Spaulding v. Colvin
Filing
25
MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Young B. Kim on 5/22/2015. (ma,)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
CORRINDA SPAULDING,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting
Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration,
Defendant.
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No. 14 CV 5255
Magistrate Judge Young B. Kim
May 22, 2015
MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER
Corrinda Spaulding claims that she became disabled in December 1993 from
a combination of gastrointestinal ailments. Spaulding filed for Disability Insurance
Benefits (“DIB”) in October 1996. Although her DIB claim has been denied five
times by the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) in the nearly two decades that
have elapsed since its filing, each denial has been reversed by the federal judiciary
and remanded for further administrative proceedings. After the Appeals Council
declined to review the administrative law judge’s (“ALJ”) most recent decision
denying benefits to Spaulding, she filed this suit seeking yet another judicial
review. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Before the court are the Commissioner’s motion for
voluntary remand for further administrative proceedings and Spaulding’s motion
for summary judgment. For the following reasons, the Commissioner’s motion is
granted and Spaulding’s motion is granted in part and denied in part:
Procedural History
The procedural history of this case spans a jaw-dropping 19-year epoch
involving six separate trips to federal court and touching the administrations of five
different SSA Commissioners. This unfortunate state of affairs originated when
Spaulding filed her DIB claim in October 1996, alleging that her disability began in
December 1993. (Administrative Record (“A.R.”) 762.) Spaulding’s application was
denied by an ALJ in June 1998 and again by the Appeals Council in September
1999. (Id.) The district court affirmed the ALJ’s decision but the Seventh Circuit
reversed in February 2002 and returned the case to the SSA for further
proceedings. (Id.)
Since the Seventh Circuit’s remand, Spaulding’s DIB claim has languished in
a seemingly endless loop between administrative and federal court proceedings.
After a supplemental hearing before the same ALJ who had previously denied her
DIB claim, Spaulding’s claim was denied for a second time in April 2003, and the
Appeals Council declined to review the appeal. (Id.) But when Spaulding sought
judicial review for a second time, the district court remanded in November 2003,
ordering that a different ALJ handle the proceedings on remand. (Id.) Spaulding’s
third sojourn through the SSA’s adjudicative machinery was partially successful in
that her Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) application, filed protectively on
April 24, 2004, was granted, but her DIB claim was again denied by an ALJ, only to
be remanded again by the district court in March 2007. In an order remanding the
case for the third time, the district court admonished the government that “[t]here
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has to be some way to reach closure,” and that “[t]he ALJ’s failure to provide a full
and fair credibility determination and assessment of the entire record will lead us to
. . . grant . . . plaintiff’s benefits.” (A.R. 567.) But in February 2008, the same ALJ
yet again found that Spaulding was not entitled to receive DIB and the district
court again remanded to the SSA in March 2010, thus completing the fourth episode
of the SSA’s increasingly absurd attempt to properly adjudicate Spaulding’s claim.
On remand, an ALJ denied Spaulding’s claim for the fifth time in February 2011,
but the district court once again sent the case back to the SSA, also for the fifth
time, in August 2012. (Id. at 791.)
Now in its sixth trip to the district court after the latest unfavorable decision
before an ALJ, (id. at 762-75), and nearly two decades after Spaulding filed her DIB
claim, the government confesses that the ALJ again failed to correctly apply the
law, and asks this court to remand for proper adjudication before an ALJ for the
seventh time, all but guaranteeing that Spaulding’s case—which, for context, began
during the first term of President William J. Clinton—will exceed two decades of
waiting. Understandably frustrated with the SSA’s inability to render an adequate
decision, Spaulding opposes the government’s motion to remand and asks the court
to declare that she is entitled to award of benefits.
Facts
Because the parties do not dispute that the case should be remanded and
because this is the sixth time this same case has surfaced in federal district court,
only a brief summary of certain relevant facts is necessary here.
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A lengthy
recounting of Spaulding’s medical history may be found in Spaulding v. Astrue, 702
F. Supp. 2d 983, 987-994 (N.D. Ill. 2010).
Spaulding claims that she has been disabled since December 1993 because of
varying
combinations
of
ailments
including
diarrhea,
constipation,
gastroesophageal reflux, nausea, gastritis, vomiting, and dry heaves. (Id. at 765.)
In 1992, an x-ray revealed a small hiatal hernia, which did not appear on a
subsequent 1992 CT scan, but did appear on an esophogastroduodenoscopy. (Id.)
Over the years, Spaulding’s doctors have treated her with Zantac, Prilosec, and
Pepsid, as well as other drugs as necessary, with mixed results. (Id. at 765-66.)
Spaulding was last insured for Title II DIB on December 31, 1998, meaning that in
order to receive DIB she must show her conditions were disabling on or before that
date. (Id.)
Spaulding’s most recent hearing before an ALJ took place on March 21, 2014.
(Id. at 858.)
At the hearing, Spaulding testified extensively about her
gastrointestinal problems in the 1990s. (Id. at 870-94.) A medical expert (“ME”)
testified that Spaulding’s testimony about high frequency diarrhea was inconsistent
with her periods of weight gain, but that her disability was a “judgment call” based
on the frequency and severity of her symptoms. (Id. at 899.) The ME did not place
any exertional limitations on Spaulding. (Id.) A vocational expert (“VE”) testified
that a hypothetical individual requiring two five-minute unscheduled breaks per
day would be unable to perform Spaulding’s past relevant work as a bank teller,
although employers could probably tolerate two unscheduled fifteen-minute breaks
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per week. (Id. at 900-01.) The ALJ did not explain why he pitched the fifteen, five,
and two-minute unscheduled break hypotheticals to the VE. (See id.) Spaulding
also submitted documentary evidence of her medical condition in support of her
claim for DIB.
Analysis
The parties both agree that the ALJ failed to give Spaulding a fair evaluation
of her claim for DIB. (Compare R. 15, Pl.’s Br. at 9-17 with R. 20, Govt.’s Br. at 2-6.)
In asking for a voluntary reversal and remand of this sixth failure, the government
concedes that the ALJ’s decision “does not adequately address evidence of record,
most notably medical experts’ testimony in prior hearings, which the ALJ did not
evaluate at all.” (R. 20, Govt.’s Br. at 2.) Spaulding similarly argues that the ALJ’s
opinion “is untethered to any evidence in the record including from multiple Agency
experts.” (R. 15, Pl.’s Br. at 2.)
Because the parties agree that the ALJ’s decision
cannot be affirmed, the remaining question before the court is whether the case
should be remanded for further proceedings, as the government argues ought to be
done, or whether this court should simply direct the Commissioner to award
benefits to Spaulding. District courts “have the statutory power to affirm, reverse,
or modify the SSA’s decision, with or without remanding the case for further
proceedings.” Allord v. Astrue, 631 F.3d 411, 415 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g)).
Within these statutory powers, district courts retain the “ability to
remand with instructions for the Commissioner to calculate and award benefits.”
Id. (citing Campbell v. Shalala, 988 F.2d 741, 744 (7th Cir. 1993)).
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Spaulding argues that this court should simply award benefits at this
juncture rather than remand the case for a sixth time. Specifically, she argues that
the government has engaged in a “charade” and that the SSA’s repeated inability to
issue a proper decision after nearly two decades is plainly unfair. (R. 15, Pl.’s Br. at
22.) Seizing on language from Wilder v. Apfel, 153 F.3d 799, 801 (7th Cir. 1998),
Spaulding contends that “[s]ending the case back for a 7th hearing would serve no
purpose, and at this point would undermine fairness and justice.” (R. 23, Pl.’s Resp.
at 7.) Spaulding also points to a prior decision remanding her claim, Spaulding v.
Barnhart, No. 05 CV 6311, 2006 WL 2524132, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jul. 14, 2006), in
which the district court wrote with exasperation “[t]here has got to be some way to
reach closure. Perhaps at some point the agency abdicates its authority to make the
determination and surrenders that authority to the court . . . .”
According to
Spaulding:
Although the length of time a case has been pending or the number of
times a claimant has been to an administrative hearing may not alone
mandate an outright award of benefits, these are factors which
highlight the Agency’s inability to sustain a reasoned bases for the
denial of benefits and corroborate that the record directs a disability
finding.
(R. 15, Pl.’s Br. at 18.) But frustration with the SSA is not itself an adequate
ground for the court to order the payment of benefits: the Seventh Circuit has
explained that the stern language of Wilder is nonetheless grounded in the principle
that “an award of benefits is appropriate only if all factual issues have been
resolved and the record supports a finding of disability.” Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v.
Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 356 (7th Cir. 2005). In other words, “obduracy” on the part
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of the SSA is not enough to warrant an award of benefits, see Briscoe, 425 F.3d at
357.
Spaulding’s next tack is to argue that “there are no outstanding factual
issues,” and that “the record supports only one conclusion—entitlement to disability
benefits.” (R. 15, Pl.’s Br. at 20.) To this end, Spaulding argues that the opinion of
the ME from her most recent hearing is uncontroverted and supports a finding of
disability. (R. 23, Pl.’s Resp. at 4-5.) Spaulding points to the ME’s testimony that
her limitations were a judgment call “[i]n terms of severity of symptoms,” and
characterizes this testimony as “completely consistent” with Spaulding’s own
description of her limitations. But that assertion is an overstatement because the
ME placed no exertional limitations on Spaulding at all. (A.R. 899.) And, because
Spaulding ignores a great deal of evidence in the record that conflicts with her own
testimony about her symptoms, she has missed an opportunity to explain why she
believes the record supports only one conclusion.
Although the government concedes that the ALJ’s decision is irredeemably
flawed, it nevertheless argues that the record contains numerous unresolved factual
issues that prevent this court from awarding benefits outright. (R. 20, Govt.’s Br. at
8-9.)
The government specifically identifies evidence from two physicians,
Dr. Jilhewar and Dr. Miller, that conflicts with Spaulding’s assertion that she is
clearly entitled to benefits. (Id.) Dr. Miller testified in a November 2002 hearing
that extensive medical tests in Spaulding’s record had not revealed any
gastrointestinal problems that would meet listings-level severity. (A.R. 313.) Dr.
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Jilhewar similarly testified in October 2007 that he found no support for frequent
incontinence in Spaulding’s treatment records and in any event bowel movements
are “most of the time or 80 percent of the time, precipitated by eating and so one
can manage the bowel movement around the lunch time, breakfast or dinner time.”
(Id. at 623.) In light of direct testimony from medical experts that Spaulding does
not have a listings-level impairment or combination of impairments and is suitable
for light work, the government argues that benefits cannot be awarded because of
unresolved factual issues.
The Seventh Circuit has made clear that a district court should not award
benefits if evidence and testimony in the record would support the conclusion that
the claimant is not entitled to benefits. Allord, 631 F.3d at 416. In Allord, the
Seventh Circuit upheld the remanding district court’s refusal to award benefits
because “contradictory inferences could be drawn from the physicians’ testimony,”
and explained that it is incumbent upon the claimant to “extinguish the lingering
doubt regarding . . . qualification for disability benefits.” Id. at 417.
Here, Spaulding fails to meet the requirements of Allord for two reasons.
First, she has provided very little documentation of her alleged disability. Second,
expert medical testimony suggests that Spaulding does not have a gastrointestinal
impairment that would prevent her from working.
Dr. Miller
testified
that
Spaulding
did
not
meet
(See, e.g., A.R. 313-14.)
any
of
the
Digestive
Gastrointestinal impairment listings, noting that although Spaulding underwent
“extensive testing,” the fact remained that there was “nothing there that establishes
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that she has anything that approaches these [sic] category of [gastrointestinal]
impairments.” (Id.) Spaulding cites nothing to call Allord into doubt,1 and makes
no attempt to reconcile any of the conflicting medical evidence in her voluminous
record with her bare assertion that all factual issues have been resolved.
Accordingly, she fails to “extinguish the lingering doubt” about her entitlement to
DIB. See Allord, 631 F.3d at 417.
The court concludes by noting that if it were simply to grant Spaulding’s
request out of frustration with the SSA, however justified that frustration might be,
the case would likely be appealed, then perhaps reversed under Allord and Briscoe,
thereby prolonging the resolution of this claim even longer. There is no question
that the SSA has done Spaulding, itself, and the federal courts a serious disservice
with its lamentable handling of this DIB claim. Perhaps there should be a “six
strikes and you’re out” rule, but presently no such rule exists and “[o]bduracy is not
a ground on which to award benefits; the evidence properly in the record must
demonstrate disability.” Briscoe, 425 F.3d at 357. This court does not have the
authority to award benefits when factual issues persist about whether Spaulding is
disabled at all. Unpalatable as it may seem, the required course of action here is to
The bevy of cases from Maine and Massachusetts cited by Spaulding does not get
her past Allord and Briscoe, which have never been overruled or called into doubt
and which are binding on this court. And although Spaulding also identifies Petrey
v. Astrue, No. 10 CV 317, 2010 WL 5158100, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 14, 2010), as
support for an award of benefits even in the face of apparently conflicting medical
testimony, Petrey is a district court opinion that predates the Seventh Circuit’s
binding decision in Allord.
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remand the case and to demand that the SSA abide by its own standards and get it
right on what will be its seventh try.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Commissioner’s motion is granted, Spaulding’s
motion is granted in part and denied in part, and the matter is remanded to the
SSA for further proceedings.
ENTER:
____________________________________
Young B. Kim
United States Magistrate Judge
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