Venegas v. Aerotek, Inc., et al
Filing
68
Memorandum Opinion and Order signed by the Honorable Robert W. Gettlemanon 3/22/2016. Navistar's motion 45 to dismiss Aerotek's third-party complaint is granted. Aerotek's motion for summary judgment 51 is granted in part and denied in part. Mailed notice (gds)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
JUANA VENEGAS,
Plaintiff,
v.
AEROTEK, INC.,
Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff,
v.
NAVISTAR DEFENSE, LLC,
Third-Party Defendant.
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No. 14 C 9829
Judge Robert W. Gettleman
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff, Juana Venegas, sued her former employer Aerotek, Inc. and its client, Navistar
Defense, LLC in the Circuit Court of DuPage County, Illinois, alleging: violations of the Family
and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. against Aerotek (Counts I and II);
pregnancy discrimination, employment agency discrimination, and failure to accommodate
pregnancy under the Illinois Human Rights Act (“IHRA”) 775 ILCS 5/2-102 et seq. against
Aerotek and Navistar (Counts III, IV, V, and VI); promissory estoppel against Aerotek and
Navistar (Count VII); breach of contract against Aerotek (Count VIII); negligent infliction of
emotional distress against Navistar (Count IX); and tortious interference with contract against
Navistar (Count X).
After defendants removed the case to this court, plaintiff settled with and dismissed with
prejudice all claims against Navistar. Aerotek filed a third-party complaint against Navistar
because Counts III, IV, and VI contain allegations that Aerotek is derivatively liable to plaintiff
for Navistar’s actions. In the third-party complaint, Aerotek alleges that if it is found liable to
plaintiff solely on a derivative basis, Navistar is liable to Aerotek under a common law implied
indemnity theory. Navistar moved to dismiss the third-party complaint, but before the court
could rule on that motion, Aerotek moved for summary judgment against plaintiff on all counts.
For the reasons described below, Aerotek’s motion for summary judgment is granted in part and
denied in part. Navistar’s motion to dismiss Aerotek’s third-party complaint is granted.
BACKGROUND1
Aerotek, a staffing agency, recruited plaintiff in March 2011 specifically to apply to
Navistar for employment as an “inventory manager.” Michael Mosher, an Aerotek Account
Recruiting Manager, recruited plaintiff and was her main contact at Aerotek. Plaintiff applied
and had her final interview with Navistar staff only. Aerotek had no input into whether plaintiff
was hired. Plaintiff signed an Aerotek employment agreement on March 16, 2011. This was the
only employment agreement she signed.
Plaintiff began working at Navistar as what it termed a “field services representative” on
March 23, 2011, but Aerotek classified her as an inventory manager. In her agreement with
Aerotek, she acknowledged that she understood that she was specifically hired to fill a position
at Navistar and was an at-will employee. Navistar effectively controlled and supervised
plaintiff’s work, and it alone determined whether plaintiff continued to work for Navistar. For
example: she worked at the Navistar facility, where Aerotek had no managerial presence; she
reported to Jason Mann, a Navistar employee, for day-to-day activities; Navistar set her hours;
1
The following facts are, unless otherwise specified, undisputed and come from the
parties’ Local Rule (“L.R.”) 56.1 statements and responses. In addition to its response to
plaintiff’s additional facts, Aerotek also responded to plaintiff’s responses to Aerotek’s statement
of facts. These responses are not allowed under L.R. 56.1 and will be ignored.
2
and Navistar dictated what work she did on a daily basis. Navistar had no complaints about
plaintiff or her work product.
Plaintiff learned that she was pregnant with twins in April or May of 2012. She notified
Mann around August 2012, and Mosher around October 2012 that she was pregnant.
On November 20, 2012, plaintiff asked Mosher about the possibility of taking maternity
leave.2 Plaintiff emailed Mann, at Navistar, on November 26, 2012, notifying him of her
doctor’s orders to go on bed rest, but he was out of town and did not respond to the email. A
member of the Aerotek field support group told Mosher that plaintiff could request FMLA leave.
On November 30, 2012, in an email, he told plaintiff that Aerotek could provide unpaid
maternity leave under the FMLA, but that she needed to submit specific forms to obtain the
leave. Also on November 30, 2012, plaintiff notified Mosher, through email: that she was set to
be induced on December 21, 2012; she was “getting put on moderate bed rest [because of
complications related to her pregnancy]” until then; that it was recommended that “she work
days from home”; and that she “[had emailed Mann], but he ha[d]n’t responded yet.”
On December 3, 2012, Mosher informed plaintiff that he would send her the FMLA
paperwork. Additionally, an FMLA request was submitted to Aerotek’s Benefits Department on
plaintiff’s behalf. On the same day, plaintiff emailed Mann again, and again told him about her
doctor recommending bed rest until her due date. On December 4, 2012, the Aerotek Benefits
Department sent plaintiff the FMLA paperwork. Also on December 4, 2012, after consulting
2
Although the parties disagree on whether Mosher or plaintiff initiated this conversation,
the dispute is immaterial because both parties agree that Mosher initiated the FMLA leave
conversation.
3
with Elizabeth Serrano, Navistar’s Human Resources Manager, Mann and another Navistar
employee decided to terminate plaintiff’s Navistar assignment. Mann called plaintiff later that
day to terminate her assignment, effective immediately. After that, he called Mosher to inform
Aerotek that Navistar had terminated plaintiff’s assignment, effective immediately. Mosher
called plaintiff after receiving Mann’s call, and confirmed that plaintiff “was done” with Aerotek
because her assignment at Navistar had ended. No Aerotek employee was involved in Navistar’s
decision to end her assignment or knew about it until after it happened.
The next day, December 5, 2012, Aarati Doddanna, Aerotek’s Employee Relations
Manager, attempted to contact plaintiff to learn more about the situation, but was unable to reach
her. Later that day, plaintiff’s attorney, who had been hired within the last 36 hours, left Mosher
a voicemail instructing Mosher to direct all calls to him. Plaintiff received the FMLA paperwork
on December 6, 2012, but did not complete and return it because she thought she was “already in
litigation.” In a December 10, 2012, conversation with plaintiff’s attorney, the attorney
allegedly told Doddanna “that [p]laintiff may not want to return to work at Navistar.”3
Serrano told Doddanna that Navistar could not accommodate plaintiff’s request to work
from home because it was concerned about “the confidential and propriety nature of [p]laintiff’s
work, but that it would accept plaintiff back after her maternity leave, if there was still a business
need for [p]laintiff’s position.” It is unclear whether this was communicated to plaintiff through
her attorney or otherwise. In any event, plaintiff’s attorney allegedly later told Aerotek that
3
This is one of several conversations that plaintiff claims occurred during settlement
negotiations and therefore should be protected by Fed. R. Evid. 408. Because these statements
by plaintiff’s attorney were made to Aerotek to communicate plaintiff’s unwillingness to return
to work, rather than in connection with a potential settlement, Rule 408 does not apply.
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plaintiff did not want to return to work at Navistar or Aerotek. Plaintiff never sought more (nonNavistar) work through Aerotek, nor did Mosher tell her she was entitled to seek other work
through Aerotek.
On January 3, 2012, Aerotek denied plaintiff’s FMLA leave request because plaintiff had
not submitted the required paperwork. Plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Illinois
Department of Human Rights (“IDHR”) on April 1, 2013. The IDHR issued a Notice of
Dismissal for Lack of Evidence and Lack of Jurisdiction on August 19, 2014. Plaintiff filed the
instant suit in the Circuit Court of DuPage County, Illinois on November 6, 2014. The case was
removed to this court on December 8, 2014. Navistar was subsequently dismissed with
prejudice from the case on May 7, 2015, after settling with plaintiff for an undisclosed amount.
DISCUSSION
I.
Standard
A movant is entitled to summary judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 when the
moving papers and affidavits show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Once a moving party has met its burden, the nonmoving party must go
beyond the pleadings and set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Becker v. Tenenbaum-Hill Assoc., Inc., 914 F.2d 107, 110 (7th Cir. 1990).
The court considers the record as a whole and draws all reasonable inferences in the light most
favorable to the party opposing the motion. See Green v. Carlson, 826 F.2d 647, 651 (7th Cir.
1987).
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A genuine issue of material fact exists when “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury
could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
248 (1986). The nonmoving party must, however, “do more than simply show that there is some
metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the
[nonmoving party’s] position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury
could reasonably find for the [nonmoving party].” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
II.
Legal Analysis
As an initial matter, in Counts III, IV, and VI, plaintiff attempts to hold Aerotek liable for
Navistar’s actions, even though plaintiff settled with and released Navistar. Plaintiff attempted
to preserve her right to sue Aerotek in her settlement agreement with Navistar through a
reservation clause. Although Illinois law at one time allowed a plaintiff to maintain a suit
against a principal for an agent’s actions after the plaintiff settled with and released the agent, the
Illinois Supreme Court ultimately rejected that previous precedent. Gilbert v. Sycamore Mun.
Hosp., 156 Ill. 2d 511, 528-29 (1993) (holding that the plaintiff’s negligence claim against the
defendant hospital was extinguished when she settled with the defendant doctor, even though the
settlement agreement included an express reservation of the plaintiff’s “right to seek recovery”
from the hospital). Plaintiff argues that this principle is not applicable to the instant case because
Gilbert involved a tort claim, while the allegations in the instant case are for statutory civil rights
violations only. This argument fails because civil rights violations are simply statutory torts.
Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of America, 123 F.3d 490, 506 (7th Cir. 1997) (Posner, J. concurring
and dissenting). Additionally, the Seventh Circuit has held that an employer is responsible for
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its “own deeds” only and taking reasonable care to prevent or redress potential violations. Dunn
v. Washington Cnty. Hosp., 429 F.3d 689, 690-91 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that the defendant
hospital was liable to its employee, a nurse, for the hostile work environment created by an
independent contractor doctor).
Nonetheless, plaintiff continues to argue that Aerotek is liable for Navistar’s actions, but
she offers no case law to support her theory. The court has found no precedent that supports
plaintiff’s position that a staffing agency should be held liable for its client’s actions when the
staffing agency has no power over the client. Aerotek, in contrast, has offered several cases
where the staffing agency was not held liable. See e.g., McQueen v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg.,
955 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1272-73 (N.D. Ala. 2013) (holding that Aerotek’s conveying its client’s
wishes to terminate the plaintiff was not enough to make Aerotek liable); see also E.E.O.C. v.
Olver Inc., 2006 WL 2076764, at *2 (W.D. Va. 2006) (granting the employment agency
summary judgment because it did not commit an adverse employment action against the plaintiff
when the agency’s client fired the plaintiff after three days for alleged discriminatory reasons).
Further, courts in this district have held that a temporary employment agency could not be liable
for its client’s discriminatory actions when the agency “serves as an intermediary between the
plaintiff and the agency’s client but exercises virtually no control or supervision over the
plaintiff’s day-to-day work.” Shah v. Littelfuse Inc., 2013 WL 1828926, at *5-*6 (N.D. Ill.
2013) (Kendall, J.).
Plaintiff relies on Dunn, but its relevant holding states only that an employer must take
reasonable care to prevent or redress potential Title VII violations. Dunn, 429 F.3d at 691.
Here, plaintiff did not work at an Aerotek location, and plaintiff concedes that Navistar
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effectively controlled and supervised her. No evidence has been submitted that Aerotek’s
decision-making was based on anything except Navistar’s termination of plaintiff, which ended
her contract. Consequently, Aerotek is not responsible for Navistar’s actions, and Aerotek’s
motion is granted as to Counts III, IV, and VI. As a result, Navistar’s motion to dismiss
Aerotek’s third-party complaint is granted. Thus, the remaining counts are plaintiff’s claims for
FMLA interference and retaliation (Counts I and II), IHRA employment agency discrimination
(Count V), promissory estoppel (Count VII), and breach of contract (Count VIII).
A.
Count I - FMLA Interference
Plaintiff alleges that Aerotek interfered with her FMLA rights by firing her before she
could complete the FMLA certification paperwork. Aerotek argues that it is entitled to summary
judgment because it is undisputed that plaintiff never submitted the FMLA paperwork.
The FMLA entitles an eligible employee to twelve workweeks of leave during any
twelve-month period for certain qualifying reasons, including a serious health condition, such as
a pregnancy, that incapacitates and prevents an employee from performing the functions of her
position. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D); 29 C.F.R. § 825.115(b). The FMLA prohibits employers
from interfering with an employee’s attempt to exercise any FMLA right. 29 U.S.C.
§ 2615(a)(1).
To prevail on her interference claim, plaintiff must show that: (1) she was eligible for the
FMLA’s protections; (2) the FMLA covered her employer; (3) she was entitled to leave under
the FMLA; (4) she provided sufficient notice of her intent to take leave; and (5) the employer
denied her FMLA benefits to which she was entitled. See e.g., Burnett v. LFW Inc., 472 F.3d
471, 477 (7th Cir. 2006); Daugherty v. Wabash Ctr., Inc., 577 F.3d 747, 750 (7th Cir. 2009). An
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employer may require an employee to document her condition before granting FMLA leave. 29
C.F.R. § 825.305(a). The employer must give the employee 15 calendar days to submit the
documentation, and must promptly notify the employee, in writing, of the deadline. Rager v.
Dade Behring, Inc., 210 F.3d 776, 778 (7th Cir. 2000). The only elements in dispute are whether
plaintiff was entitled to FMLA leave, and was denied FMLA benefits to which she was entitled.
Aerotek claims that plaintiff “received the FMLA paperwork two days after [it was] sent
to her, but that she made the conscious decision not to complete and return the paperwork,
because she had hired an attorney and thought she was ‘in litigation.’” Both parties agree that
plaintiff was fired on December 4, 2012, and that she did not receive the FMLA paperwork until
December 6, 2012. Plaintiff argues that this made the paperwork “completely devoid of any
substance” and that the FMLA violation had already occurred.4
Aerotek argues that no reasonable jury could find that it interfered with plaintiff’s FMLA
rights because she was not entitled to any FMLA benefits since she did not submit the
paperwork. Aerotek correctly notes that an employer may require certification from an
employee’s health care provider to confirm an employee’s serious health condition, and may
deny an employee’s FMLA leave request if she fails to provide the certification in a timely
manner. 29 C.F.R. §§ 825.305(a), 825.313(b); Smith v. Hope School, 560 F.3d 694, 700 (7th
Cir. 2009). Aerotek, however, fails to expound on what constitutes a timely manner. 29 C.F.R.
§ 825.305(b) defines it as 15 calendar days from the employer’s request for certification. The
4
In its reply brief, Aerotek argues, for the first time, that plaintiff did not have standing to
file an FMLA interference claim because she was already fired. Because plaintiff has not had
the opportunity to respond to this argument, the court will not address it. Citizens Against
Ruining the Env’t v. E.P.A., 535 F.3d 670, 675 (7th Cir. 2008).
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regulation also requires the employer to warn the employee in writing of the consequences of
failing to return the certification within a timely manner. 29 C.F.R. § 825.305(d).
Plaintiff was not given the 15 calendar days because she was fired one day after
Aerotek’s request for certification, and two days before she received the necessary paperwork.
Aerotek has demonstrated only that Mosher told plaintiff that “there was some paperwork that
she had to fill out,” but there is no evidence that plaintiff was aware of the deadline or that
Mosher warned her about the consequences for not submitting the paperwork in a timely manner.
Consequently, there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether plaintiff was entitled to
FMLA leave or simply elected not to apply.
In addition, the record does not support Aerotek’s argument that plaintiff did not want to
return to work for either Navistar or Aerotek. Doddanna’s affidavit, on which Aerotek relies,
says only that plaintiff’s counsel told Doddanna that plaintiff “may not want to return to work at
Navistar.” At her deposition, plaintiff denied knowing that her lawyer told Aerotek that she “did
not want to work at Aerotek again.” Nothing in the record definitively demonstrates plaintiff’s
refusal to return to either company. Consequently, there are genuine issues of material fact that
preclude summary judgment on Count I.
The court, however, is unclear if there is any remedy available to plaintiff, especially in
light of the fact that Navistar informed Aerotek that it was willing to rehire plaintiff after she
completed her maternity leave if there was a position then available. If that offer was
communicated to plaintiff, it appears that plaintiff may have been offered all of the relief to
which she was entitled. The court will address this issue at the next status hearing.
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B.
Count II - FMLA Retaliation
Plaintiff alleges that Aerotek retaliated against her for requesting FMLA leave. Aerotek
argues that it is entitled to summary judgment because it did not take any adverse employment
action and plaintiff did not engage in any protected activity. The FMLA protects employees
from employers who attempt to retaliate or discriminate against the employees for exercising
their substantive rights. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2). Specifically, “an employer is prohibited from
discriminating or retaliating against an employee . . . for having exercised or attempted to
exercise FMLA rights.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c); see also King v. Preferred Technical Group,
166 F.3d 887, 892 (7th Cir. 1999). “The difference between a retaliation and interference theory
is that the first ‘requires proof of discriminatory or retaliatory intent while [an interference
theory] requires only proof that the employer denied the employee . . . her entitlements under the
Act.’” Goelzer v. Sheboygan Cnty., Wisc., 604 F.3d 987, 995 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting
Kauffman v. Fed. Express Corp., 426 F.3d 880, 884 (7th Cir. 2005)).
Plaintiff is proceeding under the direct method of proof to prove her FMLA retaliation
claim.5 To do so, she “must demonstrate [that]: (1) [she] engaged in [a] statutorily protected
activity; (2) [she] suffered an adverse action taken by [her] employer; and (3) there was a causal
connection between the statutorily protected activity and the adverse action.” Johnson v.
Reichhold, Inc., 2010 WL 3385548, at *9 n.1 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (citing Tomanovich v. City of Ind.,
457 F.3d 656, 662-63 (7th Cir. 2006)).
5
Generally, plaintiffs may proceed under the direct or indirect methods of proof
established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See also Long v.
Teachers’ Retirement Sys. of Ill., 585 F.3d 344, 349 (7th Cir. 2009).
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Aerotek focuses on whether plaintiff’s claim met the first two elements, but this focus is
misplaced. Aerotek concedes that plaintiff requested FMLA leave, which the statute protects.
See 29 U.S.C. §§ 2615(a)(1)(2); see also Buie v. Quad/Graphics, Inc., 366 F.3d 496, 503 (7th
Cir. 2004). There is no dispute that Aerotek terminated plaintiff. The Seventh Circuit has held
that “termination is certainly an adverse employment action.” Burks v. Wisc. Dept. of
Transportation, 464 F.3d 744, 758 (7th Cir. 2006).
The more challenging issue is whether there was a causal connection between the first
two elements. The Seventh Circuit requires that the plaintiff show that there is some “proof of
discriminatory or retaliatory intent.” Goelzer, 604 F.3d at 995 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting
Kauffman, 426 F.3d at 884). Based upon the evidence, a reasonable jury could not find that
Aerotek had any discriminatory or retaliatory intent when it fired plaintiff. Aerotek had no input
or control over Navistar’s decision to end plaintiff’s assignment. Plaintiff concedes that she was
an at-will employee, whose employment contract with Aerotek was specifically to fill a Navistar
position. The employment term specified in the contract ended when Navistar terminated
plaintiff. Plaintiff has submitted no evidence that Aerotek had any discriminatory or retaliatory
intent. Consequently, Aerotek’s motion is granted as to plaintiff’s FMLA retaliation claim in
Count II.
C.
Count V - IHRA Employment Agency Discrimination
Plaintiff alleges that Aerotek committed IHRA employment agency discrimination by
terminating her and not referring her to other Aerotek clients (Count V). Aerotek argues that it
had no statutory obligation to refer her to other clients and, as a staffing agency, it was not
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included in the IHRA’s employment agency definition.6 The IHRA prohibits employment
agencies from failing or refusing to refer an employee based on unlawful discrimination. 775
ILCS 5/2-102(B).
Assuming that Aerotek is an employment agency, plaintiff fails to allege that Aerotek did
not refer her to other clients for a “discriminatory reason." She does not present any evidence
that she sought work from Aerotek after her Navistar assignment ended, nor does she have any
evidence that Aerotek refused to refer her to other clients. Her employment agreement with
Aerotek was not for Aerotek to find her a position, but to fill a specific position at Navistar.
Also, she hired an attorney within one day of being fired. The attorney prohibited Aerotek from
contacting plaintiff directly. This dampened any ability to determine if plaintiff could, or wanted
to, be placed with another Aerotek client. Consequently, Aerotek’s motion for summary
judgment is granted as to plaintiff’s IHRA employment agency discrimination claim (Count V).
D.
Counts VII & VIII - Promissory Estoppel & Breach of Contract
In Count VII plaintiff alleges a claim of promissory estoppel, and in Count VIII she
alleges a breach of her employment contract. Both counts are based on emails allegedly sent by
unknown Aerotek employees in the fall of 2012, allegedly indicating that Navistar had extended
her assignment for six months. Aerotek argues that there were no modifications and that the
controlling employment agreement is the one plaintiff signed when she was hired on March 16,
6
The parties dispute whether a staffing agency qualifies as an employment agency under
775 ILCS 5/2-101(c). The court does not reach this issue, but assumes that Aerotek qualifies as
one for purposes of the instant motion.
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2011. Additionally, Aerotek argues that because plaintiff cannot produce the emails, the “best
evidence rule” bars plaintiff from relying on their alleged contents.
The employment agreement clearly states that plaintiff “acknowledge[s] and
understand[s] that [her] employment with AEROTEK is ‘at will,’” and that plaintiff will be
working at “Navistar . . . for a temporary period.” Plaintiff concedes that she signed the
agreement during her orientation, but argues that she did not see it again until her deposition.
She argues that two emails from unknown Aerotek employees extended her employment until
July 1, 2013. Besides plaintiff’s own testimony, there is no evidence in the record that these
emails exist. Plaintiff did not produce them, Aerotek could not find them in its own records,
Navistar refused to release the “forensic image of the [laptop] Navistar (or any related entity)
issued to [p]laintiff during the course of her employment,”7 and there was no motion to compel
Navistar’s production of any documents relating to these emails.
Even if these alleged emails exist, and they came from someone at Aerotek who had the
authority to extend her employment, plaintiff has not alleged or presented evidence that the
emails altered the at-will terms of her employment. Therefore, even if her employment was
extended, she could still be fired at-will, without notice. Further, there is no evidence that
plaintiff detrimentally relied on these alleged promises.8 Consequently, Aerotek’s motion is
7
Plaintiff alleged in her deposition that the emails were stored on her Navistar laptop.
8
To establish a claim based on promissory estoppel under Illinois law, a plaintiff must
show that: (1) the defendant made an unambiguous promise to the plaintiff; (2) the plaintiff
relied on such promise; (3) the plaintiff’s reliance was expected and foreseeable by the
defendant; and (4) the plaintiff relied on the promise to its detriment. Newtown Tractor Sales,
Inc. v. Kubota Tractor Corp., 233 Ill. 2d 46, 51-52 (2009). The reliance must be reasonable and
justifiable. Id. at 60.
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granted as it relates to plaintiff’s promissory estoppel and breach of contract claims (Counts VII
& VIII).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court grants in part and denies in part Aerotek’s motion for
summary judgment. Aerotek’s motion is granted as to her claim for FMLA retaliation (Count
II), IHRA pregnancy discrimination (Count III), IHRA discrimination and discharge based on
gender and pregnancy (Count IV), IHRA employment agency discrimination (Count V), IHRA
failure to reasonably accommodate pregnancy (Count VI), promissory estoppel (Count VII), and
breach of contract (Count VIII). Aerotek’s motion is denied as to her claim for FMLA
interference (Count I). Additionally, Navistar’s motion to dismiss Aerotek’s third-party
complaint is granted.
ENTER:
March 22, 2016
__________________________________________
Robert W. Gettleman
United States District Judge
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