Edwards v. ARAMARK Uniform & Career Apparel, LLC et al
Filing
51
MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Ruben Castillo on 1/19/2016. Mailed notice(sj, )
{artv
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
GREGORY EDWARDS, individually
for all others similarly situated,
and
)
Plaintiff,
No. 14 C 8482
v.
Chief Judge Rub6n Castillo
ARAMARK UNIFORM AND CAREER
APPAREL, LLC and ARAMARK,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Gregory Edwards ("Plaintiff') brings this collective action on behalf of himself and other
similarly situated employees against Aramark Uniform and Career Apparel, LLC ("AUCA") and
Aramark (collectively "Defendants") for alleged violations of the overtime provisions of the Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938,29 U.S.C. $ 201 et seq. (the "FLSA"), as well as violations of the
Illinois Minimum Wage Law (the "IMWL"), 820lrt. Covp. Srer. $ 105/l et seq. Defendants
have filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that Plaintiff is exempt from the FLSA's
overtime provisions under the Motor Carrier Act (the "MCA") exemption, 29 U.S.C.
$
213(bX1). (R. 37, Defs.' Mot.) Defendants also argue that the IMWL and FLSA are parallel and,
if summary judgment is granted as to Plaintiff s FLSA claim,
summary judgment should also be
granted as to Plaintifls IMWL claim. (R. 38, Defs.' Mem. at7 n.3.) For the reasons stated
below, Defendants'motion for summary judgment is granted.
FACTS
I.
The Parties
"AUCA rents, leases and sells various products to customers throughout the state of
Illinois, including garments (uniforms), and allied goods (such
as linens, towels, mops, and
floor
mats)." (R. 38, Defs.' Mem. at2 (citing R. 39, Defs.' Facts flfl 7-9).) Under AUCA's rental
services agreement, AUCA provides uniforms and allied goods to its customers and AUCA's
employees visit the customers on a weekly basis to "pick up dirty items, launder them, and return
them the following week." (R. 43, Pl.'s Resp. to Defs.' Facts tJ 10.) Under AUCA's lease
program, AUCA provides uniforms to the customer and "the customer launders the uniforms
themselves"; however, AUCA "manages any repairs that need to be done or size exchanges and
replaces worfn] out garments." (Id.lT I 1.) Under
will pick an item from
back." (ld.1l
a catalog," the customer
AUCA's direct purchase program, "a customer
will
purchase it, and AUCA'onever sees the item
B.\l
Plaintiff worked as a Route Service Representative ("RSR") from early 2000 to October
3,2074. (ld.
111; see
also R. 49, Defs.' Resp. to Pl.'s Add'l Facts fl 4.) Every RSR in Illinois is
assigned to a "market center," and Plaintiff was assigned to the "Chicago Market Center" (the
"CMC"). (R. 43, Pl.'s Resp. to Defs.' Facts fl 15.) RSRs "provide services to customers who
have entered into rental agreements and lease agreements, and sometimes provide services to
customers with respect to direct purchases." (Id. 1114.) Plaintiff s duties included, among other
tasks: "delivering garments and allied goods to Defendants' clients"; "inspecting customers'
inventories"; "picking up soiled goods"; "unloading soiled uniforms and garments" at the CMC;
I
Defendants do not provide any details regarding the nature of Aramark's business and instead state that
"Aramark was not Plaintiff s employer and is improperly named as a defendant." (R. 38, Defs.' Mem. at
n.2.) However, the Court need not resolve this issue because summary judgment is appropriate for both
defendants for the reasons outlined below.
I
"generating new business on his route"; conducting "inventory control when visiting customers";
and "plac[ing] orders
Add'l
for [ ] merchandise on his handheld device." (R. 49, Defs.' Resp. to Pl.'s
7;R.43, Pl.'s
Facts tf
Resp. to Defs.' Facts fltf 18-19.) Plaintiff and the other RSRs
assigned to the CMC worked exclusively in
fltT
lllinois. (R. 49, Defs.' Resp. to Pl.'s Add'l Facts
s, 21.)
II.
The Purchasing and Delivery of New and Used Uniforms and Allied Goods
As further discussed below, in order to determine whether Plaintiff and similarly situated
RSRs fall under the MCA exemption, the Court must establish whether Plaintiff s job duties
involved interstate activity. As such,
it is necessary to examine not only the specifics of
Plaintiff s job duties, but also the nature of AUCA's business activities.
A.
Purchase and Shipment of New Uniforms
A "Grade A" garment is a "[b]rand new garment, [that has] never been worn," and
a
"Grade B" garment is "[e]verything else." (R. 43, Pl.'s Resp. to Defs.' Facts fl']f 24,25.) All new
customers receive Grade A garments. (1d $ 26.) If a customer requests a new style or requires a
special size uniform those orders are also filled with Grade A garments. (ld. fln 26,27 .) ln
addition, if a customer's uniforms are worn-out or ruined, AUCA will first attempt to
fill
the
order with "used, Grade B garments," but if the CMC "does not have a sufficient number
of
Grade B garments on hand to
fill
the order, AUCA orders new, Grade A garments." (ld.
tT
61.)
The majority of the Grade A uniforms are shipped from AUCA's Distribution Center in
Lawrenceville, Georgia, but some are shipped from AUCA's Distribution Center in Reno,
Nevada, or from third-party vendors. (Id.
tT 1 1.)
AUCA
\28;
see also R. 49, Defs.' Resp. to Pl.'s
uses a third-party freight vendor, USF Holland,
Add'l
Facts
for its shipments from Georgia to
the CMC, and it uses FedEx or UPS freight for its shipments from Nevada to the CMC. (R. 43,
Pl.'s Resp. to Defs.' Facts fl 28.) It is undisputed that employees at the CMC order 2000 new
uniforms every week from AUCA's distribution centers in Georgia and Nevada or from other
vendors. (R. 43, Pl.'s Resp. to Defs.' Facts !f!f 28,67,69; R. 44, Opp. at 5-6, 10.)
The Grade A garments that arrive at the CMC are "designated for a particular customer."
(R. 43, Pl.'s Resp. to Defs.' Facts $ 30.) In fact, the uniforms are often "ordered for a specific
wearer or employee" of the customer. (Id.) AUCA uses a Garment Tracking System that
"will
show when a garment is scanned in and scanned out of autosort, who that garment is for based
on the route, day, garment identification number, and the wear[erl." Qd.fl 33.) If a Grade A
garment is sent from one of AUCA's distribution centers in Nevada or Georgia, a barcode is
"affixed at the distribution center." (ld. n35.) If a Grade A garment is sent by
a
third-party
vendor, the barcode is affixed at the CMC. (ld.136; see also R. 49, Defs.' Resp. to Pl.'s Add'l
Facts u 15.) Thus, all Grade
A garments
are tracked
until they reach AUCA's customers via the
Garment Tracking System.
When a shipment of Grade A garments arrives at the CMC, stockroom employees
unpack, take inventory of, sort, and steam-clean the Grade A garments, which are then "sorted
by route for the RSRs to pick up and load onto their trucks for delivery." (R. 43, Pl.'s Resp. to
Defs.' Facts flfl 40-42.) The Grade A garments are placed on trucks for delivery to customers
"within 24-hours [sic] of receipt at the" CMC. (ld.
B.
Purchase and Shipment of New
1143.)
Allied Goods
As for the purchasing of new allied goods, Rob Wennerstrom, the Merchandise Control
Manager for the CMC, testified that he generates a weekly report that shows the "average
demand per week and then the day for each allied line item," and the report is based upon "what
the RSRs are ordering in their handhelds." (1d.n47.) As discussed more fully below, while
4
Wennerstrom testified that the purchasing of new allied goods is not necessarily "predetermined
or predesignated for a particular client," he does place orders for new allied goods based upon a
series of factors including the weekly demand reports, "inventory," his
own'Job knowledge,"
"new account" demands, and "addition[s] to an account that could be a large size." Ud nn 48-50;
see also R. 49,
Defs.' Resp. to Pl.'s Add'l Facts fl 17.)
It is undisputed that employees at the CMC order 27,000 new allied goods every week
from AUCA's distribution centers in Georgia and Nevada or from other vendors. (R. 43, Pl.'s
Resp. to Defs.' Facts
flfl
52,
67,70; see a/so R. 44, Opp. at 5-6, 10.) When the new allied goods
arrive at the CMC they are "unboxed, hung, sorted, scanned, and steam tunneled before they can
be sent to clients." (R. 43, Pl.'s Resp. to Defs.' Facts Id. fl 54.) "The majority of new allied goods
are loaded onto RSRs trucks within 48-hours [sic] after arriving at the" CMC and then are
"delivered by RSRs directly to AUCA's customers." (ld.1156)2
In response to AUCA's statement that the "majority of new allied goods are loaded onto RSRs trucks
within 48-hours [sic] after arriving at the Market Center," Plaintiff states that the fact is: "Disputed.
Wennerstrom testified that allied goods do not simply pass through the Chicago market center but instead
must go through a process in which they are unboxed, hung, sorted, scanned, and steam tunneled before
they can be sent to clients." (R. 43, Pl.'s Resp. to Defs.' Facts fl 56.) This answer does not substantively
respond to AUCA's fact that the new allied goods are loaded onto the RSRs' trucks within 48 hours of
their arrival at the CMC. The Local Rules governing summary judgment are straightforward and strictly
enforced. Flint v. City of Belvidere,T9l F.3d764,767 (7th Cir.20l5) ("This Court has consistently
upheld district court judges' discretion to require strict compliance with Local Rule 56.1."). When
responding to a moving party's statement of facts, the non-movant must provide "a response to each
numbered paragraph in the moving party's statement, including, in the case of any disagreement, specific
references to the affidavits, parts of the record, and other supporting materials relied upon." N.D. ILL.
L.R. 56. L In addition, a response must also be relevant. See Valenti v. Qualex, lnc.,970 F.2d 363,369
(7th Cir. 1992) (*A. . . responsive statement that . . . contain[s] irrelevant additional facts[] has no
standing [under the local rule]."). The consequence of failing to comply with this requirement is that the
statement is deemed admitted. N.D.lLL. L.R.56.1(b)(3XC).Because Plaintifls response does not comply
with the Local Rules, the Court will deem this fact admitted. Flint,79l F.3d at 766-67 (district court
properly exercised discretion when "deeming admitted forfy-two of the forty-seven enumerated
paragraphs in Defendants' Rule 56.1(a) statement" based on opposing party's improper response).
'
C. Deliver)'of New
and Used Uniforms and Allied Goods
The facts taken as a whole demonstrate that at any given time an RSR may be delivering
a new
uniform or allied good, picking up a dirty uniform or allied good, and/or delivering
a
freshly laundered rented uniform or allied good. Thus, the RSRs' trucks (including PlaintifPs)
contain both new and used merchandise for delivery to customers on their routes.(ld n 67.) The
number of the new uniforms and allied goods that RSRs deliver every week versus the number
of
used uniforms and allied goods that RSRs deliver every week is a contested issue. On one hand,
AUCA states that"7.lo/o of
the total goods delivered by RSRs each week were new uniforms and
new allied goods." (R. 39, Defs.' Facts fl 72.)Plaintiff s position is that 6.7Yo of the total goods
delivered by RSRs each week were new-specifically,0.5yo are new garments and 6.2oh are new
allied goods. (R. 43, Pl.'s Resp. to Defs.' Facts fl 72; see alsoP..44,Opp. at 10-17.) For purposes
of the motion for summary judgment, the Court accepts the non-moving party's calculation
(Plaintiff s) that 6.7% of the total goods delivered by RSRs each week consisted of new uniforms
and new allied goods.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On October 28,2014, Plaintiff filed this collective action against Defendants alleging that
they violated the FLSA and the IMWL by "knowingly . . . permitting Plaintiff and the Class
members to work in excess of 40 hours per week without properly compensating them at an
overtime rate for those additional hours." (R. 1, Compl. fl 1.) Specifically, the complaint alleges
that Defendants "misclassified Plaintiffs as exempt from the FLSA and the IMWL even though
Plaintiffs did not meet any tests for exemption," and Plaintiffs "were subject to Defendants'
uniform policies and practices and were victims of Defendants' schemes to deprive them of
overtime compensation." (Id. flfl 11, 15.) On December 79,2014, Defendants answered the
complaint and asserted their affirmative defenses, including that the "claims . . . are barred, in
whole or part, by one or more exemptions to the overtime provisions o[f] federal and state law,
including . . . the motor carrier exemption." (R. 19, Affirmative Defenses fl 8.)
On March 16,2015, Plaintiff moved to conditionally certify the case as a collective
action under the FLSA. (R. 29, Pl.s' Mot. to Issue Notice.) Shortly thereafter, Defendants sought
to stay Plaintiff s motion pending the resolution of Defendants'motor carrier exemption defense.
(R. 33, Mot. to Stay.) On April 1,2075, the Court granted the motion to stay. (R. 35, Min.
Order.) Subsequently, Defendants filed their motion for summary judgment as to the motor
carrier exemption (R. 37, Defs.' Mot.; R. 44, Opp.; R. 48, Reply), and the issue is now ripe for
determination.
LEGAL STANDARI)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that "[t]he court shall grant summary
judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Feo. R. Ctv. p. 56(a). Summary judgment is
proper
"if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue
as
to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,477 U.S.
317,322 (1986) (citation omitted). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court does
not evaluate the weight of the evidence, judge the credibility of the witnesses, or determine the
ultimate truth of the matter; instead, it is the function of the Court to ascertain whether there
exists a genuine issue of triable fact. Andersonv. Liberty Lobby, Lnc.,477 U.5.242,249-50
(1986). "A genuine dispute as to any material fact exists if the evidence is such that a reasonable
jury could return
a
verdict for the nonmoving party." Kvapil v. Chippewa Cnty.,752
F
.3d 708,
712 (7th Cir.2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 imposes an initial burden of production on the party
moving for summary judgment to inform the district court why a trial is not necessary." Sterk
Redbox Automated Retail,
v.
LLC,770 F.3d 618,627 (7th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). "That
burden may be discharged by showing . . . that there is an absence of evidence to support the
nonmoving party's case." Id. (intemal quotation marks and citation omitted). If the movant
carries this burden, "the non-movant . . . must make a showing sufficient to establish the
existence of an element essential to that party's case." Id. (intemal quotation marks and citation
omitted). In addition, the non-movant "must go beyond the pleadings (e.9., produce affidavits,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, or admissions on file) to demonstrate that there is
evidence upon which
a
jury could properly proceed to find a verdict in their favor." Id. (internal
quotation marks, citation, and alterations omitted). "The existence of a mere scintilla
evidence, however, is insufficient to
that there is evidence upon which
a
of
fulfill this requirement. The nonmoving party must show
jury reasonably could find for the plaintiff."
Vf/heeler v.
Lawson,539 F.3d 629,634 (7th Cir.2008).
ANALYSIS
The sole issue raised by Defendants' motion for summary judgment is whether the MCA
exempts Plaintiff and similarly situated RSRs from the overtime provisions of the FLSA. If the
exemption applies, then Plaintiff and similarly situated RSRs are not due overtime compensation
for their work.
A. FLSA and the MCA Exemption
The FLSA requires employers to pay employees one and one-half times their normal
hourly wage for each hour they work in excess of forty hours per week. 29 U.S.C. $ 207(a)(l).
Generally, motor carriers whose employees engage entirely in "intrastate commerce are subject
to the Secretary of Labor's jurisdiction, and consequently the overtime and maximum hours
provisions of the FLSA." Johnson v. Hix Wrecker Serv., lnc.,651 F.3d 658, 660 (7th Cir.
20ll).
However, motor carriers whose employees engage "in interstate commerce may come under the
Secretary of Transportation's jurisdiction under the Motor Carrier Act." Id. at 660-61. These
employees are "exempt from the FLSA's maximum hour and overtime provisions pursuant to the
FLSA's motor carrier exemption." Id. at66l.
While many motor carrier employers engage in both intrastate and interstate commerce,
an employee "cannot be subject to the jurisdiction of both the Secretary of Labor and the
Secretary of Transportation simultaneously."
ld Thus, the overtime provisions of the FLSA do
not apply to "any employee with respect to whom the Secretary of Transportation has power to
establish qualifications and maximum hours of service pursuant to the provisions of section
31502 of Title 49." 29 U.S.C. $ 213(bX1). According to that provision, the Secretary
of
Transportation may establish "( I ) qualifications and maximum hours of service of employees of,
and safety of operation and equipment of, a motor carrier; and (2) qualifications and maximum
hours of service of employees of, and standards of equipment of, a motor private carrier, when
needed to promote safety of operation." 49 U.S.C. $ 31502(b). This exception to the FLSA's
applicability is commonly known
as the
Motor Carrier Act exemption. Whether the MCA
exemption applies "depends both on the class to which [the] employer belongs and on the class
of work involved in the employee's job." 29 C.F.R. $ 782.2(a).Indeed, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held years ago that the applicability of the MCA exemption
"depends upon the activities of the individual employees." Goldberg v. Faber Indus., [nc.,291
F
.2d 232, 235 (7th Cir. I 961 ); see also Jaramillo v. Garda, 1rc. , No. 12 C 662, 2012 WL
4955932, at *2 (N.D. Ill. OcL 11,2012).
The MCA exemption applies if the Secretary of Transportation has the power to establish
maximum hours and qualifications of service of employees. That power is triggered if two
requirements are met:
(l)
an employee must be "employed by carriers whose transportation
of
passengers or property by motor vehicle is subject to [the Secretary's]jurisdiction"; and (2) an
employee must "engage in activities of a character directly affecting the safety of operation
of
motor vehicles in the transportation on the public highways of passengers or property in
interstate or foreign commerce within the meaning of the Motor Carrier Act." 29 C.F.R.
$
782.2(a); see also Collins v. Heritage Wine Cellars, 589 F.3d 895, 897 (7th Cir. 2009). "The
employer bears the burden of proving the application of the exemption," Klein v. RushPresbyterian-St. Luke's Med. Ctr.,990F.2d279,283 (7th Cir. 1999), and exemptions are to be
narrowly construed against the employer. Auer v. Robbins,5l9 U.S. 452,462 (1991).
Thus, to determine whether to grant summary judgment for Defendants under the MCA
exemption, the Court must consider: (1) whether AUCA is a motor carrier subject to the
Secretary of Transportation'
s
j
urisdiction; and (2) whether Plaintiff was engaged in activity
directly affecting the safety of operation of motor vehicles in the transportation on public
highways in interstate commerce.
B. AUCA
is a Motor Private Carrier Subject to the Power of the Secretary of
Transportation.
The parties do not dispute that AUCA is classified as a "motor private carrier" by the
U.S. Department of Transportation ("DOT") and was subject to regulation by the DOT during
l0
the relevant time period from 2000 to 2014. (R. 43, Pl.'s Resp. to Defs.' Facts flfl 4, 6, 12, 40-42;
R. 38, Defs.' Mem. at 7.) "The term 'motor private carrier' means a person, other than a motor
carrier, transporting property by motor vehicle when (A) the transportation is as provided in
section 13501 of this title; (B) the person is the owner, lessee, or bailee of the property being
transported; and (C) the property is being transported for sale, lease, rent, or bailment or to
further a commercial enterprise." 49 U.S.C. $ 13102(15). AUCA argues that all three elements
are met here because:
(l) "AUCA
transports goods via public highway from out-of-state
distribution centers, through its Chicago Market Center, to customers located in Illinois"; (2)
"AUCA is the owner of the goods transported"; and (3) "AUCA's primary business is leasing or
renting the goods to its customers." (R. 38, Defs' Mem. at 7 (citing R. 39, Defs.' Facts fltf 6-7,
72,28,40-42,52-55).) Plaintiff does not contest AUCA's position in his opposition to the
motion for summary judgment. (See generallyR.44, Opp.)
In addition, "[a]n employer subject to the Secretary's jurisdiction is required to register
with the Department of Transportation." Collins,589 F.3d at897. AUCA states that it is
"registered with the Department of Transportation." (R. 43, Pl.'s Resp. to Defs.' Facts fl 4; see
also
k.38, Defs.' Mem. at7 .) In response, Plaintiff
does not specifically admit or deny whether
AUCA is registered with the DOT, but he states that the fact is "[d]isputed with regards to
Edward" because "Edwards testified at his deposition that he did not need a commercial license
to drive his work vehicle." (R. 43, Pl.'s Resp. to Defs.' Facts fl 4.) This statement does not fully
and substantively respond to
AUCA's statement that it is registered with the DOT. As such, the
Court will deem this fact admitted. See Flint,791 F.3d at766-67.
Because Plaintiff does not rebut Defendants' assertion that
and the record demonstrates that
it is a "motor private carrier,"
AUCA is registered with the DOT, the Court finds that AUCA
ll
is subject to the power of the Secretary of Transportation. See Walters v. Am. Coach Lines
of
Miami, lnc.,575F.3d1221,1227 (1lthCir.2009) (concludingthatthe DOThad jurisdiction
over defendant employer because the employer "was licensed by the DOT, has the [ ]
authorizations necessary to be an interstate motor carrier, and was audited in the past by the
DOT"). Accordingly, there is no genuine issue of material fact that AUCA satisfies the first
prong of the MCA exemption test.
C. Plaintiff
Was Engaged in Interstate Commerce.
The parties dispute whether Plaintiff and similarly situated RSRs "engage in activities
a character
of
directly affecting the operation of motor vehicles in the transportation on the public
highways of passengers or property in interstate . . . commerce within the meaning of the Motor
Carrier Act." 29 C.F.R. $ 782.2(a)(2). Put simply, the crux of their dispute is whether Plaintiff
was engaged in interstate activity while employed at AUCA.3
AUCA argues that it "transports its
product across state lines for sale," "the product undergoes no alteration during its journey to
AUCA's customer" and, thus, "the entire journey should be regarded
as having taken place
in
interstate commerce within the meaning of the MCA's exemption from the FLSA." (R. 38,
Defs.' Mem. at 14 (internal alterations, citation, and quotation marks omitted).) In response,
Plaintiff argues that he and similarly situated RSRs "never crossed state lines to perform any job
duties," and that the "evidence shows that Plaintiff and other RSRs have never been the final
phase of an interstate journey." (R. 44, Opp. at
l-2.)
3
Plaintiff does not dispute Defendants' argument and supporting facts demonstrating that "Plaintiff
engaged in activities directly affecting the operational safety of motor vehicles on public highways"
because: (1) the "regulations specifically identifu 'drivers' as affecting the safety of vehicles"; (2) "courts
in lllinois have held, without exception, that truck drivers are engaged in activities that affect the
operational safety of motor vehicles"; and (3) "all of the vehicles at the [CMC] . . . which RSRs . . . used
for delivering product weigh well over 10,001 pounds." (R. 38, Defs.' Mem. at 7-8 (citations omitted);
see generally R. 44, Opp.) As such, the Court concludes that Plaintiffand sirnilarly situated RSRs
engaged in activities directly affecting the operational safety of motor vehicles on public highways.
t2
Plaintiff
s
first point can be disposed of relatively quickly, but whether Plaintiff
s and
other RSRs' job activities were part of a continuous interstate joumey requires much more
attention. Plaintiff s contention that
"[i]t is undisputed
that Plaintiff and other similarly-situated
RSRs perform services solely and exclusively within Illinois" and that the employees'owere
never expected to and did not cross state lines while servicing customers" is not outcome
determinative. (ld. at 8; see also id. at 7,2, 4,7 .) Courts have repeatedly made clear that "the fact
that a driver has or has not crossed a state line is not dispositive. So long as the goods are being
transported on an interstate journey, all legs of that journey satisfy Section 13501's requirement
even
if
one or several of the legs are strictly intrastate." Sedrickv.
All Pro Logistics, ZZC, No. 07
C 581 1,2009 WL 160755 6, at *3 (N.D. Ill. June 8, 2009); see also Collins,589 F.3d 895
(concluding that a portion of transportation that was entirely within Illinois was nonetheless
interstate commerce within the meaning of the MCA); Chao v. First Class Coach Co.,
Inc.,2l4
F. Supp. 2d 1263,1272 (M.D. Fla. 2001) ("The principle that intrastate travel may qualify as a
legitimate part of interstate commerce is not new."); 49 C.F.R. $ 390.5 (defining "interstate
commerce" as, inter alia,"trade, traffic, or transportation in the United States . . . [b]etween two
places in a State as part of trade, traffic, or transportation originating or terminating outside the
State or the United States"). Thus, the fact that Plaintiff "never crossed state lines to perform any
job duties" does not alter the Court's conclusion.
Despite the fact that Plaintiff worked entirely in the state of Illinois, the interstate
commerce requirement still may be satisfied y'the uniforms and allied goods are transported
within the borders of Illinois
as part
of a "practical continuity of movement" in the flow of
interstate commerce. Walling v. Jacl
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