Lacy v. Dart et al

Filing 337

MOTION by Defendants Cook County, Illinois, Thomas Dart for judgment as a Matter of Law (Cummings, Nicholas)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
MARQUE BOWERS,

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Plaintiff,
-vsTHOMAS DART, Sheriff of Cook County,
COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS,
Defendants.

No. 14-cv-6259
Judge Gettleman

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DEFENDANTS’ RULE 50(a) MOTION
FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW
Defendants THOMAS J. DART, Sheriff of Cook County, and COOK COUNTY,
ILLINOIS, by their attorney, ANITA ALVAREZ State’s Attorney of Cook County, and through
her Assistant State’s Attorneys, and pursuant to FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 50(a), move
for judgment as a matter of law based upon the evidence submitted in this trial. In support thereof,
the Sheriff’s Office states the following:
INTRODUCTION
This Court found Defendants liable for the violation of Plaintiff’s rights secured by the
Americans with Disabilities Act. Additionally, the Court limited Plaintiff’s damages to the time
period of January 2013 through November 2015. Throughout the pendency of this action however
Plaintiff was and remains a “prisoner” as defined by the Prison Litigation Reform Act. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e(h). Consequently, Plaintiff cannot recover damages “for mental or emotional injury
suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury…” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e).
Plaintiff failed to show any physical injury in this case; accordingly, the jury award of damages
should be vacated and the court should return a judgment in favor of Defendants.

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LEGAL STANDARD
FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 50(a) states:
Judgment as a Matter of Law.
(1)

In General, if a party has been fully heard on an issue during a jury trial and
the court finds that a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient
evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue, the court may:
(A) resolve the issue against the party; and
(B) grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law against the party on a
claim or defense that, under the controlling law, can be maintained or
defeated only with a favorable finding on that issue.

(2)

Motion. A motion for judgment as a matter of law may be made at any time
before the case is submitted to the jury. The motion must specify the
judgment sought and the law and facts that entitle the movant to the
judgment.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a). Under Rule 50(a), “the district court must enter judgment if, under the
governing law, a reasonable fact-finder could not find for the nonmoving party.”

Shields

Enterprises, Inc. v. First Chicago Corp., 975 F.2d 1290, 1294 (7th Cir. 1992). a reasonable factfinder cannot not find Plaintiff suffered physical injury and, therefore, under §1997e(e) of the
PLRA, cannot award damages for any alleged mental or emotional pain.
ARGUMENT
The plain language of the statute mandates that Plaintiff cannot recover “for mental or
emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury…” 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e(e). Unlike some constitutional claims that allow for the recovery of nominal damages,
see Rowe v. Shake, 196 F.3d 778, 781-82 (7th Cir. 1999) (deprivation of the First Amendment
right is a cognizable injury, regardless of any resulting mental or emotional injury), Plaintiff can
only recover for “injuries that the plaintiff has proved by a preponderance of the evidenced were
caused by defendants’ wrongful conduct.” Jury Instructions, Dkt. _ p. 17. Additionally, the only
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type of compensatory damage Plaintiff is allowed to recover is for “physical and mental/emotional
pain that plaintiff has experienced.” Id. In other words, the PLRA’s “physical injury” requirement
applies.
In addition to the plain language of the statute, this circuit applies the “physical injury”
requirement to Title II cases. In Cassidy v. Indiana Dep’t of Corrections, 199 F.3d 374, 375-76
(7th Cir. 2000), for example, the Seventh Circuit refused to allow the plaintiff seek damages for
emotional injuries against the Indiana Department of Corrections in his Title II action. Citing the
plain language of the statute and the D.C. Circuit Appellate Court in Davis v. District of Columbia,
332 U.S. App. D.C. 436 (D.C. Cir. 1998) the court reasoned “Congress did not intend to exempt
such actions from sec. 1997e(e)’s ambit.” Cassidy, 199 F.3d at 376. Accord Shaw v. Wall, 2015
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55259, *3-*6 (W.D. Wisc. April 28, 2015) (following Cassidy and granting
defendant’s motion in limine to bar the plaintiff’s claims for emotional injuries under the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 as the plaintiff had not shown anything more than de minimis physical
injuries).
In Shaw, the plaintiff alleged he suffered a physical injury when he had a stuffy nose. Shaw,
2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55259, at *5. In granting defendants’ motion in limine, the court cited
several cases including a Fifth Circuit case where nausea and vomiting was de minimis and did not
overcome the bar of § 1997e(e). Id., citing Alexander v. Tippah Cnty., Miss., 351 f.3d 626, 631
(5th Cir. 2003). Additionally, physical manifestations of psychological injuries do not qualify.
Id., citing Pearson v. Welborn, 471 F.3d 732, 744 (7th Cir. 2006) (Seventh Circuit rejected an
inmate’s claim of physical injury when he was “mentally and physically depressed” and “lost at
least 50 pounds.”) In this case, Plaintiff testified at trial that he was constipated, had gas and

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nausea and that he felt like throwing up. Tr. Trans. 9/12/16 Dkt. _. Such pain and discomfort do
not rise above de minimis; consequently, Plaintiff cannot recover for mental/emotional pain here.
Plaintiff failed to allege in his complaint and did not submit evidence at trial of any physical
injury that rose above a de minimis level as a result of the denial of access to toilets and sinks when
he attended court. Plaintiff’s only complaint of any physical injury was during transportation to
court. Dkt. 18 ¶ 4. This Court determined Defendants were not liable for any violations of the
ADA while transporting detainees to and from court. Having failed to produce evidence of any
physical injury, Plaintiff not only cannot recover damages for any mental/emotional injury, he has
not met his burden to recover any damages.
Furthermore, Plaintiff should not be able to recover any damages from January 1, 2015
through November 1, 2015. Jury instructions in this case allow the jury to consider damages from
February 2013 until November 2015, Dkt. _, p. 16; however, the testimony at trial indicated that
Plaintiff was given access to a fully accessible bathroom in the public area of the building each
time he went to court beginning January 2015. Tr. Trans. 9/12/16 Dkt. _. Accordingly, Plaintiff
was not denied access to a toilet or sink when he went to court during that time frame. Therefore,
judgment should be entered in favor of Defendants, and Plaintiff granted no monetary award.
CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, defendants THOMAS J. DART, Sheriff of Cook County, and COOK
COUNTY, ILLINOIS respectfully that this Honorable Court: (a) grant judgment as a matter of
law based upon the evidence submitted in this trial and (b) grant such other and further relief that
this Court deems just and reasonable.

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Respectfully submitted,
ANITA ALVAREZ
State’s Attorney of Cook County
/s/ Nicholas E. Cummings
Nicholas E. Cummings
Assistant State’s Attorney
Torts/Civil Rights Litigation Section
500 Richard J. Daley Center
Chicago, IL 60602
[phone]
[e-mail]
/s/ Jacqueline Carroll
Jacqueline Carroll
Conflicts Counsel
69 W. Washington St Suite 2030
Chicago, Illinois 60602
[phone]
[e-mail]

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