Anderson v. Equifirst Corporation et al

Filing 37

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Written by the Honorable Gary Feinerman on 12/2/2014.Mailed notice.(jlj, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
PAMELA ANDERSON,
Plaintiff,
vs.
DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST CO., N.A.;
SOUNDVIEW HOME LOAN TRUST 2006-EQI;
FINANCIAL ASSET SECURITIES CORP.; EQUIFIRST
CORPORATION; MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC
REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC. (MERS);
MERSCORP, INC.; DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL
TRUST CO., as trustee for REGISTERED HOLDER OF
SOUNDVIEW HOME LOAN TRUST 2006-EQI ASSETBACKED CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2006-EQI; RENEE
Y. PARLATO; and JOHN/JANE DOES 1-INFINITY,
Defendants.

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14 C 5474
Judge Feinerman

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
In this quiet title action, originally filed in state court and removed to this court, Pamela
Anderson alleges that she is the rightful holder of title to a parcel in Oak Park, Illinois, because
the documents purporting to transfer her mortgage note from one defendant to another were false
or fraudulent. Doc. 1-1 at 7-17. Defendants have moved to dismiss Anderson’s claims under
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), 12(b)(2), and 12(b)(6). Docs. 21, 24, 27. In response,
Anderson submitted a one-paragraph opposition citing Trinsey v. Pagliaro, 229 F. Supp. 647
(E.D. Pa. 1964), for the proposition that attorneys may not “put evidence into a court without
having a signed verified affidavit, from the executive[] officers of the entity they are
representing,” and saying nothing else of substance. Doc. 32.
Defendant Renee Y. Parlato argues under Rule 12(b)(2) that the court lacks personal
jurisdiction over her because she is not an Illinois resident and the complaint does not allege that

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she has any connection to Illinois. Doc. 23 at 7-9. Although a complaint “need not include facts
alleging personal jurisdiction, … once the defendant moves to dismiss the complaint under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the
burden of demonstrating the existence of jurisdiction.” Purdue Research Found. v. SanofiSynthelabo, S.A., 338 F.3d 773, 782 (7th Cir. 2003). Anderson does not respond to Parlato’s
jurisdictional argument—as just mentioned, Anderson does not respond to much of anything—so
Parlato’s 12(b)(2) motion is granted and the claims against her are dismissed without prejudice.
See Sikhs for Justice v. Badal, 736 F.3d 743, 751 (7th Cir. 2013); Manez v. Bridgestone
Firestone N. American Tire, LLC, 533 F.3d 578, 583-84 (7th Cir. 2008).
The other defendants seek dismissal for lack of standing under Rule 12(b)(1) and for
failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). As for standing, they argue that because Anderson
was not a party to the agreements transferring the note, she lacks standing to challenge any
alleged deficiencies in the transfer. Doc. 23 at 10-12; Doc. 29 at 10. Anderson does not directly
challenge the note’s transfer, however; rather, she brings an action for quiet title to property in
which she claims legal title. That is sufficient to give her standing to bring this suit. See Avista
Corp. v. Wolfe, 549 F.3d 1239, 1246 n.6 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Avista’s assertion of an ownership
interest to the centerline provides it with standing to bring a quiet title and declaratory judgment
action.”); Thorntons, Inc. v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 2009 WL 175044, at *3 (C.D. Ill. Jan. 22,
2009) (“a party claiming legal title to property has standing to bring a quiet title action”).
On the merits, Defendants argue that because the note confers only the right to collect
payment on Anderson’s underlying debt, transferring the note did not affect title to her property,
meaning that the note’s allegedly improper transfer provides no possible grounds for a quiet title
action. Doc. 29 at 8. Defendants’ argument finds support in the case law and is highly plausible.

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See Krile v. Swiney, 109 N.E.2d 189, 191 (Ill. 1952) (“[A] bill to quiet title applies only to
instruments or other proceedings in writing which appear of record and cast doubt on the validity
of the record title.”); Stewart v. Am. Homestead Mortg., LLC, 2014 WL 1334127, at *1 (D.
Mont. Apr. 2, 2014) (“The fact that transfers of a promissory note and an associated deed of trust
result in different entities holding those interests does not cloud title to the property and does not
provide a basis on which to quiet title in the mortgagor.”); Lane v. MERS, Inc., 2014 WL
129071, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 14, 2014) (“[T]he allegations that [the defendant] transferred the
note and there is no record of the transfer in public records are not sufficient to bring a quiet title
action.”).
Anderson’s only response is the one noted in this opinion’s first paragraph—that
attorneys cannot submit evidence without a verified affidavit. That’s not what the only case she
cites, Trinsey v. Pagliaro, supra, says, but in any event Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motions do
not submit “evidence.” Rather, they make legal arguments as to the complaint’s legal
sufficiency, taking all well-pleaded facts as true and properly considering “documents attached
to the complaint, documents that are critical to the complaint and referred to in it, and
information that is subject to proper judicial notice.” Geinosky v. City of Chicago, 675 F.3d 743,
745 n.1 (7th Cir. 2012).
Anderson makes no other defense of her claims in response to the Rule 12(b)(6) motions.
This dooms her case. “If [a court is] given plausible reasons for dismissing a complaint, [the
court is] not going to do the plaintiff’s research and try to discover whether there might be
something to say against the defendants’ reasoning.” Kirksey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 168
F.3d 1039, 1041 (7th Cir. 1999). Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion, as just noted, submits a
plausible ground for dismissal. By making only an irrelevant response, Anderson has forfeited

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any substantive argument she might have had against a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal. See Lekas v.
Briley, 405 F.3d 602, 614 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[w]hile Lekas alleged in his complaint that his
segregation was in retaliation for his filing of grievances, he did not present legal arguments or
cite relevant authority to substantiate that claim in responding to defendants’ motion to
dismiss”); Stransky v. Cummins Engine Co., 51 F.3d 1329, 1335 (7th Cir. 1995) (“when
presented with a motion to dismiss, the non-moving party must proffer some legal basis to
support his cause of action,” and “[t]he federal courts will not invent legal arguments for
litigants”). It is true that Anderson is pro se, but “[e]ven pro se litigants ... must expect to file a
legal argument and some supporting authority.” Mathis v. New York Life Ins. Co., 133 F.3d 546,
548 (7th Cir. 1998). The Rule 12(b)(6) motions accordingly are granted.
To summarize, Anderson’s claims against Parlato are dismissed without prejudice under
Rule 12(b)(2), while her claims against the other defendants are dismissed with prejudice under
Rule 12(b)(6). The Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is with prejudice because Anderson’s opposition
does not request an opportunity to file an amended complaint in the event some or all of her
claims are dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6), because she effectively abandoned her case by making
an entirely inapposite argument in opposition to the Rule 12(b)(6) motions, and because from all
appearances any amendment would be futile. See Bogie v. Rosenberg, 705 F.3d 603, 608 (7th
Cir. 2013) (“When a complaint fails to state a claim for relief, the plaintiff should ordinarily be
given an opportunity, at least upon request, to amend the complaint to correct the problem if
possible.”) (emphasis added); Tribble v. Evangelides, 670 F.3d 753, 761 (7th Cir. 2012)
(“District courts have broad discretion to deny leave to amend … where the amendment would
be futile.”); Estrada v. Reed, 346 F. App’x 87, 89-90 (7th Cir. 2009) (affirming the district
court’s denial of “a futile amendment” where the plaintiff could not state a viable claim); James

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Cape & Sons Co. v. PCC Constr. Co., 453 F.3d 396, 400-01 (7th Cir. 2006) (rejecting the
plaintiff’s argument that the district court erred in dismissing its complaint with prejudice, rather
than without prejudice and with leave to amend, where the plaintiff did not request leave to
amend); Baker v. Chisom, 501 F.3d 920, 926 (8th Cir. 2007) (affirming the dismissal with
prejudice of a claim where the plaintiff “failed to defend that claim or to urge that it be dismissed
without prejudice”).

December 2, 2014

___________________________________
United States District Judge

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