Puhr v. Univar, Inc.

Filing 32

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER; Civil case terminated. Signed by the Honorable Harry D. Leinenweber on 7/7/2015:Mailed notice(wp, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

GARY PUHR,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 14 C 5837

v.

Judge Harry D. Leinenweber

UNIVAR, INC.,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff
employer,

Gary

Puhr

Defendant

(“Puhr”)

Univar

claims

Inc.

that

(“Univar”),

his

former

wrongfully

terminated him in retaliation for exercising his rights under
the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act (“IWCA”).

Before the

Court is Univar’s Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 12].

For

the reasons stated herein, the Motion is granted.
I.

BACKGROUND

The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted.
Univar is a chemical distribution company with facilities across
the United States, including one in Plainfield, Illinois, where
Puhr was employed as a bulk delivery specialist.

George “Jay”

Boby (“Boby”) is Operations Manager at the Plainfield facility.
As a bulk delivery specialist, Puhr drove tanker trucks
loaded with hazardous chemicals to various client sites.
the

nature

of

the

chemical

products,

safety

is

Given

particularly

important.

According to Univar, all employees receive safety

training and are required to use personal protective equipment
(“PPE”) when loading, unloading, or otherwise handling corrosive
materials.
boots”

Univar

which

are

contends
worn

that

over

PPE

includes

steel-toed

work

rubber

“over-

boots.

Puhr,

however, testified that he never received over-boots with his
mandatory PPE, and that they were never mentioned during safety
training.
On December 31, 2013, approximately six months in to Puhr’s
employment,

Puhr
PQ

was

assigned

to

deliver

a

truck

Corporation,

a

Univar

client

of
in

sodium

hydroxide

to

Joliet,

Illinois.

Sometime later, Puhr contacted Univar dispatch from

PQ’s containment area, reporting trouble with the truck’s air
lines, which may have been frozen.

The next time Puhr contacted

dispatch, he reported that he had gotten chemical burns on the
top of his feet while attempting to thaw the truck’s lines.
Puhr was taken to a nearby emergency room for treatment.

Puhr

told Boby, who visited him later that day, that he had not been
wearing

over-boots.

Sometime

after

his

release

from

the

hospital on January 2 or 3, Puhr filed for and began receiving
workers’ compensation benefits.
Univar

conducted

an

investigation

of

the

incident.

Although Univar could not determine whether Puhr’s injury had
been caused by the product in the truck, or by another chemical
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already in the PQ containment area, Univar concluded that Puhr
could have prevented his injury by wearing rubber over-boots.
On January 3, 2014, Boby emailed Univar’s HR director, Jason
O’Neal (“O’Neal”), stating that he and Mike Lewis (“Lewis”), a
general manager, had determined that Puhr should be terminated
for failing to wear PPE.

According to Boby’s deposition, O’Neal

responded that Puhr would be terminated upon his return to work.
In

the

interim,

medical benefits.

Puhr

would

continue

to

receive

his

pay

and

Puhr contends that the decision to terminate

him was not made immediately after the incident, but sometime
later.
Months passed, and Puhr was not cleared for a full-time
return to work until June 9, 2014.

On June 10, 2014, Puhr

received a notice stating that he was being terminated for not
wearing his required PPE.
complaint

in

the

Circuit

Later that month, Puhr filed his
Court

of

Cook

County

alleging

that

Univar discharged him in retaliation for exercising his rights
under the IWCA.

On July 30, 2014, the case was removed to

federal court.
II.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.”
facts

are

those

that

affect

FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).
the

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outcome

of

the

Material
lawsuit.

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

A

genuine

a

dispute

exists

“if

the

evidence

is

such

that

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”
Id.

The moving party may meet its burden by showing “there is

an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.”
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986).

If the

moving party satisfies its initial burden, the non-moving party
must demonstrate with evidence “that a triable issue of fact
remains on issues for which [it] bears the burden of proof.”
Knight v. Wiseman, 590 F.3d 458, 463–64 (7th Cir. 2009).
The

judge’s

role

at

summary

judgment

is

credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.
Haupert, 481 F.3d 543, 550 (7th Cir. 2007).
whether

a

construes

genuine
all

issue

evidence

nonmoving party.

of

material

in

the

light

fact
most

not

to

make

Washington v.
In determining

exists,

the

favorable

Court

to

the

Bellaver v. Quanex Corp., 200 F.3d 485, 491-92

(7th Cir. 2000).
III.

ANALYSIS

Where, as here, a retaliatory discharge case brought under
Illinois law is litigated in federal court, “the federal court
must apply the standard of the state law to a motion for summary
judgment, and not the federal standard.”
Inc.,

614

F.3d

298,

303

(7th

Cir.

Gacek v. Am. Airlines,
2010).

To

establish

retaliatory discharge in the workers’ compensation context, Puhr
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must

show

that

(1)

he

was

employed

by

Univar

before

his

termination occurred, (2) he exercised a right granted under the
IWCA, and (3) his discharge was causally related to his filing a
workers’ compensation claim.

Carter v. Tennant Co., No. 02 C

1925,

*4

2003

WL

21418231,

at

(N.D.

Ill.

June

16,

2003)

(citation omitted), aff’d, 383 F.3d 673 (7th Cir. 2004).

Only

the third element of Puhr’s claim is contested.
“With

respect

to

causation,

‘the

ultimate

issue

to

be

decided is the employer's motive in discharging the employee.’”
Goode v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 741 F.Supp.2d 877, 891 (N.D. Ill.
2010) (quoting Hartlein v. Ill. Power Co., 601 N.E.2d 720, 730
(Ill. 1992)).

A plaintiff may show an improper motive through

direct or circumstantial evidence.

See, Jackson v. Bunge Corp.,

40 F.3d 239, 242 (7th Cir. 1994).

Direct evidence proves a fact

“without reliance on inference or presumption.”

Lalvani v. Ill.

Human Rights Comm’n, 755 N.E.2d 51, 65 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001).
Circumstantial
circumstances
facts,

evidence
from

which

reasonably

circumstances.”

consists

of

the

may

following

jury
from

“proof
infer

the

of

facts

other

proven

and

connected
facts

and

Jackson, 40 F.3d at 242 (citation and internal

quotations omitted).
Puhr has failed to come forward with any direct evidence of
Univar’s
pieces

retaliatory
of

intent.

circumstantial

Instead,

evidence
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from

Puhr

offers

which

he

several
contends

retaliatory intent may be inferred.

First, Puhr argues that

Boby lacked any understanding of Illinois workers’ compensation
law and did not know whether an employee could be fired for
filing a workers’ compensation claim.

Second, Puhr claims that

Univar was financially motivated to terminate him in response to
his filing a claim.
Puhr’s

workers’

Puhr’s

medical

Third, Puhr contends that Boby knew about

compensation
condition.

claim

and

Fourth,

was

Puhr

kept

apprised

testified

that

of

Boby

expressed “displeasure” with the workers’ compensation process
and how long it was taking, and told him to “hurry up and heal.”
Finally,

Puhr

claims

that

other

Univar

employees

were

not

required to wear over-boots and never disciplined for failing to
do so.
his

This evidence, Puhr argues, coupled with the timing of

termination,

creates

“a

strong

inference

of

causation.”

(Pl.’s Resp., ECF No. 21, at 10.)
The Court finds Puhr’s evidence insufficient to create a
triable issue of fact regarding causation.

For instance, Puhr

has provided no basis for his claim that retaliatory animus can
be

inferred

from

a

decision-maker’s

workers’ compensation law.
to is equally thin.

lack

of

knowledge

about

The financial motivation Puhr refers

It is based entirely on Boby’s agreement

that it is “not a good thing” to incur expenses paying workers’
compensation claims.

However, Boby went on to say that “the

reason for that is because you don’t want people off of work.”
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(Boby

Dep.,

ECF

No.

16-5,

at

227:9–228:8.)

Although

it

is

undisputed that Boby knew Puhr had filed a workers’ compensation
claim,

“an

employer

cannot

be

held

liable

for

a

retaliatory

discharge solely because the employer fired an employee who at
one time or another filed a workers’ compensation claim.”

Dixon

Distrib. Co. v. Hanover Ins. Co., 612 N.E.2d 846, 852 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1993) aff’d, 641 N.E.2d 395 (Ill. 1994).

And while it is

true that Univar never formally disciplined another employee for
failing to wear over-boots (see, Boby Dep., ECF No. 16-5, at
132:3–21),

Puhr’s

contention

that

other

similarly

situated

employees were not required to wear them is based solely on his
assertion that he never saw anyone else doing so.
The Court is also not persuaded that the timing of events
supports an inference of discrimination.
specifically,

a

short

length

of

time

Suspicious timing —
between

an

employee’s

exercise of rights under the IWCA and termination — is relevant
to, but not determinative of, a plaintiff’s retaliation claim.
See, Goode, 741 F.Supp.2d at 892.

However, temporal proximity

between a claim and a termination is a “wash” when a single
underlying incident is the cause of both events.
Wal-Mart

Stores,

Inc.,

412

F.3d

781,

787

See, Hudson v.

(7th

Cir.

2005)

(rejecting evidence of timing where altercation with co-worker
was

the

cause

of

employee’s

workers’

ultimate termination).
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compensation

claim

and

Only one piece of evidence remains:

Puhr’s testimony that

Boby was displeased with the workers’ compensation process and
how long Puhr’s recovery was taking

— frustrations that Boby

apparently voiced to Puhr’s coordinating nurse.

However, Puhr

also stated that he did not have a great deal of contact with
Boby during the recovery process, and that his conversations
with him were “more general.”
11:2–11.)

(Puhr Dep., ECF No. 16-1, at

The Court finds this evidence, even when construed in

the light most favorable to Puhr, fails to provide a sufficient
basis from which a reasonable jury could infer causation.
Even assuming that Puhr had established that his assertion
of rights under the IWCA prompted his termination, “causation is
not

met

if

the

employer

has

a

valid

basis,

pretextual, for discharging the employee.”
at

728.

Here,

Univar

has

provided

what

legitimate reason for the termination:
required

PPE.

Univar

has

provided

which

is

not

Hartlein, 601 N.E.2d
it

claims

to

be

a

Puhr’s failure to wear
substantial

evidence

—

including Boby’s testimony, a monthly safety checklist including
“Steel

toe

rubber

boots;

chem/corr

resistant,”

and

a

safety

training slide depicting rubber over-boots — demonstrating that
over-boots were a required PPE component, and that Puhr received
a pair of over-boots in conjunction with his safety training.
It is undisputed that Puhr was not wearing over-boots when the

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incident occurred.

Univar has also provided evidence that it

terminated another employee for failing to wear other PPE items.
To

survive

summary

judgment,

Puhr

must

provide

evidence

that Univar’s explanation for the termination is “mere pretext,”
that is, that Univar “did not honestly believe the reasons it
gave for its action.”
internal

quotations

Goode, 741 F.Supp.2d at 892 (citation and
omitted).

As

evidence

of

pretext,

Puhr

appears to contend that the over-boot policy was non-existent,
arguing

that

Univar

never

provided

him

with

over-boots,

discussed over-boots during safety training, or disciplined him
or any other employee for failing to wear over-boots.
Although this evidence may show that Puhr was not aware of
the over-boot policy, or even that the policy was not rigorously
enforced, it is insufficient to raise a question of fact as to
whether Univar “honestly believe[d] the reasons it gave for its
action” or “tried to cover up the actual reasons for its actions
through lies or deceit.”

Id. (citation and internal quotations

omitted); see also, Fuentes v. Lear Siegler, Inc., 529 N.E.2d
40, 43 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (explaining that employee’s lack of
awareness

regarding

a

particular

safety

rule

does

not,

in

itself, “raise a question of fact regarding defendant’s motive
for

the

discharge”).

Puhr’s

evidence

fails

to

support

the

conclusion that Univar did not honestly believe that Puhr was in
violation of the over-boot policy when the incident occurred, or
- 9 -

attempted to hide behind the policy to cover up the real reason
for its decision.
IV.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, Univar’s Motion for Summary
Judgment [ECF No. 12] is granted.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge
United States District Court
Dated: July 7, 2015

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