Elder v. Dart
Filing
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MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order: Defendants' motion to dismiss, R. 7 , is denied as moot. For the foregoing reasons, the Sheriffs motion to dismiss, R. 13 , is granted. Elders claims against the Sheriff made pursuant to Monell are dismissed w ithout prejudice, and Elders claims for conspiracy, false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution, are dismissed without prejudice. Elder has leave to attempt to cure the deficiencies described by the Court in an amended complaint by February 18, 2015. The status hearing scheduled for February 19, 2015 stands. The Court expects an Assistant States Attorney to appear at the February 19 status. Signed by the Honorable Thomas M. Durkin on 2/4/2015:Mailed notice(srn, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
EMPEROR ELDER,
Plaintiff,
No. 14 C 6495
v.
THOMAS DART, COOK COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS DIV. 2 –
DORM 1 PERSONNEL, COOK COUNTY
SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT,
Judge Thomas M. Durkin
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Emperor Elder alleges that he was falsely arrested and mistreated at the
Cook County Jail while he was detained there. R. 12. Specifically, he makes the
following claims: Count I for deliberate indifference to his medical needs under 42
U.S.C. § 1983; Count II for denial of “religious freedom and practice”; Count III for
failure to intervene; Count IV for denial of “access to legal information”; and Count
V for conspiracy, as well as “violation of rights that may be protected by the laws of
Illinois, such as false arrest, assault, battery, false imprisonment, malicious
prosecution, conspiracy, and/or any other claims that may be supported by the
allegations of this complaint.” R. 12 ¶ 38. Elder also alleges that Defendants “acted
pursuant to a custom or policy of defendant municipality” in violating his rights,
although he does not enumerate this claim as a separate count in his complaint. Id.
¶ 6. Cook County Sheriff Thomas Dart1 has moved pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss (1) Elder’s claims against Dart, which must be made
pursuant to the doctrine stated in Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs. of the City of N.Y.,
436 U.S. 658 (1978), and (2) Count V, to the extent that it includes claims for
conspiracy to violate Elder’s civil rights, and false arrest, false imprisonment, and
malicious prosecution in violation of Illinois law. R. 13. For the following reasons,
the Sheriff’s motion is granted.
Legal Standard
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion challenges the sufficiency of the complaint. See, e.g.,
Hallinan v. Fraternal Order of Police of Chi. Lodge No. 7, 570 F.3d 811, 820 (7th
Cir. 2009). A complaint must provide “a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), sufficient to
provide defendant with “fair notice” of the claim and the basis for it. Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). This standard “demands more than an
unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009). While “detailed factual allegations” are not required, “labels
and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will
not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The complaint must “contain sufficient factual
Elder does not make any allegations about Thomas Dart’s personal conduct, so the
Court assumes he has sued Dart in his official capacity as the Cook County Sheriff.
Suing the Sheriff in his official capacity has the same legal effect as suing the
Sheriff’s Office. See Budd v. Motley, 711 F.3d 840, 843-44 (7th Cir. 2013) (“Because
a suit against a government office and the officeholder are identical, the two
defendants—the Sheriff and his office—are redundant on this claim.”) (internal
citation omitted). The Court will refer to the Sheriff and his Office collectively as the
“Sheriff.”
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matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “‘A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’”
Mann v. Vogel, 707 F.3d 872, 877 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). In
applying this standard, the Court accepts all well-pleaded facts as true and draws
all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Mann, 707 F.3d at 877.
Complaints filed by pro se plaintiffs are held to “a less stringent standard
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Luevano v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 722
F.3d 1014, 1027 (7th Cir. 2013). Because pro se plaintiffs do not have the benefit of
legal expertise, courts are to ensure that their claims are given “fair and meaningful
consideration.” Philos Tech., Inc. v. Philos & D, Inc., 645 F.3d 851, 858 (7th Cir.
2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Background
On March 4, 2014, Judge Tommy Brewer of the Illinois Circuit Court signed
a civil contempt order against Elder for failure to pay child support. See R. 15.2
Elder was arrested that day and taken to the Cook County Jail. R. 12 ¶ 7. He was
eventually released on March 9. Id. Elder (referring to himself as “plaintiff”) alleges
that the “proceedings were given termination in favor of the plaintiff in a manner
Although not attached to or directly referenced in the complaint, the Court
considers the contempt order, Elder’s prisoner data sheet, and Elder’s electronic
docket, because they are “matters of public record” of which the Court “may take
judicial notice . . . without converting the 12(b)(6) motion into a motion for summary
judgment.” Anderson v. Simon, 217 F.3d 472, 474-75 (7th Cir. 2000).
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indicating plaintiff was innocent which may include a judgment of not guilty,
reversal of a conviction on direct appeal, expungement of the conviction, a voluntary
dismissal (SOL) by the prosecutor, nolle prosequi order, or purge of charges.” Id. ¶
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Elder alleges that he was mistreated in several different ways while he was
detained in Cook County Jail. Most of these allegations are not relevant to the
claims the Sheriff has moved to dismiss, so it is not necessary for the Court to
review them in detail. In general, however, Elder alleges that while he was in jail
he did not receive adequate medical care, he was denied materials necessary to
practice his religion, he was denied access to legal materials, and he was physically
injured. See R. 12.
More relevant to this motion, Elder alleges that “Defendant officer or official
[sic] acted pursuant to a custom or policy of defendant municipality.” Id. ¶ 6. Elder
describes the “custom or policy” as follows:
All officials of CCDOC execute all duties under the
mandating authority and regulations of Head Sheriff
Thomas Dart’s Cook County Sheriff Department.; [sic] it
is upon the CCDOC to ensure all detainees are properly
identified by legal name; it is upon CCDOC to ensure
detainees’ right to exercise religion shall not be
substantially burdened; it is upon the CCDOC to ensure
all disabled individuals receive necessary prescriptions
and orders of physician; all physical contact issues
between inmates or personnel within CCDOC are to be
recorded by officials; all CCDOC officials are not to
commit any action that would be disruptive to the
harmony of the facility or in disregard to the safety of
detainees or facility in general; all physical contact issues
between inmates or personnel within CCDOC are to be
recorded by officials; CCDOC is to ensure access to legal
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information necessary to adequately defend against any
allegations in cause of detainment within facility; CCDOC
is to provide access to necessary medical attention to
disabled detainees.
Id. Elder also alleges that Defendants “conspired together to violate one or more of
[his] civil rights.” Id. at 5 (Count V). The only other allegation Elder makes that
could be relevant to his conspiracy claim is, “All activities within the facility are
recorded by multiple officials at any given time. This ensures that all actions and/or
decisions, intentionally or negligently, are knowledgeable to all officials and/or
officers.” Id. ¶ 34. Elder also makes claims for “false arrest . . . false imprisonment,
[and] malicious prosecution,” id. ¶ 38, but he does not make any factual allegations
related to these claims.
Analysis
I.
Monell Claim
Although “a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat
superior theory,” “municipalities and other local government units [are] included
among those persons to whom § 1983 applies.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91; accord
Calhoun v. Ramsey, 408 F.3d 375, 379 (7th Cir. 2005). “A local governing body may
be liable for monetary damages under § 1983 if the unconstitutional act complained
of is caused by: (1) an official policy adopted and promulgated by its officers; (2) a
governmental practice or custom that, although not officially authorized, is
widespread and well settled; or (3) an official with final policy-making authority.”
Thomas v. Cook Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 604 F.3d 293, 303 (7th Cir. 2010).
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Elder has not alleged that “an official with final policy-making authority”
caused his injuries, and he has made only a conclusory allegation that his alleged
injuries are the result of a custom or policy of the Sheriff (or any other entity for
that matter). He purports to describe the custom or policy that caused his injuries,
but Elder’s description is merely a list of rights he believes detainees possess while
they are in jail. See R. 12 ¶ 6. Nowhere in his complaint does Elder explain what
custom or policy caused his injuries. Because he has failed to do that, his claims
against the Sheriff (and any other municipal entities) are dismissed.
Even if Elder had identified the custom or policy that caused his injuries, the
factual allegations in his complaint are insufficient to support the inference that a
custom or policy (of any kind) existed. One reason Elder’s allegations are
insufficient is that he only makes allegations of conduct directed at him. “[I]t is not
impossible for a plaintiff to demonstrate the existence of an official policy or custom
by presenting evidence limited to his experience. However, it is necessarily more
difficult for a plaintiff to demonstrate an official policy or custom based only on his
own experience because what is needed is evidence that there is a true municipal
policy at issue, not a random event.” Grieveson v. Anderson, 538 F.3d 763, 774 (7th
Cir. 2008) (internal citation omitted). For this reason, courts in this district
generally dismiss Monell claims in which “[a]ll of the allegations in the Complaint
pertain exclusively to [the plaintiff].” Davis v. Metro. Pier & Exposition Auth., 2012
WL 2576356, at *12 (N.D. Ill. July 3, 2012); Lewis v. County of Cook, 2011 WL
839753, at *14 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 24, 2011) (dismissing Monell claim because the
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plaintiff “does not allege facts supporting retaliatory conduct against anyone other
than herself”); Travis v. City of Chicago, 2012 WL 2565826, at *5 (N.D. Ill. June 29,
2012) (“although [the plaintiff] states that he himself made complaints, he does not
identify any other people who complained to the City”). Elder has not alleged that
the Sheriff had a policy to mistreat Elder in particular, and the Court cannot
reasonably infer that a custom or practice caused Elder’s alleged injuries from
Edler’s experience alone. Thus, his claims against the Sheriff are dismissed for this
reason as well.
Additionally, Elder’s allegations are insufficient because he has not alleged
more than one occurrence of any of the various forms of mistreatment he alleges.
Although “there is no clear consensus as to how frequently [certain] conduct must
occur to impose Monell liability [under the custom and practice theory],” the
Seventh Circuit has held “that it must be more than one instance, or even three.”
Thomas, 604 F.3d at 303 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Elder
has alleged that (1) he was denied adequate medical care; (2) his right to religious
freedom was violated; and (3) his right to legal materials was violated. He also
alleges that he was falsely arrested and imprisoned. The only facts common to these
allegations are Elder himself and the Cook County Jail. The Court has already
explained that Elder’s allegations fail to state a claim for a custom or practice
because he only makes allegations about his own experience. Absent some
connection among the various injuries Elder alleges other than Elder being the
subject of the injuries, they cannot serve as evidence of the same custom or practice.
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For the facts as Elder has stated them in his complaint to support a claim against
the Sheriff (or any other entity), Elder would also have to allege that the Sheriff had
separate policies to deny detainees adequate medical care, to violate their right to
religious freedom, to violate their right to access to legal materials, and to falsely
arrest and imprison them. But having only alleged one instance of each of these
rights violations, Elder’s complaint fails to allege a custom, policy, or practice. Thus,
his claims against the Sheriff also fail on this basis.
II.
Conspiracy
Elder also alleges that Defendants “conspired together to violate one or more
of Plaintiff’s civil rights.” R. 12 at 5. “A civil conspiracy is a combination of two or
more persons acting in concert to commit an unlawful act, or to commit a lawful act
by unlawful means.” Beaman v. Freesmeyer, --- F.3d ---, 2015 WL 156744, at *9 (7th
Cir. Jan. 13, 2015). “To establish conspiracy liability in a § 1983 claim, the plaintiff
must show that (1) the individuals reached an agreement to deprive him of his
constitutional rights, and (2) overt acts in furtherance actually deprived him of
those rights.” Id. Elder has alleged none of this. There is no mention of an
agreement to do anything in the complaint, let alone overt acts in furtherance of an
agreement. Elder merely makes the bare allegation that a “conspiracy” occurred.
This unadorned and conclusory statement is not enough to state a claim for
conspiracy, thus Elder’s conspiracy claim is dismissed.
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III.
False Arrest, False Imprisonment, and Malicious Prosecution
Under Illinois law, probable cause is a defense to false arrest, false
imprisonment, and malicious prosecution. See Gauger v. Hendle, 954 N.E.2d 307,
327 n.6 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 2011) (“If probable cause existed for the arrest, an
action for false arrest cannot lie.”); Martel Enters. v. City of Chicago, 584 N.E.2d
157, 161 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1991) (“Probable cause is an absolute bar to a claim
of false imprisonment.”); Johnson v. Target Stores, Inc., 791 N.E.2d 1206, 1219-20
(Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2003) (“If it appears that there was probable cause to
institute the proceedings, such fact alone constitutes an absolute bar to an action
for malicious prosecution.”). The Court has taken judicial notice of an order of
contempt issued by the Illinois Circuit Court. This order directed the Sheriff to
arrest Elder and gave the Sheriff probable cause to do so. Moreover, the Sheriff had
no discretion to ignore this order. Since the Sheriff had probable cause to arrest
Elder, Elder has failed to state a claim for false arrest, false imprisonment, and
malicious prosecution, and those claims are dismissed.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Sheriff’s motion to dismiss, R. 13, is granted.
Elder’s claims against the Sheriff made pursuant to Monell are dismissed without
prejudice, and Elder’s claims for conspiracy, false arrest, false imprisonment, and
malicious prosecution, are dismissed without prejudice. Elder has leave to attempt
to cure the deficiencies described by the Court in an amended complaint by
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February 18, 2015. The status hearing scheduled for February 19, 2015 stands. The
Court expects an Assistant State’s Attorney to appear at the February 19 status.
ENTERED:
______________________________
Honorable Thomas M. Durkin
United States District Judge
Dated: February 4, 2015
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