Kline v. International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers District Lodge 141 et al

Filing 74

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Signed by the Honorable Harry D. Leinenweber on 2/23/2016:Civil case terminated.Mailed notice(wp, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

LIONELL H. KLINE,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 14 C 6369

INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
MACHINISTS AND AEROSPACE
WORKERS DISTRICT LODGE 141,
IAMAW LOCAL LODGE 1487, and
ERIK STENBERG,

Judge Harry D. Leinenweber

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff, Lionell Kline (“Kline”), filed suit in Illinois
state

court

alleging

that

his

union

misrepresented

him

in

various proceedings, leading to his termination as a lead ramp
serviceman for United Airlines.
of

the

International

Defendants (two local branches

Association

of

Machinists

and

Aerospace

Workers, and union officer Erik Stenberg, whom the Court refers
to collectively as “the Union”) removed the case to this Court
based on federal-question jurisdiction.

See, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a)

(allowing claims in federal court for certain disputes between a
union

and

its

members);

see

also,

No. 735, 390 U.S. 557, 560 (1968).
summary judgment [ECF No. 39].
the Court grants the Motion.

Avco

Corp.

v.

Aero

Lodge

The Union has moved for

For the reasons stated herein,

I.

BACKGROUND

The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted.
Kline
years.

was

an

employee

of

United

Airlines

(“United”)

for

25

During the events underlying this suit, he worked as a

lead ramp serviceman, which the Union considers a non-managerial
position. His duties entailed servicing United planes while they
sat on the “airport apron” (the area directly outside the gates
where the planes park before takeoff and after landing).
On January 12, 2013, Kline claims he was twice shoved by
Daniel Loner (“Loner”), another United employee, while working
outside Gate B9 at O’Hare International Airport.

He claims that

Loner shoved him suddenly and from behind, “unprovoked and for
no apparent reason.”

(Pl. Ex. 1, at ¶ 4, ECF No. 66.)

Four

days later, on January 16, Kline reported the incident to his
United

supervisor,

investigation.

and

United

subsequently

opened

an

The Union also assigned Kline a union official

to represent him in the proceedings.
Kline has consistently characterized Loner’s actions as an
assault, a battery, or both.

He does not claim Loner punched or

kicked him. (Def. Ex. A, at 13, ECF No. 41.)

He also did not

fall down as a result of being shoved. (Id.)

He finished his

shift

on

the

day

of

the

incident

following day. (Id. at 16-17.)

and

returned

to

work

the

He claims, however, that the

shoves aggravated a preexisting shoulder injury. (Id. at 14.)
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Consequently, he went to see a doctor on January 16, the same
day he reported the incident.

For reasons unknown, Kline did

not tell the doctor about the assault.

(Def. Ex. A at 22 and

Def. Ex. N.)
On January 20 – eight days after the shoving incident –
Kline filed a police report.
battery

against

Loner

The report indicates a claim of

and

describes

the

date

occurred as January 14 rather than January 12.

the

battery

Police arrested

Loner while he was on the job at O’Hare; the criminal complaint
subsequently was dismissed, as best Kline can remember, “for
lack

of

evidence,”

although

definitively what became of it.

the

record

does

not

indicate

(Def. Ex. A at 28.)

United interviewed Kline on January 29 and had him fill out
an injury report.

Like the police report, the injury report

indicated that the assault occurred on January 14 rather than
January 12. (Def. Ex. A at 28-29.)

At some point, Kline met

with the parties conducting the investigation, and together they
viewed surveillance footage of the area outside Gate B9 from
January 14.
show

an

assault.

January 31,
admitted,

Kline admits that the footage from that day did not
(Def.

“The

A

changed

Kline

Ex.
his

story;

at

his

deposition,

he

place

I

said

initially

on

assault

took

at

31-32.)

On

January 14[,] then I changed it to January 13.”
Def. Ex. A. at 33.)
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or

about

(Kline Dep.

The

investigation

continued.

In

April

2013,

Kline

had

another meeting with United and was again represented by the
Union.

Following that meeting, on May 6, United announced that

it

recommending

was

company’s

guidelines

Kline’s
of

discharge

professional

for

violation

conduct.

of

the

Specifically,

United found that Kline had falsely accused a co-worker (Loner)
of assault, had faked his injury, and generally had lied to the
investigators.
“investigative
prior

to

an

(Def. Ex. I.)
review

hearing,”

employee’s

Kline’s next recourse was an
which

termination

is

a

under

Union’s collective bargaining agreement.

hearing
the

required

terms

of

the

(Def. Ex. C at 30.)

At some point during this time – it is unclear exactly when
– Kline changed his story again to allege that the assault took
place on January 12 rather than January 13.

Kline disputes the

contention that he ever “changed his story,” but that is an
undeniably

accurate

description;

what

the

parties

disagree about is not if his story changed but why.

really

Regardless,

Kline discussed his case with the Union in preparation for his
investigative review hearing, and the Union represented him at
that hearing on May 30.

(Def. Ex. A. at 38-41.)

After the

hearing, United issued a decision upholding Kline’s termination.
(Def. Ex. J.)
The
collective

next

step

bargaining

afforded

to

agreement
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Kline
was

a

under

the

“third-step

Union’s
appeal.”

Again, the Union represented Kline in the process, this time
through union official Erik Stenberg (“Stenberg”).
at 44.)

(Def. Ex. A.

The appeal occurred on November 26, and Kline lost.

(Def. Ex. K.) The Union, through Stenberg, sent Kline a letter
on January 22, 2014, which read in pertinent part:
The Company denied your Third Step Appeal which I
received on January 14, 2014.
I have already
discussed and emailed the Third Step Decision to you
on January 15, 2014. I carefully reviewed your case
. . . for appeal to the final step of the grievance
process.
I also talked to other Union District
Officers about your case.
After we examined the
specific facts in your case, the Collective Bargaining
Agreement and past System Board Cases, the Union
determined that further appeal would not be successful
at the System Board of Adjustment.
Your case is now
closed.
Please call me if you have any questions
about
your
case . . . Good
luck
in
your
future
endeavors.
(Def. Ex. L.)
In effect, this letter notified Kline that the Union would not
represent him in a “step-four” appeal that would have entailed
arbitration of the dispute. Kline filed this lawsuit, alleging
that

the

Union

breached

its

duty

of

fair

representation

throughout the investigation and in failing to pursue another
appeal.
II.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.”

FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).

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A genuine

dispute exists “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury
could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
summary

judgment,

the

Court

does

not

Anderson v.

On a motion for

“make

credibility

determinations, weigh the evidence, or decide which inferences
to draw from the facts.”

Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 770

(7th Cir. 2003) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255).
III.
Kline
behalf

believes

more

the

ANALYSIS

Union

strenuously;

should

whether

have

a

advocated

reasonable

on

jury

his

could

determine that the Union failed to meet its obligations under
the law in this regard is the only issue before the Court.
Unions

have

a

statutory

duty

to

represent

fairly

their

members, a duty that “was developed over 20 years [prior to
1967]

in

a

discrimination

series
by

of

unions

cases

involving

certified

as

alleged

exclusive

racial

bargaining

representatives under the Railway Labor Act . . . and was soon
extended to unions certified under the [National Labor Relations
Act].”

Vaca

omitted).
“only

when

A

v.

Sipes,

union

[the]

386

breaches
union’s

U.S.
the

171,
duty

conduct

190
of

toward

(1967)

fair
a

(citations

representation
member

of

the

collective bargaining unit is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in
bad faith.”

Vaca, 386 U.S. at 190 (citing Humphrey v. Moore,

375 U.S. 335 (1964)).
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There is no serious argument that can be made in this case
that

the

Kline

Union’s

aims

for

conduct

such

toward

an

Kline

argument,

was

but

nondiscriminatory.

misses;

twice

in

his

response to the Union’s motion, Kline points out that he is
African-American and that Loner is white.

This alone is meant

to “suggest the unfair representation was animated by racial
discrimination

against

(Pl.’s Resp. at 13.)

Mr.

Kline

on

the

That’s not enough.

part

of

the

Union.”

The record contains no

evidence from which the Court could infer motivation based on
any racial factor.

Indeed, Kline has emphasized throughout this

case that he has no idea why Loner shoved him – he never raised
the possibility of racial hostility.
was

not

allege

raised

in

racial

his

initial

discrimination

The accusation likewise

Complaint.
now,

That

without

Kline

any

would

supporting

evidence whatsoever, smacks of opportunism.
There
faith.
Union

is

also

no

evidence

that

the

Union

acted

in

bad

Kline does not point to any motive on the part of the
(other

than

that

would

racism)

the

previously

suggest

discussed

dishonesty

in

its

implication

of

representation.

For example, in Ooley v. Schwitzer, there was evidence that a
union official believed the plaintiff’s claim had merit, but
that

the

reasons.

union

abstained

from

another

appeal

for

strategic

See, Ooley v. Schwitzer Div., Household Mfg., 961 F.2d

1293, 1303 (7th Cir. 1992).

The Seventh Circuit noted that this
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evidence could be enough to establish a bad-faith motive on the
part of the union.

See, id. at 1303-04.

The record in this

case shows only that the Union represented Kline at all points
during the investigation, until it thought further appeal would
be fruitless; when it reached that point, it sent Kline a letter
explaining
weak.

its

decision

and

obviously

believed

the

case

was

Kline has not offered evidence that the Union had an

ulterior motive.
Because there is no evidence of discriminatory intent or
bad

faith,

Kline’s

last

behavior was arbitrary.

hope

is

to

show

that

the

Union’s

To do this, Kline must allege facts

showing that the Union’s actions were “so far outside a wide
range of reasonableness that the actions rise to the level of
irrational
deferential

or

arbitrary

standard,

conduct.

courts

Under

should

not

this

extremely

substitute

their

judgment for that of the union, even if . . . it appears that
the union could have made a better call.”

Ooley, 961 F.2d at

1302; see also, Trnka v. Local Union No. 688, 30 F.3d 60, 61-62
(7th Cir. 1994).
Kline points to several alleged deficiencies in the Union’s
representation

as

evidence

of

arbitrary

conduct.

First,

he

claims the Union failed to search for other surveillance footage
outside of Gate B9 and failed to undertake a forensic analysis
of the existing footage to ensure absence of tampering.
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Hours

of surveillance footage are part of the record in this case.
The parties had to review quite a bit of it, because Kline
recalled the wrong date, twice, before settling on January 12.
After reviewing the footage from January 12, Kline believes that
he pinpointed one of the two shoves:

he captured a screenshot

of the moment from 8:09 a.m. on January 12, ostensibly showing
Loner’s arm, outstretched, in the direction of Kline, who is
obscured behind a pole.
could marshal.

That is the only video evidence Kline

He speculates that other cameras may have shown

more, but he offers no specific proof of the existence of other
cameras with better vantage points.
have suspected tampering?

And why should the Union

If an airline employee is assaulted

on the airport apron by a co-worker, that is a serious security
incident; it stands to reason that the responsible airline would
want to do everything in its power to catch the offender.

The

Union was not required to presume a conspiracy by United to
protect Loner by wiping surveillance footage.
Kline

next

argues

that

the

Union

acted

arbitrarily

in

various ways at his hearings, including by failing to call more
eye-witnesses, failing to introduce more exhibits, not demanding
a detailed written statement from Loner or calling him at the
hearings, and not investigating why one particular eye-witness
recanted.

In each instance, Kline fails to convey specifically

what each piece of additional evidence would show or how it
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would

have

changed

the

outcome

of

the

investigation.

See,

Garcia v. Zenith Electronics Corp., 58 F.3d 1171, 1176-77 (7th
Cir. 1995) (holding that a union’s failure to present favorable
evidence breaches the duty of fair representation only if the
evidence

probably

decision).

For

would
example,

have

brought

Kline

about

claims

the

a

crew

different
aboard

the

aircraft at Gate B9 should have been called to testify, but he
offers no evidence that the crew saw anything relating to the
assault.

Moreover, United’s written opinions from the hearings

reveal that the Union mounted a sincere defense, introducing
several
account.

exhibits

and

highlighting

(Def. Exs. J and K.)

the

lone

eye-witness’s

That witness initially said she

saw Loner shove Kline and then later recanted.

She testified at

one or both of the hearings, and the Union argued explicitly
that she changed her story because she wanted to keep her job.
Perhaps the Union could have pressed her further, but it is not
the

Court’s

strategy.

job

to

micromanage

the

Union’s

investigatory

See, Ooley, 961 F.2d at 1302.

Kline’s final argument is that the Union acted arbitrarily
in failing to pursue the fourth-step appeal.

Article XVIII of

the collective bargaining agreement covers grievance procedures.
(Def. Ex. C at 30.)

The agreement describes the procedures for

each step separately, and its wording suggests that the step-two
and step-three appeals are mandatory.
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But the step-four appeal

is discretionary, providing that the Union “may request” it if
the grievance remains unsettled.

The question is whether the

Union arbitrarily exercised its discretion in deciding not to
pursue the fourth-step appeal.

In answering that question, the

Court emphasizes that it is not important whether Kline’s story
of the assault is actually true; what is important is whether
the undisputed facts show that the Union had a reasonable basis
to believe Kline’s case was so weak that it did not warrant
further time and effort.
belief

was

exceedingly

And here, the Union’s basis for its
strong:

Kline

got

the

date

of

the

assault wrong four days after it supposedly occurred; he flubbed
the

date

again

some

time

later;

the

hours

of

surveillance

footage did very little (if anything) to bolster his story; his
lone eye-witness recanted; and he failed to connect his injury
to the assault when visiting the doctor.
In short, because the undisputed facts fail to show that
the Union acted arbitrarily, discriminatorily or in bad faith in
representing

Kline,

the

Union

fulfilled

representation as a matter of law.

its

duty

of

fair

The Court pauses briefly to

address some scattershot arguments made in Kline’s response to
the

Union’s

motion

for

summary

judgment

payments owed to him after his termination.
these

allegations,

Kline

attached

various

regarding

various

To substantiate
documents

to

his

response that were not produced in discovery in violation of
- 11 -

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a).

The production of these

documents well after discovery unfairly prejudices the Union.
Moreover, it is unclear how the Union would owe payments to
Kline rather than United Airlines, who is not a party to this
case.

Regardless, the Court dismisses the payment claims for

lack of evidence, because a party who fails to provide required
information

under

Rule

26(a)

is

not

allowed

to

use

that

information later “to supply evidence on a motion, at a hearing,
or at a trial. . . .”

FED. R. CIV. P. 37(c)(1); see also, Mannoia

v. Farrow, 476 F.3d 453, 456-57 (7th Cir. 2007).
IV.
For

the

reasons

CONCLUSION

stated

herein,

Defendants’

Summary Judgment [ECF No. 39] is granted.

Motion

for

The case is dismissed

with prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge
United States District Court
Dated:2/23/2016

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