Reed v. State Of Illinois et al
Filing
75
MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order. The Court grants in part and denies in part the motion to dismiss of the State of Illinois, the Circuit Court of Cook County, Judge Quinn, Judge Collins-Dole, and Chief Judge Evans 50 , grants Pacelli's motion to d ismiss 45 , dismisses plaintiff's claims against the Circuit Court of Cook County, Judge Quinn, Judge Collins-Dole, Chief Judge Evans, and Melissa Pacelli, and terminates them as parties to this case. Plaintiff's claims against the State of Illinois, which is the only defendant remaining in this suit, will stand. A status hearing is set for 8/19/15 at 9:30 a.m. Signed by the Honorable Jorge L. Alonso on 8/10/2015. Notice mailed by judge's staff (ntf, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
LINDA REED,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
STATE OF ILLINOIS, CIRCUIT
)
COURT OF COOK COUNTY,
)
ILLINOIS, THE HONORABLE
)
JUDGE CAROLYN QUINN, in her
)
official capacity as Circuit Judge of the )
Cook County Circuit Court, THE
)
HONORABLE JUDGE ANN COLLINS- )
DOLE, in her official capacity as Circuit )
Judge of the Cook County Circuit Court, )
THE HONORABLE JUDGE TIMOTHY )
C. EVANS, in his official capacity as
)
Chief Judge of the Cook County Circuit )
Court, and MELISSA PACELLI, in her )
official capacity as Court Disability
)
Coordinator for the Circuit Court of
)
Cook County,
)
)
Defendants.
)
14 C 2247
Judge Jorge L. Alonso
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
In her third amended complaint, plaintiff alleges that defendants violated the Americans with
Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Rehabilitation Act (“RA”). The case is before the Court on
defendants’ Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss. For the reasons set forth
below, the Court grants in part and denies in part the motion of the state of Illinois, the Circuit Court
of Cook County, Judge Quinn, Judge Collins-Dole, and Chief Judge Evans and grants Pacelli’s
motion.
Facts
Plaintiff has Tardive Dyskinesia, a neurological disorder that causes “involuntary movements
in her limbs, hands, and mouth, . . . an uncontrollable impulse to move,” “difficulty in logical or
critical thinking[,] and inability to verbally communicate.” (3d Am. Compl. ¶ 13.) She also has
“PTSD, bipolar disorder, and acute anxiety.” (Id.) Her conditions are exacerbated by stress. (Id.
¶ 15.)
In July 2005 and March 2009, respectively, probate cases were opened in the Circuit Court
of Cook County for the estates of plaintiff’s mother and father. (Id. ¶¶ 17, 19.) From March 5, 2014
through May 7, 2014, defendant Quinn presided over both probate cases. (Id. ¶¶ 18, 20.) From May
7, 2014 “until the close of these files,” defendant Collins-Dole presided over these cases. (Id. ¶ 21.)
Plaintiff was a pro se litigant in both cases. (Id. ¶ 22.)
On December 11, 2013, plaintiff asked defendant Pacelli via email for a request for
accommodations form, which Pacelli provided. (Id. ¶ 24.)
On February 3, 2014, plaintiff returned the form to Pacelli, apparently requesting that she not
have to appear in court. (Id. ¶ 25; see id. ¶ 27.)
On February 5, 2014, Pacelli emailed plaintiff, asking how her disability prevented her from
appearing in court. (Id. ¶ 27.) Plaintiff responded that “her nervous system disorder resulted in
involuntary jerky movements, impaired her speech, [caused] anxiety, contortions characterized as
aggression, inability to recall and/or articulate words, grunting noises, screaming, and otherwise
[made her] appear[] out of order.” (Id. ¶ 28.)
On February 7, 2014, Pacelli emailed plaintiff a list of proposed accommodations, including
that: (1) defendant Quinn “would allow the initial hearing to be done by telephone conference and
2
would make a case-by-case determination on whether telephone conference[s] would be permitted
for subsequent hearings”; and (2) plaintiff could provide a note-taker for her appearances in court
or obtain hearing transcripts from the official court reporter. (Id. ¶ 29.)
Plaintiff requested clarification from Pacelli, and asked that Pacelli provide only “yes” or
“no” answers to plaintiff because narratives “ma[de] [her] sick.” (Id. ¶ 31.) Pacelli responded that
the “accommodations process [was] . . . interactive” and “often a simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’ [would] not
suffice.” (Id. ¶ 32.) Pacelli also explained that plaintiff could appear via telephone for the March
5, 2014 hearing, a temporary gmail address had been set up for the hearing so plaintiff could use gchat to type her questions and answers to the judge, though the judge would speak and respond
orally, and the judge could not “commit to a hearing where [plaintiff] [would] only provide yes and
no responses.” (Id. ¶ 33.)
Plaintiff told Pacelli that “she had looked into . . . g-chat . . . but was under too much stress
to learn new technology.” (Id. ¶ 34.) Pacelli then offered plaintiff the use of Textnet, another
technology for typing her communications to the judge. (Id. ¶ 36.)
In response, plaintiff told Pacelli that she became sick after “every exchange (interactive
process)” with Pacelli and felt the court was trying “to accommodate her physical disabilities” but
not her “psychological and neurological disabilities.” (Id. ¶ 38.) Pacelli said the court had made
several attempts to accommodate plaintiff and asked her to suggest reasonable accommodations.
(Id. ¶ 39.) Among other things, plaintiff asked for the court to provide her with a computer, a
note-taker, a lawyer, and someone to help her communicate, that she communicate only via email
with the judge during hearings, and that the court make her note-taker’s notes part of the court
record. (Id. ¶ 40.)
3
On March 5, 2014, Pacelli told plaintiff “[t]he nine accommodations you requested . . . will
not be granted by the court,” and offered “teleconference, Textnet, or g-chat as accommodations.”
(Id. ¶ 41.) The same day, plaintiff participated in a hearing in her father’s probate case via
teleconference. (Id. ¶ 42.) During the hearing, “[p]laintiff struggled to verbally articulate and,
therefore, argue and advocate on her own behalf,” and “became confused under stress.” (Id.)
On March 11, 2014, for reasons not alleged in the complaint, plaintiff “was forced to
temporarily withdraw from the interactive process.” (Id. ¶ 43.)
On May 23, 2014, Pacelli told plaintiff via email that Quinn had recused herself from the
probate cases, the next status date was May 29, 2014, and the accommodations plaintiff had
previously been given would continue in the proceedings before the new judge, defendant CollinsDole. (Id. ¶ 47.) Pacelli also said that she would send orders to plaintiff via email, as an
accommodation. (Id. ¶ 48.)
Plaintiff attended a hearing on August 28, 2014 by teleconference, but she could not hear her
sister’s testimony and could not cross-examine her “due to [plaintiff’s] inability to speak from the
stress and her disorder.” (Id. ¶ 49.) In addition, plaintiff’s phone disconnected at one point during
the hearing, and at another, Collins-Dole told plaintiff to “stop talking” when she tried to ask a
question. (Id.)
“[O]n numerous occasions,” plaintiff told Pacelli “that hearings make her sick, she has
required medical treatment after such hearings, and/or she becomes physically ill after such hearings”
and “has asked for assistance in reducing the stress associated with court but has not received
accommodations in this regard.” (Id. ¶ 53.) Plaintiff also told Pacelli that “she experiences
‘dissociative events’ during hearings because of stress and/or her inability to communicate
4
effectively” but “[n]o accommodations have been provided in the event that a dissociative event
occurs during a court appearance.” (Id. ¶ 54.)
Both probate cases are now closed. (Id. ¶ 55.)
Discussion
On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court accepts as true all well-pleaded factual
allegations of the complaint, drawing all reasonable inferences in plaintiff’s favor. Hecker v. Deere
& Co., 556 F.3d 575, 580 (7th Cir. 2009). “[A] complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations” but must contain “enough facts to state a claim
for relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
As an initial matter, plaintiff’s claims against the Circuit Court of Cook County, Judge
Quinn, Judge Collins-Dole, Chief Judge Evans, and Melissa Pacelli are redundant of those she
asserts against the state of Illinois. See Landers Seed Co., Inc. v. Champaign Nat’l Bank, 15 F.3d
729, 731-32 (7th Cir. 1994) (state courts are branches of state government); Orenic v. Ill. State Labor
Relations Bd., 537 N.E.2d 784, 795 (Ill. 1989) (circuit court employees are employees of the state);
see also Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985) (official capacity claims against state
employees are actually claims against the state). Accordingly, the Court dismisses plaintiff’s claims
against the Circuit Court of Cook County, Judge Quinn, Judge Collins-Dole, Chief Judge Evans, and
Melissa Pacelli.1
1
Because the individual defendants are sued only in their official capacities, they do not
have absolute or quasi-judicial immunity from plaintiff’s claims. See DeVito v. Chi. Park Dist.,
83 F.3d 878, 881 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating in an ADA case that “[t]he only immunities available in
an official capacity suit are those that may be asserted by the governmental entity itself (e.g.,
Eleventh Amendment immunity or sovereign immunity)”); Reed v. Illinois, 12 C 7274, 2014 WL
5
Plaintiff alleges that the remaining defendant, the State of Illinois, violated the ADA and the
RA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (ADA) (“[N]o qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of
such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs,
or activities of a public entity . . . .”);2 29 U.S.C. § 794 (RA) (“No otherwise qualified individual
with a disability . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation
in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance . . . .”).3 To state a viable claim under either the ADA or RA,
plaintiff must allege that the State refused to reasonably modify its policies, practices, or procedures
for her. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (“ A public entity shall make reasonable modifications in policies,
practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis
of disability, unless the public entity can demonstrate that making the modifications would
917270, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 10, 2014) (holding that judicial immunity did not bar plaintiff’s
ADA claims against Pacelli, Chief Judge Evans, and Circuit Judge Jones in their official
capacities), appeal docketed, No. 14-1745 (7th Cir. Apr. 8, 2014). Even if they did, however,
that immunity would not extend to the state. Cf. Capra v. Cook Cnty., Bd. of Review, 733 F.3d
705, 711 (7th Cir. 2013) (“Unlike individuals sued in their individual capacities, . . . municipal
entities are not entitled to absolute immunity even where the entity’s officers are entitled to
immunity.”), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1027 (2014); Hernandez v. Sheahan, 455 F.3d 772, 776 (7th
Cir. 2006) (stating that “units of government are not entitled to immunity in suits under § 1983”
because “[o]fficial immunities (judicial, legislative, absolute, qualified, quasi, and so on) are
personal defenses designed to protect the finances of public officials whose salaries do not
compensate them for the risks of liability,” a “justification [that] does not apply to suits against
units of state or local government, which can tap the public fisc”).
2
The Supreme Court has held that “[ADA] Title II, as it applies to the class of cases
implicating the fundamental right of access to the courts, constitutes a valid exercise of
Congress’ § 5 authority to enforce the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment,” and thus
abrogates the states’ immunity from suit in federal court for such claims. Tennessee v. Lane, 541
U.S. 509, 533-534 (2004).
3
The state does not contest the receipt-of-federal-funds element of the RA claim.
6
fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or activity.”). A reasonable modification “is
one that gives the otherwise qualified plaintiff with disabilities meaningful access to the program or
services sought,” McElwee v. County of Orange, 700 F.3d 635, 641 (2d Cir. 2012) (quotations
omitted), and “is both efficacious and proportional to the costs to implement it,” Oconomowoc
Residential Programs v. City of Milwaukee, 300 F.3d 775, 784 (7th Cir. 2002).4
Plaintiff affirmatively alleges that the State allowed her to participate in hearings by
telephone, permitted her to use a note-taker, and offered to let her communicate electronically with
the judges by g-chat or Textnet. (3d Am. Compl. ¶¶ 29, 33, 37.) Plaintiff argues, however, that none
of these accommodations “addressed [her] [in]ability to speak clearly and cohesively at a rate
necessary to keep pace with the proceedings, her unpredictable dissociative events or her cognitive
function disability.” (Pl.’s Mem. Law Opp’n Mot. Dismiss at 6.) Under the circumstances, plaintiff
says, the State should have appointed a lawyer to represent her or provided “someone to . . . assist[]
. . her in communicating.” (3d Am. Compl.¶ 40.)5
4
Contrary to the State’s assertion, which is based on cases arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
(see State Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss at 9 (citing Graham, 473 U.S. at 167; Hafer v. Melo,
502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991)), the ADA and RA do not require plaintiff to plead that the State has a
policy of discriminating against the disabled.
5
The other accommodations plaintiff allegedly requested were “email correspondence
[with the judge] during the hearing instead of having to speak, a lawyer, . . . acceptance of her
note-taker’s notes into the record, [and] a computer to use.” (3d Am Compl. ¶ 40.) However,
she affirmatively alleges that the State said she could use a note-taker and offered to let her
communicate electronically with the judge during hearings. (See id. ¶¶ 29, 33, 41.) Moreover,
the ADA and RA do not require the State to provide plaintiff with “personal devices” like a
computer or to make a modification, like modifying its official record of proceedings with a notetaker’s notes, that “would fundamentally alter the nature of the service” provided. See 28 C.F.R.
§§ 35.130(b)(7), 35.135.
7
The State contends that appointment of counsel cannot be a reasonable accommodation
because there is no constitutional right to appointment of counsel in civil cases. See Farmer v. Haas,
990 F.2d 319, 323 (7th Cir. 1993). However, the Supreme Court has held that Congress’ power to
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, pursuant to which Title II of the ADA was enacted, includes
the authority to “prohibit ‘a somewhat broader swath of conduct, including that which is not itself
forbidden by the Amendment’s text.’” Tennessee, 541 U.S. at 533 n.24 (quoting Kimel v. Fla. Bd.
of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 81 (2000)). Thus, the fact that the Constitution does not require the State
to appoint a lawyer for plaintiff does not mean that such an appointment cannot be a reasonable
accommodation under the ADA.
The State also argues that plaintiff’s claims fail because she has not alleged that it
intentionally discriminated against her, a prerequisite to obtaining compensatory damages.
Strominger v. Brock, 592 F. App’x. 508, 511 (7th Cir. 2014) (“Even if Strominger could show a
violation of the ADA and/or Rehabilitation Act, he could not recover compensatory damages without
showing intentional discrimination.”).
Plaintiff argues that this requirement is satisfied by
allegations of deliberate indifference, but the Seventh Circuit “has yet to decide whether
discriminatory animus or deliberate indifference is required to show intentional discrimination.”
Strominger, 592 F. Appx. at 511. However, most of the appellate courts that have addressed the
issue agree with plaintiff. See McCullum v. Orlando Reg’l Healthcare Sys., Inc., 768 F.3d 1135,
1147 (11th Cir. 2014) (“A plaintiff may prove discriminatory intent by showing that a defendant was
deliberately indifferent to his statutory rights.”); S.H. ex rel. Durrell v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 729
F.3d 248, 263 (3d Cir. 2013) (holding that “a showing of deliberate indifference may satisfy a claim
for compensatory damages under [the RA] and . . . the ADA”); Meagley v. City of Little Rock, 639
8
F.3d 384, 389 (8th Cir. 2011) (same); Duvall v. Cnty. of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1138 (9th Cir. 2001)
(same); Powers v. MJB Acquisition Corp., 184 F.3d 1147, 1153 (10th Cir. 1999) (same); Bartlett v.
N.Y. State Bd. of Law Examiners, 156 F.3d 321, 331 (2d Cir. 1998) (same), vacated on other
grounds, 527 U.S. 1031 (1999); but see Carmen-Rivera v. Puerto Rico, 464 F.3d 14, 18 (1st Cir.
2006) (requiring allegations of discriminatory animus); Delano-Pyle v. Victoria Cnty., Tex., 302 F.3d
567, 575 (5th Cir. 2002) (same). As the court in Durrell explained:
[T]he deliberate indifference standard is better suited to the remedial goals of the RA
and the ADA than is the discriminatory animus alternative. In discussing the
enactment of the RA and the ADA, the Supreme Court observed that
“[d]iscrimination against the handicapped was perceived by Congress to be most
often the product, not of invidious animus, but rather of thoughtlessness and
indifference–of benign neglect.” Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 295, 105 S.Ct.
712, 83 L.Ed.2d 661 (1985); see also Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.) Inc., 631
F.3d 939, 944-45 (9th Cir. 2011) (applying Choate’s discussion of the enactment of
the RA to the ADA). Moreover, “[f]ederal agencies and commentators on the plight
of the handicapped similarly have found that discrimination against the handicapped
is primarily the result of apathetic attitudes rather than affirmative animus.”
Alexander, 469 U.S. at 296, 105 S.Ct. 712. Consistent with these motivations, the
RA and the ADA are targeted to address “more subtle forms of discrimination” than
merely “obviously exclusionary conduct.” Chapman, 631 F.3d at 945. Thus, a
standard of deliberate indifference, rather than one that targets animus, will give
meaning to the RA’s and the ADA’s purpose to end systematic neglect. . . .
729 F.3d at 264. The Court agrees with the reasoning of Durrell and holds that allegations of
deliberate indifference satisfy the intentional discrimination requirement for ADA and RA damages
claims.
Deliberate indifference, in this context, requires both “(1) ‘knowledge that a harm to a
federally protected right is substantially likely,’ and (2) ‘a failure to act upon that likelihood.’” Id.
at 262-63 (quoting Duvall, 260 F.3d at 1139). The federally-protected right implicated in this case
is that of an individual “to obtain access to the courts without undue interference.” Snyder v. Nolan,
9
380 F.3d 279, 291 (7th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (stating that the right of access “is protected by the
First Amendment right to petition and the Fourteenth Amendment right to substantive due process”).
Plaintiff’s right of access was imperiled if she was “hindered” in “[her] efforts to pursue a legal
claim.” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996). Thus, to satisfy the deliberate indifference
standard, plaintiff must allege that the State knew her pursuit of the probate claims would likely be
hindered unless it appointed a lawyer to represent her or provided her “with someone to . . . assist[]
. . . her in communicating,” but refused to do so.
Plaintiff alleges that: (1) she told Pacelli (a) her speech was “impaired,” she was unable “to
recall and/or articulate words,” and she experiences short-term memory loss when under stress, (b)
“narrative[]” exchanges “make[] [her] sick,” (c) she “experience[d] ‘dissociative events’ during the
hearings because of stress and/or her inability to communicate effectively,” and (d) she “was under
too much stress to learn” the g-chat technology; (2) she asked Pacelli for a lawyer or “someone to
provide assistance to her in communicating”; and (3) Pacelli denied that request. (See 3d Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 28, 31, 34, 40-41, 54.) These allegations are sufficient to suggest that the State, through
Pacelli, was deliberately indifferent, i.e., knew there was substantial likelihood that plaintiff’s right
of access to courts would be infringed unless someone assisted her during the probate hearings, yet
failed to provide that assistance. Accordingly, plaintiff has stated viable claims under the ADA and
RA.
10
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the Court grants in part and denies in part the motion to
dismiss of the State of Illinois, the Circuit Court of Cook County, Judge Quinn, Judge Collins-Dole,
and Chief Judge Evans [50], grants Pacelli’s motion to dismiss [45], dismisses plaintiff’s claims
against the Circuit Court of Cook County, Judge Quinn, Judge Collins-Dole, Chief Judge Evans, and
Melissa Pacelli, and terminates them as parties to this case. Plaintiff’s claims against the State of
Illinois, which is the only defendant remaining in this suit, will stand. A status hearing is set for
8/19/15 at 9:30 a.m.
SO ORDERED.
ENTERED:
__________________________________
JORGE ALONSO
United States District Judge
11
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?