Morris v. Colvin

Filing 19

ORDER: Plaintiff Jacqueline Morris ("Plaintiff") appeals the Commissioner of Social Security's decision to deny her Supplemental Security Disability Insurance Benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act and Supplemental Security Income under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. We grant Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment [dkt. 11] and deny the Commissioner's motion for summary judgment [dkt. 16]. The Administrative Law Judge's decision is reversed and remanded. [For further detail see order] - Signed by the Honorable Susan E. Cox on 12/10/2015. Mailed notice (np, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

JACQUELINE MORRIS,

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Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.

No. 14 C 7815
Magistrate Judge Susan E. Cox

ORDER

Plaintiff Jacqueline Morris (“Plaintiff”) appeals the Commissioner of Social Security’s
decision to deny her Supplemental Security Disability Insurance Benefits under Title II of the
Social Security Act and Supplemental Security Income under Title XVI of the Social Security
Act. We grant Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment [dkt. 11] and deny the Commissioner’s
motion for summary judgment [dkt. 16]. The Administrative Law Judge’s decision is reversed
and remanded.

STATEMENT

Plaintiff appeals the Commissioner of Social Security’s decision to deny her Social
Security disability benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act (“SSA”) and Supplemental
Security Income (“SSI”) under Title XVI of the SSA. Plaintiff filed a motion for summary
judgment [dkt. 11] seeking reversal of the decision of the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). A
motion for summary judgment has been filed on behalf of Defendant Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”). For the reasons outlined below, we grant
Plaintiff’s motion and deny the Commissioner’s motion [dkt. 16]. The ALJ’s decision is reversed
and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

1

On January 27, 2012, Plaintiff filed an application for disability benefits alleging that she
has been disabled since June 30, 2010, and claiming that she had disc problems in her spine,
arthritis in her spine, knee, and arms, sciatica, and numbness in her left leg and arm. 1 The Social
Security Agency denied Plaintiff’s claims initially and denied them again upon reconsideration. 2
Plaintiff filed a request for a hearing before an ALJ on July 11, 2012. 3 The request was granted,
and ALJ John K. Kraybill held a hearing on May 23, 2013. 4
Following the hearing, the ALJ determined, inter alia, that: 1) the Plaintiff meets the
insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through December 31, 2015; 2) the
Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since June 30, 2010; 3) the Plaintiff
suffered from the severe impairment of degenerative disc disease; 4) the Plaintiff does not have
an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one
of the listed impairments as defined in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1; 5) the Plaintiff
has the Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”) necessary to perform light work as defined in 20
CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b), with additional stipulations, including that she is limited to
sitting two hours continuously, cannot climb ladders, ropes, and scaffolds, and may only
occasionally climb stairs, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch or crawl; 6) given the Plaintiff’s RFC, the
Plaintiff is capable of performing previous work as a waitress, cashier, and sales clerk. 5
Between 1990 and 2010, Plaintiff was regularly employed, working as a waitress,
cashier, and sales clerk at a bakery. 6 Until 2010, Plaintiff lived in Las Vegas, Nevada, but
moved to Illinois to live with her son because she was suffering from worsening lower back

1

R. at 189, 244.
R. at 61-64.
3
R. at 128-129.
4
R. at 21-60.
5
R. at 14-20.
6
R. at 252.
2

2

pain. 7 Plaintiff testified that her leg pain radiates to her legs and feet, and prevents her from
walking more than half a block or lifting anything heavier than a gallon of milk. 8
The record shows that the Plaintiff began to seek treatment for her back pain in 2009,
when she presented to a Las Vegas emergency room with significant tenderness in her lower
back, and pain radiating down her left leg. 9 The record also reveals several more visits to
emergency rooms due to back pain, including several diagnostic examinations on Plaintiff’s
back. For instance, an MRI taken on May 2, 2012 at John Stroger Hospital showed disc
protrusion contacting the nerve roots at the L4/L5 level and the L5/S1 level. 10
Plaintiff began seeing her reported treating physician, Dr. Lloyd Licuanan, on April 23,
2013. 11 The record contains documents from two visits to Dr. Licuanan – the initial visit, and a
second visit on May 7, 2013. On May 10, 2013, following Plaintiff’s second visit, Dr. Licuanan
completed a Physical Capacities Assessment form stating that Plaintiff could lift or carry up to
ten pounds, could only stand or walk for an hour or less during a normal workday, and had an
unlimited capacity to sit during a normal workday. 12 Plaintiff testified that she was able to get
access to medical insurance approximately one month before her hearing in May 2013, and
began physical therapy treatment for her back pain shortly before her hearing. 13
At the hearing before the ALJ, Dr. Ashok Jilhewar testified as the medical expert
(“ME”). The ME testified that, based on his review of the medical records, the Plaintiff was
capable of performing light work. However, on cross examination by the Plaintiff’s attorney, the
ME testified that he could not rule out the possibility that the nerve compression in the MRIs
7

R. at 31-32.
R. at 32-33.
9
R. at 296.
10
R. at 378.
11
R. at 468.
12
R. at 466.
13
R. at 34.
8

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caused Plaintiff back pain, or that standing or walking caused her pain. 14 He further stated that
Dr. Licuanan’s opinion that walking and standing exacerbated the Plaintiff’s condition may have
been correct. 15
In finding that the Plaintiff had the capacity to perform light work with the
aforementioned limitations, the ALJ stated that “the claimant’s medically determinable
impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms; however, the
claimant’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these
symptoms are not entirely credible for the reasons explained in this decision.” 16 The ALJ’s
opinion then spends two pages summarizing the findings in the medical records, before
providing the following two-paragraph explanation for his conclusion regarding the Plaintiff’s
RFC:
As for the opinion evidence, the undersigned gives little weight to
the residual functional capacity assessment of Dr. Lieuanan (sic).
Dr. Lieuanan (sic) indicated that the claimant could perform no
greater than sedentary work but saw the claimant only one time
previously.
In sum, the above residual functional capacity assessment is
supported by the minimal objective findings, the lack of continuing
treatment, the opinion of Dr. Jilhewar, the medical expert, and the
claimant’s inconsistent and out of proportion testimony with the
medical evidence. 17
The ALJ did not provide any further analysis for his RFC determination. For the reasons
discussed more fully below, the ALJ’s decision is reversed and remanded.
DISCUSSION
I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

14

R. at 46-48.
R. at 46-48.
16
R. at 18.
17
R. at 20.
15

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The ALJ’s decision must be upheld if it follows the administrative procedure for
determining whether the plaintiff is disabled as set forth in the Act, 18 if it is supported by
substantial evidence, and if it is free of legal error. 19 Substantial evidence is “relevant evidence
that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” 20 Although we review
the ALJ’s decision deferentially, she must nevertheless build a “logical bridge” between the
evidence and her conclusion. 21 A “minimal[] articulat[ion] of her justification” is enough. 22
II.

The ALJ Failed To Apply The “Treating Physician Rule.”
The Plaintiff first claims that the ALJ erred in assigning little weight to Dr. Licuanan’s,

opinion. 23 The ALJ gave little weight to the treating physician’s opinion because, according to
the ALJ, Dr. Licuanan had only treated the Plaintiff on one occasion before issuing his Physical
Capacities Assessment form. The “treating physician” rule requires that an ALJ give controlling
weight to the medical opinion of a treating physician if it is well-supported by medically
acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and not inconsistent with the other
substantial evidence. 24 When, as here, an ALJ does not give a treating physician’s opinion
controlling weight, the ALJ must consider five factors: (1) the “[l]ength of the treatment
relationship and the frequency of examination;” (2) the “[n]ature and extent of the treatment
relationship;” (3) “[s]upportability;” (4) consistency “with the record as a whole;” and (5)
whether the treating physician was a specialist in the relevant area. 25

18

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a) and 416.920(a).
42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
20
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971).
21
Moore v. Colvin, 743 F.3d 1118, 1121 (7th Cir. 2014).
22
Berger v. Astrue, 516 F.3d 539, 545 (7th Cir. 2008).
23
R. at 359.
24
20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2); Roddy v. Astrue, 705 F.3d 631, 636 (7th Cir. 2013).
25
20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)-(d)(6); Harris v. Astrue, 646 F. Supp. 2d 979, 999 (N.D. Ill. 2009).
19

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Here, the ALJ either failed to discuss, or inaccurately characterized, all of these factors.
There is no analysis whatsoever regarding whether Dr. Licuanan’s opinion was supported by the
record as a whole, nor its consistency, nor whether Dr. Licuanan had any particular specialty.
Additionally, regarding the factors relating to the length or extent of treatment, the ALJ simply
misstated the record, saying that the Plaintiff only saw her treating physician on one occasion
before he issued his opinion on Plaintiff’s RFC. While the Plaintiff did, in fact, only treat with
Dr. Licuanan twice, the fact that the ALJ misstated this portion of the record indicates that he did
not appropriately consider Dr. Licuanan’s opinion before rejecting it. While the ALJ’s decision
to give minimal weight to the treating physician’s opinion was not entirely unfounded, given the
relatively short treatment history, the process he used to arrive at that decision was deficient due
to the incomplete consideration of all the factors. As such, the ALJ failed to apply all of the five
factors from 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)-(5), and his decision is hereby remanded for a more
thorough analysis.
III.

The ALJ Failed to Properly Explain His Credibility Determination.

The Plaintiff also contends that the ALJ’s ruling regarding the Plaintiff’s credibility was
patently wrong. Social Security Ruling 96-7p states that, when making credibility
determinations on the claimant’s statements about his or her symptoms, “[t]he determination or
decision must contain specific reasons for the finding on credibility, supported by the evidence in
the case record, and must be sufficiently specific to make clear to the individual and any
subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave the individual’s statements and the reasons
for that weight.” Additionally, “[i]t is not sufficient for the adjudicator to make a single,

6

conclusory statement” regarding the individual’s credibility, or lack thereof. 26 The Seventh
Circuit has reversed ALJs where it was impossible to “tell whether the ALJ investigated ‘all
avenues’ that relate to [the claimant’s] complaints of pain because [the ALJ’s] decision offers no
clues as to whether she examined the full range of medical evidence as it relates to [the
claimant’s] claim.” 27
Here, the ALJ provided the conclusory statement that the Plaintiff’s “statements
concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely
credible for the reasons explained in this decision,” 28 but failed to explain those supposed
“reasons.” There was no discussion regarding which of the Plaintiff’s statements were not
credible, how they failed to line up with the objective medical evidence, or why the ALJ believed
they were inconsistent with the record as a whole. The ALJ did not explain why he believed that
the Plaintiff’s claims were not credible, but simply concluded that they were not without any
analysis of the record. In short, this is the type of single conclusory statement that is insufficient
Social Security Ruling 96-7p, and fails to provide this Court with “a sufficient basis to sustain
the ALJ’s credibility determination.” 29 As the Seventh Circuit noted in Zurawksi, this Court is
“not suggesting that the ALJ’s credibility determination was incorrect, but only that greater
elaboration is necessary.” 30 Therefore, the ALJ’s decision is reversed and remanded.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is granted [dkt. 11] and the Commissioner’s
motion for summary judgment is hereby denied [dkt. 16].
26

Social Security Ruling 96-7p.
Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 888 (7th Cir. 2001).
28
R. at 18.
29
Zurakwsi, 245 F.3d at 888.
30
Id.
27

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DATED: 12/10/2015

___________________________
Susan E. Cox
United States Magistrate Judge

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