Sanchez v. Cleannet USA Inc., et al

Filing 39

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order. Signed by the Honorable James B. Zagel on 1/15/2015. (ep, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
JOSE SANCHEZ, on behalf of himself and all
other persons similarly situated,
Plaintiff,

No. 14 C 2143
Judge James B. Zagel

v.
CLEANNET USA, INC. and CLEANNET
OF ILLINOIS, INC.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This putative class action arises out of Plaintiff Jose Sanchez’s participation as a
franchisee in a nationwide network of commercial cleaning franchised businesses. On March 26,
2014, Plaintiff filed an 8-count complaint alleging that franchisor Defendants CleanNet U.S.A.,
Inc. (“CleanNet USA”) and CleanNet of Illinois, Inc. (“CleanNet IL,” and collectively,
“Defendants”) improperly classified him and other franchisees as independent contractors
instead of employees, thereby depriving them of the benefits of an employment relationship
under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., the Illinois Minimum Wage Law,
820 ILCS 105/1 et seq., and the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act, 820 ILCS 115/1 et
seq. Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants engaged in fraud in the inducement to entice him to
enter into the franchise agreement, and that Defendants violated the Illinois Franchise Disclosure
Act, 815 ILCS 705/1 et seq.
This matter is presently before the court on Defendants’ motion to dismiss under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) or, in the alternative, stay Sanchez’s complaint
pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. ("FAA"), on the ground that his

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individual claims are subject to final and binding arbitration pursuant to the dispute resolution
provisions in his franchise agreement.
FACTS
CleanNet USA is a master franchisor whose brand of commercial cleaning franchises is
represented by area operators, such as CleanNet IL, that offer unit franchises to investors
interested in owning and operating a commercial cleaning business. Jose Sanchez is a Spanish
speaker with a limited education who, along with his brother-in-law, purchased a “package” of
$2,500 in monthly billing for a franchise price of $11,800. They paid $6,000 in money they
borrowed for the franchise and CleanNet IL financed the remaining $5,800 at 9%.
As a part of this purchase, Sanchez entered into a 41-page franchise agreement with
CleanNet IL on May 19, 2011 (the “Franchise Agreement”). Yvette Lopez appeared at the
meeting on behalf of CleanNet and discussed the Franchise Agreement with Sanchez in Spanish.
Sanchez alleges that CleanNet provided him with the Franchise Agreement in English on a take
it-or-leave-it basis and failed to inform him that the Franchise Agreement contained a dispute
resolution provision or limited his remedies while leaving Defendants’ available remedies
completely intact. In addition to signing his name in full on the final page, Sanchez initialed
every page of the Franchise Agreement next to the statement “I have read, understood, and agree
with the statements on this page as written.”
The Franchise Agreement contains a dispute resolution provision that provides for
mediation and, if the dispute remains unresolved, arbitration before the American Arbitration
Association:
A. Mediation. Before, and as a necessary condition precedent to,
filing a demand for arbitration in accordance with this Agreement,
Franchisee and Franchisor shall attempt to settle the dispute
through mediation administered by the American Arbitration
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Association ("AAA") at its office closest in proximity to
Franchisor's office in accordance with the Commercial Mediation
Rules of the AAA. . . .
B. Arbitration. All disputes, controversies, and claims of any kind
arising between the parties, including but not limited to claims
arising out of or relating to this Agreement, the rights and
obligations of the parties, the sale of the franchise, or other claims
or causes of action relating to the performance of either party that
are unable to be settled through mediation shall be settled by
arbitration administered by the AAA at its office closest in
proximity to the Franchisor's office, in accordance with the Federal
Arbitration Act and the Commercial Rules of the AAA, unless the
parties otherwise agree in accordance with Section XXII.C of this
Agreement. . . .
5. No arbitration or action under this Agreement shall include, by
consolidation, joinder, or any other manner, any claims by any
person or entity in privity with or claiming through or on behalf of
Franchisee. Franchisee shall not seek to arbitrate or litigate as a
representative of, or on behalf of, any other person or entity, any
dispute, controversy, and claim of any kind arising out of or
relating to this Agreement, the rights and obligations of the parties,
the sale of the franchise, or other claims or causes of action
relating to the performance of either party to this Agreement.
6. To the fullest extent permitted by law, direct negotiations,
followed by mediation and/or binding arbitration, shall be the
exclusive means of resolving any and all claims relating to this
Agreement, including, but not limited to, claims for breach of
contract, breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing, fraud,
violation of any and all franchise registration, disclosure and/or
franchise protection statutes, regulations, or ordinances, whether
federal, state or local, or any other common law claims.
The Franchise Agreement also allocates mediation and arbitration costs. The initiating party pays
the filing fee for the mediation while both parties share the mediator’s compensation and
administrative expenses. If the matter is not resolved through mediation, then that same initiating
party must pay the arbitration filing fee while both parties share the costs of the arbitrator and
administrative expenses.
Under the Franchise Agreement, the franchisee waives its right to collect punitive
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damages, consequential damages, loss of profits, and attorneys’ fees and costs. Instead, the
franchisor is only liable for “the percentage of total account lacking, multiplied by the initial
franchise fee multiplied by 80%” in the event that CleanNet provided at least one customer, but
failed to meet its guaranteed monthly billing quota. If CleanNet issues a refund, the amount
refunded is reduced by any amounts financed, including unpaid interest and “[CleanNet’s]
obligation to provide additional initial accounts shall be considered fulfilled, and any further
obligation in this regard shall be extinguished.”
On the same day that Sanchez filed this lawsuit, March 26, 2014, CleanNet IL filed a
submission for mediation with the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”). On May 22,
2014, CleanNet USA filed a similar submission for mediation with AAA. Both cases have been
assigned AAA case numbers. By letter dated May 23, 2014, Defendants’ counsel demanded
compliance with the dispute resolution provision. On May 30, 2014, Sanchez’s counsel
responded to the letter but did not address Defendants’ demand for mediation.
DISCUSSION
I.

Sanchez’s Claims Against CleanNet IL
Defendants’ motion to dismiss is brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) because it contends

that the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction due to the parties’ arbitration agreement. See
Montgomery v. Corinthian Colleges, Inc., No. 11 C 365, 2011 WL 1118942, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar.
25, 2011) (citing Lamb v. Gen. Elec. Consumer & Indus., 6 CV 216, 2006 WL 2228962, at *1
(N.D. Ind. Aug. 3, 2006)). On a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the court may consider matters beyond the
allegations in the complaint. Id. (citing Falbe v. Dell, Inc., 4 C 1425, 2004 WL 1588243, at *1
n.1 (N.D. Ill. July 14, 2004)). The court analyzes a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) as any
other motion to dismiss: assuming for purposes of the motion that all of the well-pleaded

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allegations in the complaint are true and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the
nonmoving party. Transit Exp., Inc. v. Ettinger, 246 F.3d 1018, 1023 (7th Cir. 2001).
The FAA governs questions of arbitrability in both state and federal courts. Jain v. de
Mere, 51 F.3d 686, 688 (7th Cir.1995). “The central purpose of the FAA is to ‘ensure that private
agreements to arbitrate are enforced according to their terms.’” O'Quinn v. Comcast Corp., No.
10 C 2491, 2010 WL 4932665, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 29, 2010) (citing Mastrobuono v. Shearson
Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 53–54 (1995)). For claims covered by a written and
enforceable arbitration agreement, the FAA requires district courts to either stay or dismiss the
underlying lawsuit and compel arbitration. 9 U.S.C. § 3; CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132
S. Ct. 665, 669 (2012). As the Seventh Circuit has noted, whether a claim is within the scope of
an arbitration agreement is a matter of federal, not state, law. Gore v. Alltel Communs., LLC, 666
F.3d 1027, 1032 (7th Cir. 2012).
Under the FAA: (1) there is a presumption to arbitrate when contracts contain
arbitration provisions, (2) any doubts concerning the scope of arbitration issues should be
resolved in favor of arbitration, and (3) unless the court has a positive assurance that the
arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute,
arbitration is appropriate. Id. (citing Kiefer Specialty Flooring, Inc. v. Tarkett, Inc., 174 F.3d 907,
909 (7th Cir. 1999)). Arbitration clauses containing the phrase “arising out of,” such as this one,
are extremely broad and “necessarily create a presumption of arbitrability.” Kiefer Specialty
Flooring, 174 F.3d at 909–10; see also Sweet Dreams Unlimited, Inc. v. Dial-A-Mattress Int’l,
Ltd., 1 F.3d 639, 642 (7th Cir. 1993) (finding that both contract rescission and tort claims were
subject to arbitration under a franchise agreement).
If there are equitable or legal grounds for the revocation of the contractual arbitration

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agreement, however, the FAA establishes that the arbitration agreement does not need to be
enforced. 9 U.S.C. § 2. Although federal law governs whether a claim is within the scope of an
arbitration agreement, courts look to the state law of contracts to determine whether the parties
entered into a valid and enforceable agreement to arbitrate. Koveleskie v. SBC Capital Markets,
Inc., 167 F.3d 361, 367–68 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing Gibson v. Neighborhood Health Clinics, Inc.,
121 F.3d 1126, 1130 (7th Cir. 1997)).
Sanchez argues that the Franchise Agreement’s arbitration provisions are
unenforceable because they are unconscionable. Under Illinois law, which both sides agree
applies here, “a finding of unconscionability may be based on either procedural or substantive
unconscionability, or a combination of both.” Kinkel v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 223 Ill. 2d 1, 21,
857 N.E.2d 250, 263 (2006) (citing Razor v. Hyundai Motor Am., 222 Ill. 2d 75, 99 (2006)).
A.

Procedural Unconscionability
Procedural unconscionability refers to a contract “where a term is so difficult to find,

read, or understand that the plaintiff cannot fairly be said to have been aware he was agreeing to
it.” Williams v. TCF Nat. Bank, No. 12 C 05115, 2013 WL 708123, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 26,
2013) (citing Kinkel, 223 Ill. at 22). Procedural unconscionability analysis takes into account the
disparity in bargaining power between the parties. Id. According to the Illinois Supreme Court,
procedural unconscionability boils down to “impropriety during the process of forming the
contract depriving a party of a meaningful choice.” Id. (quoting Frank's Maint. & Eng'g, Inc. v.
C.A. Roberts Co., 86 Ill.App.3d 980, 989 (1980)). To determine whether a meaningful choice
existed, Illinois courts consider (1) the manner in which the contract was formed, (2) whether
each party had a reasonable chance to understand the contract, and (3) whether key terms were
“hidden in a maze of fine print.” Id.

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Here, Sanchez argues that the Defendants’ take-it-or-leave-it negotiation approach,
Defendants’ failure to explain every term in Spanish, and the length and presentation of the
arbitration provisions within the Franchise Agreement are grounds for procedural
unconscionability.
The Franchise Agreement is a contract of adhesion, which means that the terms are
“nonnegotiable and presented in fine print in language that the average consumer might not fully
understand.” Kinkel v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 223 Ill. 2d 1, 26 (2006). Contracts of adhesion,
however, have long been recognized by Illinois courts as “a fact of modern life.” See Williams,
2013 WL 708123, at *9; Kinkel, 223 Ill. at 26. “Illinois law does not void contracts where parties
have unequal bargaining power, even if a contract is a so-called ‘take-it-or-leave-it” deal.”
Koveleskie v. SBC Capital Markets, Inc., 167 F.3d 361, 367 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing Kewanee
Prod.Credit Ass’n v. G. Larson & Sons Farms, 146 Ill.App.3d 301, 305 (1986)). In Koveleskie,
the plaintiff argued that she was forced to execute a mandatory arbitration agreement as a
condition of employment and that she had no bargaining power because she was an individual
employee rather than a business entity. Koveleskie, 167 F.3d at 367. Rejecting this argument, the
Seventh Circuit held that the agreement did not create an unconscionable contract of adhesion
because “driving a hard bargain is not a wrongful act” and the “disparity in size of the parties
entering into an agreement . . . without the wrongful use of that power” is insufficient to render
the arbitration agreement unenforceable.” Id.
Similarly, Defendants’ failure to translate the entire Franchise Agreement into Spanish
or explain every provision of the Franchise Agreement in Spanish does not render the agreement
unenforceable. See Arellano v. Household Fin. Corp. III, No. 01 C 2433, 2002 WL 221604, at *4
(N.D. Ill. Feb. 13, 2002) (court compelled arbitration although the negotiations leading up to the

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agreement were conducted in Spanish but the documents were drafted in English, the court
rejected the plaintiff’s allegations of fraud and unconscionability and compelled arbitration. Id.
Although the Franchise Agreement was not written in Sanchez’s native tongue,
Defendants had no obligation to explain every single term in Spanish. See Montgomery v.
Corinthian Colleges, Inc., No. 11 C 365, 2011 WL 1118942, at **3–4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 25, 2011).
Sanchez argues that Cisneros v. Am. Gen. Fin. Servs., 2012 WL 3025913 (N.D. Cal. 2012)
supports his position that the Franchise Agreement was procedurally unconscionable, but the
facts of Cisneros are noticeably different from the case presented here. In Cisneros, the court
held that the terms of an agreement were procedurally unconscionable after finding that (1) the
plaintiff could not write, read, or speak English at the time of the transaction, (2) no one was
available to translate the documents, and (3) signing the documents was the only way the
plaintiff knew to make the sales representative leave her home. Cisneros, 2012 WL 3025913, *5.
Sanchez’s last argument for procedural unconscionability—that the dispute resolution
provisions are unconscionable on the basis that they were not prominently displayed in the
Franchise Agreement—is both factually and legally meritless. In Brown v. Luxottica Retail N.
Am. Inc., No. 09 C 7816, 2010 WL 3893820, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2010), the plaintiffs
contended that an arbitration agreement was unconscionable because it was “buried” in a 51page document and was “lengthy, single-spaced, confusing, and written in a technical style that a
reasonable worker could not understand.” The court rejected the plaintiffs’ arguments,
elaborating that the dispute resolution agreement, while in the middle of a handbook, was in
regular font, single-spaced, and easily readable and that “in the absence of fraud, the law does
not protect persons who choose not to read documents given to them.” Id.; Valentine v.
Wideopen West Finance, LLC, 2012 WL 1021809, *3 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (finding that arbitration

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provision on page 26 of a 30-page document was not procedurally unconscionable because it was
no more buried than any other provision in the agreement). Here, as in Brown, the arbitration
provision is no more “buried” than any other provision in the Franchise Agreement, as the font
size and theme remain the same throughout the 41-page document.
Although the language barrier presented in this case combined with the length and
complexity of the Franchise Agreement creates a degree of procedural unconscionability, this is
not enough on its own to render the arbitration provision unenforceable.
B.

Substantive Unconscionability
Sanchez also argues that the arbitration agreement within the Franchise Agreement is

substantively unconscionable. “Substantive unconscionability concerns the actual terms of the
contract and examines the relative fairness of the obligations assumed. Indicative of substantive
unconscionability are contract terms so one-sided as to oppress or unfairly surprise an innocent
party, an overall imbalance in the obligations and rights imposed by the bargain, and significant
cost-price disparity.” O'Quinn, 2010 WL 4932665, at *5 (quoting Kinkel, 306 Ill.Dec. 157, 857
N.E.2d at 267).
Specifically, Sanchez argues that the Franchise Agreement’s dispute resolution
provision contains four substantively unconscionable terms: (1) requiring mediation first, with
the filing party paying the filing fee and the remainder costs being borne by the parties equally;
(2) requiring arbitration if mediation is not successful with the filing party paying the filing fee
and the remainder costs being borne by the parties equally; (3) waiving of punitive damages; and
(4) limiting remedies to the actual damages sustained except as otherwise provided in the
Franchise Agreement and barring recovery of attorneys’ fees.
Neither of the first two allegedly unconscionable terms -- which allocate costs for the

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mediation and arbitration process -- is unconscionable. When determining whether a provision
that forces plaintiffs to equally share the costs of arbitration is commercially reasonable, courts
ask whether the named plaintiffs can afford arbitration. See Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Alabama v.
Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000) (“It may well be that the existence of large arbitration costs
could preclude a litigant such as Randolph from effectively vindicating her federal statutory
rights in the arbitral forum.”); see also Livingston v. Associates Fin., Inc., 339 F.3d 553, 557 (7th
Cir. 2003); see also Baumann v. Finish Line, Inc., 421 F. App'x 632, 635 (7th Cir. 2011). The
party seeking to invalidate an arbitration agreement on the ground that arbitration would be
prohibitively expensive bears the burden of showing the likelihood of incurring such costs. See
Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Alabama, 531 U.S. at 92. There is no bright line for determining when the
costs associated with arbitration will be prohibitive, but the Seventh Circuit has outlined two
pertinent questions: (1) how the party's financial situation will be factored into an assessment of
the arbitration costs under this hardship provision, and (2) how the costs will compare between
litigating in the courts versus proceeding in arbitration. Baumann, 421 F. App’x at 635 (citing
James v. McDonald Corp., 417 F. 3d 672, 678-80 (7th Cir. 2005)).
Here, arbitration costs are not prohibitively high because the Franchise Agreement
specifically provides that any mediation or arbitration would be administered in accordance with
the Commercial Mediation and Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association
(“AAA Rules”). These AAA Rules allow for filing and administrative fees to be reduced in cases
of hardship and allowed an arbitrator to assess the arbitrator's fees and expenses against any
specified party. 1 Similarly, the AAA charges no administrative fees for mediation and the parties

1

See, e.g., AAA Rule 53 (“The AAA may, in the event of extreme hardship on the part of any party, defer
or reduce the administrative fees”); AAA Rule 54 (“In addition to a final award . . . the arbitrator may
assess and apportion, the fees, expenses, and compensation related to such award as the arbitrator deems
appropriate.”).

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can select a lower cost mediator.
Whether the final two allegedly unconscionable terms—which provide remedial
limitations for franchisees—are substantively unconscionable is a much closer question. Damage
limitations are not per se unconscionable. O'Quinn v. Comcast Corp., No. 10 C 2491, 2010 WL
4932665, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 29, 2010). Further, mutuality of obligations in an arbitration
agreement is not essential under Illinois law as long as there is valid consideration. Williams,
2013 WL 708123, at *11. Attempts to categorically exclude statutorily granted and statutorily
unwaivable forms of relief, however, are void and unenforceable. See O’Quinn, 2010 WL
4932665, at *7; see also Tortoriello v. Gerald Nissan of N. Aurora, Inc., 379 Ill. App. 3d 214,
238, 882 N.E.2d 157, 179 (2008).
In O'Quinn, an arbitration provision that prohibited punitive damages “unless the
statute under which [the parties] are suing provides otherwise” was deemed unenforceable
because the plaintiff brought claims under the Consumer Fraud Act, which authorizes punitive
damages. 2010 WL 4932665, at *7. In another Consumer Fraud Act case, Tortoriello v. Gerald
Nissan of N. Aurora, Inc., a similar prohibition on punitive damages was deemed unenforceable
even though the arbitration agreement did not provide the exception to its limitation on punitive
damages limitation that was present in O’Quinn. 379 Ill. App. 3d at 238.
Similar to the Consumer Fraud Act analyzed in O’Quinn and Tortoriello, the Illinois
Franchise Disclosure Act provides that “Any condition, stipulation, or provision purporting to
bind any person acquiring any franchise to waive compliance with any provision of this Act or
any other law of this State is void.” 815 ILCS 705/41. Because the Illinois Franchise Disclosure
Act, 815 ILCS 705/22, makes franchisors liable to franchisees for damages and attorneys’ fees,
the remedial limitations in the Franchise Agreement—which includes Sanchez’s waiver of

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punitive damages and recovery of attorneys’ fees and costs—are unenforceable.
The next issue to consider is whether these unenforceable remedial limitations are
severable. “In determining whether it is appropriate to sever an unconscionable provision from
an agreement and enforce the remainder of the agreement, Illinois courts are to consider whether
the provisions operate independently of each other or whether the valid provisions are ‘so closely
connected with unenforceable provisions that to do so would be tantamount to rewriting the
Agreement.’” Tortoriello, 379 Ill. App. at 238 (quoting Abbott–Interfast Corp. v. Harkabus, 250
Ill.App.3d 13, 21 (1993)). Just as they were in O’Quinn and Tortoriello, the remedial limitation
provisions in this case are severable because (1) the unconscionable terms do not affect the intent
of the Franchise Agreement’s arbitration provision overall, (2) the parties included a severability
clause in the Franchise Agreement, and (3) the “strong policy in favor of enforcing arbitration
agreements [is] best served by allowing the valid portions of the arbitration agreement to remain
in force while severing the unconscionable provision.” Tortoriello, 379 Ill. App. 3d at 238.
Because they can be severed, these remedial limitations do not make the entire arbitration
provision within the Franchise Agreement unconscionable. See Tortoriello, 379 Ill. App. 3d at
238–39; see also O’Quinn, 2010 WL 4932665, at *7.
Although the remedial limitation provisions discussed above are unenforceable and
must be severed because they attempt to restrict Sanchez’s unwaivable rights under the Illinois
Franchise Disclosure Act, it should be noted that the arbitrator is capable of handling these types
of decisions should any others arise during arbitration. See PacifiCare Health Systems, Inc. v.
Book, 538 U.S. 401, 406 (2003). Defendants argue that the Supreme Court in PacifiCare held
that the question of damages is exclusively reserved for the arbitrator. This contention misses the
point. PacifiCare stands for the proposition that when an arbitration clause is ambiguous as to

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whether statutory remedies are available, courts should not presume the arbitrator will err in law.
Id. at 407.
Accordingly, the totality of circumstances does not warrant a finding of either
procedural unconscionability or substantive unconscionability after the Franchise Agreement’s
remedial limitations are severed. Because what is left of the Franchise Agreement is therefore
valid and enforceable, I order Sanchez to arbitrate his claims against CleanNet IL on an
individual basis.
II.

Sanchez’s Claims Against CleanNet USA
Sanchez argues that his claims against CleanNet USA are not arbitrable because

CleanNet USA is a non-signatory to the Franchise Agreement. However, courts regularly allow
non-signatory entities to enforce an arbitration agreement against a signatory on the basis of
equitable estoppel. See Leff v. Deutsche Bank AG, No. 08-CV-733, 2009 WL 1380819, at *7
(N.D. Ill. May 14, 2009) (non-signatory could compel arbitration where Plaintiffs alleged that
non-signatory engaged in “interdependent and concerted misconduct” with signatories); see also
Hughes Masonry Co. v. Greater Clark County School Bldg. Corp., 659 F.2d 836 (7th Cir. 1981)
(non-signatory can compel arbitration when a signatory's claims are grounded in or intertwined
with claims under the agreement that subjects the signatory to arbitration).
Here, equitable estoppel prohibits Sanchez from avoiding arbitration on his claims
against CleanNet USA because his claims treat CleanNet IL and CleanNet USA as a single
concerted entity and are inextricably intertwined. Because all of Sanchez’s claims against
CleanNet USA arise out of the same operative Franchise Agreement, I also order Sanchez to
arbitrate his claims against CleanNet USA on an individual basis.

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III.

Dismissal of the Case
Although the FAA generally requires a federal district court to stay an action pending

an arbitration, the complaint should be dismissed where a court determines that all of a plaintiff’s
claims are subject to arbitration. Chambers v. Aviva Life & Annuity Co., No. 12 C 9589, 2013
WL 1345455, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 26, 2013); Johnson v. Orkin, LLC, No. 12 C 141, 2013 WL
828506, at *15 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 6, 2013); Denari v. Rist, No. 10 C 2704, 2011 WL 332543, at *11
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 24, 2011); Reineke v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., No. 03 C 3146, 2004 WL 442639,
at *5 (N.D.Ill. Mar.9, 2004). Because I have not certified a class, I am only compelling
arbitration of Sanchez’s individual claims.
CONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons, Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration is granted
and this case is dismissed.
ENTER:

James B. Zagel
United States District Judge
DATE: January 15, 2015

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