Elder v. Dart

Filing 51

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order: For the foregoing reasons, defendants' motion for summary judgment 38 is granted. Civil case terminated. Signed by the Honorable Thomas M. Durkin on 3/7/2016:Mailed notice(srn, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
EMPEROR ELDER,
Plaintiff,
No. 14 C 6495

v.

Judge Thomas M. Durkin

COOK COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE; THOMAS
J. DART; UNIDENTIFIED DEPUTIES,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Emperor Elder pro se alleges that Defendants violated his civil rights while
he was detained in the Cook County Jail (the “Jail”). R. 29. Defendants move for
summary judgment on all his claims. R. 38. For the following reasons, Defendants’
motion is granted.1
Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
322-23 (1986). The Court considers the entire evidentiary record and must view all
of the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences from that evidence in the light
most favorable to the nonmovant. Ball v. Kotter, 723 F.3d 813, 821 (7th Cir. 2013).

1 Elder never sought to have counsel appointed for him. At status hearings on
October 20 and December 15, 2014, the Court encouraged Elder to visit the Court’s
pro se assistance desk.

To defeat summary judgment, a nonmovant must produce more than “a mere
scintilla of evidence” and come forward with “specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial.” Harris N.A. v. Hershey, 711 F.3d 794, 798 (7th Cir. 2013).
Ultimately, summary judgment is warranted only if a reasonable jury could not
return a verdict for the nonmovant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
248 (1986).
Background
Elder was arrested on March 4, 2014 for contempt of a court order to pay
child support. R. 38-1 at 68-69; R. 38-3. He testified that he experienced seizures
upon his arrest, so he was taken to the emergency room. R. 38-1 at 68-69. Later that
day he was taken to the Cook County Jail where he was detained until March 9,
2014. Id. at 65.
I.

Elder’s Health Condition
Upon his arrival at the Jail on March 4, Elder testified that he was examined

by a doctor, including having a CT scan. Id. at 70, 101. The doctor prescribed
specific living conditions and multiple medications for a variety of Elder’s diagnosed
disabilities. Id. at 71. Specifically, Elder testified that he has the following
conditions:
Epilepsy. . . . Degenerative disc disease, gangrene,
susceptibility, . . . brachial plexus neuropathy, severe
brain injury. . . . I have a host of surgical implants, no
sense of pressure, texture or anything as far as my left
side goes. Chronic pain, chronic spasms, chronic seizures,
both gran mal and partial.

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Id. at 74. Elder testified that Jail personnel ignored or denied, in whole or in part,
the doctor’s orders and prescriptions. Id. at 73, 78, 96. Yet, Elder also testified that
he was taken to the hospital for a psychological evaluation on March 6. Id. at 97-98.
On March 8, 2014, Elder requested further medical attention because he
suffered a seizure. Id. at 84. Elder testified that the Jail personnel failed to provide
him medical treatment and instead “laughed” at him, “mocked” him, and “drag[ed]”
him to another room in the Jail, id. at 84-85, which Elder alleges constituted a
battery. Id. at 156. Elder also testified that other inmates witnessed this incident.
Id. at 83-84.
Elder also testified that he experienced chest pains during the duration of his
five-day detention. Id. at 103. He testified that he was given an EKG on March 9.
Id. at 157.
II.

Elder’s Religion
Elder testified that during his intake process at the Jail on March 4, he

informed Jail employees that he is a practitioner of the Hermetic philosophy. Id. at
114-15. Each of the five days Elder was detained at the Jail, he requested a copy of
the Kybalion, the religious book of Hermeticism; however, Elder was only offered a
King James Bible. Id. at 119-20. For a short period of time, thereafter, Elder
testified that unidentified Jail employees offered Elder manuscripts of more

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“conventional” religions, and verbally abused him for his “unconventional” beliefs.
Id. at 120-21.2
III.

Elder’s Name
Elder’s legal first name is “Emperor.” R. 38- 2. The Order of Adjudication that

led to Elder’s incarceration identifies him as “Anthony Elder AKA Emperor.” See R.
38-3. Elder testified that his Illinois state identification card and his social security
card identify him as “Emperor.” R. 38-1 at 106-07. Elder also testified that while he
was detained at the Cook County Jail he was forced to use the name “Anthony.” Id.
at 110-12. This made him “feel like” a “slave.” Id. at 140.
IV.

Elder’s Access to the Law Library
Elder also testified that he requested access to the Jail’s law library on

numerous occasions, as well as for the legal documents that led to his incarceration.
Id. at 141-42. Elder testified that Jail employees consistently denied or ignored his
requests, and that he was never given access to any legal information while he was
detained. See id.
V.

Elder’s Claims
Elder makes the following claims on the basis of his treatment while at the

Jail: Count I for deliberate indifference to his medical needs; Count II for denial of
religious freedom and practice; Count III for failure to intervene; Count IV for

2 Elder also testified that he was not given a private place to pray. But Elder did not
make a claim regarding this basis in his complaint, and he did not testify that he
ever actually requested a private place to pray. Defendants argue that the First
Amendment does not entitle Elder to a private prayer space. But since Elder has
not made a claim on this basis, and did not testify that he ever made such a request,
there is no claim for the Court to address on this motion.
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denial of access of legal information; and Count V for conspiracy, as well as
“violation of rights that may be protected by the laws of Illinois, such as false arrest,
assault, battery, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, conspiracy, and/or any
other claim that may be supported by the allegations of this complaint.” See R. 29.
Analysis
I.

The Defendants
As an initial matter, there is insufficient evidence to demonstrate that any of

the defendants in this case can be held liable for that harm Elder alleges. The Court
will address each defendant in turn.
A.

Sheriff Dart

“A plaintiff bringing a civil rights action must prove that the defendant
personally participated in or caused the unconstitutional actions.” Grieveson v.
Anderson, 538 F.3d 763, 776 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Alejo v. Heller, 328 F.3d 930,
936 (7th Cir. 2003)). Elder has made no allegations that Sheriff Dart participated in
or caused the harm Elder alleges, let alone produced any evidence to that effect.
Thus, summary judgment is granted in Sheriff Dart’s favor.
B.

Unidentified Deputies

A plaintiff’s “[f]ailure to identify a defendant during discovery, and the
consequential failure to serve that defendant with process, requires dismissal of the
unknown and unnamed defendant.” Frazier v. City of Chicago, 2015 WL 2147678, at
*2 (N.D. Ill. May 6, 2015) (citing Williams v. Rodriguez, 509 F.3d 392, 402 (7th Cir.
2007)). In October 2014, at the Court’s direction, Defendants produced documents to

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Elder relevant to his detention in the Jail. Four months later on February 4, 2015,
the Court dismissed Elder’s original complaint without prejudice for failure to state
a claim. R. 26. At a status hearing on February 19, 2015, at which Elder indicated
that he planned to file an amended complaint, the Court specifically explained to
Elder that in dismissing his original complaint the Court had identified weakness
in his Monell claims, and that he needed to use discovery to seek the names of the
individual Sheriff’s Deputies and other Jail employees who he came in contact with
while he was detained. Further, the Court described for Elder the style of letter he
should write to Defendants seeking such information. At a status hearing on April
16, 2015, Defense counsel represented, and Elder did not contest, that Elder had
served additional document requests on Defendants and Defendants had produced
several hundred pages of documents in response.
Four months later, discovery closed on August 31, 2015. At a status hearing
the next day on September 1, 2015, Elder acknowledged that he had received all the
discovery he sought and that he was prepared to respond to Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment. Despite eleven months of discovery and specific instructions
from the Court regarding the kind of evidence Elder needed to discover, Elder has
failed to identify individual defendants responsible for his alleged harm. Elder
cannot go to trial against unnamed defendants, thus dismissal is appropriate. See
Williams, 509 F.3d at 402 (“Discovery was [the plaintiff’s] opportunity to identify
this defendant, and he failed to do so before discovery closed . . . Due to [the
plaintiff’s] failure to identify this defendant . . . the district court’s grant of

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summary judgment for this unknown and unnamed defendant is modified to
dismiss this defendant from the case.”).
C.

Cook County Sheriff’s Office

“A local governing body may be liable for monetary damages under § 1983 if
the unconstitutional act complained of is caused by: (1) an official policy adopted
and promulgated by its officers; (2) a governmental practice or custom that,
although not officially authorized, is widespread and well settled; or (3) an official
with final policy-making authority.” Thomas v. Cook Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 604 F.3d
293, 303 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of the City of N.Y., 436
U.S. 658, 690 (1978)).
The Court dismissed the Monell claims in Elder’s original complaint because
he failed to allege that
‘an official with final policy-making authority’ caused his
injuries, and he . . . made only a conclusory allegation
that his alleged injuries are the result of a custom or
policy of the Sheriff (or any other entity for that matter).
He purports to describe the custom or policy that caused
his injuries, but Elder’s description is merely a list of
rights he believes detainees possess while they are in jail.
See R. 12 ¶ 6. Nowhere in his complaint does Elder
explain what custom or policy caused his injuries.
Because he has failed to do that, his claims against the
Sheriff (and any other municipal entities) are dismissed.
R. 26 at 6 (Elder v. Dart, 2015 WL 509555, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 4, 2015)). Elder’s
operative amended complaint suffers from the same deficiency, and he was unable
to discover evidence that he was harmed by any policy, custom, or practice of the
Sheriff’s Office. Although Elder alleges that he was denied the prescription
medication he needed while he was detained, he has not discovered any evidence
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that he suffered these alleged harms as the result of a Jail policy, custom, or
practice. As the Court noted in dismissing Elder’s claims previously, “it is not
impossible for a plaintiff to demonstrate the existence of an official policy or custom
by presenting evidence limited to his experience. However, it is necessarily more
difficult for a plaintiff to demonstrate an official policy or custom based only on his
own experience because what is needed is evidence that there is a true municipal
policy at issue, not a random event.” Grieveson v. Anderson, 538 F.3d 763, 774 (7th
Cir. 2008) (internal citation omitted). For this reason, courts in this district
generally dismiss Monell claims in which “[a]ll of the allegations in the Complaint
pertain exclusively to [the plaintiff].” Davis v. Metro. Pier & Exposition Auth., 2012
WL 2576356, at *12 (N.D. Ill. July 3, 2012); Lewis v. County of Cook, 2011 WL
839753, at *14 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 24, 2011) (dismissing Monell claim because the
plaintiff “does not allege facts supporting retaliatory conduct against anyone other
than herself”); Travis v. City of Chicago, 2012 WL 2565826, at *5 (N.D. Ill. June 29,
2012) (“although [the plaintiff] states that he himself made complaints, he does not
identify any other people who complained to the City”). No reasonable jury could
reasonably infer from Elder’s experience alone that a custom or practice caused
Elder’s alleged injuries. For that reason, summary judgment in favor of the Sheriff’s
Office is granted.

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II.

Substantive Claims
The Court has granted summary judgment to all Defendants. Nevertheless,

even if Elder had been able to identify a state actor responsible for his alleged
harms (which he has not), some of his claims would also fail on the merits.3
A.

Count II – Denial of Religious Freedom

Elder claims that Jail employees violated his First Amendment right to
freedom of religion by (1) by offering him a King James Bible, as opposed to a
Kybalion, the official book of Hermeticism, the religion Elder follows, and (2) by
referring to him as “Anthony Elder” as opposed to “Emperor Elder.” R. 29 at 3-4.
Failing to provide Elder with a Kybalion did not put “substantial pressure on
[Elder] to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs.” Thompson v. Holm, 809
F.3d 376, 379 (7th Cir. 2016). Elder testified that he owns a copy of the Kybalion
and that he could have asked a family member or friend to bring it to him, but he
was unwilling to have such a “prized possession” brought to an environment where
officials were denying him that same possession. R. 38-1 at 120-21. Thus, no
reasonable jury could find that Jail employees denied Elder of his First Amendment
right to freedom of religion by failing to provide him with a copy of the Kybalion,

3 Elder testified that he was prescribed certain medication when he entered the Jail,
that he was denied that medication, and that he then suffered a seizure. Defendants
have not produced any evidence to show that Elder’s testimony is false as a matter
of law. If Elder had identified an individual who was personally involved in
withholding or otherwise preventing him from taking his medication, the Court may
have denied summary judgment on that claim and his claim for failure to intervene.
But as discussed earlier, Elder has failed to identify any such individual.
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since Elder chose not to take advantage of an opportunity to have a copy brought to
him.
With regard to Elder’s name, the Seventh Circuit has held that “legitimate
interests in maintaining security and order within prisons support requiring
inmates to use their committed names [i.e., the name on their paperwork when they
were admitted to the jail] unless a state court approves a change-of-name
application.” See Mutawakkil v. Huibregtse, 735 F.3d 524, 526 (7th Cir. 2013). Elder
was arrested pursuant to a contempt of court order that identified him as “Anthony
Elder AKA Emperor.” Under those circumstances the Jail had a legitimate basis for
referring to Elder as “Anthony.” This is especially true considering that Elder was
only in the Jail for five days and it would be unreasonable to expect the Jail to
determine that Elder had legally changed his name to “Emperor” within that five
day period. Thus, summary judgment in Defendant’s favor is appropriate.
B.

Count IV – Denial of Access to Courts

Additionally, Elder alleges that Jail personnel denied him access to the Jail’s
law library and to legal documents pertaining to his incarceration. R. 29 at 5. In
order to succeed on a claim for denial of access-to-court, “the prisoner must prove
that prison officials failed to assist in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal
papers . . . [and] some quantum of detriment caused by the challenged conduct.”
Lehn v. Holmes, 364 F.3d 862, 868 (7th Cir. 2004). Elder testified that he was
denied access to a law library. But he did not testify or produce any other evidence
showing that this denial “prejudiced” him with respect to a legal proceeding. See

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Howard v. Webster, 339 Fed. App’x 616, 618 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[B]ecause [the
Constitution provides a right] to access the courts rather than legal materials or law
libraries, an inmate will not have a valid claim unless the prison authorities’
conduct prejudiced a potentially meritorious challenge to his conviction, sentence, or
conditions of confinement.”). Absent such evidence, no reasonable jury could find in
Elder’s favor and summary judgment against him is appropriate.
C.

Count V (paragraphs 34-38) – Conspiracy

Elder also alleges that Defendants “[c]onspired together to violate one or
more of [his] civil rights.” R. 29 at 5. As discussed earlier, Elder has failed to
identify any particular person who allegedly conspired against him. Having failed to
do so, it is also impossible for Elder to produce evidence of an agreement between
two or more individuals, which is necessary to succeed on such a claim. See Beaman
v. Freesmeyer, 776 F.3d 500, 510 (7th Cir. 2015).
D.

Count V (paragraph 39) – False Arrest, False Imprisonment,
and Malicious Prosecution

The Court previously addressed these claims in its opinion regarding the
motion to dismiss Elder’s original complaint.
Under Illinois law, probable cause is a defense to false arrest, false
imprisonment, and malicious prosecution. See Gauger v. Hendle, 954
N.E.2d 307, 327 n.6 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 2011) (“If probable cause
existed for the arrest, an action for false arrest cannot lie.”); Martel
Enters. v. City of Chicago, 584 N.E.2d 157, 161 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st
Dist.1991) (“Probable cause is an absolute bar to a claim of false
imprisonment.”); Johnson v. Target Stores, Inc., 791 N.E.2d 1206,
1219–20 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2003) (“If it appears that there was
probable cause to institute the proceedings, such fact alone constitutes
an absolute bar to an action for malicious prosecution.”). The Court has
taken judicial notice of an order of contempt issued by the Illinois
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Circuit Court. This order directed the Sheriff to arrest Elder and gave
the Sheriff probable cause to do so. Moreover, the Sheriff had no
discretion to ignore this order. Since the Sheriff had probable cause to
arrest Elder, Elder has failed to state a claim for false arrest, false
imprisonment, and malicious prosecution, and those claims are
dismissed.
R. 26 at 9 (Elder, 2015 WL 509555, at *4). Discovery has not revealed any new facts
regarding Elder’s state law claims. As a result, the Court’s analysis is unchanged
and still applies to Elder’s false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious
prosecution claims. Therefore, no reasonable jury could find for Elder with respect
to his state claims.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, R. 38,
is granted.
ENTERED:
______________________________
Honorable Thomas M. Durkin
United States District Judge
Dated: March 7, 2016

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