Houston v. Jones et al
Filing
42
MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order: For the reasons stated in this Memorandum Opinion and Order, Defendants' motion for summary judgment 26 is granted in part and denied in part. Defendant Simmons is dismissed and terminated. Defendants' motion is denied in all other respects. This case is set for status on January 21, 2016. Defendant Jones should be prepared at this status to notify the Court whether he wishes to pursue an evidentiary hearing, pursuant to Pavey v. Conley, rega rding the availability of information regarding the CCDOC's 15-day deadline for submitting grievances. 544 F.3d at 742. The parties should be prepared at the status to set a date for a Pavey evidentiary hearing. Signed by the Honorable Charles P. Kocoras on 12/22/2015. Mailed notice(vcf, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
WILLIE JAMES HOUSTON
(#2014-0902270),
Plaintiff,
v.
SARGENT JONES and
OFFICER SIMMONS,
Defendants.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
14 C 9462
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
CHARLES P. KOCORAS, District Court Judge:
Plaintiff Willie James Houston (“Houston”), an inmate at Cook County Jail,
brought this lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after his cellmate attacked and injured
him on September 25, 2014. Houston alleges that, before the attack, he told Defendant
Sergeant Jones (“Defendant Jones”) that his cellmate had threatened to harm him and
that later he conveyed the same information to Officer Simmons (“Defendant
Simmons”) (collectively “Defendants”). Houston further alleges that both Defendants
failed to protect him. Thus, Houston brings deliberate indifference claims against
Defendants. Before the Court is Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. For the
reasons discussed below, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted in part
and denied in part. Defendant Simmons is dismissed and a hearing pursuant to Pavey
v. Conley, will be scheduled to resolve the disputed fact issue identified below. 544
F.3d 739, 742 (7th Cir. 2008)
BACKGROUND
I.
Northern District of Illinois Local Rule 56.1
Local Rule 56.1 “is designed, in part, to aid the district court, ‘which does not
have the advantage of the parties’ familiarity with the record and often cannot afford to
spend the time combing the record to locate the relevant information,’ in determining
whether a trial is necessary.” Delapaz v. Richardson, 634 F.3d 895, 899 (7th Cir.
2011) (citation omitted). Under Local Rule 56.1(a)(3), the moving party must provide
“a statement of material facts as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine
issue” for trial. Ammons v. Aramark Unif. Services, Inc., 368 F.3d 809, 817 (7th Cir.
2004) (quoting N.D. Ill. L.R. 56.1(a)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The opposing
party must then “file ‘a response to each numbered paragraph in the moving party’s
statement, including, in the case of any disagreement, specific references to the
affidavits, parts of the record, and other supporting materials relied upon.’” Cracco v.
Vitran, Express, Inc., 559 F.3d 625, 632 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting N.D. Ill. L.R.
56.1(b)(3)(B)).
The opposing party may also present a separate statement of
additional facts that requires the denial of summary judgment. See Ciomber v. Coop.
Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 635, 643 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing N.D. Ill. L.R. 56.1(b)(3)(C)). A
court may consider true any uncontested fact in the movant’s Rule 56.1 Statement that
2
is supported by the record and is not addressed by the opposing party. Raymond v.
Ameritech Corp., 442 F.3d 600, 608 (7th Cir. 2006); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2);
Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(C).
“District courts are entitled to expect strict compliance with Rule 56.1.”
Ciomber, 527 F.3d at 643 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
A
plaintiff’s pro se status does not excuse him from complying with these rules. Greer
v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chi., 267 F.3d 723, 727 (7th Cir. 2001); Cady v. Sheahan,
467 F.3d 1057, 1061 (7th Cir. 2006) (“even pro se litigants must follow rules of civil
procedure”).
As required by Local Rule 56.1, the Defendants filed a statement of uncontested
material facts supporting summary judgment in their favor. (Defs. Stmt. of Fact, R. 28
(“Def. SOF”)). Defendants also filed and served on Houston a Local Rule 56.2 Notice,
which explains in detail the requirements of Local Rule 56.1. (R. 29.) Houston filed
a response to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. (R. 38.) He separately
submitted an exhibit, which was his own affidavit. (R. 39.) Within Houston’s
response, he addressed Defendants’ statement of facts. (R. 38, at 6-9.) Houston did
not submit a statement of additional facts requiring the denial of summary judgment.
Houston admits many of Defendants’ uncontested facts. He admits the facts
contained within paragraphs 2, 6, 7, 9, 10, 14, 15 and 16. These facts are therefore
taken as true. Houston purports to deny the remainder of Defendants’ uncontested
3
facts. As to these statements, the Court will not deem a fact uncontested where the
Defendants’ statement of that fact does not comply with the requirements of Local Rule
56.1 or lacks evidentiary support. As to Defendants’ compliant statements of fact,
Houston cannot create genuine issues of material fact by relying upon legal arguments,
conclusions or suppositions (see, e.g., R. 38, at 9), which do not constitute “facts.” See
Judson Atkinson Candies, Inc. v. Latini-Hohberger Dhimantec, 529 F.3d 371, 382 n.2
(7th Cir. 2008); see also Almy v. Kickert Sch. Bus Line, Inc., No. 08-CV-2902, 2013
WL 80367, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 7, 2013) (“[C]ourts are not required to ‘wade through
improper denials and legal arguments in search of a genuinely disputed fact.’”) (quoting
Bordelon v. Chi. Sch. Reform Bd. of Trs., 233 F.3d 524, 529 (7th Cir. 2000)).
The Court also will disregard denials that conflict with Houston’s sworn
deposition testimony. “[L]itigants ‘cannot create sham issues of fact with affidavits
that contradict their prior depositions.’” Janky v. Lake Cnty. Convention & Visitors
Bureau, 576 F.3d 356, 362 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. A & E Oil,
Inc., 503 F.3d 588, 592 (7th Cir. 2007)).
As to the facts Houston seeks to add to the record to defeat Defendants’ motion,
see Rule 56.1(b)(3)(C), he has not followed Rule 56.1 in several ways. First, he
improperly inserted additional facts into his response to Defendants’ local Rule
56.1(a)(3) statements. (See, e.g., R., 38, at 6-9.) Such statements must be ignored
because Rule 56.1 requires that additional facts be raised through a statement of
4
additional facts under Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(C). Second, Houston submits additional
facts through his legal brief. (R. 38, at 2-5.) But facts submitted “in a brief but not
presented in a Local Rule 56.1 statement are disregarded in resolving a summary
judgment motion.” Beard v. Don McCue Chevrolet, Inc., No. 09 C 4218, 2012 WL
2930121, at *5 (N.D. Ill. July 18, 2012). Third, as noted above, Houston has not added
additional facts through a statement of additional material facts.
Accordingly,
Houston has not properly provided additional facts for consideration.
The Court will, in general, incorporate Houston’s factual assertions to the extent
that they are additional facts relevant to the Court’s analysis, are supported by record
evidence, or are such that Houston properly could testify to them at trial. The Court
further will rely upon Houston’s references to exhibits where they are relevant to the
Court’s analysis and may be admissible at trial. The Court will not, however, dig
through the record to identify disputed issues of fact.
See Hemsworth v.
Quotesmith.com, Inc., 476 F.3d 487, 490 (7th Cir. 2007) (“In considering a motion for
summary judgment, the district court is not required to scour the record in search of
evidence to defeat the motion; the nonmoving party must identify with reasonable
particularity the evidence upon which the party relies.”).
established, the Court turns to the facts of this case.
5
With these guidelines
II.
Facts
Houston alleges that he was processed into Cook County Jail (“CCJ”) on
September 2, 2014. (Compl., R. 7, at 4.) Houston’s cellmate allegedly threatened
him, and, on September 23, 2014, Houston told Defendant Jones about the threats and
his concerns for his safety due to his cellmate’s violent history. (Id.) Late on
September 24, 2014, Houston told Defendant Simmons of his cellmate’s threats to
harm him. (Id. at 4-5.) Neither Defendant Jones nor Defendant Simmons acted on
Houston’s information. In the early morning hours of September 25, 2014, Houston’s
cellmate physically attacked him, causing injuries. (Id. at 5; see also Def. 56.1
Stmt. ¶ 1.)
The Cook County Department of Corrections (“CCDOC”) requires inmates to
exhaust administrative remedies under the Inmate Grievance Procedure, which was
available to detainees in 2014. (Def. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 4, 5.) The Inmate Grievance
Procedure requires an inmate to submit a grievance within fifteen (15) days of the event
of which the inmate complains. (Id. ¶ 5.)
Although Houston denies receiving a copy of the Inmate Handbook upon his
arrival at the CCJ, he testified that he “pretty much” understood how the grievance
process worked. (Id. ¶ 3; Pl. Dep., R. 28-1, at 34.) Houston authored a grievance,
dated October 11, 2014, (“October 11th grievance”) regarding the September 25, 2014,
attack. (Def. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 6.) The pre-printed grievance form Houston used provided
6
information and instructions. For example, beneath the heading “INMATE’S BRIEF
SUMMARY OF THE COMPLAINT,” the form provides that “[a]n inmate wishing to
file a grievance is required to do so within 15 days of the event he/she is grieving.” (R.
28-4, at 4.) The form requested that the inmate provide the date, time, and location of
the incident, the names of staff or inmates with information regarding the request, and
the action that the inmate requests through the grievance. (Id.)
In his grievance, Houston complained that Defendant Jones could have, but
failed to, protect him from his cellmate. (Def. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 1, 19; R. 28-4, at 4.) He
did not identify any other “personnel or inmate(s) having information regarding this
complaint.” (R. 28-4, at 4.) Houston sought “to be housed in Div. Eleven and given
$1,000.00 for my injuries.”
(Id.)
Houston’s grievance was processed as a
“NON-GRIEVANCE (REQUEST)” and denied as untimely on October 22, 2014
(“October 22 response”). (Def. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 9, 10; R. 28-4, at 5.) A handwritten
portion of the October 22 response informed Houston that he could resubmit his
grievance if he thought he had grounds for reconsideration. (Id. ¶ 12.) Houston was
told that “an administrative review will be conducted” if he “provide[d] a full detailed
explanation for the submission delay.” (R. 28-4, at 5.) Houston did not resubmit his
grievance.
(Id. ¶ 13.)
The section titled “INMATE’S REQUEST FOR AN
APPEAL” was struck through in the October 22 response. (R. 28-4, at 5.)
7
Houston brought this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that both
Defendant Jones and Defendant Simmons were deliberately indifferent to a serious risk
to his safety from his cellmate. (Compl., R. 7, at 6.) Houston was allowed to proceed
on his claims against Defendant Jones and Defendant Simmons; Defendant Tom Dart
was dismissed. (R. 6.) Defendant Jones and Defendant Simmons now move for
summary judgment.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine dispute as to a material fact exists “if the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
The party seeking
summary judgment has the burden of establishing that there is no genuine dispute as to
any material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
After a properly supported motion for summary judgment is made, the party
opposing summary judgment “must set forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. To do so, the opposing party
must go beyond the pleadings and designate specific facts showing the existence of a
genuine issue for trial. Hemsworth, 476 F.3d at 490. Moreover, evidence submitted
in opposition to summary judgment must be admissible at trial under the Federal Rules
8
of Evidence, although attested testimony, such as that found in depositions or affidavits,
also will be considered. Id.; Scott v. Edinburg, 346 F.3d 752, 759-60 & n.7 (7th Cir.
2003). The Court’s job as to “a summary judgment motion is not to weigh evidence,
make credibility determinations, resolve factual disputes and swearing contest, or
decide which inferences to draw from the facts.” Miller v. Gonzalez, 761 F.3d 822,
827 (7th Cir. 2014). Although a Court considers facts and reasonable inferences in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party, Zuppardi v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 770
F.3d 644, 649 (7th Cir. 2014), the non-movant must show more than disputed facts to
defeat summary judgment—disputed facts must be both genuine and material. Scott v.
Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). Summary judgment is appropriate if, on the
evidence provided, no reasonable juror could return a verdict in favor of the
non-movant. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322; Gordon v. FedEx Freight, Inc., 674 F.3d
769, 772-73 (7th Cir. 2012).
ANALYSIS
Defendants moved for summary judgment, on the basis that Houston failed to
exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing this lawsuit. The Prison Litigation
Reform Act (“PLRA”) requires an inmate to properly exhaust available administrative
remedies by following to completion the procedural rules for grievances within a penal
institution. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90 (2006); Ford v. Johnson, 362 F.3d
395, 397 (7th Cir. 2004) (noting that prisoner must “take all steps prescribed by the
9
prison’s grievance system”); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Accordingly, an inmate must
submit complaints and any appeals “in the place, and at the time, the prison’s
administrative rules require.” Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir.
2002).
An inmate, however, must exhaust only such administrative remedies as are
“available” to him.
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
The availability of administrative
remedies is not “a subjective inquiry—that is, dependent upon the knowledge of the
prisoner in question.” Harper v. Dart, No. 14 C 01237, 2015 WL 3918944, at *7 n.4
(N.D. Ill. June 24, 2015) (citing Twitty v. McCoskey, 226 F. App’x 594, 596 (7th Cir.
2007) (“As the Eighth Circuit has observed, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) ‘says nothing about a
prisoner’s subjective beliefs, logical or otherwise, about administrative remedies that
might be available to him.’”) (quoting Chelette v. Harris, 229 F.3d 684, 688 (8th Cir.
2000))).
On the contrary, an inmate’s mere “lack of awareness of a grievance
procedure . . . does not excuse compliance.” Twitty, 226 F. App’x at 596.
Nonetheless, jail authorities may not affirmatively mislead an inmate regarding
available procedures.
See Id.
Further, “[p]rison officials cannot immunize
themselves from suit by establishing procedures that in practice are not available
because they are impossible to comply with or simply do not exist.” King v. McCarty,
781 F.3d 889, 893 (7th Cir. 2015) (emphasis added).
Accordingly, although
authorities may not establish non-exhaustion based upon an inmate’s failure to follow
10
unwritten or unavailable rules, see id. at 896; Thomas v. Reese, 787 F.3d 845, 847-48
(7th Cir. 2015), “reasonably publicized procedures must be exhausted.” Harper, 2015
WL 3918944, at *3. “The benefits of exhaustion can be realized only if the prison
grievance system is given a fair opportunity to consider the grievance.” Pavey v.
Conley, 663 F.3d 899, 905 (7th Cir. 2011).
Defendants bear the burden of
demonstrating non-exhaustion. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 650 (7th Cir. 2013).
Where there remain in dispute factual issues relating to the defense of failure to exhaust
administrative remedies, the judge must decide those issues through a Pavey
evidentiary hearing. Pavey, 544 F.3d at 742.
Defendants argue that Houston failed to exhaust the available administrative
remedies because he did not: (1) file a grievance as to Defendant Simmons; (2)
originally submit his grievance within 15 days of the events he grieved; and (3)
resubmit his grievance as a request after he received the October 22 response that
informed him that he could do so. The Court will address each argument in turn.
1.
Failure To File A Grievance Regarding Defendant Simmons
Defendants first contend that Houston failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies because he failed to file a grievance as to Defendant Simmons. Houston
concedes that his sole grievance made no reference to Defendant Simmons or the facts
involving her. Instead, Houston seems to argue that because Defendant Jones was a
11
supervisor it was sufficient to name Defendant Jones in the grievance form. (R. 38,
at 5.)
To exhaust administrative remedies, an inmate need not always identify with a
grievance form the jail personnel responsible for the alleged constitutional violation.
See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007); Maddox v. Love, 655 F.3d 709, 722-23
(7th Cir. 2011). In Maddox, the Seventh Circuit held that the inmate had exhausted his
administrative remedies, although he did not name or describe any individuals in his
grievance. 655 F.3d at 721-23. First, the prison had never questioned the inmate’s
compliance with the grievance process while that process was ongoing; instead, the
prison ruled on the merits of the inmate’s grievance, rather than rejecting it based on its
procedural deficiencies.
Id. at 721-22. Second, the inmate grieved a particular
administrative decision specific enough for the prison to identify the individual
responsible simply from the subject matter of the grievance itself. Id. at 722. Finally,
the grievance form did not request that the inmate provide the names of the involved
personnel. Id. Accordingly, the plaintiff’s failure to name the defendants in the
grievance was a “mere technical defect” that did not in fact affect the grievance process
or “limit the usefulness of the exhaustion requirement.” Id.
However, where the grievance form requires an inmate to provide identifying
information regarding responsible officers, and the inmate’s grievance and relevant
circumstances do not allow even an inference that the inmate is complaining of a
12
particular official, the grievance may be insufficient to exhaust the inmate’s
administrative remedies as to that official. See Ambrose v. Godinez, 510 F. App’x 470,
472 (7th Cir.) (holding that “the district court properly narrowed the case” by
dismissing two defendants where “no grievance mention[ed either defendant] by name
or inference”), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 270 (2013); Woods v. Schmeltz, No.
13-CV-1477, 2014 WL 3490569, at *4 (C.D. Ill. July 14, 2014) (finding that plaintiff
did not exhaust administrative remedies as to one defendant where he failed to name a
defendant in grievance, and omission was such that prison officials could not have
discovered it); Flemming v. Shah, No. CIV. 12-761-GPM, 2013 WL 3033102, at *6
(S.D. Ill. June 17, 2013) (dismissing defendant where “grievance itself [did] not place
Brown, or the institution, on any notice of the claims against her nor could it be
extrapolated that Plaintiff [was] asserting some claim against her”); Boclair v. Hulick,
No. 10-CV-0978-MJR-SCW, 2012 WL 878219, at *4 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 14, 2012)
(“[U]nlike Maddox, nothing in Boclair’s grievance alerted prison officials that Maue or
Liefer [were] responsible for the decision to move Plaintiff in with Denton, and the
mere nature of Maue and Liefer’s jobs did not indicate that they necessarily or likely
would have been involved in the transfer decision which Plaintiff claims Tina Beardan
Monroe orchestrated to retaliate against him.”).
Here, the grievance form Houston used required him to identify the “name of
personnel or inmate(s) having information regarding this complaint.” (R. 28-4, at 4.)
13
Houston left that portion blank and in the body of his sole grievance mentioned only a
pre-attack conversation with “Sergeant Jones (3-11).” (Id.) There was no indication
from the grievance he submitted—in the description of events, in the subject matter of
the grievance, or the section of the form requiring Houston to name any personnel
having information—that Houston had any complaint regarding Defendant Simmons or
that she (or any person other than Defendant Jones) might have been involved in the
events preceding his cellmate’s attack. (Id.)
Houston also did not file a separate grievance against Defendant Simmons, and,
unlike the plaintiff in Maddox, Houston’s sole grievance did not complain of an
identifiable administrative or policy decision, for which jail officials likely could have
identified responsible parties merely from the subject matter.
Instead, Houston
complained of the inaction and deliberate indifference of a single jail official,
Defendant Jones, based on a conversation he had with only Defendant Jones on
September 23, 2014. He now complains that a different officer, Defendant Simmons,
violated his rights, based upon an entirely separate conversation he had with her, at least
a day after he spoke to Defendant Jones. Under these circumstances, Houston’s failure
to provide any clue in his grievance form that he believed Defendant Simmons (or any
person other than Defendant Jones) violated his rights effectively foreclosed any
discovery of his omission at the grievance stage or any action or investigation regarding
Defendant Simmons prior to this lawsuit. Nor does the fact that Defendant Jones is a
14
supervisor correct Houston’s omission where, as here, the grievance Houston submitted
provided no reason to examine or investigate the individuals that Defendant Jones may
have supervised. Because Houston failed to raise in a grievance that he believed
Defendant Simmons had violated his rights, Houston failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies as to Defendant Simmons. Thus, Defendants’ motion is
granted as to Defendant Simmons, and she is dismissed without prejudice.
2.
Timeliness Of Grievance
Defendants next argue that Houston failed to exhaust his administrative remedies
because his grievance was submitted more than 15 days after the events of which he
complained. Houston concedes that he submitted his grievance beyond the 15-day
deadline but contends that he was ignorant of the deadline because he was not provided
with a copy of the inmate handbook upon his arrival at the jail. (R. 38, at 5.)
Essentially, Houston argues that the grievance process was “unavailable” to him
because he did not know of the 15-day deadline. Genuine issues of fact remain
disputed regarding this issue.
Here, jail officials explicitly denied Houston’s grievance because of his failure to
comply with jail procedures regarding the timing for submitting a grievance. See
Maddox, 655 F.3d at 721-22 (noting that, where officials reach the merits of an inmate’s
grievance, rather than relying upon procedural shortcomings, the inmate may be found
to have exhausted his or her administrative remedies). However, it is unclear whether
15
the relevant portion of the CCDOC’s grievance procedure—specifically, the
information regarding the deadline for submitting a grievance—was available to
Houston prior to his grievance. Defendants state that the process was “available to all
detainees” but do not specify the means. (Def. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 4.) Houston denies
receiving the inmate handbook or having knowledge of the grievance submission
deadline, but the grievance form he used explicitly informed him of that deadline, (R.
28-4, at 4), suggesting that the key information may have been available to Houston
through means other than the inmate handbook. See Price v. Dart, No. 14 C 4630,
2015 WL 3798435, at *3 (N.D. Ill. June 17, 2015) (Kocoras, J.) (finding that, although
inmate stated that he was not given inmate handbook or verbal notification of grievance
appeal process, grievance form itself adequately informed inmate of time for appeal).
Houston also acknowledges that the “material may have been circulating in the
CCDOC in 2014” or that it might have been “available to all detainees upon request.”
(R. 38, at 2-3.) As noted above, it is not Houston’s subjective knowledge that matters;
it is whether the relevant information—the 15-day deadline—was “available” to
Houston within the meaning of the PLRA; in other words, whether the 15-day deadline
was “reasonably publicized.”
Genuine issues of material fact remain in dispute
regarding this issue. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion is denied as to this issue. As
set forth below, if Defendant Jones wishes to present evidence on this issue in a hearing
16
pursuant to Pavey v. Conley, he may so inform the Court at the upcoming status. 544
F.3d 739, 742.
3.
Resubmission Of Grievance After Denial
Defendants finally argue that Houston did not exhaust his administrative
remedies because he did not resubmit his grievance after receiving the October 22
response. Houston argues that he wanted to appeal the denial of his grievance but
could not because the responding official had struck through the appeal portion of the
response. (R. 38, at 4.) He also argues that he was excused from further pursing
administrative remedies because monetary damages were unavailable through that
process. (Id.)
The effacement of the appeal portion of the grievance response excused Houston
from submitting an appeal of the denial of his October 11th grievance. Thus, to the
extent that Defendants argue that Houston should have appealed that response, their
motion is denied.
Defendants’ key argument seems to be that, per the handwritten response to
Houston’s grievance, Houston was informed that he could “resubmit the grievance and
provide a full detailed explanation for the submission delay” to trigger an
“administrative review.” (R. 28-4, at 5.) Houston claims he avoided this process
because the response also informed him that monetary damages were unavailable in the
grievance process. (R. 38, at 4.) The unavailability of an inmate’s preferred remedy
17
in the grievance system, however, does not excuse him from exhausting the available
process.
Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 740-41 (2001) (rejecting plaintiff’s
argument that exhaustion requirement did not apply where monetary relief was
unavailable and stating “we think that Congress has mandated exhaustion clearly
enough, regardless of the relief sought through administrative procedures”). In any
case, Houston sought more than monetary damages, including a change in housing.
Nonetheless, Defendants cite only a handwritten note, rather than to policy or
procedures, in support of their argument that, to exhaust, Houston should have
resubmitted an apparently untimely grievance that had been recharacterized as a
request.1 This is insufficient to carry their burden, and no genuine facts remain in
dispute. Defendants’ motion is denied as to this issue.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated in this Memorandum Opinion and Order, Defendants’
motion for summary judgment [26] is granted in part and denied in part. Defendant
Simmons is dismissed and terminated. Defendants’ motion is denied in all other
respects. This case is set for status on January 21, 2016. Defendant Jones should be
prepared at this status to notify the Court whether he wishes to pursue an evidentiary
1
Defendants do not explain the procedural basis for the response re-designating Houston’s grievance
as a “NON-GRIEVANCE (REQUEST).” (See R. 28-4, at 4.) The inmate handbook specifies which
topics are deemed “requests,” (R. 28-4, at 28), and Houston’s grievance does not appear to relate to
those topics. Instead, his grievance appears to address issues for which inmates are permitted to file
grievances. (Id. at 28-29.) There has, in recent years, been considerable confusion regarding the
grievance/request processes in CCDOC. See Harper, 2015 WL 3918944, at *3-*7.
18
hearing, pursuant to Pavey v. Conley, regarding the availability of information
regarding the CCDOC’s 15-day deadline for submitting grievances. 544 F.3d at 742.
The parties should be prepared at the status to set a date for a Pavey evidentiary
hearing.
Date: 12/22 /2015
___________________________
Charles P. Kocoras
United States District Court Judge
19
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?