Lewis v. Donahoe et al
Filing
34
MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order signed by the Honorable Ronald A. Guzman on 6/18/2015: For the reasons stated below, Defendant's motion to dismiss 21 is granted. Civil case terminated. Mailed notice (cjg, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
Marcus Lewis,
Plaintiff,
)
)
)
v.
)
)
Patrick R. Donahue, Postmaster General, )
Defendant.
)
)
Case No: 14 C 6707
Judge Ronald A. Guzmán
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
For the reasons stated below, Defendant’s motion to dismiss [21] is granted. Civil case
terminated.
STATEMENT
Marcus Lewis, a postal worker, filed a complaint alleging that he was terminated in
retaliation for filing a complaint with the Postal Service’s Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEO”)
office regarding a ten-year “9/11" ceremony at work, which apparently included prayer. According
to Lewis, on November 27, 2012, he received a communication from the EEO office acknowledging
his claim and scheduling discovery and a hearing. Defendant, through Lewis’s plant manager,
allegedly retaliated by sending Lewis a letter dated December 4, 2012 indicating that management
was aware that Lewis was seeking to be placed on the ballot to run for Congress and that such action
violated the Hatch Act.1 Lewis further alleges that Defendant had knowledge of his EEO charge
when it fired him via a third party, the Office of Special Counsel (“OSC”), on May 16, 2014.
Defendant moves to dismiss on the ground that the letter regarding possible violation of the
Hatch Act was not an adverse employment action and the claim related to his termination was
already litigated through the Merit Systems Protection Board (“MSPB”).
While Lewis attached to his complaint only a denial of his motion for reconsideration before
the Equal Opportunity Employment Commission (“EEOC”),2 Defendant has attached to his motion
to dismiss copies of several documents from the EEOC, the OSC, the MSPB, and the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The Court is permitted on a motion to dismiss for failure to state
a claim to take judicial notice of public documents, court filings and documents that are central to
1
The Hatch Act precludes certain federal employees from becoming candidates for
public office in partisan political elections. See 5 U.S.C. § 7323(a).
2
Lewis timely filed the instant complaint exactly 90 days after the EEOC’s denial of the
motion for reconsideration.
Lewis’s complaint. Window World of Chicagoland, LLC v. Window World, Inc., No. 13 C 4624,
2015 WL 2193752, at *1 (N.D. Ill. May 7, 2015) (“Rule 12(b)(6) limits this Court's consideration
to ‘allegations set forth in the complaint itself, documents that are attached to the complaint,
documents that are central to the complaint and are referred to in it, and information that is properly
subject to judicial notice.’”) (citation omitted).
As to the December 4, 2012 letter, Defendant asserts that it did not constitute an adverse
employment action, and therefore it is not actionable under Title VII. An adverse employment action
must be materially adverse, not merely an inconvenience or a change in job responsibilities.
Hilt–Dyson v. City of Chi., 282 F.3d 456, 465 (7th Cir. 2002). An adverse employment action is one
that significantly alters the terms and conditions of the employee's job. Stutler v. Ill. Dep't of Corr.,
263 F.3d 698, 703 (7th Cir. 2001). A written warning, however, does not constitute an adverse
action. See Griffin v. Potter, 356 F.3d 824, 829 (7th Cir. 2004). Therefore, to the extent that Lewis
contends that the December 4, 2012 letter supports a claim for retaliation, the motion to dismiss this
claim is granted.
Further, Defendant’s motion to dismiss is granted to the extent that Lewis claims he was
improperly terminated for a Hatch Act violation. Lewis’s challenge to his May 2014 termination
based on a Hatch Act violation was fully litigated before the MSPB and appealed to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, see 5 U.S.C. § 7703, which upheld the MSPB’s
decision that Lewis’s violation of the Hatch Act for running as a candidate for Congress warranted
removal. See Lewis v. MSPB, 115 FMSR 32 (Dec. 4, 2014); (Gov’t’s Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss,
Dkt. # 22, Ex. H.) As to prior judgments by a federal court, res judicata has three elements: “(1) an
identity of the parties or their privies in the first and second lawsuits; (2) an identity of the cause of
action; and (3) a final judgment on the merits in the first suit.” Adams v. City of Indianapolis, 742
F.3d 720, 736 (7th Cir. 2014). Here, the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
addressing Lewis’s dismissal is res judicata as to any claim that Lewis’ dismissal for violating the
Hatch Act was improper.
Lewis’s complaint, however, also alleges that he was terminated, at least in part, in retaliation
for having filed an EEO complaint with the Postal Service. Lewis, however, fails to indicate that
he has exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to this claim. Title VII requires a plaintiff
to present his Title VII claims to the EEOC before filing a federal lawsuit. 42 U.S.C. §
2000e–5(f)(1); Gorence v. Eagle Food Ctrs, Inc., 242 F.3d 759, 763 (7th Cir. 2001). Because Lewis
did not exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to his claim that he was terminated for
having filed an EEO complaint with the Postal Service, this claim is dismissed.
For the reasons stated above, Defendant’s motion to dismiss is granted. Civil case
terminated.
Date: June 18, 2015
___________________________________
Ronald A. Guzmán
United States District Judge
2
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