Blewitt v. Mallin et al
Filing
23
Memorandum Opinion and Order signed by the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 12/1/2014: Motion to dismiss is denied as to counts I through VI and is granted as to count VII. Defendants' answer to the complaint's remaining counts is due by 12/23/2014. A joint status report is due by 1/5/2015. Mailed notice (gds)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
TIMOTHY BLEWITT,
)
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Plaintiff,
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v.
)
)
BRIAN MALLIN, UNKNOWN DEFENDANT
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OFFICERS, RYAN SCHOLZ, GLADYS
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WILDON, UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS
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HOSPITAL and HEALTH SCIENCES SYSTEM, )
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Defendants.
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No. 14 C 5986
Judge Robert W. Gettleman
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
On August 5, 2014, Plaintiff Timothy Blewitt filed a seven-count complaint asserting
claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Illinois law. Plaintiff alleges that defendant Brian Mallin and
other unknown defendant police officers violated his Fourth Amendment right against
unreasonable seizure (Count I), false arrest (Count II), excessive force (Count III), and
unreasonable search (Count IV), as well as failed to intervene to stop these constitutional
violations (Count V). Plaintiff also alleges that Ryan Scholz, a physician at the University of
Illinois Hospital and Health Sciences System (“UIHHSS”), and Gladys Wildon, a nurse at
UIHHSS, committed medical battery (Count VI), and that UIHHSS is liable for their tortious
acts pursuant to the doctrine of respondeat superior (Count VII). Defendants have filed the
instant motion to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). For the following reasons, defendants’ motion to dismiss is denied in part
and granted in part.
BACKGROUND1
Plaintiff alleges that while walking with friends on Halsted Street near Roosevelt Road in
Chicago on September 19, 2013, defendant police officers stopped plaintiff and requested his
name and where he was headed. Plaintiff asserts that he chose not to answer the officers and
continued walking with his friends. Thereafter, defendant police officers arrested plaintiff,
handcuffed him, and put him into a police car. Plaintiff contends that there was no probable
cause for his arrest. Plaintiff’s friends were not arrested. Plaintiff alleges that the officers
continued to “interrogate” him while in the police car, and subsequently removed him from the
car and “slammed his face on the trunk of the police car.” Defendant officers then took plaintiff
to the emergency department at UIHHSS where, without plaintiff’s consent, he was admitted and
treated.
Plaintiff alleges he attempted to leave the hospital, but was seized by defendant officers,
handcuffed, and returned to the emergency department. Plaintiff allegedly informed UIHHSS
emergency department personnel, including defendants Scholz and Wildon, that he did not
consent to his blood being drawn or urine being collected. Nonetheless, at Scholz’s direction,
Wildon drew plaintiff’s blood, forced plaintiff to provide a urine sample, and ran toxicological
tests. Plaintiff asserts that there was no medical emergency requiring the medical procedures to
be performed without his consent. Following these tests, defendant officers and UIHHSS
personnel contacted plaintiff’s father. Plaintiff was released from defendant officers’ custody
when his father arrived at the hospital.
1
The following facts are taken from plaintiff’s complaint and are assumed to be true for
purposes of this motion to dismiss. See Murphy v. Walker, 51 F.3d 714, 717 (7th Cir. 1995).
2
Plaintiff also alleges that during these events, defendant officers and/or UIHHSS medical
personnel threatened plaintiff that he would be expelled from the University of Illinois at
Chicago (“UIC”). Plaintiff alleges that defendant officers alerted UIC officials of the incident,
falsely reported the incident in a police report, and provided UIC officials with the false report.
UIHHSS allegedly charged plaintiff $1,900.00 for his time in the emergency department.
Plaintiff alleges that he suffered physical and emotional damages as a result of the acts described
above.
DISCUSSION
I.
Legal Standards
Under Rule 12(b)(1), a court must dismiss any action for which it lacks subject matter
jurisdiction. As with a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the court accepts all wellpleaded factual allegations as true and construes all reasonable inferences in plaintiff’s favor.
Scanlan v. Eisenberg, 669 F.3d 838, 841 (7th Cir. 2012); see also Mutter v. Madigan, No. 13CV-8580, 2014 WL 562017, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 13, 2014). However, plaintiff bears the burden
of establishing that the elements necessary for jurisdiction, including standing, have been met.
Scanlan, 669 F.3d at 841-42. “In ruling on a 12(b)(1) motion, the court may look outside of the
complaint’s allegations and consider whatever evidence has been submitted on the issue of
jurisdiction.” Mutter, 2014 WL 562017, at *2; see also Ezekiel v. Michel, 66 F.3d 894, 897 (7th
Cir. 1995).
II.
Analysis
Defendants argue that plaintiff’s complaint must be dismissed in its entirety pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(1), because his claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment and the doctrine of
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sovereign immunity. The Eleventh Amendment states, “The judicial power of the United States
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State.” U.S. Const. amend. XI. The Eleventh Amendment “bars actions in federal court against
a state, state agencies, or state officials acting in their official capacities.” Council 31 of the Am.
Fed'n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Employees v. Quinn, 680 F.3d 875, 881 (7th Cir. 2012) (internal
quotations omitted). Notwithstanding the Eleventh Amendment bar, a state may be sued where:
(1) the state consents to the suit; (2) Congress, acting under its constitutional authority, abrogates
immunity when drafting a federal law; or (3) a private party sues an individual state official for
prospective relief to enjoin ongoing violations of federal law, as established in Ex parte Young,
209 U.S. 123 (1908). Id. at 882.
A.
Constitutional Claims
With respect to plaintiff’s constitutional claims, defendants argue that Mallin and the
other unnamed police officer defendants are employed by the University of Illinois and therefore
state employees. Defendants contend that even though plaintiff sued defendant police officers in
their individual capacities, plaintiff’s allegations that defendants were “acting in the course and
scope of [their] employment,” and the fact that Illinois state law provides for the indemnification
of state employees, transforms plaintiff’s action into one against the State of Illinois. As such,
defendants argue that plaintiff’s constitutional claims are barred by Illinois state law and the
Eleventh Amendment.
In response, plaintiff argues that “a claim against an individual state employee sued in his
individual capacity is not a claim against the State of Illinois,” even if the state chooses to
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indemnify the employee. Moreover, plaintiff contends that the Illinois Court of Claims Act,
705 ILCS 505/8(d), which gives the Illinois Court of Claims exclusive jurisdiction over damages
claims against the state in cases sounding in tort, does not apply to his constitutional claims
under Section 1983. Because the court agrees with plaintiff, defendants’ motion to dismiss as to
Counts I through V is denied.
The Supreme Court has held that Section 1983 is not an exception to state sovereign
immunity. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 342-45 (1979); see also Thomas v. State of Illinois,
697 F.3d 612, 613 (7th Cir. 2012). However, plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims are not aimed at the
State of Illinois, but instead are against defendant police officers in their individual capacities.
As plaintiff notes, this district, and the majority of other districts, has held that state
indemnification of an employee does not convert a claim against an individual into one against
the state. See, e.g., Benning v. Bd. of Regents of Regency Universities, 928 F.2d 775, 779 (7th
Cir. 1991); Rubacha v. Coler, 607 F. Supp. 477, 481 (N.D. Ill. 1985). The Seventh Circuit held
in Benning, in which three defendants were sued in their individual capacities, that “the state
cannot manufacture immunity for its employees simply by volunteering to indemnify them.”
Benning, 928 F.2d at 778; see also Rubacha, 607 F. Supp. at 481 (“To hold otherwise would give
the State carte blanche to provide a meaningless kind of paper protection – granting an
‘indemnification’ that would, by its very existence, destroy the liability to which indemnity
purportedly extends.”). As such, defendants’ reliance on Edelman’s holding that a “suit by
private parties seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the state
treasury is barred by the Eleventh Amendment,” is misplaced. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651
(1974).
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Contrary to defendants’ arguments, plaintiff’s allegations that defendant police officers
were acting within the scope of their employment does not transform the nature of his complaint
to one against the State of Illinois. The cases cited by defendants in support of this faulty
proposition are inapplicable to plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims because each of the cases involved
state law claims, not alleged constitutional violations. For example, defendants rely on Turpin v.
Koropchak, 567 F.3d 880, 882 (7th Cir. 2009), to argue that “[w]here an alleged act of
misconduct arose out of the State employee’s breach of a duty that is imposed solely by virtue of
his State employment, sovereign immunity will bar maintenance of the action in any court other
than the Illinois Court of Claims.” While the plaintiff in Turpin did in fact sue defendants in
their individual capacities, the case is inapposite here because Turpin brought only state law
claims, not constitutional claims. Harvis v. Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Illinois, 744 F. Supp. 825
(N.D. Ill. 1990), also involved state tort claims. Because plaintiff has sued defendant police
officers in their individual capacities, the court will not consider defendants’ arguments
concerning Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989), in which the defendant
was sued in his official capacity.
Finally, plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims are not subject to the Illinois Court of Claims Act,
705 ILCS 505/8(d). The Illinois statute, even as quoted in defendants’ motion, specifically
limits the act to state law claims. The act provides that the Illinois Court of Claims “shall have
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine . . . [a]ll claims against the State founded upon any
law of the State of Illinois” and “[a]ll claims against the State for damages in cases sounding in
tort.” 705 ILCS 505/8(a), (d). As held in Sebesta v. Davis, No. 12-C-7834, 2013 WL 5408796,
at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 26, 2013), the Illinois Court of Claims Act “does not apply to federal claims
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filed in federal court.” See also Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 607 (7th Cir. 1973)
(“Conduct by persons acting under color of state law which is wrongful under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
. . . cannot be immunized by state law.”).
For these reasons, defendants’ motion to dismiss as to Counts I through V is denied.
B.
State Law Claims
Defendants argue that plaintiff’s state law claims against defendants Scholz, Wildon, and
UIHHSS are also barred by Illinois state law and the Eleventh Amendment. Defendants first
contend that “UIHHSS is not a legal entity capable of being sued,” and that the proper entity is
The Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois (“Board”). Because the Board is an
instrumentality of the State of Illinois, defendants argue that plaintiff’s suit is bared by sovereign
immunity and the Illinois Court of Claims Act. Defendants also argue that plaintiff’s claims
against Scholz and Wildon in their individual capacities are actually claims against the state, and
therefore prohibited.
As with Counts I through V, defendants once again incorrectly apply the Illinois Court of
Claims Act in an attempt to bar Count VI. “Under the Erie doctrine, state rules of immunity
govern actions in federal court alleging violations of state law.” Benning, 928 F.2d at 777-78,
citing Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The Illinois Court of Claims Act, as discussed
above, provides exclusive jurisdiction to the Illinois Court of Claims over tort actions filed by
private parties against the state in both state and federal court. 705 ILCS 505/8(d); see also
Benning, 928 F.2d at 779 (“Illinois has enacted a statute granting its court of claims exclusive
jurisdiction over tort suits against the state.”). However, this statute alone is not dispositive
because a suit against a state employee in his individual capacity is not necessarily a suit against
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the sovereign. Defendants, nonetheless, cite to cases establishing that under Illinois law “suits
against individuals who act within the scope of their employment are deemed to be suits against
the state actionable only in the court of claims.” Benning, 928 F.2d at 779, citing Healy v.
Vaupel, 133 Ill.2d 295 (1990) (holding that the cause of action is only nominally against a state
employee where plaintiff does not allege that defendants acted outside their scope of authority or
violated a statutory or constitutional law); see also Turpin, 567 F.3d at 883-84. Because plaintiff
has alleged that defendants Scholz and Wildon committed the supposedly tortious conduct in the
scope of their employment, defendants argue that, under Illinois law, plaintiff’s claim for
medical battery is actually against the state.
Defendants fail to address plaintiff’s argument that “claims against individual medical
providers, employed by the State, should not be dismissed under the doctrine of sovereign
immunity.” In Janes v. Albergo, 626 N.E.2d 1127, 1137 (Ill. App. 1st Dist. 1993), which is cited
by plaintiff but not addressed by defendants, the Illinois Appellate Court held that the state Court
of Claims Act did not bar the plaintiff’s claims against the defendant doctors and nurses
employed by a state health care facility because the defendants’ duties were derived from their
status as licensed health care providers, and was not dependent on their employment with the
state. Similarly, in Watson v. St. Annes Hospital, 386 N.E.2d 885 (Ill. App. 1st Dist. 1979), the
state appellate court held that the circuit court had jurisdiction over plaintiff’s action alleging
improper medical treatment against several doctors and nurses who were employed by the
University of Illinois, finding that the defendants’ duties to the plaintiff were the same duties
owed by every physician and nurse to every patient. Here, plaintiff alleges that defendants
Scholz and Wildon breached a duty owed to all patients, and not just a duty that was unique to
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their employment with the state. See, e.g., Turpin, 567 F.3d at 883 (“The question to ask . . . is
whether the defendant breached a duty owed by all citizens, or whether he breached a duty held
uniquely by State employees holding the job at issue.”). Accordingly, under Illinois law,
plaintiff’s claim against Scholz and Wildon in their individual capacities is not a claim against
the state and not barred by state law or the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
In support of their position that UIHHSS is not a legal entity capable of being sued,
defendants attach as Exhibit A to their reply brief an internet printout of a record from the United
States Patent and Trademark Office. As discussed above, in ruling on a 12(b)(1) motion, the
court may look outside of the complaint’s allegations and consider whatever evidence has been
submitted on the issue of jurisdiction. Ezekiel, 66 F.3d at 897. Exhibit A indicates that UIHHSS
is a word mark owned by the Board. Moreover, the name UIHHSS itself indicates that it is a
part of the University of Illinois. Because it is well-established in this district that state
universities are state agencies that are immune under the Eleventh Amendment to any claim for
damages,2 Count VII of plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the court denies defendants’ motion to dismiss as to
Counts I through VI and grants defendants’ motion to dismiss Count VII. Defendants are
directed to answer the complaint’s remaining claims on or before December 23, 2014. The
2
See, e.g., Cannon v. Univ. of Health Sciences/The Chicago Med. Sch., 710 F.2d 351,
356-57 (7th Cir. 1983); Mutter, 2014 WL 562017, at *3 (“Courts have routinely recognized that
state universities, as well as their governing bodies, are protected from suit under the Eleventh
Amendment.”).
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parties are directed to prepare and file a Joint Status Report using this court’s form on or before
January 5, 2015.
ENTER:
December 1, 2014
__________________________________________
Robert W. Gettleman
United States District Judge
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