Sykes et al v. Cook County Circuit Court Probate Division et al
Filing
62
ORDER: For the reasons set forth in the accompanying statement, the Motion to Dismiss by Defendants Timothy Evans, State of Illinois, Lisa Madigan, Cook County Circuit Court Probate Division, Bruce Rauner, and Aicha M. MacCarthy 18 , the Motions t o Dismiss by Defendant Carolyn Toerpe 21 , 37 , and the Motion to Dismiss by Peter Schmiedel and Fischel & Kahn LP 33 are granted. Because this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear this case, Plaintiffs' Motion for Appointment of Guardian Ad Litem and for Appointment of Counsel 7 , Motion to Disqualify Counsel 27 , Motion to Strike 28 , and Request to Take Judicial Notice 57 are denied as moot. This case is terminated for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Signed by the Honorable John J. Tharp, Jr on 3/10/2015. [For further details see order] Mailed notice(air, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
GLORIA JEAN SYKES, TIMOTHY J.
LAHRMAN, and M.G.S.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
COOK COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
PROBATE DIVISION, AICHA M.
MACCARTHY, TIMOTHY EVANS,
CAROLYN TOERPE, LISA
MADIGAN, STATE OF ILLINOIS, and
BRUCE RAUNER
Defendants.
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No. 14 C 7459
Judge John J. Tharp, Jr.
ORDER
For the reasons set forth in the attached statement below, the Motion to Dismiss by
Defendants Timothy Evans, State of Illinois, Lisa Madigan, Cook County Circuit Court Probate
Division, Bruce Rauner, 1 and Aicha 2 M. MacCarthy (Dkt. 18), the Motions to Dismiss by
Defendant Carolyn Toerpe (Dkt. 21, 37), and the Motion to Dismiss by Peter Schmiedel and
Fischel & Kahn LP (Dkt. 33) are granted. Because this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to
hear this case, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Appointment of Guardian Ad Litem and for Appointment of
Counsel (Dkt. 7), Motion to Disqualify Counsel (Dkt. 27), Motion to Strike (Dkt. 28), and
Request to Take Judicial Notice (Dkt. 57) are denied as moot. This case is terminated for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.
STATEMENT
This law suit duplicates, in large measure, both an earlier case filed by Plaintiff Gloria
Jean Sykes in this Court, and a more recent petition she filed in the Probate Division of the Cook
County Circuit Court and which was denied by Circuit Court Judge Aicha MacCarthy. In the
1
Bruce Rauner has replaced Pat Quinn as the Governor of Illinois and so has been
substituted for Mr. Quinn as a defendant in this case pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d).
2
The plaintiffs spelled Judge MacCarthy’s first name as “Aicha” in the complaint and in
the briefs, which the state defendants claim to be an incorrect spelling. Contrary to the state
defendants’ assertions, however, public records spell Judge MacCarthy’s first name as “Aicha.”
See, e.g., Cook County Clerk’s Office, November 06, 2012 Presidential General Election
Results, http://results1112.cookcountyclerk.com/summary.aspx?eid=110612 (last visited Mar.
10, 2015); Honorable Aicha Marie MacCarthy, Circuit Judge, http://www.cookcountycourt.org/
JudgesPages/MacCarthyAichaMarie.aspx (last visited Mar. 10, 2015).
1
wake of that ruling, Ms. Sykes has essentially reasserted claims that this Court denied in 2012
and that Judge MacCarthy denied in the fall of 2014. In refiling the case in federal court,
however, Ms. Sykes, has added a claim that the Circuit Court Judge violated her rights under the
Americans with Disabilities Act by ordering her service dog, “Shaggy,” to be removed from the
courtroom during a hearing. Even though this Court is quite fond of dogs, and can attest for the
record that Shaggy comported himself well when he accompanied the plaintiff to a status hearing
in this case, the Circuit Court’s order barring Shaggy’s appearance does not vest this Court with
jurisdiction over what evidently remains a contentious dispute between sisters concerning (at
least ostensibly) their mother’s welfare.
Plaintiffs Gloria Jean Sykes and Timothy Lahrman brought this action on behalf of Ms.
Sykes’s mother, M.G.S., alleging that during proceedings before the Cook County Circuit Court
Probate Division, the defendants have engaged in discriminatory practices in violation of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. The complaint also alleges
that Cook County Circuit Court Chief Judge Evans is responsible for the Cook County Circuit
Court’s compliance with the ADA, and is therefore also responsible for the injuries to the
plaintiffs and to M.G.S. The complaint includes the allegations that were the subject of Ms.
Sykes state court “Motion for Accommodation,” which asserted that the State of Illinois, through
its Office of Attorney General, “excludes” and “systematically discriminates against and
disparages those who are or who may be disabled” in its adult guardianship services, programs,
and activities. Compl., Dkt. 1, at ¶¶ 49, 77. The plaintiffs also purport to state claims on behalf of
themselves. Ms. Sykes alleges that she is “a qualified individual with a disability who is
substantially limited in life activities by PTSD and is routinely accompanied in public facilities
and palces of public accommodation with an ADA working/service dog (“Shaggy”).” Id. ¶ 22.
The complaint alleges that Mr. Lahrman is also “disabled,” though the nature of his disability is
not identified. Defendants Timothy Evans, State of Illinois, Lisa Madigan, Cook County Circuit
Court Probate Division, Bruce Rauner, Aicha M. MacCarthy (collectively, the “state
defendants”) and Defendant Carolyn Toerpe, M.G.S.’s plenary guardian (and also her daughter;
Ms. Sykes is Ms. Toerpe’s sister), 3 moved to dismiss this case for lack of jurisdiction. 4
Other than Shaggy’s presence, this case is substantially similar to the earlier case filed by
Sykes in this Court, M.G.S. ex rel. Sykes v. Toerpe, No. 11 C 7934 (“Sykes I”). In that case, just
as in this one, Sykes and and other self-styled “next friends” sought to advance claims on behalf
of M.G.S. Particularly relevant to this case, the Sykes I complaint alleged, among other things,
3
Carolyn Toerpe, who was appointed as M.G.S.’s plenary guardian in the state court
proceedings, is also M.G.S.’s daughter. See Toerpe Mem., Dkt. 22, at 3 (describing Toerpe as
“the duly appointed guardian for her . . . mother”); Motion to Move [M.G.S.] Home, Dkt. 39-1,
at 11 nn.2 & 3 (referring to Carolyn as M.G.S.’s daughter); Order, Dkt. 40-1, at 1–2 (identifying
Carolyn Toerpe as “Carolyn Sykes-Toerpe”).
4
The plaintiffs assert in their response brief that the defendants’ motions should be
denied because they are in default for having failed to timely respond to the complaint. Resp.,
Dkt. 52, at 1–2. The plaintiffs did not seek entry of an order of default, or file a motion for
default judgment, however, so they forfeited any objection to the timeliness of the defendants’
responses to the complaint. In any event, the Court would not enter a default judgment for the
plaintiffs in a matter in which it concludes that it has no jurisdiction over the claims asserted.
2
that the defendants were violating the ADA by denying M.G.S. the “meaningful and equal access
to the courts and [public] services” and the “occupancy of a residence of her choosing” on
account of her disabilities, and employed policies and procedures that violate adult wards’ due
process rights. Compl., Sykes I, No. 11 C 7934, Dkt. 1, at ¶¶ 26–29, 34–35.
In Sykes I, this Court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on two
independently sufficient bases: the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and the probate exception to
federal jurisdiction. See Sykes I, 2012 WL 3235240, at *2–3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 6, 2012). This Court
applied the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which precludes lower federal courts from reviewing state
court judgments, and found that it lacked the jurisdiction to review “the validity of adjudication
of M.G.S. as legally disabled, the appointment of Ms. Toerpe as her guardian, and Ms. Toerpe’s
ongoing management of M.G.S.’s affairs under the authority granted by the probate court.” Id. at
*2 (citing Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923); D.C. Court of Appeals v.
Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983); Brown v. Bowman, 668 F.3d 437, 442 (7th Cir. 2012);
Taylor v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 374 F.3d 529, 533 (7th Cir. 2004)). Under the RookerFeldman doctrine, courts lack jurisdiction to hear even independent claims that are “inextricably
intertwined, i.e., that it indirectly seeks to set aside a state court judgment.” Taylor, 374 F.3d at
533. Applying this test, this Court held that any claims or prayers for relief brought on behalf of
M.G.S. were “inextricably intertwined” with the state court probate judgment establishing
M.G.S.’s guardianship, and that Rooker-Feldman precluded adjudication of those claims. Sykes
I, 2012 WL 3235240 at *3 (quoting Taylor, 374 F.3d at 533). Further, because Sykes was
challenging Toerpe’s guardianship over M.G.S. and other probate matters, the Court determined
that the probate exception precluded this Court from “elbow[ing] its way” into a contested
guardianship case “over which the state court is exercising control.” Id. (citing Struck v. Cook
County Public Guardian, 508 F.3d 858, 859–60 (7th Cir. 2007)). The Court concluded that
Sykes’ claims “must be pursued in state court” and dismissed the case. Id. at *4. The Seventh
Circuit affirmed the dismissal, agreeing that “[t]he allegations in this case are serious, but they
belong in state court.” M.G.S. ex rel Sykes v. Toerpe (“Sykes II”), No. 12-3373, Dkt. 19 (7th Cir.
Jan. 9, 2013).
In August of 2014, Ms. Sykes again sought to assert claims that the state was violating
M.G.S.’s rights under the ADA and that Ms. Toerpe was not adequately protecting M.G.S.’s
rights. Heeding the rulings in Sykes I and Sykes II, however, Ms. Sykes brought her claims in the
Probate Division of the Circuit Court of Cook County, filing a “Motion for Reasonable
Accommodation.” Dkt. 1-A. In that motion, Sykes raised essentially the same ADA claims as the
ones asserted in the federal case, alleging that “the Probate Division and its appointed agent
guardian” (i.e., Ms. Toerpe) the defendants had discriminated against M.G.S. on account of her
disability and had failed to provide reasonable accommodations for M.G.S.’s disability. Id. at 2–
5. The relief Sykes sought included: (i) transfer of the case from the Probate Division; (ii)
appointment of legal counsel for M.G.S.; and (iii) “an appropriate order ensuring to [M.G.S.] her
right to receive, un-impeded and un-impaired, the emotional support and informed perspective of
Gloria.”
The court held a hearing on Sykes’ motion on September 4, 2014. Sykes attended the
hearing with Shaggy, her service dog. Compl., Dkt. 1, at ¶ 37. At the start of the hearing, Judge
MacCarthy immediately inquired into the qualifying criteria of Shaggy. Id. at ¶ 38. Unsatisfied
with Sykes’ response, Judge MacCarthy then ordered Sykes and Shaggy out of her courtroom
3
and entered an order forbidding Sykes from returning to the court with Shaggy without leave of
the court. Order, Dkt. 1-D, at 1. The order did not address the merits of Sykes’ motion, but struck
the motion without prejudice. Id.
After Judge MacCarthy dismissed her motion, Sykes did not (so far as the record reflects)
appeal or seek any further remedies in state court. Instead, she returned to federal court to file
this action. Here, she has reasserted the claims she set forth in her state court Motion for
Accommodation, see Compl., Dkt. 1, at ¶ 17–20, which targeted the actions of Ms. Toerpe and
the Probate Division. She has added claims against Judge MacCarthy for her actions with respect
to Ms. Syke’s Motion for Accommodation and her exclusion of Shaggy from her courtroom. Ms.
Sykes also tacked on claims against Chief Judge Evans for failing to adequately supervise and
control the Probate Division and Judge MacCarthy, and against the State of Illinois, its
Governor, and its Attorney General, for failing to prevent the alleged abuses by the state court
“in the adult-guardianship matter of M.G.S.” Id. at ¶ 77.
As in Sykes I, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies here and precludes the Court from
adjudicating Ms. Sykes claims on behalf of M.G.S. Sykes and Lahrman are neither M.G.S.’s
appointed guardians nor her attorneys (they are not attorneys, period 5), and—as explained in the
Court’s opinion dismissing Sykes I—adjudicating the claims in the complaint would require this
court to ask whether Sykes and any other putative “next friends” are authorized by Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure to bring any claims on M.G.S.’s behalf. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 17. Applying Rule
17 would require asking whether M.G.S. “already is represented by someone who is considered
appropriate under the law of the forum state”—in this case, Illinois. T.W. ex rel Enk v. Brophy,
124 F.3d 893, 896 (7th Cir. 1997) (quoting 6A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary
Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1570 (2d ed. 1990)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P.
17(b)(1) (capacity to sue or be sued for an individual is determined “by the law of the
individual’s domicile”). Answering this question would inevitably require reviewing the state
court judgments that found M.G.S. legally disabled and that appointed Toerpe as her plenary
guardian—a power this Court simply does not have. As state court judgments, they cannot be
reviewed by inferior federal courts (such as this Court). See Rooker, 263 U.S. at 415–16 (holding
that federal courts other than the Supreme Court could not entertain any proceedings to reverse a
state court’s errors); Feldman, 460 U.S. at 486–87 (holding that federal district courts lack
jurisdiction to hear allegations that are “inextricably intertwined” with the judgment of a state6
court); Taylor, 374 F.3d at 533 (holding that federal district courts cannot even indirectly “set
aside a state court judgment”). And answering this question in the manner that Sykes would
like—that is, finding that Sykes, rather than Toerpe, should be permitted to assert claims on
5
Even if Sykes or Lahrman were attorneys, this would not appreciably change the
analysis in this case. The Court would still have to determine whether the retained attorney
actually has an attorney-client relationship with the disabled person, which would still be
inextricably intertwined with the state court judgment finding her to be legally disabled and
appointing Toerpe as her guardian.
6
Technically, the prior court judgment at issue in Feldman was one of a court of the
District of Columbia, and not a state, but the reasoning of the Feldman opinion applies to state
courts as well. See, e.g., Taylor, 374 F.3d at 533 (applying Rooker-Feldman in Illinois); T.W.,
124 F.3d at 896 (applying Rooker-Feldman in Wisconsin).
4
behalf of M.G.S.—would effectively overrule the state court’s judgment appointing Ms. Toerpe
as her mother’s guardian. Rooker-Feldman bars such review of state court judgments by federal
trial courts.
In affirming this Court’s ruling in Sykes I, the Seventh Circuit agreed that the RookerFeldman doctrine bars Sykes’ attempt to litigate ADA (and other) claims on behalf of her mother
in lieu of the court-appointed guardian. Sykes II, slip op. at 2 (“As the district court noted, this
case is governed by our decision in Struck.”). Sykes does not address the Court’s prior ruling,
though she does argue that Rooker-Feldman does not bar her claims because there is no final
judgment in the state probate proceeding and because she does not characterize this case as
challenging the state court judgment. Pl.’s Resp., Dkt. 52, at 4. Sykes’ first argument, that the
state court order was not final, is unavailing both because it misapprehends the order that gives
rise to the application of the doctrine (it is the order appointing Toerpe as guardian, not Judge
MacCarthy’s denial of her Motion for Accommodation) and because in any event RookerFeldman can apply to interlocutory as well as final orders. Schmitt v. Schmitt, 324 F.3d 484, 487
(7th Cir. 2003). Sykes’ second argument, that she does not challenge any state court judgments,
is a conclusion of law regarding whether her instant claims are “inextricably intertwined” with
the state court guardianship order. As discussed, asking who may properly litigate claims on
M.G.S.’s behalf is a question inextricably intertwined with the state court orders appointing
Toerpe as M.G.S.’s plenary guardian.
Moreover, even if there were no state court judgment already in place, this Court, as a
federal court, would still lack jurisdiction to decide questions of domestic relations under the
probate exception. Federal courts have no power to decide probate matters, such as the contested
guardianship or custody issues that arise in a Rule 17 analysis. See Struck, 508 F.3d at 859–60
(holding that the probate exception to federal jurisdiction applies to adult children challenging
state court custody decisions relating to a legally disabled parent); T.W., 124 F.3d at 897
(requiring the “would-be next friend who is not the [disabled] plaintiff’s general representative to
seek appointment in state court as a guardian ad litem in the federal suit”). This analysis applies
to all claims on behalf of M.G.S.—whether the claims relate to the probate proceedings or not or
whether the claims arose before or after the probate court’s appointment of special or general
guardians. For these reasons, this Court lacks the power to hear any claims brought on M.G.S.’s
behalf by anyone other than her state-court-appointed guardians. Neither Sykes nor Lahrman are
M.G.S.’s guardians, so they may not assert claims in this Court on behalf of M.G.S., without first
being appointed as guardians ad litem by an Illinois state court. All claims asserted on behalf of
M.G.S., then, must therefore be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Counts I, II-B,
III, and IV are dismissed for this reason. 7
7
Sykes and Lahrman have filed a “supplemental complaint” purporting to add a claim for
a violation of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3617, against Toerpe and her attorneys without
first seeking leave of the Court, as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d). The “supplemental
complaint” is therefore inoperative. Even if the Court had permitted its filing, however, the new
theory would not cure the jurisdictional problems of the filed complaint, because it is premised
on the same core allegation that Toerpe is not properly fulfilling her role as M.G.S.’s guardian
and that Sykes should be permitted to assert claims on her behalf.
5
Therefore, the Court has jurisdiction here only to the extent that Sykes and Lahrman have
asserted any claims in which they have personally suffered an “injury in fact” in the form of “an
invasion of a legally protected interest.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560
(1992). Such an injury must be “particularized” to the plaintiff and may not be “conjectural or
hypothetical.” Id. (citing City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983); Sierra Club v.
Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 740–41 (1972)). In this case, the injuries alleged are violations of
statutory rights under the ADA. See Compl., Dkt. 1, at ¶¶ 49, 55–58, 61–65, 70–71, 76–79. Thus,
in order to survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must allege that either Sykes or Lahrman
were “excluded from participation or denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities”
of a public entity because of their own disabilities. 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
After reviewing the complaint, the Court must dismiss claims asserted by Mr. Lahrman,
who has not alleged any injury. Indeed, the complaint concedes that Mr. Lahrman has not
suffered any injury. See Compl., Dkt. 1, at ¶ 84 n.7 (“With regard to the Plaintiff Lahrman, thus
far and as present he has not yet come within or been directly subjected to the authorities and
jurisdictions of the Defendant public entities.”). 8 Lahrman, an Indiana resident, has previously
visited the Circuit Court on several occasions without suffering any discrimination from the
defendants. Lahrman gives no indication of when or if he will return to the Circuit Court, or how
the court might begin to discriminate against him in the future. This is insufficient to state an
imminent injury against Lahrman at all, because standing requires more than just a mere intent to
“some day” return to the place where the injury will occur and must allege “concrete plans”
describing when the injury will occur. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564.
Which brings us back to Shaggy. Count II-A alleges that Judge MacCarthy and the Cook
County Circuit Court improperly discriminated against Sykes because of her disabilities, and
retaliated against her for asserting ADA claims on behalf of M.G.S., by barring Shaggy from the
courtroom after demanding that Sykes supply proof of both her disabilities and Shaggy’s bona
fides as a service dog. The cold reception the Circuit Judge allegedly provided to Shaggy does
not vest this Court with jurisdiction to hear what remain probate claims. The Circuit Judge’s
order that Sykes could not remain in the courtroom with Shaggy was entered as part of a probate
proceeding and so is inextricably intertwined with that proceeding. Indeed, Sykes maintains that
the Probate Court’s ruling dismissing her state court petition was issued to retaliate against her
for bringing additional claims on behalf of her mother. Compl., Dkt. 1, at ¶ 54 (alleging
exclusion “because of her association with M.G.S.”); ¶ 57 (alleging retaliation “on account of . . .
opposition to acts made unlawful by the ADA and her efforts to aid and encourage her mother
. . . with attaining and enjoying fully those of her rights provided in” the ADA). As discussed
above, this Court lacks the power to review state court orders under the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine and the probate exception to federal jurisdiction. Sykes’ accommodation claim, in
essence, seeks to overturn a state court decision dismissing her petition asserting ADA rights on
behalf of M.G.S. and an interlocutory order issued in that proceeding. See Rooker, 263 U.S. at
415–16; Feldman, 460 U.S. at 486–87; see also Schmitt, 324 F.3d at 487 (applying RookerFeldman doctrine to interlocutory order in divorce proceeding.). And again, the probate
8
In fact, Lahrman, an Indiana resident, has not even outlined “concrete plans” to return to
Illinois, much less concrete plans to attend hearings in the Circuit Court of Cook County. See
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564.
6
exception to federal jurisdiction also precludes adjudication of Shaggy’s ouster from Judge
MacCarthy’s courtroom. And if either of these doctrines did not preclude the exercise of
jurisdiction by this Court to review Judge MacCarthy’s order excluding Shaggy, the abstention
doctrine set forth in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), would. That doctrine holds that
federal courts “must abstain from enjoining or otherwise interfering in ongoing state court
proceedings that are (1) judicial in nature, (2) involve important state interests, and (3) provide
an adequate opportunity to raise the federal claims, as long as (4) no exceptional circumstances
exist that would make abstention inappropriate.” Strohman Realty, Inc. v. Martinez, 505 F.3d
658, 662 (7th Cir. 2007). This is a judicial matter involving important state interests (the ongoing
supervision of a guardianship matter) and the state court is competent to decide issues of federal
law; abstention would be appropriate even if the Court had jurisdiction. To the extent that Sykes
is aggrieved by the Probate Court’s orders, she must seek redress through the state court system
before turning to a federal court.
Accordingly, the Court dismisses the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The dismissal is without prejudice, in that it does not bar the plaintiffs from asserting their claims
in any other forum. It is with prejudice, however, with respect to reasserting these claims in
federal court. Further, the Court notes that the plaintiffs have provided no rationale for
reasserting ADA claims on behalf of M.G.S. in this Court after the Court’s dismissal of the
claims in Sykes I and the affirmance of that dismissal in Sykes II; they appear to have simply
ignored the bases of the prior decisions and judgment with respect to those claims. Further
attempt to reassert the claims in this Court will prompt the Court to consider imposition of
sanctions.
Dated: March 10, 2015
John J. Tharp, Jr.
United States District Judge
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