Boston v. Dart et al

Filing 46

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Young B. Kim on 8/4/2015. (ma,)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
MAURICE BOSTON,
Plaintiff,
v.
THOMAS DART and MARLENE
FUENTES,
Defendants.

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No. 14 CV 8680
Magistrate Judge Young B. Kim

August 4, 2015

MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER
Plaintiff Maurice Boston brings this suit pro se against Defendants Sheriff
Thomas Dart and Marlene Fuentes, alleging that conditions he has been subjected
to while detained at the Cook County Jail violated the Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, et seq., the Rehabilitation Act (“Rehab
Act”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 701, et. seq., and his constitutional rights. (R. 20, Am. Compl. at
11.) The parties consented to this court’s jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 636(c).
(R. 29.) Before the court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss the action pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (R. 25.) For the following reasons, the
motion is granted in part and denied in part:
Facts
In reviewing the Rule 12(b)(6) motion, this court accepts as true all well
pleaded allegations of the complaint. See Alam v. Miller Brewing Co., 709 F.3d 662,
665-66 (7th Cir. 2013).

On August 21, 2014, Boston was transferred to the

Residential Treatment Unit (“RTU”) at the Cook County Jail to be housed as a pre-

trial detainee. (R. 20, Am. Compl. at 7.) Boston describes the RTU as a “state of the
art” facility built in 2012 “to accommodate people who are disabled and physically
challenged.” (Id.) Boston is a paraplegic who uses a wheelchair to perform daily
tasks like dining, showering, and engaging in leisure activities. (Id.)
Boston alleges that while he was housed in the RTU, Defendants did not
provide adequate access to shower stalls or dining tables, which are also used for
leisure activities such as card playing. (Id. at 8-12.) Specifically, Boston claims that
the dining tables’ design prevented him from pulling his wheelchair up to the table,
and as a result, he was unable to eat his meals at the table or participate in leisure
activities.

(Id. at 13, 17, 44.)

As for the showers, Boston alleges that he was

provided a portable chair to help him access the showers, but that the chair did not
fit in the shower stall. (Id. at 11.) As a result, Boston had to sit on an unpadded
concrete block in the shower, which he alleges caused him pain and injuries,
including sores and scars. (Id. at 8, 11, 21.) Based on these facts, Boston claims
that the conditions of his detention were more difficult and uncomfortable for him
than they were for other pretrial detainees, made dining and showering a “major
inconvenience,” and violated his constitutional rights. (Id. at 8, 12, 42.) Defendants
move to dismiss Boston’s claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), arguing that he fails to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted under the ADA, the Rehab Act, or 42
U.S.C. § 1983. (R. 25, Mot. at 1.)

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Analysis
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must include “a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although a plaintiff need not provide detailed allegations to fend off
a motion to dismiss, the “allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above
the speculative level” and “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell
Atl. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007).

The plausibility standard asks for

“more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully,” and demands
more than a “the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Accordingly, complaints must provide “fair notice of what
the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
Where, as here, a plaintiff is proceeding pro se, this court must “liberally construe”
the pleadings and hold them to less stringent standards than those drafted by
lawyers. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).
Defendants raise three arguments in support of their motion to dismiss.
First, they argue that Boston’s ADA and Rehab Act claims against Defendant
Fuentes fail because he has sued her only in her individual capacity.

Second,

Defendants argue that even when read in the light most favorable to Boston, his
allegations are insufficient to state a claim for relief under the ADA or the Rehab
Act.

Finally, they argue that Boston’s § 1983 claim fails because he is

impermissibly attempting to bypass the statutory enforcement mechanisms set
forth in the ADA and the Rehab Act to pursue a separate § 1983 claim based on the

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same allegations underlying his other claims.

The court is persuaded by

Defendants’ first argument, but not by the latter two.
A.

The ADA and Rehab Act Claims Against Fuentes
Defendants first assert that Boston’s ADA and Rehab Act claims against

Fuentes must be dismissed because, they argue, claims under these statutes cannot
be brought against an individual.

(R. 25, Mot. at 5-6.)

Fuentes is the ADA

Coordinator for the Sheriff of Cook County, and Boston has sued Fuentes in her
individual capacity for violations of the ADA and Rehab Act. (R. 20, Am. Compl. at
10-12.) Title II of the ADA states that no disabled individual shall be “excluded
from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or
activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”
42 U.S.C. § 12132.

Because Title II claims can only be brought against public

entities, claims against employees in their individual capacity must fail. Stanek v.
St. Charles Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 303, 783 F.3d 624, 644 (7th Cir. 2015); see also
Jaros v. Ill. Dep’t. of Corr., 684 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2012) (“employees of the
Department of Corrections are not amenable to suit under the Rehabilitation Act or
ADA”).
The Rehab Act is substantially similar to the ADA, except that it requires a
demonstration that the public entity receives federal funding. Wagoner v. Lemmon,
778 F.3d 586, 592 (7th Cir. 2015).1 Accordingly, “courts construe and apply” the

Although Boston has not alleged whether the Cook County Sheriff’s Office
receives federal funding, in one similar case the plaintiffs submitted evidence
suggesting that it has since at least 2003. See Phipps v. Sheriff of Cook County, 681

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ADA and the Rehab Act “in a consistent manner.”

Radaszewski on behalf of

Radaszewski v. Maram, 383 F.3d 599, 607 (7th Cir. 2004). Like the ADA, the Rehab
Act has been interpreted to preclude suits against officials in their individual
capacities. See, e.g., Stanek, 783 F.3d at 644; Garfield v. Cook County, 08 CV 6657,
2009 WL 4015553, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 19, 2009). Because Fuentes cannot be held
liable in her individual capacity for Boston’s claims under the ADA and Rehab Act,
and because Boston has brought these claims against her only in her individual
capacity, his ADA and Rehab claims against Fuentes are dismissed with prejudice.
B.

The Sufficiency of Boston’s ADA and Rehab Act Allegations
Defendants next argue that Boston’s allegations relating to the shower stalls

and dining tables are insufficient to state a claim against them under either the
ADA or the Rehab Act. (R. 25, Mot. at 3.) Title II of the ADA protects detainees
with qualified disabilities against discrimination by a public entity, and requires
jails to reasonably accommodate their disabilities. Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corr. v.
Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 209 (1998). To state a claim under the ADA and Rehab Act,
Boston must allege: (1) that he is a qualified individual with a disability; and (2)
that he was denied the benefit of services, programs, or activities at the prison
facility because his disability was not reasonably accommodated.

See 42 U.S.C

§ 12132; Yeskey, 524 U.S. at 209-10. Where detention facilities provide detainees
with the benefit of recreational activities, medical services, and educational and
F. Supp. 2d 899, 913 (N.D. Ill. 2009). Because Defendants have not raised the issue
of whether the Rehab Act applies here, the court will assume for purposes of the
present motion that the Cook County Sheriff’s Office receives federal funding. See
Bramlett v. Dart, 14 CV 5939, 2015 WL 4148711, at *4 n.1 (N.D. Ill. July 9, 2015).
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vocational programs, they must do so in a way that does not exclude the disabled
members of the detainee population. See Yeskey, 524 U.S. at 210. The same is true
with respect to detainees’ access to meals and use of showers. See Jaros, 684 F.3d
at 672 (meals and showers are a program or activity within the meaning of the ADA
and Rehab Act); Phipps, 681 F. Supp. 2d at 916 (showers are regarded as programs
and/or services under the ADA).
Although there is no dispute that Boston has sufficiently alleged that he is a
qualified individual with a disability, the parties dispute whether he has
sufficiently presented a plausible claim that the alleged denial of meals, some
leisure activities, and shower amenities in the RTU amount to a violation of the
ADA and Rehab Act. (R. 25, Mot. at 3.) Defendants argue that Boston has only
claimed that he is inconvenienced by the shower and table accommodations, and
argue that merely alleging an inconvenience or that the detainee did not receive the
level of accommodation that he wished for does not amount to a denial of services,
programs, or activities within the meaning of the statutes. Defendants rely in part
on Wagoner, 778 F.3d at 593, where a paraplegic plaintiff alleged that the
defendants failed to accommodate problems he experienced with his wheelchair,
including failing to properly equip the prison van for wheelchairs. The Wagoner
plaintiff identified one instance in which he was forced to crawl on a van’s floor to
exit the vehicle, but the court found that his allegation that he was inconvenienced
with longer waits and humiliation when exiting the van were insufficient to
establish that he was denied access to programs, services, or activities. Id. at 589,

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593. The Seventh Circuit concluded that dismissal was appropriate in that case
because the plaintiff failed to allege that he was “denied all access to some programs
and activities, and his access to others was severely limited” as a result of the
defendants’ failure to accommodate his disabilities. Id. (quotation omitted); see also
Doyle v. Fairman, 96 CV 2572, 1997 WL 610332, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 1997)
(detainee who used cane failed to state a claim under ADA or Rehab Act because
alleged difficulty ascending or descending stairs was merely an inconvenience).
But at least one Seventh Circuit case addressing allegations similar to those
Boston raises here held that where the plaintiff alleges that the refusal to
accommodate his disability “kept him from accessing meals and showers on the
same basis as other inmates,” he has pleaded a plausible claim for relief. See Jaros,
684 F.3d at 672. In Jaros, the plaintiff alleged that he required a cane to walk, and
had difficulty showering at the prison because the stalls lacked grab bars. Id. at
669. Because he feared falling he limited himself to four showers a month, and
because he could not walk quickly to get to the cafeteria, he occasionally missed
meals. In concluding that these allegations stated a valid claim for relief under the
ADA and the Rehab Act, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that because the plaintiff
missed showers and meals, he was excluded from programs, services, or activities.
Id. That was sufficient to create a plausible claim for failure to accommodate under
the Rehab Act. Id. at 672; see also Bramlett, 2015 WL 414871, at *3 (allegation that
plaintiff kept from accessing showers on same basis as other detainees stated claim
under ADA and Rehab Act); McKinnie v. Dart, 14 CV 9588, 2015 WL 1117297, at

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*1, *5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 10, 2015) (detainee who missed showers because he did not
have access to a handicap accessible shower stall stated claim).
Boston appears to meet the strictures of Rule 12(b) as it applies to alleged
violations of the ADA and the Rehab Act stemming from his limited access to the
RTU showers. Boston alleges that showering was made more difficult for him than
other detainees because of the presence of a protruding concrete block in the shower
stalls for the disabled at the RTU. (R. 20, Am. Compl. at 11.) Defendants provided
him with a chair which did not fit in the stalls for the disabled and was not useful in
the other stalls, which lacked grab bars. (Id. at 11-12.) As a result, he was forced to
sit on the concrete block in the stall, causing him pain and injuries. (Id. at 12.) The
concrete shower block caused sores on his buttocks, and when wet, became slippery.
(Id. at 41.)

Boston also alleges that because of Defendants’ failure to properly

accommodate his disability, he sometimes missed showers altogether. (Id. at 46.)
Because Boston has alleged that he did not access showers on the same basis as the
other detainees in the RTU, he has pleaded a plausible claim for failure to
accommodate. See Jaros, 684 F.3d at 672. Therefore, Boston’s shower allegations
state a claim for relief under the ADA and Rehab Acts.
Although Boston’s meal and leisure activities claims present a closer call,
construing his complaint liberally, the court concludes that he also has stated a
claim with regard to his inability to access the dining tables where RTU detainees
eat their meals. It is true, as Defendants point out, that the ADA and Rehab Act do
not provide a remedy for inconvenience, Wagoner, 778 F.3d at 593, but a refusal to

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accommodate a disability resulting in a detainee accessing meals on a different
basis than other detainees states a plausible claim for relief under the ADA and the
Rehab Act, see Jaros, 684 F.3d at 672. Boston alleges that his wheelchair did not fit
under the RTU’s dining tables, which all detainees used for meals and leisure
activities, such as playing cards. (See R. 20, Am. Compl. at 11, 13.) Thus, he
alleges that he was kept from accessing the tables on the same basis as the other
detainees, and he was forced to eat his meals in his sleeping area on a daily basis.
(Id. at 44.) Although Boston has not alleged that his lack of access to the table
caused him to completely miss meals or leisure activities, reading Boston’s claims in
the light most favorable to him, he has sufficiently alleged that he accessed meals
and leisure activities on a different basis than other detainees. That is sufficient to
state a claim for relief under the ADA and Rehab Act. See Jaros, 684 F.3d at 672;
Johnson v. Godinez, 13 CV 2045, 2015 WL 135103, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 9, 2015)
(disabled inmate’s allegations that accommodations at times prevented him from
going to meals stated ADA and Rehab Act claims).
C.

Boston’s Section 1983 Claim
The only argument Defendants have raised in support of their motion to

dismiss Boston’s § 1983 claim is that he cannot pursue relief under § 1983 for the
same allegations that provide the basis for his ADA and Rehab Act claims.2 (R. 25,
Mot. at 6-8.)

Specifically, they argue that the ADA and Rehab Act include

Defendants have not argued that Boston’s allegations are insufficient to support a
constitutional violation under the standard defined by Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, or
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
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comprehensive enforcement mechanisms which Boston cannot bypass by seeking to
enforce the statutes under § 1983.

“Section 1983 provides a remedy for the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities created by the Constitution and
federal statutes.” Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103,
105 (1989) (internal quotation omitted).

When a statute includes its own

comprehensive enforcement scheme, “that scheme may not be bypassed by pleading
an underlying violation of the statute and bringing suit directly under § 1983.”
Alexander v. Chi. Park Dist., 773 F.2d 850, 856 (7th Cir. 1985). Here, Defendants
cite a string of cases outside the prisoner litigation context to argue that Boston’s
ADA and Rehab Act claims bar him from also proceeding under § 1983, but the
cited cases involved situations where the plaintiffs attempted to enforce statutory
rights, rather than constitutional rights, under § 1983 as well as the ADA or Rehab
Act. (R. 25, Mot. at 8 (citing, e.g., Jones v. Regional Transp. Auth., 11 CV 04924,
2012 WL 2905797, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Jul. 16, 2012) (concluding that the plaintiff was
precluded from relying on § 1983 as a means to remedy an alleged ADA violation
where no constitutional violation alleged); Silk v. City of Chicago, 95 CV 0143, 1996
WL 312074, at *19 (N.D. Ill. Jun. 7, 1996) (“this court concludes that the
comprehensive enforcement schemes adopted by Congress in the ADA and the
[Rehab Act] preclude [the plaintiff] from seeking to enforce a violation of either
statute through 42 U.S.C. section 1983”); Holmes v. City of Chicago, 94 CV 4083,
1995 WL 270231, at *5 (N.D. Ill. May 5, 1995) (Congress did not “intend to permit
§ 1983 claims based upon alleged injuries remediable under” the Rehab Act and

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ADA).) As one of these cases put it, “a plaintiff may not maintain a section 1983
action in lieu of—or in addition to—a Rehabilitation Act or ADA cause of action if
the only alleged deprivation is of the employee’s rights created by the Rehabilitation
Act and the ADA.” Holbrook v. City of Alpharetta, Ga., 112 F.3d 1522, 1531 (11th
Cir. 1997).
Defendants’ argument overlooks the many cases from this circuit allowing
constitutional § 1983 claims to proceed alongside the ADA and Rehab Act claims,
even where the underlying allegations are similar. See, e.g., Strominger v. Brock,
592 Fed. App’x 508, 511 (7th Cir. 2014); Miller v. Dart, 14 CV 6270, 2015 WL
1651940, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 10, 2015); Hildreth v. Cook County, 08 CV 3506, 2010
WL 1656810, at *3-4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 23, 2010). For example, in Miller, the plaintiff’s
§ 1983 claim was allowed to proceed because he sought redress for the defendants’
alleged deliberate indifference to his need for an ADA and Rehab Act-mandated
accommodation. 2015 WL 1651940, at *1-*2. Similarly, in Hildreth, the plaintiff’s
§ 1983 claims were allowed to proceed where in addition to his ADA claims the
plaintiff alleged that the defendants acted with “deliberate indifference” to deprive
him of his constitutional rights. 2010 WL 1656810, at *3-*4. As one recent decision
points out, “[n]umerous courts of this district have found that a disabled pretrial
detainee states an official capacity claim against the Sheriff and the County under
the Fourteenth Amendment’s ‘denial of medical care framework’ by stating that
they ‘failed to act when they learned that correctional officers were not providing

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reasonable housing accommodations to disabled detainees.’” Bramlett, 2015 WL
4148711, at *2 (quoting McKinnie, 2015 WL 1117297, at *2-*3).
Here, when liberally construed, Boston’s complaint can be read as bringing a
§ 1983 claim based on what he alleges is a constitutional violation that is separate
and distinct from the alleged statutory violations. Boston’s ADA and Rehab Act
claims allege discrimination based on lack of access, but he also alleges that
Defendants were deliberately indifferent to either his medical needs or to what he
alleges to have been constitutionally unacceptable conditions of his detention.
(R. 20, Am. Compl. at 12.)

For example, Boston alleges that Defendants were

deliberately indifferent to his needs because they did not provide him with a useful
accommodation so that he may access the shower stalls for the disabled after he
complained.

(Id.)

Further, Boston alleges that Defendants intentionally and

wantonly inflicted pain, injuries, and suffering by failing to provide him with
protective padding or a cushion for the concrete shower block. (Id. at 14.) Lastly,
Boston alleges that Defendants were aware that a nurse noticed the scars and sores
on his buttocks caused by the concrete shower stump, but they nonetheless
neglected to provide him with adequate accommodations. (Id. at 21.) As a result,
Boston asserts that his constitutional rights have been violated and seeks redress
under § 1983.3

Boston asserts that his Eighth Amendment rights have been violated, but because
he is a pretrial detainee, his rights are instead governed by the Fourteenth
Amendment. Miller, 2015 WL 1651940, at *3 n.1. To the extent that the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments implicate different standards, those differences are
not relevant to the determination of the current motion.
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Based on a liberal reading of his complaint, Boston’s § 1983 claim rests on his
allegations of a constitutional deprivation that is separate and apart from his
attempt to seek accommodations under the ADA and Rehab Acts.

Accordingly,

Defendants failed to show that Boston is attempting to bypass the enforcement
mechanisms set out in the ADA and Rehab Act in pursuing his § 1983 claim.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Boston’s amended
complaint is granted in part and denied in part. Boston’s ADA and Rehab Act
claims against Fuentes are dismissed with prejudice.
ENTER:

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Young B. Kim
United States Magistrate Judge

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