Joyner v. Magana et al
Filing
34
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Signed by the Honorable Andrea R. Wood on 4/17/2020. Mailed notice. (dal, )
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
ARNOLD JOYNER (#N31385),
Petitioner,
v.
MICHAEL MAGANA,
Respondent.
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No. 14-cv-02331
Judge Andrea R. Wood
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Petitioner Arnold Joyner, a prisoner currently incarcerated at Dixon Correctional Center,
has brought this pro se habeas corpus action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his
convictions from the Circuit Court of Cook County for aggravated robbery, attempted escape,
and escape. Joyner raises two arguments in his petition: first, he claims that he did not receive a
prompt probable cause hearing following his warrantless arrest in violation of Gerstein v. Pugh,
420 U.S. 103 (1975); and second, he contends that he was brought before eyewitnesses for
identification following his arrest without the presence of counsel. As explained below, the Court
denies the petition on its merits and declines to issue a certificate of appealability.
BACKGROUND
State court factual findings are afforded a presumption of correctness, and the petitioner
has the burden of rebutting that presumption by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(e)(1); Coleman v. Hardy, 690 F.3d 811, 815 (7th Cir. 2012). Joyner has not done so here.
This Court accordingly draws the following factual history from the state court record. (Dkt. No.
14.)1
1
The exhibit listing for the state court materials submitted by Respondent Michael Magana in support of
his response states that Exhibit A is Illinois v. Joyner, No. 1-12-2932 (Ill. App. Ct. Sept. 13, 2013). (Dkt.
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On May 23, 2006, Joyner entered a negotiated guilty plea covering four separate criminal
cases. (Dkt. No. 14-2 at 38.) Joyner agreed to the factual basis for each crime during the guilty
plea hearing.
First, in Illinois v. Joyner, No. 04 CR 26513 (Circuit Court of Cook County), the first of
two aggravated robbery cases, the evidence showed that on October 17, 2004, Joyner entered a
juice bar in downtown Chicago shortly before 11:00 a.m. (Dkt. No. 14-4 at 26.) He told the
workers there that he was armed with a gun and demanded the money from the cash register.
(Id.) He fled with $354 dollars. (Id.) A police officer arrested Joyner while he was fleeing the
scene in a taxi. (Id.) The money was recovered, and Joyner was taken back to the crime scene
were two employees identified him as the offender. (Id. at 26–27.)
Next, in Illinois v. Joyner, No. 04 CR 26514 (Circuit Court of Cook County), Joyner’s
second aggravated robbery case, Joyner entered into a Subway sandwich shop in downtown
Chicago at approximately 5:20 p.m. on October 11, 2002—six days before the juice bar robbery.
(Dkt. No. 14-4 at 27.) He told the worker he was armed with a gun, and the worker gave him
$485 from the cash register. (Id.) The worker called the police after Joyner fled, but he was not
immediately apprehended. (Id.) After Joyner was arrested for the juice bar robbery, the Subway
worker identified Joyner as his assailant. (Id.)
Third, in Illinois v. Joyner, No. 06 CR 2225 (Circuit Court of Cook County), the
attempted escape case, Joyner was in the custody of the Cook County Sheriff awaiting trial. (Dkt.
No. 14-4 at 28.) He was with a group of inmates in a holding area. (Id.) The deputy sheriff
No. 14 at 1.) However, the submitted exhibit actually consists of an opinion from Illinois v. Gater, No.
2014 IL App (1st) 101982-U (Ill. App. Ct. June 30, 2014), an unrelated case. Fortunately, the Joyner case
referenced by Respondent’s Exhibit A is available in the state court materials. (Dkt. No. 14-2 at 38.)
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overseeing the inmate group was processing paperwork for transport of other detainees. (Id.)
While this was occurring, Joyner walked away from the area into an empty cell and then to a
different part of the lockup without authorization. (Id.)
Finally, in Illinois v. Joyner, No. 06 C 7094 (Circuit Court of Cook County), the escape
case, Joyner was in the custody of the Cook County Sheriff awaiting trial. (Dkt. No. 14-4 at 28.)
He was at the Cook County criminal courts building at 2600 South California in Chicago for a
court hearing. (Id.) Joyner left the holding area and went to the snack shop on the first floor. (Id.)
He was wearing his Cook County Jail Department of Corrections uniform while in the snack
shop. (Id.) A sheriff’s deputy in the courthouse observed Joyner and arrested him. (Id.)
Following his guilty pleas, Joyner was sentenced to a total of 42 years of imprisonment.
(Dkt. No. 14-2 at 38–39.) He subsequently filed a motion to reduce his sentence, which was
denied on June 29, 2006. (Dkt. No. 14-3 at 77–83.) He did not bring a direct appeal. On June 26,
2007, Joyner brought a combined pro se postconviction petition and motion for judgment from
relief.2 (Dkt. No.14-3 at 150.) The trial court denied the motion on July 6, 2007. (Dkt. No. 14-3
at 159.) Joyner did not appeal that denial either.
Then, on June 29, 2011, Joyner filed a petition for relief from judgment arguing that he
was denied a prompt probable cause hearing after his arrest and that his trial attorney was
ineffective for failing to raise the issue. (Dkt. No. 14-2 at 39.) Three months prior to filing the
petition for relief from judgment, Joyner received a $2,844.30 check through the class action
settlement in Dunn v. City of Chicago, No. 04 C 6804 (N.D. Ill.). (Dkt. No. 14-2 at 7.) Joyner
2
There is no proof of service, so the Court cannot apply the prison mailbox rule for the filing. Regardless,
the issue is not outcome determinative so the Court will use June 26, 2007—the date it was filed-stamped
by the state court.
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qualified for the Dunn class because he was arrested by the Chicago Police Department on
suspicion of a felony without an arrest warrant and detained in excess of 18 hours without a
judicial probable cause hearing sometime during the period from March 15, 1999 to February 10,
2008. Dunn v. City of Chicago, 231 F.R.D. 367, 370 (N.D. Ill. 2005); (Dkt. No. 14-2 at 4.)
On February 14, 2012, while the motion for relief from judgment was pending before the
state court, Joyner filed a motion for a writ of habeas corpus in the state court. (Dkt. No. 14-2 at
39.) The trial court denied both the motion for relief from judgment and the motion for a writ of
habeas corpus. (Dkt. No. 14-2 at 39.) Joyner appealed, but the denial of both motions was
affirmed following the filing of a motion under Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987), by
his appointed appellate counsel stating that there were no nonfrivolous grounds for appeal. (Dkt.
No. 14-2 at 40.) Joyner’s petition for leave to appeal was denied by the Supreme Court of
Illinois, ending his state court proceedings. Illinois v. Joyner, No. 117057, 3 N.E.3d 799 (Ill. Jan.
29, 2014) (Table).
Joyner subsequently filed the present habeas corpus petition on March 19, 2014. (Dkt.
No. 1 at 9.) The Court issued a show cause order explaining that the petition appeared to be
untimely under the one-year statute of limitations, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). (Dkt. No. 5 at 1.) Joyner
responded to the order by arguing that the limitations period should be tolled due to his mental
illness. (Dkt. No. 11 at 1.) In light of Joyner’s allegations, the Court concluded that it could not
resolve the statute of limitations issue at the outset of the case, discharged the show cause order,
and ordered the parties to brief the habeas corpus petition. Id. The matter is now fully briefed for
resolution by the Court.
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DISCUSSION
Joyner alleges in the instant habeas corpus petition both that he did not receive a prompt
probable cause hearing following his warrantless arrest in violation of Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S.
103 (1975), and that he was improperly presented to eyewitnesses for identification without the
presence of counsel. The Respondent counters that both claims are meritless and untimely, and
further that the counsel claim is also procedurally defaulted. As an initial matter, the Court
agrees with the Respondent that it is best to first address the merits arguments before the statute
of limitations issue, as the statute of limitations is significantly more complex. See Estremera v.
United States, 724 F.3d 773, 775 (7th Cir. 2013) (instructing that a district court has discretion to
resolve the merits issues first when they are “easy” and the statute of limitations questions are
“hard” because there is no required priority in resolving issues that do not implicate the Court’s
subject-matter jurisdiction). And so that is the manner in which the Court will proceed.
I.
Merits of Joyner’s Claims
A.
Claim One
Joyner contends that he was arrested without a warrant on October 17, 2004, following
the juice bar robbery. (Dkt. No. 1 at 5.) He became ill at the police station and was hospitalized
until he was discharged four days later on October 21. (Id.) He was then transferred to the Cook
County Jail, where he claims he remained detained without being presented before a judge for 23
days. (Id. at 5–6.) Joyner argues that this delay violated his Fourth Amendment right to a prompt
probable cause determination by a judicial officer under Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
Joyner’s claim is meritless for three distinct reasons. First, the claim is barred under Stone
v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). The Court cannot consider the merits of a Fourth Amendment
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claim in a habeas corpus proceeding when the state court provided a full and fair hearing on the
issue. Stone, 428 U.S. at 494; Monroe v. Davis, 712 F.3d 1106, 1112–13 (7th Cir. 2013). Here,
Joyner received a full and fair hearing of the issue as it was adjudicated by the state courts in his
petition for relief from judgment proceedings. Stone thus bars his claim. Second, Gerstein itself
prohibits this claim. “[A]lthough a suspect who is presently detained may challenge the probable
cause for that confinement, a conviction will not be vacated on the ground that the defendant was
detained pending trial without a determination of probable cause.” Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 119
(citations omitted); Evans v. Poskon, 603 F.3d 362, 364 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[A]n arrest without
probable cause violates the Fourth Amendment but does not imply the invalidity of a conviction,
because courts do not ‘suppress the body’ of the accused.”). While the alleged lack of a timely
probable cause hearing may support a claim for damages, it is insufficient grounds to vacate a
conviction. Finally, Joyner relies upon the Dunn settlement for support that he is entitled to
relief. But the parties agreed in Dunn, that “the Settlement Agreement shall not be deemed to be
an admission of liability, or of unconstitutional or illegal conduct . . . .” Dunn, No. 04 C 6804,
Dkt. No. 356 at 4. That Joyner received a cash payment as part of the Dunn class settlement is of
no moment as there was no liability determination in that case.
For all of these reasons, Claim One must be denied.
B.
Claim Two
Following his arrest on October 17, 2004 for the juice bar robbery, Joyner was identified
by employees from the juice bar as well as by the Subway worker from the robbery that occurred
six days earlier. Joyner argues that he was denied the presence of counsel when compelled to
participate in the identification procedures following his arrest. This claim, however, is
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procedurally defaulted. Joyner was required to exhaust his claim through all levels of state court
review before bringing the claim in a federal habeas corpus petition. Reynolds v. Hepp, 902 F.3d
699, 705 (7th Cir. 2018). Yet he did not raise the claim in the state courts as required, thus
resulting in the procedural default.
Joyner cannot excuse his default based on either cause and prejudice or a fundamental
miscarriage of justice. Examples of cause are: (1) interference by officials making compliance
impractical; (2) the factual or legal basis was not reasonably available to counsel; or, (3)
ineffective assistance of counsel. Guest v. McCann, 474 F.3d 926, 930 (7th Cir. 2007). The
record does not suggest any possible grounds to demonstrate cause and prejudice. Joyner also
fails to satisfy the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception. To satisfy this exception, Joyner
has the burden of demonstrating actual innocence through new, reliable evidence. McQuiggins v.
Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1928 (2013). Yet here, Joyner presents no new evidence and the
evidence of his guilt is overwhelming: he was arrested fleeing the scene of one robbery,
eyewitnesses identified him as the offender in both robberies, and he was captured and returned
to custody during his attempted escape and escape cases. Joyner admitted the facts of his crimes
during his guilty plea and makes no showing here of actual innocence. In short, the claim is
procedurally defaulted and Joyner cannot excuse his default.
The claim is also meritless. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches when the
government instigates “‘adversary judicial criminal proceedings—whether by way of formal
charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.’” Thompkins v. Pfister,
698 F.3d 976, 984 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972)). “[A]
criminal defendant’s initial appearance before a judicial officer, where he learns the charge
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against him and his liberty is subject to restriction, marks the start of adversary judicial
proceedings that trigger attachment of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.” Rothgery v.
Gillespie County, Tex., 554 U.S. 191, 213 (2008). Joyner, however, complains about
eyewitnesses identifying him immediately following his arrest prior to any presentment before a
judge. There was no Sixth Amendment violation, as his right to counsel had not yet attached at
the time of the identifications.
II.
Statute of Limitations
In addition to being meritless, Joyner’s habeas corpus petition is also untimely under the
one-year statute of limitations. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). The relevant limitations period begins
upon: (A) the completion of direct appeal or expiration of the time period for pursuing review;
(B) the date a state created unconstitutional impediment that previously prevented the filing of
the petition is removed; (C) the date a newly retroactive constitutional right is recognized by the
Supreme Court; or, (D) the date a factual predicate of the claim could have been discovered
through the exercise of due diligence. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)-(D). The one-year limitations
period is tolled while a properly filed application for state postconviction or other collateral
proceeding is pending in the state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).
The petition in this case is governed by § 2244(d)(1)(A), and more specifically, the date
when Joyner’s period for further direct review expired. Sections (B) and (C) are clearly
inapplicable and need not be discussed further. As to Section (D), the factual predicate of
Joyner’s claims were available to Joyner before the completion of his direct appeal. Joyner
points out that he did not learn about the Dunn settlement until multiple years after the
completion of his direct appeal. However, actual knowledge and understanding of a claim is
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irrelevant—the controlling date is when he could have discovered the factual predicate through
due diligence. Owens v. Boyd, 235 F.3d 356, 359 (7th Cir. 2000). Joyner was aware of the facts
supporting his claims when they occurred—he knew that he had been held for multiple days
following his arrest without being presented to a judge and that he was presented for
identification to eyewitnesses without the presence of an attorney. These events all occurred
prior to the expiration of his direct appeal period. Section § 2244(d)(1)(A) thus controls the
statute of limitations calculation and the relevant date is the date when his conviction became
final by direct review
The last event in Joyner’s direct appeal proceedings was the denial of his motion for
reduction of sentence by the state trial court on June 29, 2006. (Dkt. No. 14-3 at 83.) Joyner had
30 days to bring his appeal. See Ill. S. Ct. Rule 604(d). He took no action. Thus, his direct appeal
period ended for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) on July 29, 2006. Gonzalez v. Thaler,
565 U.S. 134, 150 (2012). Joyner had one year from July 29, 2006 to file his federal habeas
corpus petition. But then, Joyner filed his joint post-conviction and relief from judgment motion
on June 26, 2007, thereby tolling the limitations period from that date under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(d)(2). (Dkt. No. 14-3 at 150.) Thus, 332 days counted against the statute of limitations
between the completion of Joyner’s direct appeal and the beginning of the tolling period. The
trial court denied the motion on July 6, 2007. (Dkt. No. 14-3 at 159.).
Joyner did not appeal the denial. It is an open question in the Seventh Circuit whether the
time period for bringing an appeal following the denial of a collateral proceeding tolls the statute
of limitations. See Adamczyk v. Sullivan, No. 18 C 1858, 2019 WL 6903385, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Apr.
9, 2019). Assuming the time period for bringing an appeal continues the tolling, the tolling
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period ended on August 5, 2007. As 332 days already counted against the statute of limitations
period, the limitations period for Joyner expired on September 7, 2007. As a result, Joyner’s
present habeas corpus petition, filed almost seven years later in March 2014, is untimely.
Moreover, the later-filed proceedings in the state court (i.e., the 2011 motion for relief from
judgment and the 2012 state habeas corpus petition) have no effect on the statute of limitations
calculation. The federal limitations period expired in 2007, meaning that any action taken in state
court in 2011 or 2012 is irrelevant. Dolis v. Chambers, 454 F.3d 721, 723 (7th Cir. 2006).
Joyner responds that the statute of limitations should be equitably tolled because he
suffers from a mental illness. To justify tolling the statute of limitations, Joyner has the burden of
demonstrating that: (1) he diligently pursued his rights; and, (2) some extraordinary circumstance
stood in his way preventing a timely filing. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010);
Mayberry v. Dittmann, 904 F.3d 525, 529-30 (7th Cir. 2018). “[M]ental illness may toll a statute
of limitations[] ‘only if the illness in fact prevents the sufferer from managing his affairs and
thus from understanding his legal rights and acting upon them.’” Mayberry, 904 F.3d at 530
(quoting Obriecht v. Foster, 727 F.3d 744, 750–51 (7th Cir. 2013); Miller v. Runyon, 77 F.3d
189, 191 (7th Cir. 1996)).
The record is inconclusive as to whether Joyner suffers from a mental illness. In 2005,
Joyner was examined at the outset of his criminal case by a staff psychiatrist for the Circuit
Court of Cook County’s Forensic Clinical Services. The psychiatrist concluded that Joyner was
“attempt[ing]to malinger mental illness.” (Dkt. No. 14-3 at 34.) Subsequent examinations during
Joyner’s incarceration in the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”) concluded that he had
no mental illness, and that his only notable issue was addiction to illegal drugs. (Dkt. No. 10 at
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10.) IDOC reports observe that Joyner was “alert and oriented,” with “[n]o delusions,
hallucinations or formal thought disorder;” his “thought processes were organized and goal
directed;” “[h]is memory for immediate, recent and remote events appeared unimpaired;” and
“[h]is speech was clear and coherent.” (Id.) The reports also state that Joyner was attempting to
publish a book he had written. (Id. at 21, 23, 24.) Nonetheless, some material in the record
suggests that Joyner does have a mental illness. Joyner was prescribed a number of psychotropic
medications while at the Cook County Jail, but the pretrial psychiatrist also noted that “it is not
clear that he requires these in order to maintain his fitness for trial.” (Dkt. No. 14-3 at 64.) There
are also health evaluations from the IDOC diagnosing Joyner with either paranoid schizophrenia
or schizoaffective disorder. (Dkt. No. 10 at 6–9.)
The Court need not resolve the question of whether Joyner suffers from schizophrenia or
a similar disorder, or is a malingerer, as he cannot meet the required standard for equitable
tolling. There is no evidence suggesting that any alleged mental illness impacted Joyner’s ability
to manage his affairs such that he could not assert his legal rights. Mayberry, 904 F.3d at 530.
Notably, Joyner litigated matters pro se in the state courts in both 2007 and 2011. (Dkt. No. 14-2
at 39; Dkt. No. 14-3 at 150.) He also successfully submitted the class action claim form to
receive his settlement payment in the Dunn case and attempted to find publishers for a book he
wrote while incarcerated. These actions indicate that Joyner was not suffering from a mental
illness that prevented him from managing his affairs such that he could not understand his legal
rights and take action upon them. Mayberry, 904 F.3d at 530. The Court thus finds that Joyner is
not entitled to equitable tolling.
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III.
Certificate of Appealability and Notice of Appeal Rights
As explained above, Joyner’s habeas corpus petition fails on the merits in addition to
being barred by the statute of limitations. The case is therefore denied. The Court further
declines to issue a certificate of appealability, as Joyner has not made a substantial showing of
the denial of a constitutional right or that reasonable jurists would debate this Court’s resolution
of his claims. Arredondo v. Huibregtse, 542 F.3d 1155, 1165 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(2); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880,
893 & n.4 (1983)).
Joyner is advised that this is a final decision ending his case in this Court. If he wishes to
appeal, Joyner must file a notice of appeal with this Court within 30 days of the entry of
judgment. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1). Joyner need not bring a motion to reconsider this Court’s
ruling to preserve his appellate rights. However, if he wishes the Court to reconsider its
judgment, he may file a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) or 60(b). Any Rule
59(e) motion must be filed within 28 days of the entry of judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e).
The time to file a motion pursuant to Rule 59(e) cannot be extended. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(2).
A timely Rule 59(e) motion suspends the deadline for filing an appeal until the Rule 59(e)
motion is ruled upon. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(iv). Any Rule 60(b) motion must be filed
within a reasonable time and, if seeking relief under Rule 60(b)(1), (2), or (3), must be filed no
more than one year after entry of judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1). The time to file a Rule
60(b) motion cannot be extended. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(2). A Rule 60(b) motion suspends the
deadline for filing an appeal until the Rule 60(b) motion is ruled upon only if the motion is filed
within 28 days of the entry of judgment. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(vi).
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, Joyner’s habeas corpus petition (Dkt. No. 7.) is denied
on the merits. Joyner’s motion for status report (Dkt. No. 27) is granted. Joyner is advised that
this Memorandum Opinion and Order brings the case up to date. Joyner’s recently filed motions
to be released on bond pending resolution of this matter (Dkt. Nos. 29, 32) and any other pending
motions are denied as moot.
ENTERED:
Dated: April 17, 2020
____________________________________
Andrea R. Wood
United States District Judge
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