Mastriani v. Chicago Transit Authority et al
Filing
55
Enter MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo on 7/7/2016. Mailed notice (jdh)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
Vince Mastriani,
Plaintiff,
v.
Chicago Transit Authority,
Defendant.
)
)
)
)
)
) Case 14 CV 6800
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
In this action, plaintiff—a former Bus and Truck Mechanic
for defendant Chicago Transit Authority (the “CTA”)—claims that
after a work injury to his back left him unable to work for a
period of time, he was medically cleared and able to return to
work, with restrictions, in June of 2012.
He asserts that the
CTA denied his request for reasonable accommodations consistent
with those restrictions, which would have allowed him to perform
the essential functions of his job, and instead terminated him
in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112(b)(5) (the “ADA”).
Before me is defendant’s motion for
summary judgment, which I deny for the following reasons.
I.
The
undisputed
record
establishes
that
plaintiff
was
working as a Bus and Truck Mechanic for the CTA until 2004, when
he injured his back on the job.
for
approximately
medical
care
one
and
year,
took
Plaintiff was unable to work
during
narcotic
which
pain
time
he
received
on
a
medications
daily
basis.
Plaintiff returned to work in September of 2005 with work
restrictions of no excessive bending and twisting.
continued
to
take
controlled
pain
medications
Plaintiff
at
the
time.
Neither his back condition nor his restrictions affected the way
plaintiff
began
performed
having
his
duties,
back
spasms
Plaintiff
reported
these
McGinnis,
explaining
that
well.”
A.
but
in
related
spasms
“the
November
to
to
his
his
medication
of
original
2007,
injury.
supervisor,
wasn’t
he
Mark
working
as
Mastriani Dep. at 58:18-19, Pl.’s L.R. 56.1 Stmt., Exh.
This prompted McGinnis to ask what medications plaintiff was
taking, and to inform plaintiff, in response to his answer, “you
can’t take that while you’re at work.”
Id. at 58:21.
Defendant
explains that a Bus and Truck Mechanic is a “safety sensitive”
position
prohibited
within
by
the
CTA,
Department
which
of
meant
that
Transportation
2
plaintiff
regulations
was
from
working while taking narcotic medications.
Cobb Dep. at 57:17-
58:2, Def.’s L.R. 56.1 Stmt., Exh. B. 1
Plaintiff did not return to work after his conversation
with
McGinnis,
and
on
approximately
November
7,
2007,
he
received a letter from defendant notifying him that he had been
placed in “Temporary Medical Disability/Area 605,” a status that
allowed him to remain employed while not actively working and to
treat his medical condition.
Although the face of the letter
states that plaintiff was allowed to remain in “TMD” for two
years from his last day worked, with the possibility of a oneyear extension, the parties agree that plaintiff remained in
Area 605 for almost five years, until July of 2012.
Mastriani
Dep., Pl.’s L.R. 56.1 Stmt., Exh. A at Exh. 1.
By letter dated May 29, 2012, defendant informed plaintiff
that he had been in Area 605 in excess of the time allowed, and
that
he
was
required
either
to
return
to
active
employment
status by July 2, 2012; to be administratively separated; or to
elect
one
of
several
additional
options,
which
included
accepting a disability pension or taking early retirement, among
others.
3.
Mastriani Dep., Pl.’s L.R. 56.1 Stmt., Exh. A at Exh.
In response to that letter, plaintiff visited his personal
1
Plaintiff does not dispute that his position was “safety
sensitive,” but he asserts that he was never told that that
meant he was prohibited from taking narcotics while working.
Pl.’s L.R. 56.1 Stmt. at ¶ 10.
3
physician,
Dr.
Heyer,
who
filled
out
a
physical
capacities
evaluation form and also wrote a letter stating that plaintiff
was medically cleared for work with enumerated restrictions. See
id. at Exhs. 5, 4. Those restrictions were: 1) no repetitive
trunk
function
and
no
repetitive
trunk
rotation;
2)
accommodation to allow plaintiff to wear a TENS unit 2 at all
times while at work; 3) allowing plaintiff to take certain doses
of Ibuprofen and acetaminophen while at work; and 4) allowing
plaintiff to take controlled pain medication at home after work,
but not immediately prior to or during work.
addition,
Dr.
Heyer
indicated
on
the
Id. at Exh. 4.
physical
In
capacities
evaluation form that plaintiff could lift a maximum of 40 pounds
occasionally, and that he could kneel, squat, crawl, and walk on
uneven ground or an elevated structure occasionally.
Id. at
Exh. 5.
Plaintiff
Accommodations
submitted
Review
Dr.
Heyer’s
Committee
letter
(“ARC”),
whose
to
the
three
CTA’s
voting
members—Larry Wall, Cara Levinson, and a third individual whose
identity no one recalls, but who all agree would have come from
plaintiff’s
reviewed
job
site
plaintiff’s
and
been
familiar
restrictions
2
to
with
determine
his
if
position-he
could
Plaintiff explains that a TENS unit is “an electrical device
you wear on your belt and it has suction cups that stick to your
back and it’s a stimulator, electric shock stimulator, and it’s
supposed to help loosen muscles and stuff.”
Mastriani Dep. at
69:22-70:2.
4
return
to
manager,
work.
also
Anna
Cobb,
attended
the
defendant’s
meeting,
voting member of the ARC.
benefits
although
compliance
she
was
not
a
Cobb testified that of the four
restrictions enumerated in Dr. Heyer’s letter, the only one that
the committee considered to pose a problem was the first: no
repetitive
trunk
function
and
no
repetitive
trunk
rotation.
Cobb Dep. at 38:1-40:12, 44:2-22. Def.’s L.R. 56.1 Stmt., Exh.
B.
Wall and Levinson both stated that they did not remember
plaintiff or the specifics of his accommodation request, see
Wall
Dep.
at
38:6-40:14,
Def.’s
L.R.
56.1
Stmt.,
Exh.
C;
Levinson Dep. at 42:13-23, Def.’s L.R. 56.1 Stmt., Exh. F, but
Levinson
agreed
that
the
no
repetitive
trunk
function
or
rotation restriction was the only one that would have posed an
accommodation problem.
members
of
the
ARC
Levinson Dep. at 45:5-48:4.
voted
to
deny
plaintiff’s
All three
request
for
accommodation.
III.
The
ADA
requires
an
employer
to
make
reasonable
accommodations that will allow a “qualified individual with a
disability” to “perform the essential functions of his or her
job.”
42
U.S.C.
§ 12112(b)(5)(A).
To
state
a
prima
facie
failure to accommodate claim, plaintiff must identify evidence
from which a reasonable jury could conclude: 1) that he is a
qualified individual with a disability; 2) that CTA was aware of
5
his disability; and 3) that CTA failed to reasonably accommodate
the disability.
(7th
Cir.
Mobley v. Allstate Ins. Co., 531 F.3d 539, 545
2008).
Defendant
argues
that
undisputed
evidence
shows that plaintiff cannot establish the first or the third of
these elements.
With respect to the first element, defendant argues that
plaintiff
was
perform
major
walking,
and
not
life
that
disabled
because
activities
he
could
he
as
such
groom
admits
sitting,
himself,
that
he
could
standing
perform
and
household
chores, and engage in recreational activities such as golfing
and
camping,
without
limitation.
It
is
true
that
plaintiff
testified at his deposition that in 2012, his medical condition
did not limit his ability to walk, sit, or stand.
Mastriani
Dep. at 109:2-15, Pl.’s L.R. 56.1 Stmt., Exh. A.
Plaintiff
later clarified in his declaration, however, that he could do
these
things
using
the
declaration
only
TENS
as
while
unit.
taking
narcotic
Defendant
self-serving
and
urges
pain
me
to
contradictory
medication
and
disregard
the
to
plaintiff’s
deposition testimony, but there is nothing inherently wrong with
a self-serving declaration, see Hill v. Tangherlini, 724 F.3d
965, 967 and n. 1 (7th Cir. 2013), and I agree with plaintiff
that the statements he makes in it do not directly contradict
his
deposition
testimony.
Defendant
does
not
argue
that
if
plaintiff’s declaration is considered, a reasonable jury still
6
could not find that his back injury substantially impaired a
major life activity, so I move on to defendant’s next argument.
See Carter v. Pathfinder Energy Services, Inc., 662 F.3d 1134,
1142
(10th
Cir.
2011)
(“whether
the
impairment
substantially
limits a major life activity is ordinarily a question of fact
for the jury.”).
Defendant next argues that plaintiff has not made a prima
facie showing that he was a “qualified individual” who, “with or
without
reasonable
functions”
of
his
accommodation,
position
can
because
perform
his
the
medical
essential
restrictions
prevented him from performing the essential functions of a Bus
and Truck Mechanic.
“An essential function is a fundamental job
duty required of a person in the job; a marginal duty is not an
essential function.”
Shell v. Smith, 789 F.3d 715, 717 (7th
Cir. 2015) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1)).
provide
that
evidence
of
whether
a
EEOC regulations
particular
function
essential includes:
(i) The employer’s judgment as to which functions are
essential;
(ii) Written job descriptions prepared before
advertising or interviewing applicants for the job;
(iii) The amount of time spent on the job performing
the function;
(iv) The consequences of not requiring the incumbent
to perform the function;
(v) The terms of a collective bargaining agreement;
7
is
(vi) The work experience of past incumbents in the
job; and/or
(vii) The current work experience of incumbents in
similar jobs.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3).
Defendant
position
points
description
establish
that
to
the
written
and
the
testimony
bending,
twisting,
Bus
and
of
Truck
its
kneeling,
Mechanic
witnesses
squatting,
to
and
lifting were among the essential functions of plaintiff’s job.
It is true that the job description states that the position
requires
lifting
raw
materials
up
to
50
pounds,
as
well
as
stooping, kneeling, crouching and crawling, see Mastriani Dep.
at Exh. 1, Def.’s L.R. 56.1 Stmt., Exh. A, and that at least one
witness
stated
that
Bus
and
Truck
perform these physical tasks.
Def.’s
L.R.
56.1
Stmt.,
Mechanics
indeed
have
to
Laski Dep. at 31-32, 42-43, 48,
Exh.
E.
While
this
evidence
is
certainly relevant to whether these functions are essential, it
is
not
dispositive.
See
Shell,
789
F.3d
at
719.
Indeed,
plaintiff testified that he performed some of these functions
only
“rarely”
perform
functions
or
others,
were
“occasionally,”
undercutting
essential.
that
defendant’s
See
Pl.’s L.R. 56.1 Stmt., Exh. A.
and
Mastriani
he
never
claim
Dep.
at
had
that
to
the
79:1-80:4,
At all events, plaintiff’s first
restriction--evidently the only one at issue--prevented him only
8
from “repetitive” trunk function and trunk rotation, and is not,
on
its
face,
inconsistent
crouching, or crawling.
with
occasional
kneeling,
bending,
I note that defendant does not argue
that any of the other restrictions identified in Dr. Heyer’s
letter--including
medication
plaintiff’s
after
need
work--prevented
to
take
him
controlled
from
performing
pain
any
essential function of his job.
With respect to the lifting limitation noted on plaintiff’s
physical capacity evaluation form (i.e., that he could lift up
to 40 pounds only occasionally), plaintiff proffered evidence
that “wheel dollies” and hoists were used to assist mechanics
with any heavy lifting that was required.
at
¶ 5,
Pl.’s
L.R.
56.1
Stmt.,
Exh.
See Olsen Declaration
H.
Plaintiff
further
testified that because Bus and Truck Mechanics work in teams of
two—a point defendant does not meaningfully dispute—he could ask
his partner to help with tasks that would require heavy lifting.
Defendant tries to leverage this testimony into an admission
that
plaintiff’s
requested
accommodation
was
unreasonable,
citing E.E.O.C. v. AutoZone, Inc., 809 F.3d 916 (7th Cir. 2016).
It
is
true
that
in
that
case,
the
court
held
that
the
plaintiff’s requested accommodation, which would have amounted
to
“essentially
delegating”
employee, was unreasonable.
the
position
Id. at 923.
itself
to
another
In this case, however,
the factual dispute regarding which functions were essential, as
9
well
as
typically
plaintiff’s
worked
evidence
together
regarding
to
complete
how
two-person
their
duties,
teams
makes
summary judgement inappropriate on the basis that plaintiff’s
accommodation
request
is
per
se
unreasonable.
See
Miller
v.
Illinois Dept. of Transp., 643 F.3d 190, 198 (7th Cir. 2011).
III.
For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s motion for summary
judgment is denied.
ENTER ORDER:
_____________________________
Elaine E. Bucklo
United States District Judge
Dated: July 7, 2016
10
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?