Castaneda v. Colvin

Filing 19

ORDER: Plaintiff Pompeyo Castaneda ("Plaintiff") appeals the Commissioner of Social Security's decision to deny his Supplemental Security Disability benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act and Supplemental Security Income un der Title XVI of the Social Security Act. We grant Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment 11 and deny the Commissioner's motion for summary judgment 16 . The Administrative Law Judge's decision is remanded. [For further details see order] - Signed by the Honorable Susan E. Cox on 2/4/2016. Mailed notice (np, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

POMPEYO CASTANEDA

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Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.

No. 14 C 7023
Magistrate Judge Susan E. Cox

ORDER

Plaintiff Pompeyo Castaneda (“Plaintiff”) appeals the Commissioner of Social Security’s
decision to deny his Supplemental Security Disability benefits under Title II of the Social
Security Act and Supplemental Security Income under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. We
grant Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment [dkt. 11] and deny the Commissioner’s motion
for summary judgment [dkt. 16]. The Administrative Law Judge’s decision is remanded.

STATEMENT

Plaintiff appeals the Commissioner of Social Security’s decision to deny him Social
Security disability benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act (“SSA”) and Supplemental
Security Income (“SSI”) under Title XVI of the SSA. Plaintiff filed a motion for summary
judgment [dkt. 11] seeking reversal of the decision of the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). A
motion for summary judgment has been filed on behalf of Defendant Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”). For the reasons outlined below, we grant
Plaintiff’s motion and deny the Commissioner’s motion [dkt. 16]. The ALJ’s decision is
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

1

On July 16, 2012, Plaintiff filed his application for disability benefits alleging entitlement
to benefits as of March 29, 2012, due to stiffness and pain in his shoulders, knees, hands, and
lower back, as well as prostate cancer. 1 Additionally, Plaintiff suffers from obesity. 2 The Social
Security Agency denied Plaintiff’s claims initially and denied them again upon reconsideration. 3
Plaintiff filed a request for a hearing before an ALJ on April 11, 2013. 4 The request was granted,
and ALJ Karen Sayon held a hearing on February 3, 2014. 5
Following the hearing, the ALJ determined, inter alia, that: 1) the Plaintiff meets the
insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through December 31, 2016; 6 2) the
Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since March 29, 2012; 7 3) the Plaintiff
suffered from the severe impairments of obesity, mild degenerative joint disease of the left knee,
and lumbar degenerative disease; 8 4) the Plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of
impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments as
defined in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526,
416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926); 9 5) the Plaintiff has the Residual Functional Capacity
(“RFC”) necessary to perform a full range of medium work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(a)
and 416.967(a); 10 6) given the Plaintiff’s RFC the ALJ believes that the Plaintiff is capable of
performing previous work as a machine operator. 11

1

Pl.’s Mot. 1-2.
Pl.’s Mot. at 2.
3
R. at 34.
4
R. at 127.
5
R. at 47.
6
R. at 36.
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
R. at 37.
10
R. at 37-38.
11
R. at 41.
2

2

The ALJ found that “the claimant’s medically determinable impairments could
reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms; however, the claimant’s symptoms
concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely
credible . . . .” 12 The ALJ supported this finding by noting that “[t]he claimant has daily
activities that are not limited to the extent one would expect, given that complaints of disabling
symptoms and limitations,” including “wash[ing] dishes, driv[ing] his 17-year-old daughter to
and from school, driv[ing] his wife to and from work, and do[ing] chores in the home and
yard.” 13 The ALJ further bolstered her finding that Plaintiff’s statements regarding the extent of
his symptoms were not credible by noting that Plaintiff had applied for state unemployment
benefits, stating that “[i]n order to qualify for such benefits, applicants typically must affirm that
they are capable of working.” 14 To support her conclusion that the Plaintiff is capable of
performing past relevant work, the ALJ also cited Bob Hammond, the vocational expert, who
testified that claimant would be able to perform past relevant work as a machine operator as it
would require a medium exertion level. 15
DISCUSSION
I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Section 405(g) provides in relevant part that “[t]he findings of the Commissioner of
Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive.” 16
Judicial review of the ALJ’s decision is limited to determining whether the ALJ’s findings are
supported by substantial evidence or based upon legal error. 17 Substantial evidence is “such

12

R. at 38.
R. at 39.
14
R. at 39.
15
R. at 41.
16
42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
17
Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 869 (7th Cir. 2000); Stevenson v. Chater, 105 F.3d 1151, 1153 (7th Cir. 1997).
13

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relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” 18 This
Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner by reevaluating facts,
reweighing evidence, resolving conflicts in evidence, or deciding questions of credibility. 19
The ALJ is not required to address “every piece of evidence or testimony in the record,
[but] the ALJ’s analysis must provide some glimpse into the reasoning behind her decision to
deny benefits.” 20 In cases where the ALJ denies benefits to a Plaintiff, “he must build an accurate
and logical bridge from the evidence to his conclusion.” 21 The ALJ must at least minimally
articulate the “analysis of the evidence with enough detail and clarity to permit meaningful
appellate review.” 22 “An ALJ has a duty to fully develop the record before drawing any
conclusions . . . and must adequately articulate his analysis so that we can follow his
reasoning.” 23
II.

The ALJ Failed to Build a Logical Bridge Between Plaintiff’s Testimony
Regarding Daily Activities and an Ability to Perform Medium Work.
“Medium Work” is defined as work that “involves lifting no more than 50 pounds at a

time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 25 pounds.” 24 According to a
Social Security Administration Program Policy Statement, “a full range of medium work
requires standing or walking, off and on, for a total of approximately 6 hours in an 8-hour
workday in order to meet the requirements of frequent lifting or carrying objects weight up to 25
pounds.” 25 The Seventh Circuit has “long bemoaned” ALJs who “have equated the ability to
18

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Skinner v. Astrue, 478 F.3d 836, 841 (7th Cir. 2007).
Skinner, 478 F.3d at 841; see also Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that the ALJ’s
decision must be affirmed even if “‘reasonable minds could differ’” as long as “the decision is adequately
supported”) (citation omitted).
20
Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 889 (7th Cir. 2001).
21
Clifford, 227 F.3d at 872.
22
Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 351 (7th Cir. 2005); Murphy v. Astrue, 496 F.3d 630, 634 (7th
Cir. 2007).
23
See Boiles v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 421, 425 (7th Cir. 2005).
24
20 CFR 404.1667.
25
SSR 83–10, 1983 WL 31251, at *5–6.
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engage in some activities with an ability to do full-time work, without a recognition that full-time
work does not allow for the flexibility to work around periods of incapacitation.” 26
Here, the ALJ failed to explain how any of the enumerated daily activities discussed
above have any bearing on whether Plaintiff’s claims regarding his ability to work full time are
credible, or whether Plaintiff would, in fact, be able to perform medium work. Driving his
family members is done from a sedentary position, and does not involve lifting of any kind.
Likewise, washing dishes does not bear any resemblance to the type of exertional level that can
be expected from a job that fits the criteria for medium work. Finally, and most importantly, the
ALJ did not explore the manner or duration of chores and yardwork that Plaintiff reporting
performing. It is certainly possible that these chores would have been indicative of the ability to
engage in medium work, but without exploring that issue, this Court is left to guess. Simply put,
the ALJ did not build the bridge between the Plaintiff’s ability to perform certain daily activities
and its bearing on his ability to work a full-time medium exertional level job. His failure to do
so was error and requires remand.
III.

The ALJ Erred In Finding That Plaintiff’s Application for Unemployment
Benefits Rendered His Testimony Not Credible.

The ALJ also based her credibility finding on the fact that “the claimant applied for state
unemployment benefits after the alleged onset date in this case,” reasoning that “[i]n order to
qualify for such benefits, applicants must affirm they are capable of working.” 27 Although ALJs
are allowed to consider such evidence, the Seventh Circuit has warned that “attributing a lack of
credibility to [applying for unemployment benefits] is a step that must be taken with significant
care and circumspection.” 28 As such, “[a]ll of the surrounding facts must be carefully

26

Moore v. Colvin, 743 F.3d 1118, 1126 (7th Cir. 2014).
R. at 39.
28
Scrogham v. Colvin, 765 F.3d 685, 699 (7th Cir. 2014).
27

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considered,” particularly “[i]n the case of a progressive disease” because “it is especially
possible that an applicant might, at the early stages of the disease’s manifestations, be unsure of
the limits of his physical capabilities and only later determine that his inability to work was due
to the fact that the physical toll taken by the disease was greater than he had thought.” 29 A
failure to consider these factors may be cause for remand. 30
In this case, the Plaintiff testified at his hearing that his conditions were progressive,
stating that “in the beginning, the pain used to be . . . less frequent and lighter, but now it’s
become more frequent and more consistent.” 31 However, the ALJ did not consider the
progressive nature of Plaintiff’s condition when considering the evidence regarding Plaintiff’s
application for unemployment benefits. In fact, the ALJ did not direct any of her questions
during the Plaintiff’s hearing to his seeking unemployment benefits, and limited her
consideration of this evidence to two short sentences in her opinion. In short, the ALJ did not
take the “significant care and circumspection” required by the Seventh Circuit in considering
unemployment benefit evidence in cases where the claimant – like the Plaintiff in the instant case
– suffers from a progressive condition. As such, the ALJ erred in making her credibility
determinations, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is granted [dkt. 11] and the Commissioner’s
motion for summary judgment is hereby denied [dkt. 16].

29

Id.
See id.
31
R. at 61.
30

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DATED: 2/4/2016

___________________________
Susan E. Cox
United States Magistrate Judge

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