Griffin v. Chicago Housing Authority

Filing 64

OPINION AND ORDER. Signed by the Honorable Sara L. Ellis on 10/19/2016. Mailed notice(rj, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
ANDREA GRIFFIN,
Plaintiff,
v.
CHICAGO HOUSING AUTHORITY,
Defendant.

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No. 14 C 2481
Judge Sara L. Ellis

OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Andrea Griffin, who is African American, alleges claims of racial harassment
and retaliation while working for Defendant Chicago Housing Authority (the “CHA”). She
brings this lawsuit against the CHA for violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. The CHA moves for summary judgment. Because the
Court finds no basis for employer liability on Griffin’s racial harassment claim, the Court grants
summary judgment for the CHA on that claim. As for her retaliation claim, Griffin has not
introduced evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to find that the CHA took adverse action
against her because she reported racial harassment; thus, the Court grants the CHA summary
judgment on that claim as well.
BACKGROUND 1
Griffin worked for the CHA from May 2004 through March 22, 2013, employed as the
office manager in the General Counsel’s Office from March 2006 until she left the CHA. During
1

The facts set forth in this section are derived from the CHA’s statement of facts to the extent it comports
with the Court’s summary judgment procedures. They are taken in the light most favorable to Griffin, the
non-movant. The Court has included in this background section only those portions of the statement of
facts that are appropriately presented, supported, and relevant to resolution of the pending motion for
summary judgment. The Court addresses Griffin’s failure to comply with the Court’s summary judgment
procedures, in addition to her attempt to improperly create a dispute of fact through the submission of her
self-serving affidavit, below.

her tenure as office manager, she had four supervisors: Gail Neimann, Jorge Cazares, Scott
Ammarell, and Melissa Freeman Cadoree. Throughout Griffin’s employment at the CHA, the
CHA’s employee handbook provided that “[e]mployees must report incidents of discrimination,
harassment or hostile work environment to the CHA’s Ethics Officer or to any other CHA
Management Representative.” Doc. 47-12 at 10.
Griffin complains about one of her co-workers, George Brown, a Caucasian attorney in
CHA’s General Counsel’s Office. Griffin did not report to Brown, and Brown did not review or
supervise Griffin’s job performance or have any input in her compensation, promotion
opportunities, or benefits. Although Brown and Griffin did not interact on a regular basis,
according to Griffin, Brown used racially offensive and harassing language toward her and
others in 2007, 2009, 2011, 2012, and 2013. Brown also allegedly tossed file folders toward
Griffin from across her desk, delivered his ARDC registration to her, tossed file folders onto a
counter above where she was storing supplies, motioned as if he was throwing something in a
trash can near her, and let a door close on her. Griffin did not report these incidents to her
supervisors, the CHA’s Human Resources Department, the Chief or Deputy Chief Legal Officer,
the Ethics Officer, or the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) Officer.
Griffin also did not report any of these incidents to the Illinois Department of Human Rights
(“IDHR”) or the EEOC, despite being asked broadly about all incidents concerning Brown
during the IDHR fact finding conference.
Griffin did report one interaction she had with Brown (the “conference room incident”) to
the CHA, however. On September 11, 2012, Griffin, Brown, and Audrey Wade, another CHA
attorney, met in a conference room to discuss the CHA’s Housing Choice Voucher program.
During the meeting, Griffin and Brown got into a heated disagreement about who had

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responsibility to find space for the program’s consultants to work. Brown pointed his pen at
Griffin, saying it was Griffin’s responsibility. Brown did not make any racially offensive or
disparaging remarks or reference Griffin’s race. But Griffin took offense and left the meeting to
seek out Ammarell, the CHA’s Chief Legal Officer at the time. Because Ammarell was
unavailable, she spoke to his assistant and then returned to the meeting. Cadoree, the Deputy
Chief Legal Officer and Griffin’s direct supervisor at the time, who learned that Griffin was
upset from Ammarell’s assistant, then interrupted the meeting to speak with Griffin. Griffin
explained to Cadoree what had occurred without mentioning anything race-related and indicated
that she was fine returning to the meeting, which she then did. Cadoree met with Brown later
that day to discuss the conference room incident.
In addition to speaking with Cadoree, Griffin reported the conference room incident to
Marilyn Jefferson, the CHA’s Senior Director of Human Resources and Training and at the time
the Vice President of Human Resources and Training. Jefferson then spoke separately with
Brown and Wade to investigate further. Jefferson concluded the incident was merely a
“communication conflict.” Doc. 47 ¶ 16. Cadoree, Jefferson, and Ammarell together also met
with Griffin and Brown to discuss civility in the workplace, the importance of working together,
and the need not to raise voices at each other.
At no time during her employment at the CHA did Griffin report any of the other
allegedly racially offensive or harassing interactions she had with Brown of which she now
complains, including when she reported the conference room incident. 2 Nor did Griffin indicate

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Griffin attempts to introduce into evidence her affidavit which states that she complained about racially
offensive language and harassment to the CHA’s outside counsel, who was investigating her complaint;
however, when asked at her deposition whether she spoke of the incidents to anyone, regardless of
whether at the CHA or outside of the CHA, Griffin denied doing so. See, e.g., Doc. 47-3 at 9–11, 13, 25.
As discussed below, the Court cannot credit this attempt to create a factual dispute with a self-serving
affidavit that contradicts her own deposition testimony.

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she could not work with Brown at any time. Instead, she advised both Jefferson and Cadoree
that she had no issues doing so and declined suggestions to limit interactions with him by, for
example, placing a mailbox outside her office so people would not have to enter her office to
drop things off or using an intermediary, such as Cadoree, between the two of them.
Beginning in late 2012 and early 2013, Griffin claims that Cadoree, her immediate
supervisor, began to more closely monitor her performance, changing her work process in a
manner that she no longer operated as autonomously as previously. Griffin believed this kept her
from being as efficient as possible, but she could not point to any specific decision she normally
would have made autonomously but after the conference room incident required a different
process for approval. Instead, she admitted that those decisions she claimed she would normally
make autonomously required supervisor approval even before the incident.
Griffin also complains that she did not receive a merit based raise in early 2013. She
does not identify any other individual who received a similar raise during that same time period.
Additionally, Griffin did not receive a merit based raise in 2010. In fact, she did not receive any
pay raises after 2010.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment obviates the need for a trial where there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.
To determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists, the Court must pierce the pleadings and
assess the proof as presented in depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, and
affidavits that are part of the record. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 & advisory committee’s notes. The party
seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of proving that no genuine issue of material
fact exists. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265

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(1986). In response, the non-moving party cannot rest on mere pleadings alone but must use the
evidentiary tools listed above to identify specific material facts that demonstrate a genuine issue
for trial. Id. at 324; Insolia v. Philip Morris Inc., 216 F.3d 596, 598 (7th Cir. 2000). Although a
bare contention that an issue of fact exists is insufficient to create a factual dispute, Bellaver v.
Quanex Corp., 200 F.3d 485, 492 (7th Cir. 2000), the Court must construe all facts in a light
most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986).
ANALYSIS
I.

Compliance with Summary Judgment Procedures
Before addressing the merits of Griffin’s claims, the Court must address several

procedural issues. This Court’s summary judgment procedures differ from Local Rule 56.1, in
that this Court requires the parties to submit a joint statement of undisputed facts. See Sweatt v.
Union Pac. R.R. Co., 796 F.3d 701, 711–12 (7th Cir. 2015) (affirming this Court’s summary
judgment case management procedures). The party opposing summary judgment may, however,
submit additional facts it contends demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact in its response,
providing citations to supporting material. Id.; Judge Sara L. Ellis, Case Procedures, Summary
Judgment Practice, http://www.ilnd.uscourts.gov/judge-info.aspx?VyU/OurKKJRDT+
FUM5tZmA==. Here, however, Griffin did not participate in the joint process despite the
CHA’s efforts to obtain her compliance and to follow the Court’s summary judgment
procedures. See Doc. 47-13 (CHA counsel’s declaration explaining attempts to obtain Griffin’s
compliance). Because the Court’s procedures are not advisory and Griffin failed to abide by
them, the Court may treat the CHA’s facts as established. See Sweatt, 796 F.3d at 711–12
(affirming this Court’s summary judgment case management procedures as conforming to Local

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Rule 56.1); Raymond v. Ameritech Corp., 442 F.3d 600, 608 (court may deem admitted any fact
in the moving party’s statement that is supported by the record and not contested by the opposing
party). Moreover, Griffin herself acknowledges she does not disagree with the CHA’s version of
the facts. See Doc. 62-1 at 4 (counsel’s representation at a motion hearing); Doc. 58-1
(representation in response to motion for summary judgment that Griffin “accepts Defendant’s
Statement of Undisputed Facts”). Therefore, the Court treats the CHA’s facts as undisputed.
But despite nominally accepting the CHA’s facts as undisputed, Griffin nonetheless
argues that certain disputed facts prevent the Court from entering summary judgment for the
CHA. These alleged disputes of fact arise from Griffin’s own self-serving affidavit, dated July 6,
2016, the day before she filed her response to the CHA’s summary judgment motion. In this
affidavit, Griffin contradicts many of the facts she agrees are undisputed and to which she
testified in her deposition, given on January 25, 2016. See Doc. 59. 3 For example, Griffin
claims to have told Cadoree, Jefferson, and Ammarell that the conference room incident was
racially motivated and to have reported other instances of Brown’s racially offensive behavior to
Cadoree and Jennifer Caracciolo, outside counsel for the CHA investigating her complaints. See
id. ¶¶ 5–14. But Griffin’s attempt to avoid summary judgment based on her affidavit fails:
“litigants cannot create sham issues of fact with affidavits that contradict their prior depositions.”
Janky v. Lake County Convention & Visitors Bureau, 576 F.3d 356, 362 (7th Cir. 2009) (citation
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Abraham v. Wash. Grp. Int’l, Inc., 766 F.3d
735, 741 (7th Cir. 2014) (“[A] deponent may not use an affidavit sworn to after a deposition to
contradict deposition testimony without giving a credible explanation for the discrepancies.”).

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Griffin also refers to a letter written by Jennifer Caracciolo, whom the CHA apparently retained to
investigate Griffin’s complaint concerning the conference room incident. But this letter (or any other
evidence surrounding an external investigation) is not in the record; therefore, the Court cannot consider it
in deciding the motion for summary judgment.

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Griffin cannot claim to have merely suffered an “occasional lapse[ ] of memory” in testifying or
to need to correct or clarify her testimony, which would excuse application of the sham affidavit
rule, for she had numerous opportunities during her deposition to provide the information
contained in her affidavit but did not. See Castro v. DeVry Univ., Inc., 786 F.3d 559, 571 (7th
Cir. 2015). And she provides no credible explanation for the contradictions between her
deposition and affidavit. Although she attempts to argue that she was only asked at her
deposition whether she told anyone at the CHA of the racially hostile comments, which would
not have invited a response concerning information she told Caracciolo, the deposition transcript
betrays her because Griffin was asked generally whether she reported information concerning
racial harassment to anyone, which did not cabin her answers to just CHA employees. See, e.g.,
Doc. 47-3 at 9–11, 13, 25. 4 Griffin does not even attempt to explain the discrepancy concerning
whether she told anyone at the CHA or herself considered that the conference room incident was
racially motivated. Compare Doc. 59 ¶¶ 5–6, with Doc. 47-3 at 18–19. The only reasonable
conclusion to be drawn is that her affidavit is “designed to thwart the purposes of summary
judgment,” warranting its exclusion. Castro, 786 F.3d at 571–72 (collecting cases where
affidavits have been excluded). Without this affidavit, the Court has before it only the facts
submitted by the CHA, facts which, as Griffin acknowledges, are undisputed.
II.

Racial Harassment Claim (Count I)
To prevail on her racial harassment claim, Griffin must show that (1) her work

environment was both objectively and subjectively offensive, (2) the harassment was based on
race, (3) the conduct was severe or pervasive, and (4) there is a basis for employer liability.

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Griffin also had the opportunity to provide this information in response to the CHA’s interrogatories,
which asked for details of communications she had with “anyone (other than [her] attorney) with regard
to the racial harassment and/or retaliation” she alleged. Doc. 47-5 at 16. Griffin responded she only
discussed the issue with Dallis Rogers, another CHA employee. Id.

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Jajeh v. County of Cook, 678 F.3d 560, 566 (7th Cir. 2012). The CHA argues that Griffin cannot
establish any of the elements of her claim.
Although the Court questions whether Griffin has created a genuine issue of fact as to
any of the elements, it need only address the fourth element to dispose of this claim. Where the
alleged harasser is a co-worker, as the parties agree Brown was, the CHA is liable if it was
negligent in either discovering or remedying the harassment. Vance v. Ball State Univ., 646 F.3d
461, 470 (7th Cir. 2011), aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 2434 (2013). “Under Title VII, however, an
employer’s liability for coworker harassment is not triggered unless the employee notifies the
employer about an instance of racial harassment.” Id. at 472. Here, Griffin only notified the
CHA of the conference room incident. But even so, she did not identify the incident as being
racially motivated so as to put the CHA on notice for purposes of imposing employer liability
under Title VII. Thus, Griffin’s failure to report the conference room incident as race-related
warrants finding for the CHA. 5 See Jajeh, 678 F.3d at 569 (vague complaints that do not suggest
that harassment was based on forbidden animus not enough to give rise to employer liability);
Yancick v. Hanna Steel Corp., 653 F.3d 532, 550 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[V]ague complaints unrelated
to racial hostility are insufficient to establish employer liability.”).
But even going a step further, Griffin has not created a genuine issue of fact as to whether
the CHA’s response was unreasonable because the CHA promptly addressed the issue. As in
Vance, after Griffin complained of Brown’s conduct during the conference room incident, the
CHA promptly investigated, concluded it was merely a communication conflict, and counseled
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There also is not evidence that the racial harassment Griffin suffered was so pervasive and obvious that
the CHA could be charged with constructive knowledge of it despite Griffin’s failure to identify it as
race-related. See Rhodes v. Ill. Dep’t of Transp., 359 F.3d 498, 506–07 (7th Cir. 2004) (plaintiff failed to
set forth evidence to charge employer with constructive knowledge of sexual harassment where plaintiff
only complained of one pornographic picture in her locker and did not present any evidence of other
employees’ complaints about pornographic materials), overruled on other grounds by Ortiz v. Werner
Enters., Inc., --- F.3d ----, 2016 WL 4411434 (7th Cir. 2016).

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both employees concerning civility in the workplace. 6 Vance, 646 F.3d at 472–73; Cerros v.
Steel Techs., Inc., 398 F.3d 944, 954 (7th Cir. 2005) (“Our cases recognize prompt investigation
of the alleged misconduct as a hallmark of reasonable corrective action.”). The CHA crafted its
response to resolve the issues it knew about and cannot be held liable as a result. Vance, 646
F.3d at 473 (although “the ideal result of an employee’s complaint would be that the harassment
ceases . . . . Title VII does not require an employer’s response to ‘successfully prevent[ ]
subsequent harassment’” (second alteration in original) (quoting Cerros, 398 F.3d at 954)).
Although Griffin alleges that Brown engaged in other harassing behavior after the conference
room incident, she admits that she did not report these incidents to anyone at the CHA, meaning
that the CHA could not take additional steps to address them; therefore, it is not liable for its
failure to take further action. See Chaparro v. City of Chicago, 47 F. Supp. 3d 767, 778 (N.D.
Ill. 2014) (employer did not respond unreasonably to complaints of harassment after subsequent
incidents arose because plaintiff did not report those incidents to the employer). Further, the
evidence in the record shows Griffin turned down suggested accommodations that would have
lessened her interactions with Brown; moreover, the CHA “was not required to completely
insulate” Griffin from Brown. Milligan v. Bd. of Trs. of S. Ill. Univ., 686 F.3d 378, 385 (7th Cir.
2012) (attempts to minimize contact sufficient under the circumstances). Finally, the CHA’s
equal employment opportunity policy, which prohibits racial harassment and sets forth reporting
and investigation procedures, also supports finding no basis for employer liability. See Shaw v.
AutoZone, Inc., 180 F.3d 806, 811–12 (7th Cir. 1999) (employer exercised reasonable care in
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Griffin complains in her response to the motion for summary judgment that the CHA’s investigation was
not reasonably prompt, claiming it was unnecessarily slow in getting started. To the extent she complains
of any outside investigation, instead of the internal response that occurred, the Court finds that such
outside investigation is not properly before the Court because no admissible evidence has been presented
concerning such an investigation. The only facts concerning an investigation before the Court concern
the investigation undertaken by Cadoree, Ammarell, and Jefferson, which began the same day as the
conference room incident, which cannot be called anything but prompt.

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preventing sexual harassment where it had a sexual harassment policy indicating that such
harassment would not be tolerated); Chaparro, 47 F. Supp. 3d at 779 n.6 (existence of antiharassment policy supported finding of no employer liability). Griffin cannot complain that the
CHA did not promptly investigate other instances of alleged harassment when she failed to avail
herself of the remedies to harassment made available to her under the CHA’s policy. See
Muhammad v. Caterpillar, Inc., 767 F.3d 694, 698 (7th Cir. 2014) (failure to report incident after
prior report and employer response does not make employer liable); Logan v. Sabre Mfg., LLC,
No. 3:12-cv-338-CAN, 2013 WL 5570218, at *10–11 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 8, 2013) (finding that
employer could not be held liable for harassment where, among other things, employee did not
report all incidents of harassment in contravention of anti-harassment policy, noting that “[t]he
employee also has a responsibility to mitigate his damages and must avail himself of the
remedies to harassment made available by the employer”). Thus, the Court grants summary
judgment for the CHA on Griffin’s racial harassment claim. 7
III.

Retaliation Claim (Count II)
The CHA also seeks summary judgment on Griffin’s retaliation claim. Griffin contends

that the CHA retaliated against her for complaining about Brown’s racially discriminatory
treatment of her, claiming that the CHA denied her a raise in early 2013, more closely monitored
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Griffin would also be hard-pressed to demonstrate that Brown’s actions were severe or pervasive.
Griffin alleges that, over a six-year period, Brown acted in a harassing manner toward her on
approximately fifteen occasions. But “[t]he infrequency of the offensive comments is relevant to an
assessment of their impact. A handful of comments spread over months is unlikely to have so great an
emotional impact as a concentrated or incessant barrage.” Baskerville v. Culligan Int’l Co., 50 F.3d 428,
431 (7th Cir. 1995); see also Scruggs v. Garst Seed Co., 587 F.3d 832, 840–41 (7th Cir. 2009) (“Offhand
comments, isolated incidents, and simple teasing do not rise to the level of conduct that alters the terms
and conditions of employment.”). Moreover, Griffin’s admitted failure to report any of these alleged
incidents, save for the conference room incident, which she did not even identify as race-related,
undermines her contention that they were severe or pervasive enough to create a hostile work
environment. See Ford v. Minteq Shapes & Servs., Inc., 587 F.3d 845, 848 (7th Cir. 2009) (employee’s
inaction in face of racially insensitive comments “belie[d] the notion” that the “comments created a
hostile work environment”).

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her activities, and relieved her of authority. 8 To avoid summary judgment, Griffin must show
that a reasonable jury could find that she suffered an adverse employment action because she
engaged in statutorily protected activity. 9 Majors v. Gen. Elec. Co., 714 F.3d 527, 537 (7th Cir.
2013).
Griffin’s retaliation claims fail for lack of an adverse employment action or lack of a
causal connection. 10 First, the CHA argues that Griffin did not suffer an adverse employment
action. “The showing a plaintiff must make to set out an adverse employment action required for

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Griffin appears to also argue that she suffered an adverse employment action due to Brown’s continued
harassment after reporting the conference room incident in that she was required to take FMLA leave,
found it difficult to work, and suffered health issues. But the Court already limited the scope of her
retaliation claims at the motion to dismiss stage; thus, the Court only addresses those retaliatory actions
on which the Court allowed Griffin to proceed. See Griffin v. Chicago Hous. Auth., No. 14 C 2481, 2014
WL 6657799, at *3–4 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 24, 2014).

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Courts have referred to a direct and indirect method of proof to establish a retaliation claim. See, e.g.,
Boss v. Castro, 816 F.3d 910, 918 (7th Cir. 2016). In Ortiz, the Seventh Circuit addressed the methods in
establishing employment discrimination claims, holding that the correct legal standard to evaluate a claim
“is simply whether the evidence would permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the plaintiff’s race,
ethnicity, sex, religion, or other proscribed factor caused the discharge or other adverse employment
action.” 2016 WL 4411434, at *4. The Ortiz court further stated, “[e]vidence must be considered as a
whole, rather than asking whether any particular piece of evidence proves the case by itself—or whether
just the ‘direct’ evidence does so, or the ‘indirect’ evidence.” Id.; see also Lord v. High Voltage Software,
Inc., --- F.3d ----, 2016 WL 5795797, at *4 (7th Cir. Oct. 5, 2016) (in the retaliatory discharge context,
courts should consider whether “the record contain[s] sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable fact
finder to conclude that retaliatory motive caused the discharge” instead of looking at direct or indirect
evidence of causation independently). That said, the Seventh Circuit acknowledged that the McDonnell
Douglas burden-shifting method remains good law. Ortiz, 2016 WL 4411434, at *5. But because Griffin
does not attempt to establish her retaliation claim under the burden-shifting method, the Court need not
address the burden-shifting method further and will only consider whether she has produced enough
evidence to permit a reasonable jury to conclude that she suffered an adverse employment action because
of her protected activity.
10

The CHA does not challenge whether Griffin engaged in statutorily protected activity for purposes of
summary judgment, although the Court questions whether Griffin could show this based on the facts in
the record because, as discussed above in connection with the hostile work environment claim, the only
evidence before the Court at this stage is that Griffin raised the conference room incident with her
supervisors and that she did not identify that incident to have been racially motivated. See Tomanovich v.
City of Indianapolis, 457 F.3d 656, 663 (7th Cir. 2006) (“Merely complaining in general terms of
discrimination or harassment, without indicating a connection to a protected class or providing facts
sufficient to create that inference, is insufficient.”).

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a retaliation claim is lower than that required for a discrimination claim; a plaintiff must only
show that the employer’s action would cause a ‘reasonable worker’ to be dissuaded from making
or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Chaib v. Indiana, 744 F.3d 974, 986–87 (7th Cir.
2014) (quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 165
L. Ed. 2d 345 (2006)), overruled on other grounds by Ortiz, 2016 WL 4411434. But even under
this lower standard, Griffin’s claims of being more closely monitored and being relieved of
authority do not qualify. When questioned at her deposition, Griffin admitted that any changes
only affected the work process and could not point to specific decisions she normally would have
made on her own but that now required additional layers of approval. Such conclusory
assertions are not sufficient to overcome summary judgment. See Boss, 816 F.3d at 919
(plaintiff’s general complaints of being subjected to “a barrage of criticism” and “workplace
stresses,” without identifying specific incidents, not sufficient to overcome summary judgment).
Instead, she acknowledged that decisions she claimed she previously made on her own had also
required supervisor approval, meaning that any changes after the conference room incident in the
manner the CHA supervised her work were not materially adverse. See Burlington N., 548 U.S.
at 68 (“petty slights or minor annoyances that often take place at work and that all employees
experience” do not qualify as adverse employment actions; the action must be materially
adverse); Washington v. Ill. Dep’t of Revenue, 420 F.3d 658, 662 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[b]y and large
a reassignment that does not affect pay or promotion opportunities” does not amount to an
adverse employment action).
Although the denial of the pay raise in early 2013 amounts to an adverse employment
action, see Hunt v. City of Markham, Ill., 219 F.3d 649, 654 (7th Cir. 2000), the record contains
no evidence to suggest a causal connection between Griffin’s complaints surrounding the

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conference room incident and the CHA’s denying Griffin that pay raise. Griffin has not
submitted any evidence surrounding the reasons for the denial of the pay raise, nor could she
identify any other employees who received raises around that same time period. She also
conceded that the CHA previously denied her a pay raise, which cuts against finding that the
denial of a raise in 2013 was retaliatory. Without any evidence connecting the pay raise denial to
her complaints concerning the conference room incident, Griffin cannot proceed further on this
aspect of her retaliation claim. See Patterson v. Triangle Tool Corp., No. 14-C-1557, 2016 WL
3519617, at *7–8 (E.D. Wis. June 22, 2016) (granting summary judgment for defendant on
plaintiff’s claim that defendant denied him raises because of his age, disabilities, and use of
FMLA leave where plaintiff did not submit any admissible evidence to establish the required
causal connection). Thus, the Court grants summary judgment for the CHA on Griffin’s
retaliation claim.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants the CHA’s motion for summary judgment
[45]. The Court enters judgment for the CHA on Counts I and II. This case is terminated.

Dated: October 19, 2016

______________________
SARA L. ELLIS
United States District Judge

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