SMART Transportation Division v. Northeast Illinois

Filing 27

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order. Signed by the Honorable Manish S. Shah on 4/6/2015: Respondent's motion 17 is denied. This matter is remanded to the NationalRailroad Adjustment Board, First Division, to clarify whether the phrase "all lost time" in its award means "all time lost, less any outside earnings." Status hearing remains set for 4/8/15 at 9:30 a.m. [For further detail see attached order.] Notices mailed by Judicial Staff. (psm, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
SMART TRANSPORTATION DIVISION,
Petitioner,
v.
NORTHEAST ILLINOIS REGIONAL
COMMUTER RAILROAD CORPORATION
(METRA),

No. 14 CV 7828
Judge Manish S. Shah

Respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Petitioner SMART Transportation Division, a labor union, seeks to enforce an
arbitration award it obtained on behalf of Barry Brandenburger—a train conductor
respondent Metra terminated for allegedly giving away free rides. Finding in favor
of the employee, the National Railroad Adjustment Board ordered Brandenburger
reinstated and directed Metra to pay him for “all lost time.” After the parties were
unable to agree on what that meant exactly, the union instituted this enforcement
action under the Railway Labor Act.
Metra moves to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. For
the following reasons, Metra’s motion is denied and the matter is remanded to the
Board for clarification on the issue of back-pay setoff.
I.

Legal Standard
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction; “they have only the power

that is authorized by Article III of the Constitution and the statutes enacted by

Congress pursuant thereto.” Transit Express, Inc. v. Ettinger, 246 F.3d 1018, 1023
(7th Cir. 2001). The burden of establishing that a district court has proper
jurisdiction lies with the plaintiff. Id. A defendant arguing that a plaintiff has not
met this burden may move for dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1). When reviewing a 12(b)(1) motion, “[t]he district court may properly look
beyond the jurisdictional allegations of the complaint and view whatever evidence
has been submitted on the issue to determine whether in fact subject matter
jurisdiction exists.” Capitol Leasing Co. v. FDIC, 999 F.2d 188, 191 (7th Cir. 1993)
(internal quotation omitted).
II.

Background
Barry Brandenburger was dismissed by his employer Metra (also known as

the Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter Railroad Corporation). Brandenburger’s
union, SMART Transportation Division, appealed the decision on his behalf and the
matter was eventually submitted to arbitration pursuant to 45 U.S.C. § 153. On
August 1, 2014, the National Railroad Adjustment Board, First Division, sustained
Brandenburger’s claim in its entirety. The Board’s succinct award quoted the claim
as follows:
Dismissal assessed to employee Barry Brandenburger. Claim for
payment of all lost time, immediate employment reinstatement, and
all notations removed from his personal work record resulting from his
dismissal from service. This claim shall include all wage equivalents to
which he is entitled, Carrier’s 401(k) contributions, and Railroad
Retirement credits, include all costs for health and welfare benefits,
return to service with seniority unimpaired, and restoration of all
vacation entitlements.

2

The award went on to find the“[c]laim sustained” and it ordered “the Carrier . . . to
make the Award effective on or before 30 days following” its postmark date.
Metra began to comply with the award by requesting information from
Brandenburger about any compensation he received while away from Metra. The
company intended to reduce any such amounts from the total it was giving him as
back pay. It pursued this course in light of Rule 38(k) of the applicable collective
bargaining agreement, which stated that “[i]n case suspension or dismissal is found
to be unjust, [the dismissed employee] shall be reinstated and paid for all time lost,
less any outside earnings.” Brandenburger did not provide the requested
information because, as he and the union saw it, Rule 38(k) did not apply. Instead,
the union petitioned this court under 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (p) to have the Board’s
award enforced without any setoff.
Metra has moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) to dismiss
the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
III.

Analysis
Metra believes this case should be dismissed for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction because the dispute turns on a so-called “minor” dispute over the
interpretation of Rule 38(k), and such disputes must go through arbitration before
an enforcement action can be heard in federal court. Metra’s view of subject matter
jurisdiction is too narrow. Article III of the United States Constitution authorizes
federal court jurisdiction for suits arising under the laws of the United States. See
U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. Congress has authorized the federal courts to exercise

3

this “federal question” jurisdiction in 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which provides, “[t]he
district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Invoking
federal law—namely, 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (p)—the union asks this court to enforce
the Board’s order. This case thus arises under federal law and this court has subject
matter jurisdiction under § 1331.
But “[i]f an arbitration award is too ambiguous to be enforced, as when the
award fails to address a contingency that later arises or when the award is
susceptible to more than one interpretation, the district court should if possible
send the matter back to the original arbitration panel for clarification . . . .”
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen v. Union Pacific Railroad Co.,
500 F.3d 591, 592 (7th Cir. 2007); see also Ethyl Corp. v. United Steel Workers of
America, 768 F.2d 180, 187 (7th Cir. 1985) (“But if the award is too ambiguous to be
enforced, the court has—it has to have—the power to remand the case to the
arbitrator for clarification.”); Brotherhood of Railroad Signalmen v. Union Pacific
Railroad Co., 2004 WL 2931289 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 15, 2004) (remanding Railway Labor
Act enforcement action to Board for clarification on meaning of “be made whole”).
The award in this case is too ambiguous to enforce without clarification. Its
brief language could reasonably be understood as ordering back pay either with or
without offset. “[A]ll lost time” could refer to those hours of the workweek
Brandenburger lost by not working anywhere (Metra’s interpretation). Or, it could
refer to the Metra-specific hours Brandenburger lost as a result of his dismissal (the

4

union’s interpretation). The award does not expressly refer to outside earnings. At
the same time, though, it does direct Metra to pay Brandenburger only those “wage
equivalents to which he is entitled,” which under Rule 38(k) would mean back pay
net of outside earnings. The Board’s award is susceptible to more than one
interpretation.
The union believes the award is unambiguous because it says nothing about
setting off any outside earnings. The union cites two decisions for the proposition
that the award’s silence should be construed as the Board’s affirmative decision to
award gross back pay. See Newkirk v. Chicago & North Western Transportation Co.,
Inc., 1996 WL 164376 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 2, 1996); Automobile Mechanics Local 701 v.
Joe Mitchell Buick, Inc., 930 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1991). As Metra notes, however,
Newkirk and Buick differ materially from this case because they did not involve a
background setoff agreement like Rule 38(k). Moreover, it is not completely accurate
to say the award in this case is totally silent on the issue of setoff, since it does
specify that Brandenburger should receive only what he is “entitled” to—arguably
implicating the collective bargaining agreement and Rule 38(k). See Buick, 930 F.2d
at 578 (holding that award’s silence on vacation and Health and Welfare Fund
benefits meant employee was entitled to those benefits as “provided in the collective
bargaining agreement”).
Metra did not waive its offset argument below. In its submission to the
Board, Metra identified Rule 38 as the “Rule at Issue.” It also attached a copy of the

5

individual rule—not the entire agreement—as Exhibit A. The Board’s award is
ambiguous as to how it resolved Metra’s argument.
IV.

Conclusion
Respondent’s motion [17] is denied. This matter is remanded to the National

Railroad Adjustment Board, First Division, to clarify whether the phrase “all lost
time” in its award means “all time lost, less any outside earnings.”

ENTER:
___________________________
Manish S. Shah
United States District Judge

Date: 4/6/15

6