Riley El v. Pfister
Filing
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MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order. Signed by the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 6/15/2016. Mailed notice. (jl)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
WILLIAM RILEY EL, a/k/a William Riley,
B03069,
Petitioner,
v.
RANDY PFISTER, Warden,
Pontiac Correctional Center,
Respondent.
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Case No. 14 C 7776
Judge Joan H. Lefkow
OPINION AND ORDER
William Riley El, 1 currently in the custody of Randy Pfister, Warden of Stateville
Correctional Center, is serving a life sentence for first degree murder, a thirty-year sentence for
home invasion, a consecutive thirty-year sentence for armed robbery, and a concurrent three-year
sentence for aggravated unlawful restraint. On October 3, 2014, Riley filed a pro se petition for a
writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Dkt. 6.) For the reasons stated below, the petition
is denied.
1
Although petitioner captions his habeas petition with the name William Riley El, his name
appears as William Riley throughout the record of proceedings in state court. People v. William Riley, No.
1–11–3262. To avoid confusion, he will be referred to in this Opinion as Riley.
1
BACKGROUND 2
A.
Pre-Trial Motions and Evidence
Riley filed a pretrial motion to quash his arrest and suppress evidence, including his
confession, arguing that the police lacked probable cause to arrest and the evidence was “fruit of
the poisonous tree.” (Dkt. 21-1, Ex. A at 1.) At a hearing on the motion, Riley testified that at
about 9:30 p.m. on June 12, 1997, detectives entered his apartment, placed him in handcuffs, and
took him to a police station. (Id.) He was held in a cell for three days until he was taken to Cook
County Jail, and he could not recall ever being placed in an interview room. (Id.) Riley also
denied ever being taken to police department headquarters at 11th and State Streets. (Id.)
Detectives Nick Rossi and Lawrence Thezan both testified at the hearing that on June 12,
1997, Detective Rossi and Officer Edward Louis went to Riley’s apartment, knocked on the
door, and asked Riley to come to the police station for questioning. (Id.) Riley agreed and was
transported to the police station. (Id.) Rossi testified that (1) Riley was not handcuffed while
being transported, (2) when they arrived at the police station, Riley was placed in an interview
room, (3) Riley admitted to knowing Joseph Steinert, (4) Riley then agreed to go to the police
station at 11th and State Streets for further questioning and a polygraph test, and (5) Riley agreed
to remain in his cell overnight because the polygraph test could not be administered until the next
day. (Id. at 1–2.)
Detective Thezan testified that he arrived for work at 4 p.m. on June 13, 1997 and was
briefed on the status of the investigation. (Id. at 2.) Detectives Akin and Gorski told him that (1)
Riley admitted that he had been with Robert Miller, known as “Moose,” and Moose had been
2
The facts in this section are derived from the state court opinions and the record. For a habeas
review, “state court factual findings that are reasonably based on the record are presumed correct, and the
petitioner bears the burden of rebutting that presumption by clear and convincing evidence. Kaczmarek v.
Rednour, 627 F.3d 586, 589 (7th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). The
court thus adopts the state courts’ recitation of the facts.
2
looking for a computer; and (2) fingerprints from Steinert’s back door matched Riley’s
fingerprints. (Id.) He confronted Riley with this information, and Riley admitted to the burglary
of Steinert’s apartment. (Id.) At this point, at around 6:30 p.m. on June 13, Riley was placed
under arrest. (Id.)
Finding the police detectives’ testimony credible, the court denied Riley’s motion to
suppress. (Id.)
B.
Trial
On the first day of Riley’s bench trial, the State disclosed that certain pieces of evidence,
including the crowbar used to kill Happ, had been inadvertently destroyed. (See Dkt. 21-2, Ex. B
at 2.) Riley’s attorney made an oral motion for sanctions. (Id. at 2–4) After a hearing, the court
denied the motion, finding that the destruction of the crowbar was inadvertent and that the
petitioner had suffered no prejudice. (Id.)
Riley’s statement was admitted into evidence. (Dkt. 21-1, Ex. A at 2.) In the statement,
Riley admitted to breaking into Steinert’s apartment, tying and gagging Happ, and striking Happ
in the head with a crowbar. (Id.) The State also presented witness testimony that corroborated the
events at Moose’s apartment, as well as physical evidence, including a hair sample found in
Riley’s duffel bag which belonged to Happ. (Id. 2–3.) The defense rested without presenting any
evidence. (Id. at 3.)
The trial court found Riley guilty and sentenced him to death on the murder conviction,
although the sentence was commuted to natural life imprisonment in 2003. 3 (Id.)
3
Riley’s girlfriend Sirena Smith was also charged in connection with this crime and pleaded
guilty to one count of felony murder in exchange for a forty-eight year sentence. See People v. Smith, 383
Ill. App. 3d 1078 (2008).
3
C.
Direct Appeal
Riley initially filed an appeal directly to the Illinois Supreme Court pursuant to Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 603. (See dkt. 21-3, Ex. C.) Following the commutation, the Illinois
Supreme Court transferred the case to the Illinois Appellate Court. (Id. at 1–2.) Riley raised two
arguments challenging his conviction: (1) the trial court erred in denying Riley’s motion to
suppress, and (2) Riley was denied effective assistance of counsel because one of his public
defenders was suspended from the practice of law between his trial and his capital sentencing
hearing. (See dkt. 21-4, Ex. D.) The appellate court rejected both arguments and affirmed Riley’s
conviction. 4 (Dkt. 21-3, Ex. C at 30, 32–33.)
On October 4, 2004, Riley filed a petition for leave to appeal (PLA) with the Illinois
Supreme Court. (See dkt. 21-7, Ex. G.) Riley’s PLA raised a single issue—whether the court
erred in denying his motion to suppress. (Id.) On November 24, 2004, the Illinois Supreme Court
denied the PLA. (Dkt. 21-8, Ex. H.)
D.
Post-conviction Proceedings
Riley, by his counsel, raised two issues in his post-conviction petition: (1) that trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress his involuntary confession which
was the result of police abuse, and (2) that Riley’s appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to
raise the denial of a mistrial or sanctions after the police mistakenly destroyed the crowbar. (Id.)
The State filed a motion to dismiss Riley’s petition. The trial court granted this motion in
October 2011. (Id.; see also dkt. 21-11, Ex. K.)
4
Riley also challenged his death sentence conviction. The appellate court, however, determined
that these arguments were moot in light of the commutation. (See dkt. 21-3, Ex. C at 2, 32–33.)
4
On appeal, Riley raised only the claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. (Dkt. 211, Ex. A at 3.) The appellate court affirmed the dismissal on September 30, 2013. (Id. at 10.)
Riley did not petition for leave to appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court.
E.
Federal Habeas Petition
In his timely habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, 5 Riley asserts four claims:
Claim (1): Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that
petitioner’s confession should be suppressed as involuntary;
Claim (2): Petitioner was denied effective assistance of counsel
when his trial counsel failed to investigate the disciplinary record
of the officers who interrogated petitioner;
Claim (3): appellate counsel on direct appeal was ineffective for
failing to appeal the denial of sanctions relating to the lost
evidence; and
Claim (4): petitioner’s conviction was supported by a confession
elicited through coercion.
ANALYSIS
Multiple procedural doctrines limit a federal court’s power to reach the merits of claims
raised in habeas petitions filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. As a result of these doctrines, and
more, Riley is not entitled to habeas relief.
I.
Claims 1 and 2
A.
Procedural Default
For a federal court to reach the merits of a petition for habeas corpus, the petitioner must
have fully and fairly presented his claim to the state courts. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S.
5
Riley’s petition is considered filed on the date the prison officials received the petition. See
Jones v. Bertrand, 171 F.3d 499, 502 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that “the Houston mailbox rule should be
extended to prisoners filing pro se habeas petitions, and, for statute of limitations purposes, a petition is
deemed filed when given to the proper prison authorities and not when received by the district court
clerk”). The statute of limitations began to run on October 1, 2013, and the petition here was provided to
the prison officials on September 29, 2014, just within the one-year deadline.
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838, 848, 119 S. Ct. 1728, 144 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1999). If the petitioner has failed to do so, and the
opportunity to raise the claim has passed, the claim is procedurally defaulted for the purposes of
federal habeas review. See id. This means that prior to petitioning a federal court, a federal
habeas petitioner must first “give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any
constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State’s established appellate review
process.” Id. at 845. This may be achieved either on direct appeal or in post-conviction
proceedings. Lewis v. Sternes, 390 F.3d 1019, 1025 (7th Cir. 2004).
In Illinois, the requirement of a complete round of state review is satisfied by appealing
to the Illinois Appellate Court and filing a PLA to the Illinois Supreme Court. See Boerckel,
526 U.S. at 845–46. Where a petitioner has failed to fairly present his federal constitutional claim
to the state courts and the opportunity to raise that claim has passed, the claim is procedurally
defaulted for purposes of federal habeas review. Gonzales v. Mize, 565 F.3d 373, 380 (7th Cir.
2009).
As noted, Riley raised claims 1 and 2 during his post-conviction proceedings. (See dkt.
21-1, Ex. A; dkt. 21-10, Ex. J.) The issues were raised both at the circuit and appellate levels.
(Id.) Riley, however, concedes that he did not file a PLA to the Illinois Supreme Court. (Dkt. 26
at 3–4.) Therefore, Riley’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims are procedurally defaulted.
See Boerckel, 526 U.S. 844–45 (holding that the failure to file a petition for discretionary review
(PLA) is a “normal, simple, and established” part of the State’s review process, and that the
failure to exhaust a claim in a PLA will foreclose review by the federal courts); see also United
States ex rel. Haqq v. Carter, 176 F. Supp. 2d 820, 828 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (finding petitioners
claims procedurally defaulted where he failed to file PLA from dismissal of post-conviction
appeal).
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B.
Cause and Actual Prejudice For the Procedural Default
Although claims 1 and 2 are procedurally defaulted, the court may grant relief on
procedurally defaulted claims if the petitioner can establish cause for the default and actual
prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722,
750, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 115 L. Ed. 2d 640 (1991), or demonstrate that the court’s failure to
consider the claim will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice, McCleskey v. Zant,
499 U.S. 467, 494, 111 S. Ct. 1454, 113 L. Ed. 2d 517 (1991). Guest v. McCann, 474 F.3d 926,
930 (7th Cir. 2007). Riley does not argue “a fundamental miscarriage of justice”; therefore, the
court need not consider that exception to procedurally defaulted claims. Crockett v. Hulick,
542 F.3d 1183, 1193 (7th Cir. 2008) (recognizing that a court cannot consider reasons to excuse
procedural default that the petitioner himself has not raised).
To establish cause Riley “must explain how an objective, external impediment prevented
him from complying with state procedural rules. See Williams v. Buss, 538 F.3d 683, 686 (7th
Cir. 2008). Riley attempts to excuse his defaults by claiming that (1) the Office of the State
Appellate Defender “abandoned” him by failing to provide notice that it would not be filing a
PLA on his behalf; (2) he could not file a pro se PLA because he was physically unable to do so
and because prison staff tampered with his mail and withheld his property. (Dkt. 26 at 1–4.)
First, an error by petitioner’s attorney in state post-conviction appeal proceedings cannot
supply cause for excusing procedural default. Generally, petitioner must “bear the risk of
attorney error that results in a procedural default.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488,
106 S. Ct. 2639, 91 L. Ed. 2d 397 (1986). Furthermore, “[s]ince there is no right to the effective
assistance of counsel in post-conviction proceedings, ineffective assistance of post-conviction
counsel does not constitute cause to excuse a procedural default.” Cawley v. DeTella, 71 F.3d
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691, 695 (7th Cir. 1995). Therefore, the alleged abandonment by the Office of the State
Appellate Defender does not establish cause for Riley’s default.
Second, Riley does not explain why his ailments and the prison’s tampering with his mail
prevented him from complying with state procedural rules. 6 Cause cannot be established through
mere conclusional allegations. Williams v. Buss, 538 F.3d 683, 686 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that
procedural default will not be excused by petitioner’s allegation that he was denied access to
prison law library absent explanation “why the lack of access to the library hindered his case”).
Moreover, this case is similar to Maciel v. Carrier, 22 F. Supp. 2d 843 (N.D. Ill. 1998),
in that Riley needed only to reallege his original claims and send them to the Illinois Supreme
Court. Therefore, as in Maciel, Riley has failed to demonstrate cause for his procedural defaults,
as it is unclear why the alleged impediments prevented him from filing such a PLA. Id.
Furthermore, even if Riley were to be excused for untimeliness, he offers no excuse for not filing
a PLA at all. Cawley, 71 F.3d at 694 (“[I]f the state in which the habeas petitioner was convicted
would treat failure to appeal as a procedural default barring further review, that default likewise
bars federal review of the claim.”).
Because Riley has failed to demonstrate adequate cause for the procedural defaults for
claims 1 and 2, the court will not consider them.
6
The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the denial of Riley’s post-conviction petition on
September 30, 2013. (Dkt. 21-1.) Riley had thirty-five days to file a timely PLA. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315(b). He
failed to do so and he now argues that his medical condition at that time prevented him from doing so.
Riley, however, fails to demonstrate why the impediments prevented him from filing a PLA in this case
but managed to file numerous documents with this court in several other pending lawsuits during the
same time period from August 2013 to December 2013. See Riley El v. Godinez, No. 13 C 5768, Dkt. 1
(N.D. Ill. Aug. 13, 2013); Riley El v. Ill. Dep’t of Corrs., No. 13 C 5771, Dkt. 1 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 13, 2013);
Riley El v. Illinois, No. 13 C 5773, Dkt. 1 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 13, 2013); Riley El v. Illinois, No. 13 C 6226,
Dkt. 1 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 30, 2013); Riley El v. Godinez, No. 13 C 6725, Dkt. 1 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 18, 2013);
Riley El v. Godinez, No. 13 C 8656, Dkt. 1 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 3, 2013).
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II.
Claim 3
Riley abandoned claim 3 (ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to appeal
denial of sanctions for lost evidence) in his post-conviction appeal by not raising this claim in his
appellate brief following the denial of his post-conviction petition. (See dkt. 21-12, Ex. L).
Moreover, this claim is procedurally defaulted for the same reasons stated above in claims 1 and
2. See Boerckel, 526 U.S. 844–46 (holding that the exhaustion doctrine requires habeas
petitioners to exhaust all remedies available under state law). Nowhere in his briefs does Riley
present a reason to excuse this default. Accordingly, Riley’s claim 3 is procedurally defaulted,
and this court will not consider it further.
III.
Claim 4
Claim 4 (petitioner’s conviction was supported by a confession elicited through coercion)
was not raised in any state proceeding. (See dkt. 20 at 11.) A claim asserted for the first time on
federal habeas review is defaulted because the state courts have not had any opportunity, let
alone a full and fair opportunity, to review the issue through one complete round of appellate
proceedings. Lewis, 390 F.3d at 1026; United States ex rel. Page v. Mote, Nos. 01 C 232, 01 C
233, 2004 WL 2632935, at *10 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 17, 2004). Petitioner’s trial counsel may have
been ineffective for failing to present this claim, which deficient performance could serve as
cause to excuse default. Lewis, 390 F.3d at 1026. “However, a claim of ineffectiveness must
itself have been fairly presented to the state courts before it can establish cause for a procedural
default of another claim.” Id. (citing Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 452–54, 120 S. Ct.
1587, 146 L. Ed. 2d 518 (2000)). Therefore, Claim 4 is procedurally defaulted. Because Riley
does not attempt to establish cause for this default, this court will not give further consideration
to claim 4.
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IV.
Certificate of Appealability
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A), Riley may appeal from this final order denying relief
under § 2254 only if this court issues a certificate of appealability. A certificate of appealability
may issue if the applicant has made a substantial showing of denial of a constitutional right. Id.;
§ 2253(c)(2). For the reasons stated above, the court finds that Riley has not made a showing of a
substantial constitutional question for appeal, as reasonable jurists would not find this court’s
ruling debatable. See Lavin v. Rednour, 641 F.3d 830, 832 (7th Cir. 2011) (to obtain certificate
of appealability, the prisoner must show that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s
assessment of the constitutional claim and any antecedent procedural rulings debatable or
wrong). Thus, the court declines to issue a certificate of appealability.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, Riley’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus (dkt. 6) is denied
and the court declines to certify any issues for appeal.
Date: June 15, 2016
_____________________________
U.S. District Judge Joan H. Lefkow
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