Christianson v. Yarbrough et al

Filing 36

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Signed by the Honorable Harry D. Leinenweber on 4/2/2015:Mailed notice(wp, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHER DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

PHILLIP CHRISTIANSON,

Case No.

14 C 7363

Plaintiff,
Judge Harry D. Leinenweber
v.
KAREN YARBROUGH, et al.,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Phillip Christianson (“Christianson”) filed a threecount Complaint against Cook County Recorder of Deeds Karen Yarbrough
(“Yarbrough”),

Chief

Deputy

(“Velaquez”),

Deputy

Recorder

Recorder

of

of

Deeds

Deeds

William

Velazquez

William

Drobitsch

(“Drobitsch”), and Cook County, Illinois (hereinafter, collectively,
the “Defendants”) alleging political discrimination and retaliation
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and violation of the Shakman decrees.

(Compl.,

ECF No. 1.)
There

are

Defendants’

three

Motion

to

motions
Dismiss

pending
for

before

Failure

to

the
State

Court:
a

Claim

(1)
[ECF

No. 13]; (2) Christianson’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction [ECF
No.

15];

No. 17)].
Motion

to

and

(3)

Defendants’

Motion

to

Reassign

the

Case

[ECF

For the reasons stated herein, the Court grants Defendants’
Dismiss

and

denies

the

remaining

motions

as

moot.

Christianson is given fourteen (14) days leave to amend his Complaint.

I.

BACKGROUND

Christianson began working as the Concourse Manager of the Cook
County Recorder of Deed’s Office on October 9, 2012 under outgoing
Recorder

Eugene

Moore

(“Moore”).

Christianson

received

positive

evaluations from Moore’s administration.
Yarbrough was elected as Recorder of Deeds in November 2012 and
took office in early December 2012.
as

Chief

Recorder

Deputy
of

Recorder

Deeds

and

of

Under Yarbrough, Velazquez serves

Deeds.

was

Drobitsch

Christianson’s

serves

direct

as

Deputy

supervisor.

Christianson claims that Defendants discriminated against him because
of his political non-affiliation with Yarbrough.

Christianson alleges

that he was the victim of false incident reports and evaluations,
resulting in his eventual termination in February 2013.
After his termination, Christianson obtained a new job with a
title company that required him to go to the Recorder’s Office.

In

April 2013, Christianson filed a complaint with the Office of the
Independent Inspector General (“OIIG”) of Cook County alleging that
the Recorder’s Office had engaged in political discrimination.

In

August 2013, Velazquez sent a letter to Christianson’s new employer
stating that Christianson failed to follow sign-in procedures at the
Recorder’s

Office

and

disrupted

employees

when

he

accusations that are false, according to Christianson.

visited

—

In May 2014,

an incident arose between Christianson and a security guard at the
Recorder’s
Office

Office.

sent

a

As

letter

a
to

result

of

this

Christianson’s

incident,
new

the

employer

Recorder’s
prohibiting

Christianson from setting foot in the Recorder’s Office again.

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II.

ANALYSIS

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) challenges the legal sufficiency of a
complaint.

Hallinan v. Fraternal Order of Chi. Lodge No. 7, 570 F.3d

811, 820 (7th Cir. 2009).

The complaint must contain “enough facts to

state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Corp.

v.

Twombly,

550

U.S.

544,

570

(2007).

Bell Atlantic

When

considering

a

Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a court must accept the plaintiff’s
allegations as true, and view them in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff.

Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408, 410 (7th Cir. 1987).

A court need not accept as true “legal conclusions, or threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements.”

Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir.

2009) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)) (internal
quotations and alterations omitted).
A.

Count I - Political Discrimination under § 1983

Christianson’s first claim is that Defendants violated his First
Amendment

rights

when

they

terminated

him

from

his

Concourse Manager because of his political neutrality.
Christianson,

Defendants

concourse

manager

political

factors,

and

“attempted

to

subsequently

including

affiliation with Yarbrough.”

but

block

his

terminated

not

limited

(Compl. ¶ 48.)

as

According to

appointment

[him]
to,

position

based
his

lack

as
upon
of

Based on this alleged

violation of constitutional rights, Christianson seeks relief under
§ 1983 against all Defendants.

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Individual

liability

under

§

1983

requires

a

showing

that

defendants were acting under the color of state law and that their
conduct violated the plaintiff’s rights under the Constitution or laws
of the United States.
2005).

A

“causal

Lekas v. Briley, 405 F.3d 602, 606 (7th Cir.

connection,

or

an

affirmative

between the violation and the defendant.
F.2d 864, 869 (7th Cir. 1983).
§

1983

violations

unless

link”

must

exist

Wolf-Lillie v. Sonquist, 699

Supervisors cannot be held liable for

they

“knowingly,

recklessly” cause the violation.

willfully,

or

at

least

Rascon v. Hardiman, 803 F.2d 269,

274 (7th Cir. 1986).
Under the First Amendment, government officials cannot “discharge
or

threaten

to

discharge

public

employees

solely

for

not

being

supporters of the political party in power, unless party affiliation
is an appropriate requirement for the position involved.”
Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 64–65 (1990).
state

a

claim

for

violation

employee must show that:

of

First

Amendment

Rutan v.

Accordingly, to

rights,

a

public

(1) his or her conduct was constitutionally

protected; (2) the employee suffered a deprivation likely to deter
free speech; and (3) the constitutionally protected conduct caused the
adverse employment action.
Cir. 2009).

Gunville v. Walker, 583 F.3d 979, 984 (7th

Although a plaintiff must ultimately establish but-for

causation to succeed on a political discrimination claim, he or she
may begin by making an initial showing that speech was a “motivating
factor” in the employer’s adverse decision.
679 F.3d 957, 965 (7th Cir. 2012).
employer

to

rebut

the

causal

The burden then shifts to the

inference

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Kidwell v. Eisenhauer,

raised

by

the

plaintiff’s

evidence.

Id.;

see

also,

Greene

v.

Cook

Cnty.

Sheriff's

Office,

No. 12 C 8763, 2015 WL 514660, at *12 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 4, 2015).

Thus,

at the motion to dismiss stage, a plaintiff need only show that speech
was a motivating factor behind an employer’s adverse action.
1.
The

only

allegation

Karen Yarbrough

specific

to

Yarbrough

is

that

in

late

September 2012 — before Yarbrough was elected Recorder — Yarbrough
expressed disappointment to then-current Chief Deputy Recorder Darlena
Williams-Burnett that high-level positions were being filled prior to
Yarbrough’s

election.

(Compl.

¶

16.)

Christianson’s

other

allegations against Yarbrough concern actions she took through her
subordinates.
she

took

against

(See, e.g., id. ¶ 22 (“[A]fter Yarbrough took office

numerous
the

false

Plaintiff,

adverse
through

and
her

pretextual
deputies,

employment

because

he

actions
was

not

politically affiliated with Yarbrough.”).)
Christianson
statements

to

concedes

that

Williams-Burnett

the

—

first

is

not

incident

actionable

—

Yarbrough’s

under

§

1983.

Because it took place before Yarbrough took office, Yarbrough was not
acting under the color of state law.

See, Lanigan v. Vill. of E.

Hazel Crest, Ill., 110 F.3d 467, 471 (7th Cir. 1997).
more

general

allegations

against

Yarbrough

occurred through her subordinates.

concern

Christianson’s
conduct

that

However, a supervisory official

cannot be held vicariously liable under § 1983 for conduct of her
subordinates “unless the individual was personally involved in the
wrongful conduct such that he or she caused or participated in the
alleged violation.”

Boyce v. Moore, 314 F.3d 884, 888 (7th Cir.

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2002).

Here, Christianson does not allege to what extent, if any,

Yarbrough caused or participated in the “false adverse and pretextual
employment

actions”

taken

against

him.

(Compl.

¶

22.)

For

these

reasons, Count I is dismissed as to Yarbrough.
2.

William Velazquez & William Drobitsch

Plaintiff alleges that in late September 2012 Velazquez — then
Yarbrough’s campaign manager — also criticized Williams-Burnett for
filling

high-level

positions,

including

prior to Yarbrough’s election.

that

of

concourse

manager,

Because Velazquez took these actions

before his appointment to Chief Deputy Recorder, he was not acting
under the color of state law.

Therefore, Christianson’s claim that

Velazquez tried to “block his appointment as concourse manager,” (id.
¶ 48), is not actionable.

See, Lanigan, 110 F.3d at 471.

After Velazquez was appointed Chief Deputy Recorder, Christianson
alleges

that

he

received

several

false,

negative

evaluations

and

incident reports.

Christianson claims that Drobitsch, his immediate

supervisor,

at

issued

least

seven

pretextual

incident

reports

and

other false statements against him in a period of just over one month.
Christianson claims that together, Velazquez and Drobitsch extended
his probationary period an additional 60 days for no reason, prevented
him

from

training

additional

supervisors

and

performing

his

job

duties, and ultimately terminated him for improper political reasons.
Although Defendants contest the first element of Christianson’s
political discrimination claim, it is well established that political
non-affiliation is constitutionally protected conduct.
Hein, 742 F.2d 350, 354 n.3 (7th Cir. 1984).

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See, Hermes v.

The only contested

element of Christianson’s political discrimination claim is whether he
has

adequately

pleaded

that

his

political

non-affiliation

was

the

claim,

the

cause of his termination.
“To

plead

plaintiff

must

causation
allege:

in
(1)

a

political

that

a

discrimination

decision

maker

was

aware

of

[plaintiff’s] political affiliation (or lack thereof), and (2) the
decision

maker

based

an

employment

decision

on

this

affiliation.”

Maxwell v. Cnty. of Cook, No. 10 CV 00320, 2011 WL 4639530, at *8
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 17, 2011) (citing Mt. Healthy City v. Doyle, 429 U.S.
274, 287 (1997)); see also, Zerante v. DeLuca, 555 F.3d 582, 585 (7th
Cir. 2009).
Recorder

Christianson argues that because he was hired by outgoing

Moore,

“Defendants

were

aware

of

Plaintiff’s

affiliation with Yarbrough.” (Pl.’s Resp. at 9.)

lack

of

Even accepting that

Velazquez and Drobitsch were aware of Christianson’s lack of political
affiliation,

Christianson

politically motivated.
investigated

his

has

not

alleged

that

their

conduct

was

Although Christianson alleges that the OIIG

allegations

of

political

discrimination

at

the

Recorder’s Office and “issued a finding in [his] favor” (Compl. ¶ 55),
it is unclear whether the OIIG’s findings pertained to Velazquez and
Drobitsch.
and

Because Christianson has failed to allege that Velazquez

Drobitsch’s

actions

were

based

on

his

non-affiliation

with

Yarbrough, Count I is dismissed as to these Defendants.
3.

Cook County

Cook County is only liable under Count I if Christianson can
plausibly allege that he suffered a constitutional deprivation as the
result of an official custom, policy, or practice.

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Monell v. Dep’t of

Social Servs. of the City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978).

An

official custom, policy, or practice may include an express policy, a
widespread practice that carries the force of policy, or “the actions
of an individual who possesses the authority to make final policy
decisions on behalf of the municipality or corporation.”
Corr. Med. Servs., 675 F.3d 650, 675 (7th Cir. 2012).

Rice v.

Christianson

does not make any allegations that he suffered an injury as a result
of an official custom, policy, or practice of either Cook County or
the Recorder’s Office.

Christianson’s claims against Cook County in

Count I are therefore dismissed.
B.
While

Count II - Political Retaliation under § 1983
Christianson

generally

alleges

that

all

Defendants

retaliated against him for filing a complaint with the OIIG, he only
makes specific allegations against Velazquez.

Because there are no

specific allegations against Yarbrough or Drobitsch, the retaliation
claims against these Defendants must be dismissed.

And, as under

Count I, Christianson fails to allege that Cook County implemented an
official

custom,

retaliation.

policy,

or

practice

that

caused

the

alleged

Christianson’s claims against Cook County are therefore

dismissed as well.
Christianson

alleges

that

Velazquez

sent

a

letter

his

new

employer on August 9, 2013 that complained of Christianson’s conduct
at the Recorder’s Office.
informing

Christianson’s

Another letter was sent on May 15, 2014,
new

employer

that

from entering the Recorder’s Office again.

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Christianson

was

barred

According to Christianson,

the letters were sent as retaliation for the complaint he filed with
the OIIG on April 25, 2013.
However,

Christianson

fails

to

allege

that

Velazquez

had

any

knowledge of his complaint to the OIIG at the time the first letter
was written.

An employer cannot retaliate against a former employee

for actions of which it is unaware.
450 F.3d 732, 741 (7th Cir. 2006).

See, Healy v. City of Chicago,
Christianson also fails to allege

that Defendant Velazquez had any personal involvement in the May 15,
2014 letter, which was sent by the “Recorder’s Office.” (Compl. ¶ 54.)
Because Christianson does not allege that Velazquez knew of the OIIG
complaint or played any part in preparing the second letter, he fails
to state a political retaliation claim against Velazquez.

Count II is

therefore dismissed.
C.

Count III - Violation of Shakman Decrees

Both Cook County and the Cook County Recorder of Deeds Office are
subject

to

consent

decrees

issued

in

Shakman

v.

Democratic

Organization of Cook County, 69 C 2145 (N.D. Ill. 1969).

The 1992

consent decree prohibits the Recorder from taking certain employment
actions

based

on political

considerations.

(See, Shakman v. Cook

Cnty. Democratic Org., No. 69 C 2145 (N.D. Ill. 1969), ECF No. 1831,
at 1.)
for

The Shakman decrees bind the settling defendants to liability

the

analysis.

actions

of

their

employees

under

a

respondeat

superior

See, Everett v. Cook Cnty., 704 F.Supp.2d 794, 804 (N.D.

Ill. 2010) (citing Wzorek v. City of Chicago, 906 F.2d 1180, 1184 (7th
Cir. 1990), aff'd, 655 F.3d 723 (7th Cir. 2011).

- 9 -

Count III is directed at Cook County.
first

time

in

Drobitsch’s

their

conduct

reply

cannot

brief,

that

be imputed

Defendants argue, for the
Yarbrough,

Velazquez,

to Cook County

because

and
Cook

County and the Recorder’s Office are separate entities, and employees
of the Recorder’s Office are not actually employed by Cook County.
The Court will not address the merits of Defendants’ argument at this
stage.

Because Christianson has failed to state a claim against the

individual defendants, no Shakman violation can be imputed to Cook
County

or

the

Recorder’s

Office.

For

this

reason,

Count

III

is

dismissed.
III.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [ECF
No.

13]

is

granted.

Christianson’s

claims

are

dismissed

without

prejudice, and Christianson is granted fourteen (14) days from the
date of this order to amend his Complaint.
Preliminary

Injunction

[ECF

No.

15],

and

Christianson’s Motion for
Defendants’

Motion

Reassign the Case [ECF No. 17] are denied as moot.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge
United States District Court
Dated:4/2/2015

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to