, an “overwhelming majority” of district
courts in this Circuit have held that federal courts may now exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over IHRA claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). De, 912 F. Supp. 2d at 731 (citing, among
others, Hoffman v. Bradley Univ., No. 11–1086, 2012 WL 4482173, at *1 (C.D. Ill. Sept. 27,
2012) (“The complaint also included claims arising under [the] Illinois Human Rights Act.
Supplemental jurisdiction over those claims is found under 42 U.S.C. § 1367.”); Massenberg v.
A & R Sec. Servs., Inc., No. 10–CV–7187, 2011 WL 1792735, at *5 (N.D. Ill. May 11, 2011)
(“This court finds . . . that federal courts can exercise supplemental jurisdiction over IHRA
claims.”)). Thus, the court, like others in this Circuit, concludes that it has subject-matter
jurisdiction over plaintiff’s IHRA claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
Defendants also argue that the court does not have subject-matter jurisdiction over
Goldberg’s IHRA claim because the Department’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction controls the
court’s determination of its own jurisdiction. (Dkt. 22 at 8–10.) Defendants cite no legal
authority for this argument. Nor is defendants’ assertion supported by common sense: if the
Department’s dismissal prohibited other courts from exercising jurisdiction over claims under
the IHRA, the Department would not, in its notice of dismissal, inform complainants of their
right to bring an action in circuit court. The court rejects the proposition that a determination
made by a state administrative body, within a scheme that allows for judicial review, limits the
court’s jurisdiction. Thus, the court has subject-matter jurisdiction over Goldberg’s IHRA claim.
6
II.
Failure to State a Claim
A.
Legal Standard
A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) challenges a
complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court accepts as true all well-pleaded facts in the
plaintiff’s complaint and draws all reasonable inferences from those facts in the plaintiff’s favor.
Active Disposal, Inc. v. City of Darien, 635 F.3d 883, 886 (7th Cir. 2011); Dixon v. Page,
291 F.3d 485, 486 (7th Cir. 2002). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the complaint must not
only provide the defendant with fair notice of a claim’s basis but must also establish that the
requested relief is plausible on its face. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct.
1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009); Bell Atl. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L.
Ed. 2d 929 (2007). The allegations in the complaint must be “enough to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The plaintiff need not plead legal
theories. Hatmaker v. Mem’l Med. Ctr., 619 F.3d 741, 743 (7th Cir. 2010). “Federal pleading
rules call for ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing the pleader is entitled to
relief’ . . . . [T]hey do not countenance dismissal of a complaint for imperfect statement of the
legal theory supporting the claim asserted.” Johnson v. City of Shelby, 574 U.S. ---, 135 S. Ct.
346, 346, --- L. Ed. 2d --- (2014) (per curiam) (citation omitted).
In evaluating a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court may consider
“documents attached to the complaint, documents that are critical to the complaint and referred
to in it, and information that is subject to proper judicial notice,” along with additional facts set
forth in plaintiff’s brief opposing dismissal, so long as those facts “are consistent with the
pleadings.” Geinosky v. City of Chicago, 675 F.3d 743, 745 n.1 (7th Cir. 2012).
7
B.
ADA Claim
Goldberg alleges two violations of Title III of the ADA: failure to accommodate and
retaliation. Defendants argue that the court lacks “subject matter jurisdiction” over both counts
because a plaintiff cannot seek damages under Title III of the ADA, and damages are the only
type of relief Goldberg requests. (Dkt. 22 at 3–4.) Although the question is not one of subjectmatter jurisdiction, defendants are correct that private individuals seeking to enforce Title III can
ask the court for injunctive relief only. Scherr v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 703 F.3d 1069, 1075 (7th
Cir. 2013); Ruffin v. Rockford Mem’l Hosp., 181 F. App’x 582, 585 (7th Cir. 2006).
Title III of the ADA prohibits discrimination against individuals with disabilities in
places of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181–89. The language of Title III’s
enforcement provision provides a remedy only to a person “who is being subjected to
discrimination on the basis of disability” or who has “reasonable grounds for believing [he or
she] is about to be subjected to discrimination . . . .” See id. § 12188(a)(1) (emphasis added).
This language does not apply to Goldberg, whose complaint concerns past events and seeks only
money damages. Because Goldberg does not seek injunctive relief, or even argue that any
injunctive relief is available, the court grants defendants’ motion to dismiss with respect to both
counts under the ADA.
C.
Rehabilitation Act Claim
Goldberg alleges two violations of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act: failure to
accommodate and retaliation. As a preliminary matter, defendants are correct that punitive
damages are not available in suits brought under the Rehabilitation Act. (Dkt. 22 at 4); Barnes v.
Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 189, 122 S. Ct. 2097, 153 L. Ed. 2d 230 (2002) (“Because punitive
damages may not be awarded in private suits brought under Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights
8
Act, it follows that they may not be awarded in suits brought under § 202 of the ADA and § 504
of the Rehabilitation Act.”). Defendants are incorrect, however, that Goldberg’s request for
compensatory and punitive damages warrants dismissal. (See dkt. 22 at 4.) Nor is a motion to
strike necessary. (See id.) Should Goldberg prevail on his Rehabilitation Act claim, only
compensatory damages will be available.
Defendants also argue that Goldberg’s Rehabilitation Act claim should be dismissed with
respect to the individual defendants, as the Rehabilitation Act does not recognize individual
liability. (Id. at 5.) Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act provides that
No otherwise qualified individual with a disability . . . shall, solely
by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subject to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance . . . .
29 U.S.C. § 794(a). “Section 504 applies to federal financial assistance recipients.” Emerson v.
Thiel Coll., 296 F.3d 184, 190 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing United States Dep’t of Transp. v. Paralyzed
Veterans of Am., 477 U.S. 597, 605–06, 106 S. Ct. 2705, 91 L. Ed. 2d 494 (1986)). It is the
organization, however, and not the individuals who receive the assistance. Id. Individual
defendants, therefore, cannot be held liable under the Rehabilitation Act. See id.; see also
Dent v. City of Chicago, No. 02 C 6604, 2003 WL 21801163, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 1, 2003).
Thus, the court agrees with defendants that Goldberg has failed to state a claim against the
individual defendants under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and that dismissal is appropriate.
Plaintiff’s Rehabilitation Act claim against the School, however, remains.
D.
IHRA Claim
Defendants argue that even if the court has jurisdiction over Goldberg’s IHRA claim,
“the facts that Plaintiff alleged within his charge do not fall within the limited scope of
9
jurisdiction under the IHRA.” (Dkt. 22 at 10.) The issue is not one of jurisdiction but of whether
Goldberg has stated a claim upon which relief may be granted. Under the IHRA, the Department
can only consider charges involving “(1) the failure to enroll an individual; (2) the denial of
access to facilities, goods, or services; or (3) severe or pervasive harassment of an individual
when the covered entity fails to take corrective action to stop the severe or pervasive
harassment.” 775 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/5-102.2. Defendants maintain that “[t]his is a case where
Plaintiff’s charge involved allegations against a place of education related to curriculum content
or course offerings,” which, defendants note, are not covered under the IHRA. (Id. at 9, 10.)
Although Goldberg does allege that the School denied him the use of an electronic tuning device
(see Compl. ¶ 21), which could be considered curriculum content, Goldberg also alleges that the
School denied him access to services. Specifically, Goldberg claims that the School “had an
official anti-discrimination policy in their handbook” and that “defendants’ denial of his requests
for reasonable accommodations was a denial of full access to services normally provided by the
CSPT.” (Id. ¶¶ 54–55.) Goldberg further claims that defendants’ “termination of his academic
probation prior to the time allotted in the student handbook” and “subsequent dismissal” of him
“constitute retaliation as defined by the IHRA.” (Id. ¶ 56.) Thus, the court finds that the facts, as
Goldberg has alleged them, state a claim under the IHRA.
E.
Breach of Contract Claim
Finally, Goldberg alleges that defendants’ violation of the student handbook is a breach
of contract. The student handbook in effect when he was at the School outlined the School’s
academic probation policy. (Id. ¶¶ 54–55, 59, 64.) According to Goldberg, defendants
published and distributed the handbook with the intention that they, and the students, be bound
by its policies. (Id. ¶ 60.)
10
Goldberg claims that on April 18, 2012, he was notified that he had been placed on
academic probation six weeks earlier. (Id. ¶ 61.) On May 11, 2012, Paul Revenko-Jones
terminated that probation “two weeks earlier than the time allotted by the handbook.” (Id. ¶ 62.)
Goldberg notes that the handbook states that if a student is placed on academic probation he will
be provided with a variety of remedial options and he will be offered until the end of the next
quarter to improve his academic standing. (Id. ¶ 64.) Although Goldberg acknowledges that he
was offered some remedial services—specifically, tutoring—Paul Revenko-Jones canceled most
of the tutoring sessions. (Id. ¶ 65.) The student handbook also states that a student on probation
will be given the opportunity to complete the course without being awarded the certification—an
opportunity that Goldberg claims he was never given. (Id. ¶ 66.) Goldberg further alleges that
he was not allowed the allotted time to improve his academic standing. (Id. ¶ 65.)
Defendants move to dismiss Goldberg’s breach of contract claim for “lack of contractual
privity.” (Dkt. 22 at 7.) The only cases defendants cite in support, however, involve the
application of the doctrine of privity of contract to substantively different claims. (See id. (citing
Spiegel v. Sharp Elec. Corp., 466 N.E.2d 1040, 1042, 125 Ill. App. 3d 897 (1984) (considering
“whether plaintiff can recover solely economic losses on a warranty theory in the absence of
privity”); Waterford Condo. Ass’n v. Dunbar Corp., 432 N.E.2d 1009, 1011, 104 Ill. App. 3d
371 (1982) (observing that “[i]t is well settled in Illinois that, absent privity of contract, a
purchaser or owner of real property has no cause of action against a defendant for breach of
contract unless he can demonstrate that the contractual obligations and duties were undertaken
for his direct benefit”)).) Defendants do not explain how these cases counsel in favor of
dismissing Goldberg’s breach of contract claim. (Id.) Defendants provide no guidance beyond
stating the elements of breach of contract (which, as defendants recite them, do not include
11
privity of contract), claiming that privity of contract “generally remains a requirement in all
breach of contract cases” (citing to Spiegel and Waterford), and discussing Spiegel—an
inapposite case concerning breach of warranty—at length. (See id.) To the extent the individual
defendants are contending they were not parties to the contract, they have failed to say so or
demonstrate that fact with documents. The court is unwilling to dismiss plaintiff’s claim on the
basis of defendants’ arguments.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in part.
Date: February 3, 2015
________________________________
U.S. District Judge
12
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?