Bell v. Weis et al

Filing 79

Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 6/17/2016: Defendants' motions to dismiss (dkts. 51, 54, 63) are granted. Plaintiff's federal claims are dismissed with prejudice. His state law claims are dismissed without prejudice to refiling in state court. Fraternal Order of Police-Chicago Lodge Number 7's motion for sanctions is granted (dkt. 59). Civil case terminated. Mailed notice(mad, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
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Plaintiff,
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v.
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OFFICER STANEK, in his official and
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individual capacities, OFFICER REIFF, in his )
official and individual capacities, and
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FRATERNAL ORDER OF
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POLICE-CHICAGO LODGE NUMBER 7,
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Defendants.
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ARMANI BELL,

Case No. 14 C 6627
Judge Joan H. Lefkow

OPINION AND ORDER
Armani Bell makes claims against former Chicago Police Department Superintendent
Jody Peter Weis, 1 Chicago Police officers Stanek and Reiff, and the Fraternal Order of PoliceChicago Lodge Number 7 (FOP) alleging that they violated Bell’s civil rights, conspired against
him, and maliciously prosecuted him. (Dkt. 43.) The City and officer-defendants have moved
under Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss Bell’s second amended complaint (dkts. 51, 54). FOP has moved
to dismiss and for sanctions under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Dkts. 63,

1

Since Bell’s claims are brought against Weis in his official capacity, they amount to
claims against the City, as an official capacity claim against a government official is a suit
against the “government entity of which the official is a part.” Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d
724, 732 (7th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted); see also Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165–66,
105 S. Ct. 3099, 87 L. Ed. 2d 114 (1985). Since Weis no longer holds the office of
Superintendent, his name is removed from the caption.

1

59). For the reasons discussed below, defendants’ motions to dismiss (dkts. 54, 54, 63) are
granted and FOP’s motion for sanctions (dkt. 59) is granted. 2
BACKGROUND 3
The court summarized the allegations of the first amended complaint in its ruling
granting motions to dismiss that complaint. (See dkt. 38.) Those allegations need not be repeated
here other than to identify the few differences between the first and second amended complaints.
(Compare dkt. 23 ¶¶ 8–20, with dkt. 43 ¶¶ 8–20; see dkt. 43 ¶¶ 37–42, 44.) The first amended
complaint alleged that Bell was charged with murder after being picked out of an unduly
suggestive lineup. (Dkt. 23 ¶ 17.) The court dismissed the claim because Bell could not allege
the conduct deprived him of his right to a fair trial. In the second amended complaint Bell asserts
an entirely new claim–that while in police custody between January 17, 2011 and January 19,
2011, Stanek and Reiff, in an effort to persuade Bell to falsely implicate Berney Lockheart in the
murder under investigation, tortured and repeatedly beat him and, because Bell refused to
succumb, charged Bell with the murder, in violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be free
from unreasonable search and seizure. (Dkt. 43 ¶¶ 17, 22.) Bell also newly alleges that a
collective bargaining agreement (CBA) negotiated between the City and FOP provided Chicago
police officers when subject to interrogation rights above those of non-police officers including
himself, in violation of his right to equal protection of the laws. (Id. ¶¶ 37–42, 44). 4

2

The court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343, and 1367(a). Venue is
appropriate in this district under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).
3

Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are taken from Bell’s seconded amended
complaint and are presumed true for the purpose of resolving the pending motions. Active
Disposal, Inc. v. City of Darien, 635 F.3d 883, 886 (7th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).
4

In summary, Count I is against Stanek for excessive force under § 1983; Count II is
against Reiff for excessive force under § 1983; Count III is against both Stanek and Reiff for
2

LEGAL STANDARD
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges a complaint for failure to state a
claim on which relief may be granted. In ruling on such a motion, the court accepts as true all
well-pleaded facts in the plaintiff’s complaint and draws all reasonable inferences from those
facts in the plaintiff’s favor. Active Disposal, 635 F.3d at 886 (citation omitted). To survive a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the complaint must not only provide the defendant with fair notice of a
claim’s basis, but must also establish that the requested relief is plausible on its face. See
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007). The allegations in the
complaint must be “enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550
U.S. at 555. At the same time, the plaintiff need not plead legal theories; it is the facts that count.
Hatmaker v. Mem’l Med. Ctr., 619 F.3d 741, 743 (7th Cir. 2010); see also Johnson v. City of
Shelby, 574 U.S. ---, 135 S. Ct. 346, 346, 190 L. Ed. 2d 309 (2014) (per curiam) (“Federal
pleading rules call for ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing the pleader is entitled to
relief’; they do not countenance dismissal of a complaint for imperfect statement of the legal
theory supporting the claim asserted.” (citations omitted)).
ANALYSIS
I.

Federal Law Claims
Defendants contend that all of Bell’s federal claims are barred by the statute of

limitations. While true that statutes of limitations provide an affirmative defense that need not be

civil conspiracy (apparently under Illinois law); Count IV is against Stanek and Reiff for
malicious prosecution (apparently under Illinois law); Count V asserts a “Monell claim” against
the City, see infra note 7; Count VI is against FOP and the City claiming a conspiracy under
§ 1983 or § 1985; and Count VII is against the City under § 1983 for the conduct alleged in
Count VI.
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anticipated in the complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, United States v. Lewis, 411 F.3d 838,
842 (7th Cir. 2005), “a party may plead itself out of court by pleading facts that establish an
impenetrable defense to its claims,” Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1086 (7th Cir.
2008). Therefore, where “the allegations of the complaint itself set forth everything necessary to
satisfy the affirmative defense,” the court may dismiss a claim on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Lewis,
411 F.3d at 842. But “[u]nless the complaint alleges facts that create an ironclad defense, a
limitations argument must await factual development.” Foss v. Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc., 394
F.3d 540, 542 (7th Cir. 2005). Here, the facts create an ironclad defense.
The statute of limitations for § 1983 claims is that of the forum state’s statute of
limitations for personal injury claims, which in Illinois is two years. See Wallace v. Kato, 549
U.S. 384, 387, 127 S. Ct. 1091, 166 L. Ed. 2d 973 (2007); 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/13–202.
Although state law governs the statute of limitations, federal law controls when the limitations
period begins to run. See Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388. Section 1983 claims accrue when the
plaintiff could have sued for the alleged constitutional injury. See Hileman v. Maze, 367 F.3d
694, 696 (7th Cir. 2004) (“First, a court must identify the injury . . . [and second], it must
determine the date on which the plaintiff could have sued for that injury.”); see also Wallace,
549 U.S. at 388 (noting that a § 1983 claim accrues “when the plaintiff has a complete and
present cause of action, that is, when the plaintiff can file suit and obtain relief” (citations
omitted)). The same statute of limitations that applies to § 1983 claims brought against
individuals also applies to Monell claims, see White v. City of Chi., No. 11 C 7802, 2014 WL
958714, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 12, 2014), and §§ 1983 and 1985 conspiracy claims, see Mehta v.
Beaconridge Improvement Ass’n, 432 F. App’x 614, 617 (7th Cir. 2011); Manley v. City of Chi.,
236 F.3d 392, 395 (7th Cir. 2001).

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A.

Fourth Amendment Claims Against Stanek And Reiff (Counts I And II)

Bell’s allegations of the officers’ use of excessive force occurred while he was in police
custody, i.e., sometime between January 17, 2011 and January 19, 2011, the date he was charged
with murder. As such, Bell had a “complete and present cause of action” at the latest on the
19th. As such, the claim is barred by the statute of limitations.5
Accordingly, counts I and II must be dismissed with prejudice. 6
B.

Monell Claims Against The City (Count V)

Count V alleges that the City is vicariously liable for Stanek and Reiff’s alleged conduct.
As was true on the earlier motion to dismiss (as indicated in dkt. 38 at 4), the parties agree that
Bell is asserting a Monell claim, through which local governments may be held liable for
constitutional violations arising from their policies, customs, or practices. See Monell v. Dep’t of
Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978); see also
Darchak v. City of Chi. Bd. of Educ., 580 F.3d 622, 629 (7th Cir. 2009). 7 As stated above, a

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Bell’s original complaint was filed on August 27, 2014 (dkt. 1). His first amended
complaint was filed on March 28, 2015 (dkt. 22), and refiled on March 30, 2015, with the names
of the officer defendants corrected (dkt. 23). Neither of these complaints alleged any facts
relating to Stanek and Reiff’s torture of Bell. Bell’s response to the motion does not explicitly
address the statute of limitations. (See dkt. 68.)
6

It is not entirely clear whether Bell’s civil conspiracy (count III) and malicious
prosecution (count IV) claims against Stanek and Reiff are based in federal or state law. See
infra, note 7. This court previously assumed that they were based in state law. (See dkt. 38 at 5.)
Nonetheless, to the extent that Bell is alleging that Stanek and Reiff conspired to violate his
constitutional rights—a permissible § 1983 claim—that claim suffers from the same statute of
limitations problem as the Fourth Amendment claims since all of the conduct relating to the
conspiracy occurred between January 17 and January 19, 2011. Likewise, to the extent that
Bell’s malicious prosecution claim is intended to be brought under § 1983, the claim is also
untimely.
7

Bell’s Monell allegations (labeled as respondeat superior liability) conflate the City’s
vicarious liability under Illinois law and its Monell liability under federal law. For simplicity, the
court considers only any potential federal claim in its Monell analysis. A malicious prosecution
5

Monell claim is also brought under § 1983 and must be filed within the statute of limitations
period.
Accordingly, count V is dismissed with prejudice.
C.

Equal Protection and Conspiracy Claims Against The City And FOP
(Counts VI And VII)

Bell alleges that the City violated, and FOP conspired to violate, Bell’s right to equal
protection of the laws. His theory seems to be that the City and FOP, by entering into a CBA
which contains a “Bill of Rights” for police officers under investigation for misconduct that
effectively immunizes them from being disciplined, amounts to an equal protection violation. 8
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects “the right to be free from
invidious discrimination in statutory classifications and other governmental activity.” Nabozny v.
Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446, 453 (7th Cir. 1996) (quoting Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 322, 100 S.

claim cannot form the basis of a § 1983 claim when state law, as is the case in Illinois, provides
an adequate remedy. See Newsome v. McCabe, 256 F.3d 747, 750 (7th Cir. 2001); see also
Saunders-El v. Rohde, 778 F.3d 556, 560 (7th Cir. 2015) (“In Newsome, we established that the
existence of a state law claim for malicious prosecution renders unavailable § 1983 as a vehicle
for bringing a federal malicious prosecution claim.”); Serino v. Hensley, 735 F.3d 588, 592–93
(7th Cir. 2013); Fox v. Hayes, 600 F.3d 819, 840–842 (7th Cir. 2010); Brooks v. City of Chi.,
564 F.3d 830, 833 (7th Cir. 2009). Neither do the allegations support the finer point that claims
involving the fabrication of evidence—even though they may bear similarities to state-law
malicious prosecution claims—can be brought under § 1983 if there has been a deprivation of
liberty. See Sanders-El, 778 F.3d at 559–62; Whitlock v. Brueggemann, 682 F.3d 567, 580 (7th
Cir. 2012) (“We have consistently held that a police officer who manufacturers false evidence
against a criminal defendant violates due process if that evidence is later used to deprive her of
liberty in some way.”).
8

Bell referred to but did not attach a copy of the CBA to his complaint. FOP attached a
copy in response to Bell’s motion to dismiss (see dkt. 64-1), which Bell has also quoted from
during his briefing, (see, e.g., dkt. 67 at 2). The court may consider the CBA here without
converting defendants’ motions to dismiss into motions for summary judgment. See Wright v.
Associated Ins. Cos., 29 F.3d 1244, 1248 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting that a court may consider
documents attached to a motion to dismiss “if they are referred to in the plaintiff’s complaint and
are central to his claims”).

6

Ct. 2671, 65 L. Ed. 2d 784 (1980)). As such, a plaintiff must show that similarly situated persons
are treated unequally and that there is no rational basis for the unequal treatment. See Srail v.
Vill. of Lisle, 588 F.3d 940, 943 (7th Cir. 2009) (“Rational basis review requires the plaintiff to
prove that (1) the state actor intentionally treated plaintiffs differently from others similarly
situated; (2) this difference in treatment was caused by the plaintiffs’ membership in the class to
which they belong; and (3) this different treatment was not rationally related to a legitimate state
interest.”)
There are a host of problems with these claims, including the dubious proposition that
FOP members are similarly situated with police detainees for purposes of equal protection
analysis. But even if the alleged facts supported an equal protection violation, the claims would
be time-barred since all of the acts necessary for Bell to bring the claims (the signing of the CBA
and Stanek and Reiff’s interrogation of Bell) occurred before charges were pressed against him
on January 19, 2011. Bell argues that these equal protection claims did not accrue until his
malicious prosecution claim accrued at his acquittal. The argument seems to be grounded in the
rule of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 489–90, 114 S. Ct. 2364, 129 L. Ed. 2d 383 (1994),
that a §1983 claim for an unconstitutional conviction or sentence does not accrue until the
conviction or sentence is invalidated. This argument, however, is precisely contrary to Seventh
Circuit precedent. See Gonzalez v. Quezada, No. 10 C 458, 2011 WL 613553, at *1–2 (N.D. Ill.
Feb. 9, 2011) (declining to apply Heck to the plaintiff’s equal protection clause § 1983 claim
based on police misconduct because the claim accrued when the plaintiff was arrested as by that
point the plaintiff knew or should have known that his constitutional rights had been violated);
see also Limestone Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Lemont, 520 F.3d 797, 805 (7th Cir. 2008) (noting that
§ 1983 equal protection claims accrue at the time of the alleged bad act); Brooks v. Ross, 578

7

F.3d 574, 579 (7th Cir. 2009) (noting that § 1983 conspiracy to prosecute claim accrued on date
of indictment); Mehta, 432 F. App’x at 617 (7th Cir. 2011) (finding § 1983 conspiracy claim was
untimely because all of the acts connected to the conspiracy occurred outside of the statute of
limitations). Bell’s original complaint was not filed until August 27, 2014, and, therefore, even if
he had made these allegations in that complaint against both the City and FOP, it would have
been untimely.
Accordingly, counts VI and VII are dismissed with prejudice.
II.

State Law Claims
With no remaining federal claims, the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction

over Bell’s claims of civil conspiracy and malicious prosecution against Reiff and Stanek. See 28
U.S.C. § 1367(c) (“The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a
claim . . . if . . . the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original
jurisdiction[.]”); Groce v. Eli Lilly & Co., 193 F.3d 496, 501 (7th Cir. 1999) (“[I]t is the wellestablished law of this circuit that the usual practice is to dismiss without prejudice state
supplemental claims whenever all federal claims have been dismissed prior to trial.”).
Accordingly, Bell’s state law claims are dismissed without prejudice to refiling in state
court.
III.

Sanctions
FOP argues that sanctions should be imposed against Bell’s attorney for filing a

complaint that was not grounded in law or fact. (Dkt. 59.) In this motion, FOP makes the same
arguments it makes in support of its motion to dismiss—that the claims are barred by the statute

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of limitations and are not warranted by existing law. 9 Bell responds that the claims are not timebarred and that FOP’s assertion that his equal protection claim is groundless is itself
groundless.
FOP asserted in its demand letter that Bell had no legal or factual basis for pursuing any
claim against it. Bell refers to a conversation with opposing counsel in which counsel asserted
that an equal protection claim can only be brought if a suspect class is involved. Bell’s counsel
rejected that assertion, correctly countering that a suspect class is not required to assert an equal
protection claim. See St. John’s United Church of Christ v. City of Chi., 502 F.3d 616, 637–38
(7th Cir. 2007) (“If no fundamental rights or suspect categories are at issue, ‘[t]he general rule is
that legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the
statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.’” (quoting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440, 105 S. Ct. 3249, 87 L. Ed. 2d 313 (1985)) (alteration in
original). 10 Bell, however, does not articulate a “no rational basis” theory wherein the City (alone
or in a conspiracy with FOP) intentionally treated plaintiff differently from others similarly
situated. In the first instance, the CBA does not apply to Bell, so how could he be treated
differently under that agreement? Further, as FOP points out, a police officer under criminal
investigation is not protected by the CBA’s Bill of Rights and is thus not treated differently from
Bell. As a citizen of the City of Chicago, Bell might suggest that FOP members (who must also
reside in the City) are treated more favorably by the City with respect to discipline in
employment. But that has nothing to do with the facts presented here. Nor is there any authority
9

Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2) imposes a duty to file pleadings that “are warranted by existing
law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for
establishing new law.”
10

In its reply brief (dkt. 70 at 4), FOP appears to recognize this point—attributing its
original statement of law to its difficulty in deciphering the allegations in Bell’s complaint.
9

indicating that an arrestee in police custody is similarly situated to a public employee with
respect to investigation of misconduct. The equal protection claim asserted is so far from the
mainstream of equal protection analysis that it cannot be fairly described as a nonfrivolous
argument for extending or changing existing law.
As such, the court finds that Bell, by his counsel, in filing the second amended complaint
against FOP, having been specifically reminded by this court that an amended complaint must be
consistent with Rule 11 (see dkt. 38), has violated Rule 11(b)(2). The court does not accept
FOP’s argument that the complaint was filed to harass FOP. Rather, it infers that counsel’s effort
to obtain a favorable outcome for his client resulted in a legally frivolous complaint against FOP.
As such, the court grants the motion and imposes the sanction of an admonition to Bell’s counsel
that he is obligated and expected to have an objectively reasonable basis for filing a law suit in
this court.
Accordingly, FOP’s motion for sanctions is granted.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
Defendants’ motions to dismiss (dkts. 51, 54, 63) are granted. Plaintiff’s federal claims
are dismissed with prejudice. His state law claims are dismissed without prejudice to refiling in
state court. FOP’s motion for sanctions is granted (dkt. 59). This case is terminated.

Date: June 17, 2016

_____________________________
U.S. District Judge Joan H. Lefkow

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