Woods v. Illinois Department Of Corrections et al
Filing
52
MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order. Signed by the Honorable Manish S. Shah on 7/17/2015: Defendant's motion for summary judgment 40 is granted. Enter judgment in favor of defendant and terminate civil case. [For further detail see attached order.] Notices mailed by Judicial Staff. (psm, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
ANTHONY WOODS (#S-06486),
Plaintiff,
No. 14 CV 1794
v.
Judge Manish S. Shah
MICHAEL MAGANA,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Anthony Woods, a prisoner currently incarcerated at Sheridan
Correctional Center, brought this action pro se under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that
he was unlawfully held in custody at Stateville Correctional Center for
approximately two months after November 28, 2013—the date he says he should
have been released. According to Woods, deliberate indifference on the part of prison
officials led to his prolonged incarceration. Michael Magana, the acting Warden at
Stateville Correctional Center from January 1, 2014 to March 31, 2014, is the sole
defendant to this action. Defendant Magana has moved for summary judgment. For
the reasons discussed below, the motion is granted.
BACKGROUND
Local Rule 56.1
Local Rule 56.1 governs the procedures for filing and responding to motions for
summary judgment in this court. Local Rule 56.1(a) requires the moving party to
provide “a statement of material facts as to which the moving party contends there is
no genuine issue” for trial. See Ammons v. Aramark Uniform Servs., Inc., 368 F.3d
809, 817 (7th Cir. 2004). “All material facts set forth in the statement required of the
moving party will be deemed to be admitted unless controverted by the statement of
the opposing party.” L.R. 56.1(b)(3)(C). The party opposing summary judgment shall
submit “a statement, consisting of short numbered paragraphs, of any additional
facts that require the denial of summary judgment.” Id.
To defeat summary judgment, the opposing party “must file a response to each
numbered paragraph in the moving party’s statement” of fact. Schrott v.
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 403 F.3d 940, 944 (7th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation
marks omitted). In the case of any disagreement, the opposing party must reference
“affidavits, parts of the record, and other supporting materials.” Id. “[M]ere
disagreement with the movant’s asserted facts is inadequate if made without
reference to specific supporting material.” Smith v. Lamz, 321 F.3d 680, 683 (7th Cir.
2003). A plaintiff’s pro se status does not excuse him from complying with Local Rule
56.1. See Greer v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chicago, 267 F.3d 723, 727 (7th Cir. 2001);
Cady v. Sheahan, 467 F.3d 1057, 1061 (7th Cir. 2006).
Consistent with the Local Rules, defendant Magana filed a statement of
uncontested material facts along with his motion for summary judgment. [41], Def.
Stmt. of Fact (“DSOF”). Each relevant substantive assertion of fact in the Local Rule
56.1(a) statement is supported by evidentiary material in the record. Also consistent
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with the Local Rules, Magana filed and served on Woods a Local Rule 56.2 Notice,
which explained in detail the requirements of Local Rule 56.1. [39].
In response, Woods filed a single document titled “Plaintiff's Response to
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.” [45], (“Pl. Resp.”). Plaintiff’s response
appears to consist of a response to defendant’s statement of facts (see Pl. Resp. at
3-4); a statement of additional facts (see Pl. Resp. at 5-6); and a brief in response to
defendant’s arguments (see Pl. Resp. at 7-15). Woods, however, did not properly
dispute defendant’s facts because his response contains no citations to the record but
rather references information contained in his separate statement of facts. See N.D.
Ill. L.R. 56.1(b)(3)(B) (explaining that any response to the moving party’s statement
of facts must include “in the case of any disagreement, specific references to the
affidavits, parts of the record, and other supporting materials relied upon”).
Similarly, many of Woods’s additional facts are not properly supported by admissible
evidence or are purely argumentative and therefore will not be considered.
Accordingly, defendant Magana’s facts are admitted. See N.D. Ill. L.R.
56.1(b)(3)(C); Keeton v. Morningstar, Inc., 667 F.3d 877, 880 (7th Cir. 2012); Parra v.
Neal, 614 F.3d 635, 636 (7th Cir. 2010). To the extent there are other undisputed
material facts in the record, those facts are also considered.
Facts
In 2011, Plaintiff Anthony Woods was arrested on charges of violating an
order of protection. See DSOF ¶ 5. His criminal case was assigned case number 11 CR
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2113401. DSOF ¶ 6. Woods subsequently was convicted on the charges and sentenced
to two years of imprisonment and one year of mandatory supervised release (“MSR”).
DSOF ¶¶ 5, 6.
On November 28, 2012, Woods was released on MSR. DSOF ¶ 7. The
conditions of Woods’s MSR mandated that he not commit any other crimes and that
he remain at least 500 feet away from his victim. DSOF ¶¶ 9, 10. Woods understood
that if he violated the terms of his MSR, his MSR could be terminated and he would
be required to serve the remainder of his sentence. DSOF ¶ 11.
Woods was arrested twice while on MSR. On August 22, 2013, Woods was
convicted of a misdemeanor theft that occurred the previous day. DSOF ¶ 13.
Approximately one month later, Woods visited his victim’s place of employment on
three occasions, in violation of the provision of his MSR that required him to remain
at least 500 feet away from his victim. DSOF ¶¶ 15, 16. As a result, on September 27,
2013, Woods was arrested. DSOF ¶ 16; see Ex. C-1 to DSOF at IDOC000003. Woods
also was charged with and subsequently convicted of stalking as a result of his
conduct in September 2013. DSOF ¶ 17. He was sentenced to four years of
imprisonment on the stalking conviction, with a projected parole date of December 7,
2015 (DSOF ¶¶ 17, 19); the dates of his conviction and sentencing are unclear.
On December 3, 2013, the Prisoner Review Board declared Woods in violation
of his MSR “as of 3/14/13” and revoked Woods’s MSR. Ex. C-1 to DSOF at
IDOC000002. The rationale given for the revocation was that Woods committed the
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criminal offense of theft on August 22, 2013, and that he violated the no-contact term
of his MSR. Id. Woods’s sentence on case no. 11 CR 2113401 was then recalculated,
resulting in a “projected discharge/out date” of February 4, 2014. Ex. C-1 to DSOF at
IDOC000001. Woods was transported from Cook County Jail to Stateville
Correctional Center the next day (see Pl. Resp. at 8 (“I ain’t get to Stateville until
12/4/13”)), and on February 3, 2014, the Illinois Department of Corrections returned
him to the jail (see Pl. Resp. at 8 (“I ain’t leave Stateville until 2-3-14”)).
Woods contends that he had a mandatory release date of November 28, 2013,
on case no. 11 CR 2113401.1 See [13] at 4. In December 2013, Woods submitted
letters to the Warden and records office at Stateville about allegedly being held past
his mandatory release date. DSOF ¶ 23. Defendant Magana, however, was not
Stateville’s Warden at that time; Magana became Warden at Stateville on January 1,
2014, and served as the Assistant Warden of Operations at Sheridan Correctional
Center prior to that time. DSOF ¶ 25. Woods did not submit any correspondence
directly to Magana and never spoke to Magana about being held past his release
date. DSOF ¶ 22. Likewise, Woods did not submit any written correspondence to the
Warden’s office after December 2013. See DSOF ¶ 23. Magana does not recall
receiving any correspondence from Woods. DSOF ¶ 26.
Woods did not submit a grievance about being held past his mandatory release
date. DSOF ¶¶ 33, 34. The Illinois Department of Corrections has a formal grievance
The parties presented no evidence showing that Woods’s original release date was, in fact,
November 28, 2013, but defendant does not dispute the date.
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procedure for inmates with three steps. DSOF ¶¶ 27–28; see 20 Ill. Admin. Code
§ 504.800 et seq. The grievance procedure must be used “to resolve incidents,
problems, or complaints other than complaints concerning disciplinary proceedings,”
but “shall not” be used “for complaints regarding decisions that are outside the
authority of the Department, such as parole decisions, clemency, or orders regarding
the length of sentences or decisions which have been rendered by the Director.” 20 Ill.
Admin. Code § 504.810(a); see Ex. D to DSOF.
Instead of submitting a grievance, Woods filed this federal lawsuit. Woods
alleges in the operative complaint that he was sentenced to two years in prison and
was in custody from November 28, 2011, to November 28, 2012. [13] at 4. He also had
one year of parole, from November 28, 2012, to November 28, 2013. Id. According to
Woods, he served parole on house arrest from November 28, 2012 to September 27,
2013, and had a mandatory release date of November 28, 2013. Id. However, he was
incarcerated at Stateville from December 4, 2013, to February 3, 2014, and “all
together I was in IDOC custody from September 27, 2013 to February 3, 2014 that’s
two months after the mandatory outdate.” Id. Woods also alleges: “Then on top of
that they came and got me again 2/7/14 and brought me back to Cook County for no
reason.” Id. Woods was allowed to proceed on his claim against Defendant Magana
that Woods was held for two months past his mandatory release date. [12].
Defendant Magana now moves for summary.
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SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine issue of material fact exists if “the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The party seeking
summary judgment has the burden of establishing that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
After a properly supported motion for summary judgment is made, the party
opposing summary judgment “may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of
his pleadings, but . . . must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine
issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248 (internal quotation marks omitted). That
is, to survive summary judgment, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings
and “identify with reasonable particularity the evidence upon which [he] relies.”
Hemsworth v. Quotesmith.Com, Inc., 476 F.3d 487, 490 (7th Cir. 2007). Moreover,
evidence submitted in opposition to summary judgment must be admissible at trial
under the Federal Rules of Evidence, although attested testimony, such as that found
in depositions or affidavits will also be considered. See id; Scott v. Edinburg, 346 F.3d
752, 759-60 & n.7 (7th Cir. 2003).
The court does not evaluate the weight of the evidence, judge credibility of
witnesses, or determine the truth of the matter, but instead, determines whether
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there is a genuine issue of triable fact after considering the facts in the light most
favorable to the movant. Nat’l Athletic Sportswear, Inc. v. Westfield Ins. Co., 528 F.3d
508, 512 (7th Cir. 2008). Summary judgment is appropriate if, on the evidence
provided, no reasonable juror could return a verdict in favor of the non-movant.
Gordon v. FedEx Freight, Inc., 674 F.3d 769, 772-73 (7th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted);
see Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256-57.
ANALYSIS
Magana argues that he is entitled to summary judgment because: (1) Woods
failed to exhaust administrative remedies before bringing this federal action; (2)
Woods’s incarceration was lawful; and (3) Woods failed to identify evidence showing
that Magana was personally involved in any alleged constitutional violation
concerning Woods.2
Magana also argued in his opening brief that Woods’s claim was barred by Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), because, according to Magana, Woods was attempting to
improperly challenge the conviction resulting from the 2013 stalking charges. Magana
subsequently withdrew this argument.
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Failure To Exhaust
As an inmate in custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections, Woods was
required to follow the grievance process outlined in the Illinois Administrative Code
to properly exhaust his claims. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S.
516, 524-25 (2002). Woods, however, was required to “exhaust only those
administrative remedies that [were] available” to him. See Lewis v. Washington, 300
F.3d 829, 833 (7th Cir. 2002). Exhaustion is an affirmative defense on which the
defendant bears the burden of proof. Pavey v. Conley, 663 F.3d 899, 903 (7th Cir.
2011); Brengettcy v. Horton, 423 F.3d 674, 682 (7th Cir. 2005). Moreover, exhaustion
is a threshold matter and should be addressed before proceeding to any disposition
on the merits. See Roberts v. Neal, 745 F.3d 232, 234 (7th Cir. 2014).
Woods did not file a grievance about being incarcerated on the 2011 case past
his alleged release date. Defendant, however, failed to establish that Woods was
required to file a grievance concerning his release date. Specifically, the Illinois
Administrative Code instructs that “[t]he grievance procedure shall not be utilized
for complaints regarding decisions that are outside the authority of the Department,
such as parole decisions . . . or orders regarding length of sentence . . . .” See 20 Ill.
Admin. Code § 504.810(a).
The scenario presented by Woods’s civil rights action—i.e., a challenge to the
calculation of his release date—arguably falls within the scope of complaints for
which the grievance process is unavailable because his complaint challenged both the
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duration of his term of imprisonment and a calculation potentially performed by the
Prisoner Review Board, which appears to be an entity separate from the Illinois
Department of Corrections. See 730 ILCS 5/3-3-2 (establishing the Illinois Prisoner
Review Board). Defendant submitted no evidence showing what entity was
responsible for re-calculation of Woods’s term of imprisonment or that Woods was
required to use the grievance process to resolve his challenge to the calculation of his
release date. Defendant also presented no evidence that other potential remedies
were available to, but not utilized by, Woods before pursuing this action for
damages.3 Consequently, defendant failed to show that Woods did not exhaust the
administrative remedies available to him before bringing this federal action.
Woods’s November 28, 2013, to February 4, 2014, Incarceration
Magana argues that he is entitled to summary judgment because Woods was
legally incarcerated on the 2013 stalking charges during the time that he allegedly
was held past his mandatory release date in the 2011 case, i.e., after November 28,
2013. To establish liability on a claim that he was held past his mandatory release
For example, defendant did not argue that Woods could have challenged the recalculation
of his release date through direct or collateral review. Ordinarily, Heck, 512 U.S. at 486–87,
precludes claim for damages under Section 1983 that would call into question the lawfulness
of a prisoner’s sentence unless the prisoner can prove that the sentence has been reversed on
direct appeal or declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination.
Here, Woods’s ability to challenge the recalculated release date is unclear. Although he
remained in custody, the sentence on the 2011 case had been discharged at the time he
brought this civil action. See Simpson v. Nickel, 450 F.3d 303, 307 (7th Cir. 2006) (explaining
that Heck “is limited to prisoners who are ‘in custody’ as a result of the defendants’
challenged acts, and who therefore are able to seek collateral review. Take away the
possibility of collateral review and § 1983 becomes available”) (emphasis in original).
Defendant made no showing that direct or collateral review of the release date was available
to Woods.
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date, a prisoner must demonstrate that (1) the defendant “held him beyond the term
of his incarceration without penological justification”; and (2) “the prolonged
detention was the result of the defendants’ ‘deliberate indifference’.” Armato v.
Grounds, 766 F.3d 713, 721 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing Campbell v. Peters, 256 F.3d 695,
700 (7th Cir. 2001)). Deliberate indifference is shown where the defendant ignored a
known risk of prolonged confinement. Id.
Defendant’s argument that Woods was incarcerated on the 2013 stalking
charges after November 28, 2013, is not quite supported by record evidence. The
evidence shows that Woods was re-arrested on September 2, 2013, on an MSR
violation and subsequently convicted of stalking. Defendant cited to no evidence
showing when the stalking charges were brought or when Woods was convicted or
sentenced for stalking. Instead, defendant cited to a hard copy of Woods’s “internet
inmate status” showing a custody date of December 7, 2013, on the stalking charges.
Ex. F to DSOF. Defendant produced no evidence showing that the custody date is
anything but the date on which Woods initially was taken into custody for the offense
of stalking. The evidence produced by Defendant shows only that Woods’s custody on
the stalking charges began nine days after, Woods says, he was to have been released
on the 2011 charges.
Nevertheless, Woods (who bears the burden of proof at trial) failed to produce
evidence showing he was held beyond the term of his incarceration on the 2011
charges without penological justification. Woods says that his incarceration in the
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2011 case was to end on November 28, 2013, but defendant produced evidence
showing that on September 27, 2013, Woods was taken into custody on a warrant for
violation of the conditions of his parole (see DSOF ¶ 16; Ex. C-1 to DSOF at
IDOC000003), and that the Prisoner Review Board subsequently found Woods in
violation of his MSR (DSOF ¶ 18; Ex. C-1 to DSOF at IDOC000002). Woods’s
sentence was re-calculated at that time (December 3, 2013) and a new release date of
February 4, 2014, was established. See DSOF ¶ 18; see Ex. C-1 to DSOF at
IDOC000001. Woods produced no evidence showing that his original release date of
November 28, 2013, remained in effect after he was re-arrested for violating the
terms of his MSR or that the February 4, 2014 release date had been miscalculated.
Woods also cited to no law supporting his implied contention that once a release date
is established, it remains unalterable in light of subsequent events such as re-arrest
for violation of the MSR terms.
Thus, Woods’s assertion that he was entitled to release from custody on
November 28, 2013, is an unsupported, conclusory allegation that is insufficient to
survive summary judgement. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248 (explaining that non-movant
may not rest on allegations in the pleadings or on conclusory statements; non-movant
must go beyond the pleadings and support his contentions with documentary
evidence). Summary judgment is appropriate on this basis alone. See Celotex, 477
U.S. at 322-23 (“Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment . . . against a
party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element
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essential to the party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at
trial.”).
Woods also produced no evidence showing that Magana knew about Woods’s
alleged attempt to bring his release date to the attention of the former Warden and
therefore Woods cannot establish that Magana was deliberately indifferent to
Woods’s allegedly prolonged incarceration. Record evidence shows that Magana
became the Warden at Stateville on January 1, 2014, but that Woods did not send
written correspondence to the Warden’s office on or after January 1, 2014; Woods
sent all correspondence concerning his release date in December 2013. DSOF ¶¶
23-25. Woods argues that his letters to the former Warden should have been in the
Warden’s “pile of work” when Magana arrived on January 1, 2014 (Pl. Resp. at 6), but
this is based on speculation and is insufficient to defeat summary judgment. See
Herzog v. Graphic Packaging Int’l, Inc., 742 F.3d 802, 806 (7th Cir. 2014). Likewise,
Woods’s observation that Magana “doesn’t say he’s a 100 percent sure . . . that he
didn’t receive correspondence from me” (Pl. Resp. at 9) is insufficient to proceed to
trial on the issue of whether Magana knew about Woods’s letters concerning his
release date and ignored them. See Harris N.A. v. Hershey, 711 F.3d 794, 798 (7th
Cir. 2012) (explaining that non-movant must produce more than “a mere scintilla of
evidence” and come forward with “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue
for trial” to defeat summary judgment).
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Moreover, Woods cannot defeat summary judgement by reliance on his
statement that he told correctional officers about being held past his release date and
that the officers, in turn, told Woods that they would give the message to the Warden.
A party opposing summary judgment cannot create a disputed issue of fact by relying
on inadmissible hearsay. See MMG Fin. Corp. v. Midwest Amusements Park, LLC,
630 F.3d 651, 656 (7th Cir. 2011); Eisenstadt v. Centel Corp., 113 F.3d 738, 742 (7th
Cir. 1997). Here, the statements of correctional officers cannot be offered for the
truth of the matter asserted, i.e., that the officers in fact told Magana about Woods’s
concerns, against Magana. Woods cannot show that Magana knew about and was
deliberately indifferent to Woods’s allegedly prolonged incarceration based on
hearsay. A reasonable juror could not find that Magana was responsible for Woods’s
allegedly prolonged incarceration.
The Events of February 7, 2014
Finally, in addition to his allegation that he was unlawfully incarcerated from
November 28, 2013 to February 4, 2014, Woods alleges: “Then on top of that they
came and got me again 2/7/14 and brought me back to Cook County for no reason.”
[13] at 4. Woods subsequently clarified in response to defendant’s motion for
summary judgment that he does not challenge the fact of his incarceration on
February 7, 2014, but rather contends that he was wrongfully confined at Stateville
for a couple of hours on that date when he should have been confined at Cook County
Jail. See Pl. Resp. at 8. Woods does not explain why he believes that his brief
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confinement at Stateville was unconstitutional. Woods also produced no evidence
showing that Defendant Magana was aware of Woods’s transit through Stateville on
February 7, 2014. Consequently, Woods’s claim concerning his detention at Stateville
on February 7, 2014, cannot survive summary judgment.
CONCLUSION
Defendant’s motion for summary judgment [40] is granted. Enter judgment in
favor of defendant and terminate civil case.
If Woods wishes to appeal this decision, he may file a notice of appeal in this
court within thirty days of the entry of judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A). If Woods
chooses to appeal, he will be responsible for paying the $505 appellate filing fee
irrespective of the outcome of the appeal. Evans v. Ill. Dep't of Corr., 150 F.3d 810,
812 (7th Cir. 1998). Furthermore, if the appeal is found to be non-meritorious, Woods
may accumulate a strike under 28 U.S.C. ' 1915(g).
ENTER:
Date: 7/17/15
_____________________________
Manish S. Shah
United States District Judge
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