Scott v. Colvin

Filing 21

ORDER: Plaintiff Cassandra Lynn Scott ("Plaintiff") appeals the Commissioner of Social Security's decision to deny his Social Security disability benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. Plaintiff has filed a motion for summ ary judgment 10 . We hereby grant plaintiff'S motion and deny the Commissioner's motion for summary judgment 16 . The Administrative Law Judge's decision is reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. - Signed by the Honorable Susan E. Cox on 10/27/2015. [For further details see order] Mailed notice (np, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
CASSANDRA LYNN SCOTT,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner )
of Social Security,
)
)
Defendant.
)

No. 14 C 6433
Magistrate Judge Susan E. Cox

ORDER
Plaintiff Cassandra Lynn Scott (“Plaintiff”) appeals the Commissioner of Social Security’s
decision to deny his Social Security disability benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act.
Plaintiff has filed a motion for summary judgment [dkt.10]. We hereby grant plaintiff’s motion
and deny the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment [dkt. 16]. The Administrative Law
Judge’s decision is reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
STATEMENT
Plaintiff appeals the Commissioner of Social Security’s decision to deny her Social
Security disability benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. 1 Plaintiff filed a motion for
summary judgment, and a motion for summary judgment has also been filed on behalf of
Defendant Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”). For
the reasons outlined below, we grant plaintiff’s motion and deny the Commissioner’s motion. The
Administrative Law Judge’s decision is reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
Plaintiff claims that she has been disabled since November 21, 2008, due to Crohn’s
Disease, as well as abdominal pain caused by her abdominal hysterectomy and myofascial flap

1

See 42 U.S.C. §§ 404(g), 216(i), 223(d).
1

closure, and appendectomy with wound complications. 2 Plaintiff applied for disability benefits
on August 31, 2010. 3 Her application was denied by the Social Security Administration; 4
Plaintiff filed a request for a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). Two
hearings were held before ALJ Daniel Dadabo. 5
Following the hearing, the ALJ determined, inter alia, that: 1) the plaintiff has not
engaged in substantial gainful activity since November 21, 2008; 6 2); Plaintiff’s severe
impairments are Crohn’s Disease, status post total abdominal hysterectomy and myofascial flap
closure, and appendectomy with wound complications; 7 3) Plaintiff’s impairments do not meet,
either individually or in combination, the severity requirements of the listing in 20 CFR 404,
Subpart P, Appendix 1; 8 4) the Plaintiff has the Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”) necessary
to perform sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(a), as long as she never climbs ropes,
ladders, or scaffolds, operates machinery, or works around unprotected hazards, and only
occasionally stoops, crouches, kneels or crawls; 9 5) given the previously determined RFC, the
ALJ believed that the Plaintiff is not capable of performing her previous work as a delivery
driver; 10 and 6) there are jobs in significant number that Plaintiff can perform. 11
Plaintiff’s primary care physician, Dr. Phillip Adjei provided a physical residual
functional capacity questionnaire for the Plaintiff. Plaintiff had been treating with Dr. Adjei
since 2009. Dr. Adjei opined that Plaintiff’s Crohn’s Disease, abdominal pain, and abdominal

2

R. at 19.
R. at 209-2012
4
R. at 121-122.
5
R. at 39.
6
R. at 19.
7
R. at 19.
8
R. at 20.
9
R. at 21.
10
R. at 25.
11
R. at 26.
3

2

wall abscess would prevent her from tolerating even low stress jobs because her condition
requires her to have frequent bowel movements, and that her Crohn’s disease is exacerbated by
stress. 12 He further stated that Plaintiff would have to take unscheduled breaks every 15-30
minutes, and could only sit for 30 minutes at a time without needing to get up. 13
At the hearing, the medical expert, Hugh Savage (“Savage”), testified that he believed
that “normal breaks would be sufficient” to accommodate Plaintiff’s Crohn’s Disease, and that
he “didn’t see any consistent mention in the record that would support” Dr. Adjei’s opinion that
Plaintiff could only sit for 30 minutes at a time. 14 Additionally, the non-examining state agency
consultant, James Hinchen (“Hinchen”), found that Plaintiff could sit for approximately 6 hours
in an 8-hour workday with normal breaks, and that Plaintiff’s reported symptoms were only
“partially credible.” 15
The ALJ, in making his RFC determination, assigned “substantial weight” to the opinions
of Hitchens and Savage, but decided not to give controlling weight to Dr. Adjei’s opinion on the
functional impact of Plaintiff’s Crohn’s Disease “because of inability to provide accurate and
specific detail.” 16 He further found that Dr. Adjei’s conclusions were “internally inconsistent
with his own charted progress notes.” 17 However, the ALJ failed to take into account or discuss
the treating relationship between Dr. Adjei and the Plaintiff.
DISCUSSION
I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

12

R. at 1085-86.
R. at 1086-87.
14
R. at 57-58.
15
R. at 449-455.
16
R. at 24-25.
17
R. at 24.
13

3

The ALJ’s decision must be upheld if it follows the administrative procedure for
determining whether the plaintiff is disabled as set forth in the Act, 18 if it is supported by
substantial evidence, and if it is free of legal error. 19 Substantial evidence is “relevant evidence
that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” 20 Although we review
the ALJ’s decision deferentially, she must nevertheless build a “logical bridge” between the
evidence and her conclusion. 21 A “minimal[] articulat[ion] of her justification” is enough. 22
II.

THE RFC DETERMINATION WAS ERRONEOUS BECAUSE THE ALJ
FAILED TO GIVE CONTROLLING WEIGHT TO THE TREATING
PHYSICIAN’S TESTIMONY.

The “treating physician” rule requires that an ALJ give controlling weight to the medical
opinion of a treating physician if it is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and
laboratory diagnostic techniques and not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence. 23 If an
ALJ does not give the opinion controlling weight, the ALJ must evaluate six criteria in deciding
how much weight to afford a medical opinion: (1) the nature and duration of the examining
relationship; (2) the length and extent of the treatment relationship; (3) the extent to which
medical evidence supports the opinion; (4) the degree to which the opinion is consistent with the
entire record; (5) the physician’s specialization if applicable; and (6) other factors which validate
or contradict the opinion. 24 An opinion is given controlling weight because “a treating physician
has the advantage over other physicians whose reports might figure in a disability case because
the treating physician has spent more time with the claimant.” 25
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a) and 416.920(a).
42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
20
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971).
21
Moore v. Colvin, 743 F.3d 1118, 1121 (7th Cir. 2014).
22
Berger v. Astrue, 516 F.3d 539, 545 (7th Cir. 2008).
23
20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2); Roddy v. Astrue, 705 F.3d 631, 636 (7th Cir. 2013).
24
20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)-(d)(6); Harris v. Astrue, 646 F. Supp. 2d 979, 999 (N.D. Ill. 2009).
25
Schmidt v. Astrue, 496 F.3d 833, 842 (7th Cir. 2007).
18
19

4

Here, the ALJ covered several of the factors, but failed to discuss the nature and duration
of Dr. Adjei’s examining relationship, or the length and extent of the treatment relationship. One
of the main reasons for the treating physician rule is that the treating physician’s familiarity with
the patient – and the nature and manifestation of the relevant condition – will allow the treating
physician to accurately assess how that condition will affect the patient’s ability to work. 26 As
such, the nature, duration, and extent of the treating relationship are crucial factors that must be
addressed by the ALJ. Here the ALJ made no mention of the treating history between Dr. Adjei
and the Plaintiff, and how that history may have provided additional credibility for Dr. Adjei’s
opinions. At the very least, the ALJ should have credited or discounted the treating relationship,
found that the remaining factors outweighed the value of the Plaintiff’s history with Dr. Adjei,
and made his finding that the opinions of Hitchen and Savage should be entitled to greater
weight. However, failing to acknowledge the Plaintiff’s treating relationship with Dr. Adjei at all
was legal error, and the ALJ’s decision is reversed.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we remand this matter for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is granted [dkt. 10] and the
Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment is hereby denied [dkt. 16].

ENTER:
DATED: October 27, 2015

_________________________

_

Susan E. Cox
United States Magistrate Judge

26

Gudgel v. Barnhart, 345 F.3d 467, 470 (7th Cir. 2003) (“More weight is given to the opinion of treating physicians
because of their greater familiarity with the claimant's conditions and circumstances”).
5