Watson v. Rich Central High School et al

Filing 26

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order. The Court grants in part defendants' motion to dismiss 14 and dismisses the federal claims asserted in Counts I and II without prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Court strikes the motion as moot as to the state-law claims asserted in Counts III-VII, which are dismissed without prejudice to refiling in state court. This case is terminated. Civil case terminated. Signed by the Honorable Jorge L. Alonso on 3/10/2015. Notice mailed by judge's staff (ntf, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
CAROL WATSON, individually and as
Best Friend and on behalf of
J.E., a minor,
Plaintiff,
v.
RICH CENTRAL HIGH SCHOOL,
BOARD OF EDUCATION RICH
TOWNSHIP HIGH SCHOOL
DISTRICT 227, and its agents,
VANESSA WOODS, as principal of
Rich Central High School, TERRELL
ALEXANDER as the Dean of Students
of Rich Central High School, DONALD
PARKER, as administrator of Rich
Central High School, DORIS W.
LANGON, as Interim Superintendent of
Rich Township High School District 227,
CAROLE COLLINS AYANLAJA, as
Superintendent of Rich Township High
School District 227, DEREK
BLASINGAME, as security for Rich
Central High School, and LACHE
POOL, as substitute teacher for Rich
Central High School,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

No. 14 C 7530
Judge Jorge L. Alonso

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff sues defendants for their alleged violations of his constitutional rights, the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), and state law. Defendants have filed a Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. For the
reasons set forth below, the Court grants the motion with respect to the federal claims and declines to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims.

Facts
J.E. is an African-American male with Autism and a speech/language impairment who attends
Rich Central High School and has an Individual Education Plan (“IEP”) in place. (Compl. ¶¶ 6, 11.)
On September 30, 2013, J.E. and another student made a bomb threat by writing a note that said “bomb
blows at 2.” (Id. ¶¶ 13-15.) The next day, one or more defendants caused J.E. to be arrested. (Id. ¶ 16.)
J.E. was interviewed and held in police custody for four hours without the presence of or notification to
his parents. (Id.)
The following day, the school district held a hearing pursuant to the IDEA, at which it was
determined that J.E.’s actions were a manifestation of his disability. (Id. ¶ 17.) It was also determined
that school officials were at fault for J.E.’s actions because they had not “timely obtain[ed] a copy of
J.E.’s IEP [or] provide[d] [him with] the special education services [he] was [supposed] to receive.” (Id.
¶ 18.) Nonetheless, the school district continues to pursue a charge of disorderly conduct against J.E.
for the events of September 30, 2013. (Id. ¶¶ 19-22.) As a result, J.E. “suffer[s] continued harassment,
embarrassment, emotional pain and suffering, permanent fear of authorities” and has been “deprived .
. . of . . . access to an education under IDEA.” (Id. ¶ 21.)1
Plaintiff alleges that defendants violated J.E.’s rights under the IDEA, the Constitution, and the
Illinois School Code, falsely imprisoned, slandered, assaulted and battered J.E., and intentionally
inflicted emotional distress on him. The relief plaintiff seeks for each claim is the same: compensatory
damages, attorney’s fees, and “an injunction . . . to expunge the School District and Cook County
Juvenile Court records of the arrest and his mug shot and to ensure that an arrest does not occur again
of a special education child without proper notification to their parents and adherence to the Federal and
State and School District due process requirements.” (See id. ¶¶ 36, 41, 47, 52, 56, 64, 69.)

1

This reference is to the second paragraph numbered 21 in the complaint.

2

Discussion
On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court accepts as true all well-pleaded factual
allegations of the complaint, drawing all reasonable inferences in plaintiff’s favor. Hecker v. Deere &
Co., 556 F.3d 575, 580 (7th Cir. 2009). “[A] complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss
does not need detailed factual allegations” but must contain “enough facts to state a claim for relief that
is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).

Federal Claims
Defendants contend that plaintiff’s claims are barred by her failure to exhaust administrative
remedies under the IDEA, which provides:
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to restrict or limit the rights, procedures, and
remedies available under the Constitution, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
[42 U.S.C.A. § 12101 et seq.], title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 [29 U.S.C.A. §
791 et seq.], or other Federal laws protecting the rights of children with disabilities,
except that before the filing of a civil action under such laws seeking relief that is also
available under this subchapter, the [administrative] procedures under subsections (f) and
(g) shall be exhausted to the same extent as would be required had the action been
brought under this subchapter.
20 U.S.C. § 1415(l). The IDEA’s exhaustion provision applies not only to IDEA claims but to any claim
seeking “‘relief that is available under’ the IDEA.” Charlie F. ex rel. Neil F. v. Bd. of Educ. of Skokie
Sch. Dist. 68, 98 F.3d 989, 991 (7th Cir. 1996).
Plaintiff admits that she did not exhaust administrative remedies but contends that she was not
required to do so because the relief she seeks, damages and an injunction, is not available under the
IDEA. In Charlie F., however, the Seventh Circuit rejected this very argument:
Charlie asks us to stop here: he wants compensatory money damages, the IDEA does
not provide this form of relief, and that is that. Things are not so clear, however. The
statute speaks of available relief, and what relief is “available” does not necessarily
depend on what the aggrieved party wants. . . . The nature of the claim and the
governing law determine the relief no matter what the plaintiff demands. If this principle
is equally applicable for purposes of § 1415(f), then the theory behind the grievance may

3

activate the IDEA’s process, even if the plaintiff wants a form of relief that the IDEA
does not supply. Several district courts have used this principle to hold that the
pleadings in court do not end the analysis under § 1415(f), and we think these decisions
right. . . .
....
We read “relief available” to mean relief for the events, condition, or consequences of
which the person complains, not necessarily relief of the kind the person prefers.
Id. at 991-92; see McCormick v. Waukegan Sch. Dist. No. 60, 374 F.3d 564, 568 (7th Cir. 2004)
(“‘Where . . . a plaintiff has alleged injuries that could be redressed to some degree by the IDEA’s
administrative procedures and remedies, then the courts should require exhaustion of administrative
remedies.’” (quoting Robb v. Bethel Sch. Dist., 308 F.3d 1047, 1054 (9th Cir. 2002)).)
Among the injuries defendants’ actions are alleged to have caused J.E. is “the depriv[ation] . .
. of . . . access to an education under IDEA” (Compl. ¶ 21), which is precisely what the IDEA
administrative process is designed to redress. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (stating that one purpose
of the IDEA is to ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate
public education”); § 1415(b)(6)-(i) (setting forth the procedures by which parents can request or object
to the evaluation and educational placement of a child with disabilities and the provision of a free
appropriate public education to that child). Thus, because plaintiff has alleged injuries that “‘could be
redressed to some degree by the IDEA’s administrative procedures,’” exhaustion of administrative
remedies is required. McCormick, 374 F.3d at 568 (quoting Robb, 308 F.3d at 1054)). Because plaintiff
admits she has not exhausted such remedies, the Court grants defendants’ motion to dismiss the federal
claims asserted in Counts I and II.2

2

Exhaustion is an affirmative defense, and thus is generally not a basis for a Rule 12(b)(6)
dismissal. See Xechem, Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 372 F.3d 899, 901 (7th Cir. 2004).
Because, however, plaintiff admits that she did not exhaust (see Pl.’s Resp. Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss at
9), this is an appropriate case for a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal. See Xechem, 372 F.3d at 901 (stating
that a defense can be the basis for a motion to dismiss if plaintiff “admits all the ingredients of an
impenetrable defense”).

4

State Law Claims
Having dismissed all of the federal claims, the Court declines to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over the state-law claims asserted in Counts III-VII. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (“The district
court[] may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a [state-law] claim . . . if . . . [it] has
dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction . . . .”).

Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the Court grants in part defendants’ motion to dismiss [14] and
dismisses the federal claims asserted in Counts I and II without prejudice for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies. The Court strikes the motion as moot as to the state-law claims asserted in
Counts III-VII, which are dismissed without prejudice to refiling in state court. This case is terminated.
SO ORDERED.

ENTERED:

March 10, 2015

__________________________________
HON. JORGE ALONSO
United States District Judge

5