Schagrin et al v. LDR Industries, LLC et al

Filing 96

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order: Defendants' motion to dismiss, R. 90 , is denied in part in accordance with this opinion. The motion is granted to the extent that the claims against LDR are dismissed without prejudice. The parties should confer regarding discovery and, if possible, be prepared to propose a schedule to the Court at the hearing on March 20, 2019. Signed by the Honorable Thomas M. Durkin on 3/19/2019:Mailed notice(srn, )

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
UNITED STATES ex rel. ROGER B.
SCHAGRIN and ROGER B. SCHAGRIN, PC,
doing business as SCHAGRIN
ASSOCIATES,
Plaintiffs,

No. 14 C 9125
Judge Thomas M. Durkin

v.
LDR INDUSTRIES, LLC; GB HOLDINGS,
INC.; LARRY GREENSPON; and DENNIS
GREENSPON,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Defendants manufactured and imported steel pipe from China. Relators, Roger
Schagrin and his law firm, allege that Defendants misclassified the pipe to avoid
paying certain customs duties. Relators claim that this worked a fraud against the
federal government in violation of the False Claims Act.
On November 20, 2018, the Court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss. The
Court “agree[d] with Relators’ theory of the case to the extent that if the Greenspons
knew that LDR—the company they owned and managed—was not paying customs
duties, they can be liable under the False Claims Act for failing to rectify the
situation.” R. 78 at 14 (United States ex rel. Schagrin v. LDR Indus., LLC, 2018 WL
6064699, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 20, 2018)). But the Court held that Relators had failed
to allege facts “that the Greenspons were sufficiently experienced in the industry”
such that the Court might infer that the Greenspons knew about or at least could

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“apprehend the ‘obviousness’ of the customs violations.” R. 78 at 16. The Court
dismissed the complaint without prejudice to permit Relators the chance to replead.
Relators filed a second amended complaint in an attempt to cure the
deficiencies the Court identified in the prior complaint. R. 86. Defendants have again
moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. R. 90. That motion is denied in part and
granted in part.
I.

Plausibility
As the Court held in its prior opinion, what is needed for Plaintiffs’ claims to

survive a motion to dismiss are plausible allegations that the Greenspons knew about
the alleged fraud. Plaintiffs have supplied several additional allegations that
plausibly establish that the Greenspons had intimate knowledge of LDR’s business
and the relevant industry, and by extension establish their knowledge of the fraud in
this case:


a former LDR employee describes the Greenspons as having “controlled
every aspect of LDR’s business,” R. 86 ¶ 52;



when LDR was sold as a part of bankruptcy proceedings, the Greenspons
entered into non-competition and consulting agreements with the buyer
and agreed “to provide for assistance [to the buyer] in connection with the
continued operation of the business, transition assistance with suppliers
and customers, and minimizing any disruption in the operation of the
business,” R. 86-1 at 23 (¶ 17);

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

Larry Greenspon submitted an affidavit in a proceeding before the U.S.
International Trade Commission, in which he rendered an opinion based on
his experience at LDR about whether “pipe fittings” imported from China
“compete with U.S.-made . . . pipe fittings,” R. 86-1 at 15-16;



in that same affidavit, Larry Greenspon described LDR as a “family owned
business,” R. 86-1 at 15; and



as of September 2014, LDR employed 90 people and had annual net sales
of $65 million, see R. 86-1 at 124-25 (pp. 3-4 ¶¶ 10, 14), as compared with
another Chicago-based competitor that employs approximately 2,300
people and has net sales of $2.6 billion, see R. 86 ¶ 50.

These allegations demonstrate that the Greenspons were actively managing
LDR and were experienced in the business of importing pipe from China. Considering
this level of involvement, industry experience, and that LDR is a relatively small
company, it is plausible that the Greenspons knew about LDR’s customs violations.
Defendants focus on Plaintiffs’ failure to make specific allegations regarding
the Greenspons’ conduct with respect to payment of customs duties, particularly
during the time period relevant to this case. But specificity is not the standard.
Rather, the allegations in the complaint must permit the Court plausibly to infer
Defendants’ liability. The new allegations discussed above plausibly demonstrate
that the Greenspons were intimately involved in LDR’s business, including its
business importing pipe from China. That involvement, combined with their complete

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control of the company, is sufficient to plead knowledge and causation, hence liability.
See R. 78 at 12-14 (citing cases).
Defendants note that Plaintiffs’ allegations do not exclude the plausibility of
an alternative scenario in which the Greenspons did not have knowledge of the fraud.
But while alternative scenarios may be so likely as to make a plaintiff’s account of
the facts implausible, the mere existence of a plausible scenario in which a defendant
is not liable does not undermine the plausibility of every other alternative in which
the defendant is liable. And courts may not weigh plausible alternatives under Rule
a 12(b)(6). If a plaintiff makes a plausible claim, the plaintiff has satisfied Rule
12(b)(6), regardless of the existence of other plausible scenarios.
II.

Alter Ego
Plaintiffs also claim that the Greenspons are liable for LDR’s fraud through

alter ego liability. Alter ego liability requires plausible allegations both that LDR was
the Greenspons’ “instrumentality” and that using LDR as an instrumentality caused
a “fraud or injustice.” In the November 20 opinion, the Court noted that Relators had
plausibly alleged “that LDR was the Greenspons’ instrumentality,” but failed to
allege “fraud or injustice.” R. 78 at 20-21.
In the second amended complaint, Relators have plausibly alleged that the
Greenspons knew about LDR’s customs violations. This knowledge, combined with
Relators’ earlier allegation that “the Greenspons siphon[ed] off LDR’s ill-gotten
profits from avoiding customs duties payments,” demonstrates fraud or injustice. See

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R. 78 at 21. Thus, Relators’ alternative theory of liability based on alter ego
allegations remains in the case.
III.

Conspiracy
Relators also claim the Greenspons have liability under a conspiracy theory.

The Court rejected this theory in its November 20 opinion citing the “intracorporate
conspiracy doctrine,” see R. 78 at 18 n.1, which generally “bars conspiracy claims
wherein the alleged conspirators are either a parent corporation and its wholly-owned
subsidiaries, a corporation and its employees, or the co-employees of a corporation.”
United States ex rel. Chilcott v. KBR, Inc., 2013 WL 5781660, at *10 (C.D. Ill. Oct. 25,
2013) (citing cases). As Relators have plausibly alleged direct liability and alter ego
liability, it is unnecessary for the Court to address the scope of the intracorporate
conspiracy doctrine as it relates to this case. Should discovery bring direct or alter
ego liability into question, the Court will address the potential for conspiracy
liability—and the effect of the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine—at summary
judgment or as necessary for trial. Allowing the conspiracy claim to remain will not
materially change the scope of discovery in this case, if at all. For now, the conspiracy
claim remains.
IV.

Claims Against LDR
The Court dismissed Relators’ claims against LDR because “Relators concede

that the government has released its claims against LDR in [LDR’s] bankruptcy
proceeding.” R. 78 at 21 (citing R. 50 at 10). Relators argued that “LDR should remain
in the case as a defendant because they ‘are not seeking to recover damages from

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LDR,’ but ‘seek only a determination of LDR’s liability.’” R. 78 at 22 (citing R. 50 at
10). Relators make the same argument on this motion but cite no authority in
support. See R. 93 at 20.
As discussed in the November 20 opinion, “liability under the False Claims Act
is determined on a person by person basis.” R. 78 at 22. The Court does not see how
a judgment against LDR is necessary to establish the liability of the Greenspons
(and/or GB Holdings, the Greenspons’ wholly owned LLC) in this case. The potential
for a finding by the Court that LDR failed to pay customs duties might be a basis to
find that LDR is a necessary party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19. But that
would be a reason for LDR or the government (which could theoretically have
additional claims against LDR) to insist that LDR be party to this case. LDR actively
seeks dismissal, and the government hasn’t expressed a position on this issue.
Since Relators haven’t identified a reason for LDR to be a party to this case,
the Court will dismiss LDR without prejudice should LDR’s presence in the case be
necessary for Relators to establish liability or to be awarded relief. If the Greenspons
believe that LDR’s presence as a party is necessary for the claims to proceed against
them, they should raise that argument promptly or the Court will consider it waived.
V.

Standing
Lastly, Defendants argue that Relators lack standing because: the government

settled its claims against LDR for failure to pay customs duties; Defendants are only
alleged to have injured the government through LDR’s failure to pay customs duties;
and standing under the False Claims Act is derivative of injury to the government.

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Defendants argue that the money LDR paid to the government constituted “full and
complete satisfaction” of LDR’s “obligations for all Claims held by Customs.” R. 95 at
14. This agreement, however, satisfies only LDR’s liability by both (1) its express
terms, and (2) the fact that the Greenspons and GB Holdings were not parties to the
agreement.
Relators concede that the settlement amount will offset any recovery they
achieve in this case. See R. 93 at 24 (they seek only damages “sustained by the United
States for which it has not already been compensated”). But they have sufficiently
alleged that there is additional recovery available beyond LDR’s settlement payment.
Thus, Relators have standing to proceed.
Conclusion
Defendants’ motion to dismiss, R. 90, is denied in part in accordance with this
opinion. The motion is granted to the extent that the claims against LDR are
dismissed without prejudice. The parties should confer regarding discovery and, if
possible, be prepared to propose a schedule to the Court at the hearing on March 20,
2019.
ENTERED:
______________________________
Honorable Thomas M. Durkin
United States District Judge

Dated: March 19, 2019

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