Young v. Schutz

Filing 56

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order. The Court denies the motions for joinder 39 and to intervene 42 . Signed by the Honorable Jorge L. Alonso on 5/11/2015:Notice mailed by judge's staff (ntf, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
AARON YOUNG,
Plaintiff,
v.
KLARICE SCHUTZ,
Defendant.

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14 C 2832
Judge Jorge L. Alonso

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Aaron Young sues Klarice Schutz to recover art works that he alleges were sold to him by
Klarice’s late father, Bernard. The case is before the Court on Klarice’s motions pursuant to Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rules”) 19 and 24 for joinder and intervention. For the reasons set forth
below, the Court denies the motions.

Facts
Until his death in October 2013, Klarice’s father, Bernard Schutz, and her brother, Louis
Schutz, owned and operated Prestige Art, Inc. (Compl. ¶¶ 5-9.) Young, who was close friends with
Bernard and remains so with Louis, alleges that he bought various art works from Prestige in
November 2002. (Id. ¶¶ 10-11.) Young did not, however, take possession of the works after he
bought them. (Id. ¶ 15.) Instead, Young agreed with Bernard and Louis that Bernard could keep
and could display the pieces in his home until Bernard’s death. (Id.) Upon Bernard’s death, Klarice
took possession of the art and has refused to give it to Young. (Id. ¶ 16.)

Discussion
Motion to Compel Joinder of Louis Schutz
In relevant part, Rule 19 provides that “[a] person who is subject to service of process and
whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action must
be joined as a party if . . . in that person’s absence, the court cannot accord complete relief among
existing parties.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1)(A)1; see Florian v. Sequa Corp., No. 98 C 7459, 2002 WL
31844985, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 18, 2002) (party seeking joinder has the burden of establishing its
necessity). In this context, “the term ‘complete relief’ refers only to ‘relief between the persons
already parties . . . not [to relief] between a party and the absent person whose joinder is sought.’”
Davis Cos. v. Emerald Casino, Inc., 268 F.3d 477, 484 (7th Cir. 2001) (quoting Perrian v. O’Grady,
958 F.2d 192, 196 (7th Cir. 1992)). Because the Court can determine whether Young or Klarice is
entitled to the art without considering either party’s potential claims against Louis, joinder of Louis
is not necessary to accord the parties complete relief. See id. (resolution of collateral issues is not
necessary to accord complete relief to persons already parties). Accordingly, the Court denies
Klarice’s motion for joinder.

Motion to Intervene
Klarice, acting as executor of Bernard’s estate, seeks to intervene in this suit “for the limited
purpose of drawing the Court’s attention to the ‘probate exception’ to this Court’s subject matter
jurisdiction.” (Mem. Law Supp. Mot. Intervene Limited Purpose at 7.) A party seeking to intervene

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Klarice does not argue that Louis’ joinder is necessary under any other section of Rule

19.
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as of right under Rule 24(a) “has the burden of establishing that: (1) [her] motion[] to intervene [is]
timely; (2) [she] possess[es] an interest related to the subject matter of the . . . action; (3) disposition
of the action threatens to impair that interest; and (4) the [parties to the suit] fail to represent
adequately [her] interest.” United States v. BDO Seidman, 337 F.3d 802, 808 (7th Cir. 2003).
Klarice cannot satisfy the first element because she was appointed executor of her father’s estate
three months before this suit was filed but waited a year to file this motion. (See Mem. Law Supp.
Mot. Intervene Limited Purpose at 1 (stating that Klarice was appointed executor by the probate
court on January 21, 2014).) She also cannot satisfy the last element because Klarice the executor’s
interests are adequately represented by Klarice the individual who has already unsuccessfully
argued, albeit in the context of a Colorado River motion to stay, that this case should yield to the
probate proceedings. (See 12/8/14 Mem. Op. & Order.) Thus, the Court denies Klarice’s motion
to intervene as of right.
The untimeliness of the motion also dooms Klarice’s request for permissive intervention.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(1)(B) (stating that permissive intervention is appropriate when the
putative intervenor makes a “timely motion” and “has a claim or defense that shares with the main
action a common question of law or fact”); Heartwood, Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., Inc., 316 F.3d 694,
701 (7th Cir. 2003) (“A prospective intervenor must move promptly to intervene as soon as [she]
knows or has reason to know that its interests might be adversely affected by the outcome of the
litigation.”). Because Klarice did not file this motion at the start of this litigation and, as noted
above, will suffer no prejudice if she is denied leave to intervene, the Court denies her motion.

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Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the Court denies the motions for joinder [39] and to intervene
[42].
SO ORDERED.

ENTERED: May 11, 2015

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HON. JORGE L. ALONSO
United States District Judge

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