Wuerffel v. Cook County Sheriff's Office et al

Filing 112

MEMORANDUM Opinion: Wuerffel's request to reverse the Board's decision is denied. It is so ordered. Status hearing set for 3/16/2017 at 9:30 AM. Signed by the Honorable Charles P. Kocoras on 2/23/2017. Mailed notice(vcf, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
TAMARA WUERFFEL,

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Plaintiff,
v.
COOK COUNTY SHERIFF’S
OFFICE, et al.,
Defendants.

14 C 3990

MEMORANDUM OPINION
CHARLES P. KOCORAS, District Judge:
Plaintiff Tamara Wuerffel (“Wuerffel”) seeks review of the Cook County
Sheriff’s Merit Board’s (“Board”) final decision, terminating her employment with
the Cook County Sheriff’s Office (“Sheriff’s Office”) (collectively, “Defendants”).
Wuerffel asks the Court to reverse the Board’s decision. Defendants ask that the
decision be affirmed. For the following reasons, the Court denies Wuerffel’s request
to reverse the Board’s decision.
BACKGROUND
Wuerffel had been an employee of the Sheriff’s Office since 1998. She was
promoted to Police Officer in 2000 and promoted to Sergeant in 2008. On December
19, 2013, Sheriff Dart (“Dart”) filed a complaint with the Board, alleging Wuerffel
“engaged in unprofessional conduct and made false statements in violation of General

Order 04- 01-D, 03-01-A, 01-08-D and 00-02-D, Departmental Rules and Regulations
00-01-A.2, 00-01- A.4, 00-01-A.12, 00-01-A.13, 00-01-A.16, and Article X, Article
10 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations.” Specifically, Dart claimed that Wuerffel
“request[ed] and receiv[ed] overtime compensation to which she was not entitled.”
The Board conducted a five-day hearing on these charges in October 2014.
The Board found that Wuerffel “violated multiple rules and regulations in that (1) she
collected 8 hours of overtime on July 26, 2012 in the ‘Johns’ matter for a hearing
lasting at most two hours; (2) that she received overtime for a court appearance on
March 16, 2012 in the Calderon case when she had no involvement in the matter; (3)
that she received overtime for court appearances on September 19 and October 26,
2012 in the Gonzalez case when the case had been previously disposed of on July 6,
2012; and (4) that she collected overtime on August 28 and October 3, 2012 in the
Skinner case when the case was disposed of on August 27, 2012.” Based upon these
violations, the Board terminated Wuerffel’s employment with the Sheriff’s Office.
Wuerffel contends that this Court should reverse the Board’s findings because
(i) the Board failed to allow her discovery and the opportunity to present evidence on
issues of discrimination and retaliation; failed to analyze the evidence under the just
cause standard; utilized the wrong burden of proof; and erroneously admitted her
OPR statements into evidence; (ii) because the Board’s findings are against the
manifest weight of the evidence; and (iii) the Board’s decision to discharge Wuerffel
was arbitrary and unreasonable.
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
A court’s review of an administrative agency’s decision regarding discharge of
employment requires a two-step analysis. First, we need to determine whether the
Board’s findings of fact are contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. Findings
and conclusions of an administrative agency on questions of fact are held to be prima
facie true and correct. Jagielnik v. Bd. of Trustees of Police Pension Fund of Vill. of
Mundelein, 271 Ill. App. 3d 869, 875 (1995). Therefore, with regard to the Board’s
determination that Wuerffel violated multiple rules and regulations, this Court’s
function is not to reweigh the evidence or substitute its judgment for the judgment of
the Board, but only to determine whether enough evidence exists to support the
Board’s findings. Clark v. Bd. of Fire & Police Comm’rs of Vill. of Bradley, 245 Ill.
App. 3d 385, 392 (1993). Second, we need to determine whether the findings of fact
provide a sufficient basis for the Board’s discharge. McDermott v. City of Chi. Police
Bd., 2016 Ill. App. 1st ¶ 18. In making this determination, this Court may not
consider whether it would have imposed a more lenient disciplinary sentence. Sutton
v. Civil Service Comm’n, 91 Ill. App. 2d 409, 438 (1982). Review is limited to a
determination of whether the Board acted unreasonably or arbitrarily by selecting a
type of discipline that was inappropriate or unrelated to the needs of the service.
Wilson v. Bd. of Fire & Police Comm’rs of City of Markham, 205 Ill. App. 3d 984,
992 (1990).
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DISCUSSION
We begin by determining whether the Board’s findings of fact are contrary to
the manifest weight of the evidence. The Board found Wuerffel violated multiple
rules and regulations of the Sheriff’s Office when she submitted time cards and
collected money for cases that were previously terminated or in which she was not
involved. The Board considered evidence of four cases where Wuerffel was alleged
to have improperly received funds. First, in the Barbara Skinner case (“Skinner
case”), the record reflects Wuerffel appeared in court and submitted overtime on
August 28, 2012 and again on October 3, 2012. However, evidence presented to the
Board showed that the Skinner case was resolved on August 27, 2012. Similarly, in
the case of Jazmin Gonzalez (“Gonzalez case”), Wuerffel appeared in court on
September 19, 2012 and October 26, 2012, and submitted overtime for both
appearances. However, evidence showed that matter was resolved on July 6, 2012.
The Board found Wuerffel also submitted overtime on a case she had no involvement
with. In the matter of Jose Calderon (the “Calderon case”), Wuerffel submitted
overtime for a court appearance on March 16, 2012. However, Officer Louie Goros
(“Officer Goros”) testified before the Board that Wuerffel was not present for the stop
and arrest of Calderon.

Lastly, Wuerffel submitted eight hours of overtime for

“Johns” hearings on July 26, 2012. The record contains testimony from various
Officers establishing that these proceedings generally last no more than two hours.
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Based on this evidence, the Board found that Wuerffel violated multiple rules
and regulations of the Sheriff’s Office. Specifically, the Board found Wuerffel’s
conduct violated General Order PER 04-01-D. It states that, “[u]pon notification,
Officers are required to appear for all court or hearing dates, during their regular days
off, while attending academic training, while on medical roll, vacation, compensatory
time and personal time.” Further, Rule of Conduct 00-01-A.4, Section 4.2, states that
“[n]o member of the Department will make false official record(s), reports or report
any inaccurate, false or improper information.” According to the Board, Wuerffel
“submitted false documentation when, in the Skinner and Gonzalez matters, her
overtime cards indicated that a hearing occurred and a future hearing was set, even
though the case had previously been closed.” Wuerffel additionally violated Rule of
Conduct 00-01-A.4 when she “filled out an overtime card in the ‘Johns’ matter for 8
hours of overtime, even though the hearings lasted no more than 2 hours.” The Board
also concluded that Wuerffel’s “conduct showed a lack of honesty which reflected
poorly upon the Sheriff’s Office.” Lastly, the Board found that by submitting false
overtime requests and collecting taxpayer dollars for nonexistent court dates, Wuerffel
brought discredit upon the Sheriff’s Office in violation of Rule of Conduct 11-01A.13.
In her defense, Wuerffel presented evidence before the Board that sought to
show her time card submissions were accidents, and not a malicious intent to defraud
the government and taxpayers. In the Calderon case, Wuerffel testified that Officer
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Goros told her that they had court on March 16, but did not tell her the specific case
name. Wuerffel further testified that, when she filled out her court attendance card,
she copied from Officer Goros “because he had the case numbers and information.”
Wuerffel claims “at most . . . [she] committed an unintentional error in putting the
wrong case on her timesheet when she attended court on other cases.” Wuerffel also
claims that she went to court two times after the termination of the Gonzalez case
because she was not “aware of the disposition of the case.” In the Skinner case,
Wuerffel testified “that she appeared on July 20th, but the defendant did not show up
so the case was continued. [Wuerffel] then put the continuation date in her phone
incorrectly and returned to court on August 28th, rather than August 27th.” Wuerffel
claimed that on August 28th, she “checked in with the state’s attorney and learned that
she had the wrong date and was told to come on the next date. She was not informed
that the case had been disposed of on the previous day.” With respect to the “John”
hearings Wuerffel claims “that she was not told that the hearing was over” and she
does not leave court until notified.
It is the function of the Board to determine the credibility of the witnesses.
Clark, 245 Ill. App. 3d at 392. Here, the Board found Wuerffel not to be a credible
witness. Further, Officer Goros and Officer Sean Murphy (“Officer Murphy”) each
separately testified before the Board that Wuerffel was “organized,” “detailed,” and
“demanded accuracy.” These findings belie Wuerffel’s assertions that she “accidently
appeared in court, or stayed too long, on several occasions.”
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Therefore, after

reviewing the record and considering both parties’ arguments, we hold that the
Board’s decision is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
We next consider whether the Board’s findings provided sufficient bases for
the sanctions imposed. In the present matter, the Board found that Wuerffel’s actions
not only violated multiple rules and regulations of the Sheriff’s Office, but also
constituted theft and fraud. As Defendants’ state in their Response, “[t]he Board has
cause to discharge an officer who shows ‘some substantial shortcoming which renders
the employee’s continuance in office in some way detrimental to the discipline and
efficiency of the service and which the law and sound public opinion recognize as
good reason for his no longer holding that position.’” Remus v. Sheahan, 387 Ill.
App. 3d 899, 904 (2009). Here, Wuerffel was found to have “exhibited deceitful
conduct” that “violated the public trust.” Defendants further argue that “[t]he Sheriff
has a legitimate interest in ensuring that all law enforcement officers maintain
integrity, abide by all laws, and avoid conduct which tends to reflect negatively on the
officer or the Sheriff.” Vill. of Oak Lawn v. Ill. Hum. Rts. Comm’n, 133 Ill. App. 3d
221, 224 (1985) (holding that trustworthiness, reliability, good judgment, and integrity
are all material qualifications for any job); See Sindermann v. Civil Serv. Comm’n,
275 Ill. App. 3d 917, 928 (1995) (holding that police officers are expected to act with
integrity, honesty, and trustworthiness).

Additionally, as the court found in Lyles v.

Department of Transportation “[p]ublic policy requires a high degree of integrity in
government employees. An employee’s misconduct may be detrimental to the agency
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itself and to the public as a whole inasmuch as, although the position may not be one
of great notoriety, it is a position involving a degree of trust.” 183 Ill. App. 3d 901,
912 (1989). As a law enforcement officer, Wuerffel was entrusted to uphold the very
laws she is accused of breaking.

As a result, the Sheriff’s Department had a

legitimate interest in dismissing an employee who not only violated internal rules and
procedures, but also violated laws she was sworn to uphold.
Wuerffel maintains that her conduct did not constitute such a substantial
shortcoming that would impair discipline or the day-to-day operations of the Sheriff’s
Office. Additionally, she claims that her years of service, lack of disciplinary history,
and failure to be previously counseled mitigate against termination. In support of
these arguments, Wuerffel cites to several cases this Court finds unpersuasive.
Moreover, as Defendants point out, Wuerffel “has failed to cite to any case law that
indicates that an officer who engages in time theft should not be terminated.” For the
reasons above, we agree with the Board’s termination of Wuerffel.
Wuerffel further argues four additional reasons that the Board’s decision should
be reversed. According to Wuerffel, the Board: (i) failed to allow her discovery and
the opportunity to present evidence on issues of discrimination and retaliation; (ii)
erroneously admitted her OPR statements into evidence; (iii) failed to analyze the
evidence under the just cause standard; and (iv) utilized the wrong burden of proof.
However, Wuerffel has taken a scattershot approach to attacking the Board’s decision

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to terminate her employment.

Several of her arguments, discussed below, are

perfunctory, underdeveloped, and unsupported by relevant facts or case law.
Wuerffel contends that the Board erred in denying her the opportunity to
conduct discovery and present evidence relating to her claims of discrimination and
retaliation. Specifically, Wuerffel alleges “that the investigation and charges that
were heard by the . . . Board were motivated by her political affiliation, gender, and/or
complaints of discrimination.”

The Board decided that “claims of retaliation or

discrimination were not relevant to whether [Wuerffel] violated the rules and
regulations of the Sheriff’s Office.” We agree. Wuerffel’s reliance upon Humphries
v. CBOCS W., Inc. 474 F.3d 387, 407 (7th Cir. 2007) and Curry v. Menard, Inc., 270
F.3d 473, 479 (7th Cir. 2001) is unpersuasive. As Defendants state in their Response,
“neither case involved an administrative review action, nor did they address what
discovery should be allowed in a proceeding before an administrative body.” For the
above reasons, we find that the Board properly denied Wuerffel’s requests for
evidence related to her claims of discrimination and retaliation.
Wuerffel claims the Board also erred by admitting her OPR statements into
evidence in violation of the Uniform Police Disciplinary Act (“UPODA”).

The

UPODA requires that an officer accused of wrongdoing be permitted to select counsel
of her choosing during an administrative interrogation. See 50 ILCS 725.3.8(a) and
50 ILCS 725.3.9.

According to Wuerffel, on July 24, 2013, and on September 3,

2013, Investigator Alexis Figueroa (“Figueroa”) interrogated Wuerffel without an
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attorney present in violation of the UPODA.

However, the record reveals that

Wuerffel was advised of her right to counsel and affirmatively waived that right.
Instead, Wuerffel selected to have her union representative present for the interviews.
Wuerffel also alleges that her statements to OPR were improper because OPR
did not create a complete record of her interviews. Defendants contend that “the
record clearly reflects [Wuerffel’s] statements are accurate, recorded summaries of
both of [Wuerffel’s] interviews.” The UPODA requires that “[a] complete record of
any interrogation shall be made, and a complete transcript or copy shall be made
available to the officer under investigation without charge and without undue delay.”
See 50 ILCS 725.3.7. The UPODA, however, does not define “complete record.”
Therefore, Defendants assert that “the type of recording OPR engaged in by
summarizing statements with a verification that the statements are accurate” is
permissible. Further, the record shows that Wuerffel had the opportunity to review
the completed record of her interviews. “This is evident by the fact that [Wuerffel]
signed both of her statements, initialing each page and signed an acknowledgement
that she had read her entire statement and ‘found it to contain answers, which I gave
in response to the questions, which were asked.

My signature verified that the

information contained in it is accurate and complete.”’
Wuerffel cites no legal support that the OPR statements were improperly taken
or admitted. The record shows that OPR permitted her to choose her representation
and recorded a summary of her statements.
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Additionally, the record contradicts

Wuerffel’s contention that she was not permitted to make corrections to her statement.
For these reasons, Wuerffel’s OPR statements were properly considered by the Board.
Wuerffel contends that the Board “erroneously denied” her motion requesting
that the just cause standard be applied to the Board’s determination on the type of
discipline that should be imposed. Therefore, she claims that the termination of her
employment should be reversed. However, Defendants argue in their Response, that
they “are in agreement with [Wuerffel] that in order for [Wuerffel] to be terminated as
Sheriff’s Police Sergeant, there must be just cause for her termination.” Defendants
further claim that, “instead of an argument that the Board failed to apply the just cause
standard, [Wuerffel’s] argument appears to be one that the Board did not consider the
factors under the just cause standard. This is not evidence that the Board applied the
wrong standard; this is an argument that the Board’s decision was arbitrary and
capricious.” We agree with Defendants’ characterization of Wuerffel’s argument.
The Board’s decision was not arbitrary or capricious. For that reason, Wuerffel’s
argument fails.
Wuerffel asserts that the Board incorrectly applied the “preponderance of the
evidence” standard in determining whether she violated the rules and regulations of
the Sheriff’s Office. Wuerffel contends the Board should have used the “clear and
convincing” standard because the allegations brought against her alleged criminal
behavior. In support of her position, Wuerffel relies on Shallow v. Police Board of
City of Chicago, 95 Ill. App. 3d 901, 908 (1981), citing Drezner v. Civil Service
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Commission, 398 Ill. 219, 227 (1974). Defendants contend that Wuerffel’s reliance
on Shallow and Drezner is misplaced as they have “been essentially overruled by
subsequent case law.”
According to Defendants, in Board of Education v. State Board of Education,
113 Ill. 2d 173, 189 (1986), “the Illinois Supreme Court found that the ‘proper
standard of proof applicable to tenured-teacher dismissal proceedings, including those
where conduct might constitute a crime is charged, is the preponderance of the
evidence standard.’” In that case, the Court used a balancing test between the private
interest affected and the public or government interest to make this decision. Id. at
192-194. Expanding on the test used in Board of Education, the court in Clark
determined the preponderance of the evidence standard was the appropriate standard
in cases where a police officer was charged with conduct that could constitute a crime.
245 Ill. App. at 391. Defendants’ utilization of the preponderance of the evidence
standard was appropriate.
CONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons, Wuerffel’s request to reverse the Board’s
decision is denied. It is so ordered.

___________________________________
Charles P. Kocoras
United States District Judge
Dated: 2/23/2017

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