Caggiano v. Illinois Department Of Corrections(IDOC)

Filing 13

Memorandum Opinion and Order signed by the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 10/15/2014: Defendant's motion to dismiss is denied. Defendant's answer to the complaint is due by 11/12/2014. Joint status report is due by 11/13/2014. Status hearing date of 10/29/2014 is re-set to 11/20/2014, at 9:00 a.m. Mailed notice (gds)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
MICHAEL CAGGIANO
Plaintiff,
v.
ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS,
Defendant.

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No. 14 C 3378
Judge Robert W. Gettleman

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
On May 8, 2014, plaintiff Michael Caggiano filed a one-count complaint against his
former employer, the Illinois Department of Corrections, alleging a violation of the Family
Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq. Before the court is defendant’s motion
to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). For the
reasons described below, the court denies defendant’s motion.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff alleges that he began working for defendant in November 1996. In April 2012,
plaintiff was employed as a corrections officer at the West Side Adult Transition Center in
Chicago. Plaintiff contends that he applied for FMLA leave for April 7 through 10, 2012, to care
for his mother, Monica Grant, who was suffering from recurrent breast cancer and severe
Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease (“COPD”). On April 10, 2012, Dr. Douglas Merkel, an
oncologist, submitted a letter to defendant confirming Ms. Grant’s medical care and that plaintiff
was “taking care” of her from April 7 through April 10, 2012.
Defendant’s Compliance and Control Human Resources Functional Process Server,
Dianna Clark, acknowledged receipt of plaintiff’s FMLA request via email on April 19, 2012,

and gave plaintiff until May 4, 2012, to submit defendant’s FMLA request forms. Plaintiff
submitted the forms on April 30, 2012. As required, the FMLA request was signed by Ms.
Grant’s physician and confirmed her condition.
On June 15, 2012, plaintiff was placed on work suspension for unauthorized absences in
April 2012. Plaintiff alleges that on June 23, 2012, he submitted an additional form requesting
FMLA leave for the April 7 through April 10, 2012, time period. The form was signed by Ms.
Grant’s pulmonologist and confirmed Ms. Grant’s medical condition. Two days later, defendant
denied plaintiff’s request for FMLA leave, stating that: “The Certification completed by your
mother’s Health Care Providers does not support your requested absences to care for your
mother.” On that same day, plaintiff was terminated by defendant for unauthorized absences in
April 2012. Plaintiff alleges that defendant had previously granted him FMLA leave to care for
his mother.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff’s complaint alleges a “violation of the FMLA,” without specifying which
theory, interference or retaliation, under which the claim is brought. Defendant argues that
plaintiff did not state an adequate claim under either theory. In his response brief, plaintiff
acknowledges that he did not plead a retaliation claim. Accordingly, the court will address only
defendant’s arguments with respect to plaintiff’s FMLA interference claim.
A.

Legal Standard
When ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court accepts the

complaint's well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences in the
plaintiff's favor. Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. City of Carmel, Indiana, 361 F.3d 998, 1001 (7th Cir.
2004). The pleading must describe the claim in sufficient detail to give the defendant fair notice

of what the claim is and the grounds on which the claim rests. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007), citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). The allegations
must plausibly suggest that the plaintiff has a right to relief, raising the possibility above the
“speculative level.” Id.
B.

Analysis
The FMLA entitles an eligible employee to twelve workweeks of leave during any

twelve-month period for certain qualifying reasons, including the need to care for a parent
suffering from a serious health condition. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1). “To show a violation of
FMLA rights, plaintiffs must show that they are eligible for FMLA protection, their employer is
covered by the Act, they are entitled to leave, they provided the appropriate notice, and their
employer denied them benefits to which they were entitled.” Daugherty v. Wabash Ctr., Inc.,
577 F.3d 747, 750 (7th Cir. 2009), citing Smith v. Hope Sch., 560 F.3d 694, 699 (7th Cir. 2009).
Defendant argues that plaintiff’s FMLA interference claim should be dismissed because, (1)
plaintiff was not entitled to FMLA leave, and (2) plaintiff did not provide sufficient notice to
satisfy the FMLA notice requirement. In opposition to defendant’s motion, plaintiff contends
that defendant’s arguments are factual in nature and do not demonstrate legal insufficiency as
required by Rule 12(b)(6). Because the court agrees with plaintiff, defendant’s motion is denied.
Defendant first argues that plaintiff’s complaint should be dismissed because, “Plaintiff
was not entitled to FMLA leave to care for his mother from April 7, 2012 to April 10, 2012.”
Defendant contends that plaintiff’s FMLA leave request was denied because the physician
certifications provided by plaintiff did not support his requested absences. According to
defendant, for the certifications to be sufficient they had to provide the beginning date of his
mother’s need for care and possible duration. Because the certifications allegedly did not

include this information, defendant argues that plaintiff was not entitled to leave, and therefore
defendant had a right to suspend and terminate plaintiff. In support of this argument, defendant
cites Jones v. C&D Technologies, Inc., No. 10-CV-696, 2011 WL 4479053, at *5 (S.D. Ind.
Sept. 27, 2011), arguing that “[w]hen an employee requests leave for a non-qualifying reason
that is not supported by the physician’s certification there is nothing in the FMLA that prevents
an employer from” terminating the employee.
Defendant also argues that plaintiff’s complaint should be dismissed because, “the
April 10, 2012, doctor’s letter confirming medical care and indicating Plaintiff was taking care
of his mother was insufficient notice to satisfy the notice requirement.” Citing McQueen v. City
of Chicago, No. 09-C-2048, 2014 WL 1715439, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 30, 2014), defendant
contends that because defendant had previously granted plaintiff FMLA leave to care for his
mother, the doctor’s notice had to “specify the qualifying reason or the need for FMLA leave to
‘take care’ of his mother.” Defendant argues that because the April 10, 2012, letter from Ms.
Grant’s doctor did not include this information, notice of plaintiff’s intent to take FMLA was
insufficient. Defendant also notes that the subsequent doctor confirmations did not specify that
plaintiff needed to take leave from April 7 to April 10, 2012.
Plaintiff correctly asserts that both of defendant’s arguments are fact-specific questions
and improper grounds for a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal. Through its motion to dismiss, defendant
seeks to litigate the merits of this case. Reynolds v. Inter-Industry Conference on Auto Collision
Repair, 594 F. Supp. 2d 925, 927 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (“The purpose of a 12(b)(6) motion is to
decide the adequacy of the complaint, not to determine the merits of the case.”). At the pleading
stage, plaintiff does not have to prove whether the physician notes he submitted to support his
request for leave were sufficient to entitle him to leave or to put defendant on notice of the need

for FMLA leave. These are factual issues that can be disputed at a later time in this litigation.
See, e.g., Burnett v. LFW Inc., 472 F.3d 471, 479 (7th Cir. 2006) (“adequacy of notice is a factspecific question”). Plaintiff need only allege (and has alleged) that defendant was put on notice
of the duration (April 7-10, 2012) and reason (plaintiff’s mother’s severe illness) entitling him to
take FMLA leave. Defendant’s reliance on Jones, 2011 WL 4479053, and McQueen, 2014 WL
1715439, is misplaced. Both cases involved motions for summary judgment, which entail
factual inquiries that are not permissible here.
As discussed above, plaintiff’s complaint need only describe the claim in sufficient detail
to give defendant fair notice of the claim and the grounds upon which it rests. Twombly, 550
U.S. at 545. Plaintiff’s allegations must be plausible, not proven. Id. at 547. Although not
required, the complaint alleges each of the five elements required to establish an FMLA claim:
(1) plaintiff worked in excess of 1,250 hours and for more than a year for defendant; (2) his
mother suffers from breast cancer and COPD, both of which qualify as “serious health
conditions” under the FMLA; (3) plaintiff notified defendant multiple times of his need to take
FMLA leave; and (4) defendant wrongfully denied plaintiff FMLA leave to which he was
entitled. Although plaintiff does not specifically allege that defendant is an employer subject to
the FMLA, the complaint states that defendant previously granted plaintiff FMLA leave,
indicating defendant is covered by the act. These allegations state a claim for relief that is both
plausible and serves to put defendant on notice as to plaintiff’s claim, thereby satisfying the
pleading standard.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the court denies defendant’s motion to dismiss.
Defendant is directed to answer the complaint on or before November 12, 2014. The parties are

directed to prepare and file a Joint Status Report using this court’s form on or before
November 13, 2014. The status hearing previously set for October 29, 2014, is continued to
November 20, 2014, at 9:00 a.m.

ENTER:

October 15, 2014

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Robert W. Gettleman
United States District Judge