Martinez v. Williams et al
Filing
42
MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order signed by the Honorable Edmond E. Chang. For the reasons stated in the Opinion, the motion to amend petition 37 is granted, but the amended petition is denied. No certificate of appealability shall issue. The status hearing of 07/01/2016 is vacated. A separate AO-450 judgment shall be entered. Civil case terminated. Emailed and mailed notice(slb, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
JOSEPH MARTINEZ,
Petitioner,
v.
GUY PIERCE, as Warden of Pontiac
Correctional Center,1
Respondent.
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No. 14 C 9845
Judge Edmond E. Chang
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Joseph Martinez filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28
U.S.C. § 2254,2 challenging his 2006 conviction for first-degree murder and the
resulting 75-year sentence. Martinez asserts five claims in support of his petition:
(1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; (2) prosecutorial
misconduct throughout the trial violated his right to due process of law; (3) the trial
court violated his right to an impartial judge and due process of law; (4) his
extended term sentence violated his right to be free from cruel and unusual
punishment; and (5) the prosecution’s use of his coerced custodial statements during
trial violated his right against self-incrimination and due process of law. R. 37 at
1The
original respondent in this case was Tarry Williams. But because Guy Pierce is
the warden of Pontiac Correctional Center (where Martinez is currently imprisoned, see R.
39, State’s Resp. to Mot. to Amend Instanter at 1 n.1), Pierce is the proper party
respondent. See Rule 2(a), Rules Governing § 2254 Cases; Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S.
426, 439 (2004). The Clerk’s Office is directed to substitute Guy Pierce as the respondent.
2This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the case under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
Citation to the docket is “R.” followed by the entry number and, when necessary, the
relevant page or paragraph number.
Exh. 1, Am. Habeas Pet.3 For the reasons that follow, Martinez’s petition is denied
and no certificate of appealability will issue.
I. Background
When considering habeas petitions, federal courts must presume that the
factual findings made by the last state court to decide the case on the merits are
correct unless the petitioner rebuts those findings by clear and convincing evidence.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Coleman v. Hardy, 690 F.3d 811, 815 (7th Cir. 2012).
Martinez has not provided clear and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption
of correctness here, so this factual background is taken from the state courts’
findings.
A. The Crime
In February 2002, Martinez began dating Valerie Padin.4 R. 25-1, Exh. A,
Order on Direct Appeal at 1-2, People v. Martinez, No. 1-07-0059 (Ill. App. Ct. Dec.
23, 2009). Padin had a young son named Michael. Id. Shortly after the two started
dating, Padin obtained a protection order against Martinez. Id. Padin, however,
modified the protection order in November 2002 and eventually reunited with
Martinez after the birth of their first child together in February 2003. Id. at 2.
3Martinez
moved to amend his petition in February 2016—14 months after he filed
his original petition. See R. 1, Habeas Pet.; R. 37, Mot. to Amend Instanter. The Court
addresses Martinez’s request for leave to file an amended petition below. See infra Section
III.A. at 12-14.
4The facts detailing Martinez’s crime are largely taken from Padin’s and Detective
John Murray’s trial testimony, which the Illinois Appellate Court relied on in its order
affirming Martinez’s conviction and sentence. See R. 25-1, Exh. A, Order on Direct Appeal
at 1-3, People v. Martinez, No. 1-07-0059 (Ill. App. Ct. Dec. 23, 2009).
2
In November 2003, Padin told Martinez that she planned to leave him and
put their unborn child (she was around five or six months pregnant with their
second child at the time) up for adoption. Exh. A, Order on Direct Appeal at 2.
According to Padin, Martinez blamed Michael for her decision to give up the unborn
child. Id. at 2-3.
On November 7, 2003, Martinez returned home in the middle of the day after
attending an anger management class. Exh. A, Order on Direct Appeal at 3.
(Martinez had previously been found guilty of domestic battery and sentenced to a
year of probation, plus anger management classes. Id.) After Padin informed
Martinez that Michael had been misbehaving, Martinez spanked the boy with a belt
and sent him to his room. Id. That afternoon, while Padin was at a Walgreen’s
store, Michael came running out of his room. Id. at 4. Martinez grabbed Michael
and pressed him against the wall in a “bear hug.” Id. (At least one doctor had told
Padin and Martinez that they could give Michael a bear hug when he acted out to
calm him down. Id. at 2.) After holding him in that position for a while, Martinez
slid Michael down the wall, stood him back up, and took him to his room for a nap.
Id. at 4. When Padin returned, Martinez told her that Michael was asleep. Id. Padin
then went to the store, and after returning home again, asked Martinez to wake
Michael. Id. at 5. Martinez responded that they should wait until after dinner to
wake him. Id. After dinner, Martinez eventually went to wake Michael, but he was
cold to the touch and not breathing. Id. Padin attempted CPR, but Michael was
already dead. Id.
3
On December 5, 2003, Martinez was indicted for first-degree murder and
aggravated battery of a child. R. 25-19, Exh. S, Trial Common Law Record at C6-16,
People v. Martinez, No. 03-CR-26668 (Cir. Ct. Cook Cnty.). The indictment alleged
that Martinez knowingly inflicted blunt trauma injuries that killed Michael. Id.
Padin was also charged, and later convicted, of child endangerment, and sentenced
to four years of imprisonment. Exh. A, Order on Direct Appeal at 5.
B. The Trial
The jury convicted Martinez of first-degree murder after hearing testimony
from a number of witnesses, including Padin, the detective who interviewed
Martinez the night of Michael’s death, a medical examiner, and forensic
pathologists. Exh. A, Order on Direct Appeal at 1-7.
Dr. Nancy Jones, a medical examiner and forensic pathologist, performed the
autopsy on Michael’s body. Id. at 6. She testified that Michael’s death resulted from
multiple injuries. Id. She further testified that she had found 43 distinct areas of
blunt trauma injuries on Michael’s body, including to his head, neck, and nearly
every vital organ. Id. These injuries—particularly those to Michael’s head and
intestines, the deep liver laceration, and Michael’s kidney and adrenal injuries—
were inconsistent with merely giving Michael a forceful bear hug. Id. And while a
normal, healthy adult could have caused these injuries, Dr. Jones testified that it
would be difficult for a pregnant woman to have caused them. Id. Dr. Jones
concluded that Michael had died of multiple blunt trauma injuries as a result of
child abuse and that his death was a homicide. Id.
4
In contrast, the defense’s forensic pathologist, Dr. Werner Spitz, testified that
a pregnant woman could have caused Michael’s injuries. Exh. A, Order on Direct
Appeal at 6. He also testified that a man of Martinez’s size would have fractured
Michael’s bones in addition to the injuries the boy suffered. Id. But Dr. Spitz never
examined Michael’s body. Id.
Robert Sisson, a paramedic, testified that Padin told him that she last saw
Michael at 2 p.m. Exh. A, Order on Direct Appeal at 7. He also testified that Padin
had stated that she later checked on Michael and noticed that he had wet the bed,
but that she did not want to wake him. Id.
The jury deliberated over a period of two days. Exh. A, Order on Direct
Appeal at 7. On the second day, after having deliberated for over eight hours, the
jury sent the trial judge a note stating, “We feel we are at an impasse on the verdict.
We are unanimous on guilt, however, divided on which charge. We ask for your
instruction/guidance.” Id. The judge then issued a Prim instruction—that is, a
deadlock instruction—to the jury. Id. Soon thereafter, the jury found Martinez
guilty of first-degree murder. Id. The jury also found that Michael was under 12
years old when he died, that his death resulted from exceptionally brutal and
heinous behavior, that Michael was the subject of a protective order, and that the
murder was committed by a person (Martinez) against whom the protection order
was issued. Id. The trial court then sentenced Martinez to an extended term of 75
years in prison. Id.
5
C. Post-Trial Procedure
On direct appeal to the Illinois Appellate Court, Martinez raised five claims:
(1) the evidence was insufficient to prove him guilty at all; (2) the evidence was
insufficient to prove specifically that he had the requisite mental state for firstdegree murder; (3) the prosecutor committed misconduct by (a) referring to
Martinez as a “beast,” (b) making improper testimonial objections, (c) misstating the
law of involuntary manslaughter, and (d) making improper comments about defense
counsel; (4) the trial court erred because the trial judge (a) refused to recuse
himself, (b) failed to define “great bodily harm” for the jury, (c) prematurely gave a
deadlock instruction to the jury, and (d) gave the jury transcripts of some, but not
all, witnesses; and (5) the extended term sentence of 75 years imprisonment was
excessive. See R. 25-2, Exh. B, Appellant’s Opening Br. on Direct Appeal, People v.
Martinez, No. 1-07-0059 (Ill. App. Ct. Feb. 9, 2009). In a written opinion, the Illinois
Appellate Court affirmed the conviction and sentence. Exh. A, Order on Direct
Appeal. Martinez filed a petition for leave to appeal, which the Illinois Supreme
Court denied. See R. 25-5, Exh. E, Pet. for Leave to Appeal, People v. Martinez, No.
109809 (Ill. Jan. 25, 2010); R. 25-6, Exh. F, Order Denying Pet. for Leave to Appeal,
People v. Martinez, No. 109809 (Ill. Mar. 24, 2010).
Martinez filed his first petition for state postconviction relief on June 4, 2010.
R. 25-35, Exh. II, Postconviction Common Law Record at C10-16, People v.
Martinez, No. 03-CR-26668 (Cir. Ct. Cook Cnty.). In his petition for postconviction
relief, Martinez asserted that the trial court violated his right to a fair trial and due
6
process of law when it improperly transferred his case to another judge.5 Id. at C1116. After the court dismissed the postconviction petition, Martinez moved to
reconsider. Id. at C58-61.
While that motion was pending, Martinez filed a motion for leave to file a
successive postconviction petition in April 2011. R. 25-40, Exh. NN, Successive
Postconviction Common Law Record at C26-39, People v. Martinez, No. 03-CR26668 (Cir. Ct. Cook Cnty.). This time Martinez asserted two claims: (1) that his
custodial statements were coerced because the police held him for more than 48
hours without a probable cause hearing; and (2) that he was denied effective
assistance of appellate counsel. Id. The court ultimately denied Martinez’s request
for leave to file the successive postconviction petition, id. at C156-159, and his
motion to reconsider his first postconviction petition, R. 25-43, Exh. QQ, Mot. to
Reconsider Report of Proceedings at A-2, People v. Martinez, No. 03-CR-26668 (Cir.
Ct. Cook Cnty.).
Martinez appealed both judgments. In his consolidated appeal, he argued (1)
that the trial court erred by refusing to recharacterize his motion for leave to file a
successive postconviction petition as an amendment to his initial postconviction
petition; and (2) that his custodial statements were coerced. R. 25-13, Exh. M,
5Martinez
also filed a petition for relief from judgment in April 2010, raising the
same argument that he had in his first petition for state postconviction relief, namely that
the trial court had improperly transferred his case to another judge. See R. 25-37, Exh. KK,
Section 2-1401 Common Law Record Vol. 2 at 4-12, No. 03-CR-26668 (Cir. Ct. Cook Cnty.).
After a few rounds of appeals, the circuit court ultimately dismissed Martinez’s petition for
relief from judgment and the Illinois Appellate Court affirmed. See R. 25-47, Exh. UU,
Section 2-1401 Report of Proceedings on Remand at C2, People v. Martinez, No. 03-CR26668 (Cir. Ct. Cook Cnty.); R. 25-12, Exh. L, Order, People v. Martinez, No. 1-12-2102 (Ill.
App. Ct. June 28, 2013).
7
Pet’r’s Opening Br. at 19-30, People v. Martinez, Nos. 1-11-1911, 1-12-3131 (Ill. App.
Ct. Apr. 2, 2013). The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed both judgments, holding
that Martinez failed to satisfy the requisite cause-and-prejudice test for filing a
successive postconviction petition. R. 25-16, Exh. P, Order, People v. Martinez, Nos.
1-11-1911, 1-12-3131 (Ill. App. Ct. Mar. 28, 2014), 2014 WL 1281696. Martinez then
raised these same two claims in a petition for leave to appeal, which the Illinois
Supreme Court denied. R. 25-17, Exh. Q, Postconviction Pet. for Leave to Appeal at
5-19, People v. Martinez, No. 117648 (Ill. Apr. 18, 2014); R. 25-18, Exh. R, Order
Denying Postconviction Pet. for Leave to Appeal, People v. Martinez, No. 117648 (Ill.
Sept. 24, 2014).
In December 2014, Martinez filed a federal habeas petition in this Court,
initially asserting ten claims. Habeas Pet. at 6-31. The State asked this Court to
deny Martinez’s petition and to deny a certificate of appealability. R. 25, State’s
Answer. Fourteen months after filing his initial federal habeas petition, Martinez
filed a motion to amend in order to correct several deficiencies in the petition and to
withdraw several claims. R. 37, Mot. to Amend Instanter. Martinez asserts five
claims in his amended petition: (1) the evidence was insufficient to prove him guilty
and to prove that he had the requisite mental state for first-degree murder; (2) he
was denied his right to a fair trial and due process of law as a result of prosecutorial
misconduct, specifically because the prosecution (a) referred to Martinez as a
“beast,” (b) made improper testimonial objections, (c) misstated the law of
involuntary manslaughter, and (d) made improper comments about defense counsel;
8
(3) he was denied his right to due process of law because the trial judge (a) refused
to recuse himself, (b) prematurely gave a deadlock instruction to the jury, and (c)
gave the jury transcripts of some, but not all, witnesses; (4) he was denied his right
to be free from cruel and unusual punishment where the trial judge sentenced him
to an extended term sentence of 75 years; and (5) he was denied his right against
self-incrimination and due process of law where the court admitted his allegedly
coerced custodial statements as evidence at trial. R. 37 at Exh. 1, Am. Habeas Pet.
at 5-21. The state then filed a response, asserting that the Court should deny
Martinez’s motion to amend on the grounds that the claims proposed in the
amended federal habeas petition are meritless. R. 39, State’s Resp. to Mot. to
Amend Instanter.
II. Standard of Review
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA),
Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, a state petitioner seeking a writ of habeas
corpus in federal court must first exhaust the remedies available to him in state
court, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A), “thereby giving the State the opportunity to pass
upon and correct alleged violations of its prisoners’ federal rights,” Cheeks v. Gaetz,
571 F.3d 680, 685 (7th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A
habeas petitioner must fully and fairly present his federal claims through one
complete round of the state appellate review process before filing a federal habeas
petition. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999). If a petitioner has failed
to properly assert his federal claims at each level of state review, his claims are
9
procedurally defaulted. See McDowell v. Lemke, 737 F.3d 476, 482 (7th Cir. 2013). A
claim is also procedurally defaulted when a petitioner fails to raise his federal
claims in compliance with relevant state procedural rules, making the state court’s
refusal to adjudicate the claim an independent and adequate state ground for
denying federal review. Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 465 (2009). Either way,
procedural default precludes federal-court review of a petitioner’s habeas claims.
See Mulero v. Thompson, 668 F.3d 529, 536 (7th Cir. 2012). A habeas petitioner may
overcome procedural default, however, either by demonstrating cause for the
default and actual prejudice from the default, or by showing that the court’s failure
to consider the claim would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. See
House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 536 (2006); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750
(1991). A fundamental miscarriage of justice occurs when “a constitutional violation
has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.” Murray v.
Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986). Thus, procedural default, although otherwise a
bar to federal habeas review, may be excused in certain circumstances.
If the petitioner successfully runs the procedural-default gauntlet for a
particular claim, then a federal court can at least consider the merits of that federal
habeas claim. But under AEDPA, a federal court may not grant habeas relief unless
the state court’s decision was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly
established federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court. 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). A state court’s decision is “contrary to” clearly established
Supreme Court law “if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that
10
reached by th[e] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case
differently than th[e] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.”
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). Alternatively, under the
“unreasonable application” prong of the AEDPA standard, a habeas petitioner must
demonstrate that although the state court identified the correct legal rule, it
unreasonably applied the controlling law to the facts of the case. See id. at 413. But
even if a federal court independently concludes that the relevant state-court
decision erroneously applied clearly established federal law, still the writ does not
necessarily issue; rather, the state court’s application must be objectively
unreasonable. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76 (2003). “This is a difficult
standard to meet; ‘unreasonable’ means ‘something like lying well outside the
boundaries of permissible differences of opinion.’” Jackson v. Frank, 348 F.3d 658,
662 (7th Cir. 2003) (quoting Hardaway v. Young, 302 F.3d 757, 762 (7th Cir. 2002)).
III. Analysis
A. Motion to Amend Habeas Petition
Before considering the substance of Martinez’s federal habeas claims, the
Court must first decide whether to allow Martinez to file the amended habeas
petition to “correct and/or cure various pleading and procedural deficiencies.” Mot.
to Amend Instanter at 2. For example, many of the claims that Martinez raised in
his original petition did not allege any sort of constitutional violation; instead, these
claims concerned state-law violations. See Habeas Pet. Martinez attempts to correct
this pleading deficiency in his amended petition by re-couching his claims in order
11
to establish that he is in custody in violation of the federal Constitution, rather than
referring to Illinois state law. See R. 37 at Exh. 1, Am. Habeas Pet. at 5-21. The
State contends that allowing Martinez to file an amended petition is futile. State’s
Resp. to Mot. to Amend Instanter at 2. Specifically, the State asserts that “[w]hile
[Martinez] has arguably addressed [the state’s] contention that several of his claims
were non-cognizable, nothing in petitioner’s amendment could remedy the fact that
his claims are either meritless as a matter of law, or procedurally barred.” Id.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2242, a habeas petition “may be amended or supplemented
as provided in the rules of procedure applicable to civil actions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2242;
see also Rule 11, Rules Governing § 2254 Cases. So, Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure governs whether Martinez may amend his habeas petition. See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 15. Rule 15(a)(2) provides that “a party may amend its pleading only with
the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave. The court should freely
give leave when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).
Courts routinely grant leave to amend a habeas petition where the initial
petition failed to allege particular violations of federal law. See, e.g., Thomas v.
California Bd. of Parole Hr’gs, 2009 WL 585830, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2009)
(allowing amendment “so that Thomas may attempt to assert a federal basis for his
claim” and warning that “[i]n his amended petition, Thomas must identify the
particular federal constitutional provision he claims was violated by the decision not
to release him from parole.”); Dema v. Goddard, 2008 WL 2397506, at *1 (D. Ariz.
June 11, 2008) (granting leave to amend “[i]n the interest of justice” where the
12
original petition “failed to make any reference to the United States Constitution or
to any laws or treaties of the United States.”); Olagues v. Foti, 2007 WL 4209433, at
*1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 27, 2007) (holding that “because only federal claims that have
been previously exhausted in the state courts may be considered, Petitioner will be
provided with an opportunity to file an amended petition, identifying which of his
claims allege the violation of his federal constitutional rights.”); cf. Sterling v.
Bartlett, 214 F.R.D. 101, 105 (W.D.N.Y. 2003) (granting petitioner’s motion to
amend after observing that “[t]he proposed amended petition does not change the
gist of Sterling’s hypnosis claims, but rather re-casts them as a federal
constitutional violation.”). This is exactly the case here: In his initial petition,
Martinez failed to assert that the state trial and sentencing proceedings violated
any one of his federal constitutional rights. Martinez now attempts to correct this
error by re-casting his claims as federal constitutional violations. The substance of
Martinez’s allegations has not changed. Cf. United States ex rel. White v.
DeRobertis, 566 F. Supp. 871, 873-74 (N.D. Ill 1983) (reasoning that “by virtue of
the substance of the allegations presented by the petitioner, the requirement that a
constitutional violation be incorporated within the petition is easily satisfied.”).
What’s more, allowing Martinez to amend his petition would not prejudice the
State—the original petition adequately notified the State of the facts that supported
Martinez’s claims for federal habeas relief. Based on the above, Martinez’s motion is
granted.6 The Court will consider Martinez’s claims as alleged in his amended
habeas petition in rendering the decision set forth below.7
6Martinez’s
amended petition is also timely under 28 U.S.C. § 2244. An amended
13
B. Claim 1 (Original Petition Claims 1 & 2):
Insufficient Evidence
In his first claim, Martinez asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support
his conviction.8 R. 37 at Exh. 1, Am. Habeas Pet. at 5-8. Specifically, Martinez
contends that the State failed to meet its burden for two reasons: “First, the State
failed to present sufficient evidence that he had the requisite mental state for
committing first degree murder. Second, other evidence and testimony presented at
trial demonstrates Ms. Padin could have inflicted the victim[’]s injuries leading to
death.” Id. at 5-6.
habeas petition relates back to the date of the original petition if “the amendment asserts a
claim or defense that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out—or
attempted to be set out—in the original [petition] … .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(B); see also
Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 655-56 (2005) (explaining that in habeas proceedings the
“original pleading” is the initial habeas petition filed by the petitioner). This is important
because under 28 U.S.C. § 2244, there is a 1-year limitation period for filing a habeas
petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).
The State does not dispute that Martinez’s original habeas petition was timely
under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), so the only issue is whether Martinez’s amended petition
properly relates back to his original one. See State’s Answer at 12 (“On December 5, 2014,
this Court received petitioner’s timely pro se 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for a writ of habeas
corpus.”). Here, there is no question that the claims in Martinez’s amended petition arise
out of the same “conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out … in the original [petition] … .”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(B). To be sure, the amended petition, unlike the original one,
identifies the constitutional claims at issue, but the facts giving rise to those claims remain
the same. See Mayle, 545 U.S. at 650 (“An amended habeas petition, we hold, does not
relate back (and thereby escape AEDPA’s one-year time limit) when it asserts a new ground
for relief supported by facts that differ in both time and type from those the original
pleading set forth.”(emphasis added)). So, Martinez’s amended petition is timely as it
“relates back” to the date of his original petition under Rule 15(c)(1)(B).
7In its response to Martinez’s motion to amend, the State requested an opportunity
to respond to Martinez’s amended petition: “If this Court holds that any of the claims that
respondent has not addressed on the merits are not procedurally defaulted, then
respondent requests thirty days from such an order in which to address the claims on the
merits.” State’s Resp. to Mot. to Amend Instanter at 2. The Court’s analysis below, see infra
Section III.B.-E., renders any further response to Martinez’s habeas petition unnecessary.
8Martinez raised this claim on direct review to the Illinois Appellate Court and in
his petition for leave to appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court. Exh. A, Order on Direct
Appeal at 7-11; Exh. E, Pet. for Leave to Appeal at 2, 12-16. Martinez’s insufficient evidence
claim, therefore, is properly before this Court on federal habeas review.
14
As noted earlier, the writ cannot issue on this ground unless the Illinois
Appellate Court decision was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application
of, Supreme Court law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. Under
Jackson v. Virginia, a court reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim must
determine “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). Though the state
appellate court did not cite Jackson specifically, this is the precise rule that it
applied. See Exh. A, Order on Direct Appeal at 8 (“‘In reviewing the sufficiency of
the evidence, the question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” (quoting People v. Jordan, 843
N.E.2d 870, 879 (Ill. 2006))). Because the state appellate court analyzed Martinez’s
insufficient evidence claim under the correct legal rule, its decision was not contrary
to clearly established Supreme Court law.
Nor did the Illinois Appellate Court apply Jackson unreasonably. It was
perfectly reasonable for that court to conclude that any rational trier of fact, after
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, could have found the
essential elements of first-degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt. McFowler v.
Jaimet, 349 F.3d 436, 447 (7th Cir. 2003). In making that determination, the
appellate court considered the following evidence:
In this case, we have defendant’s statement regarding the bear hug and
pressing Michael into a wall, resulting in problems breathing and standing.
15
There was conflicting expert testimony about whether Valerie could have
inflicted the injuries to Michael, and testimony that she had the opportunity
to inflict them while Martinez was out at Walgreen’s. However, the jury was
free to weigh the expert testimony in favor of Martinez’s guilt, and there was
no evidence that Valerie inflicted any injuries of the sort ultimately
recounted in Michael’s autopsy. Although Martinez claims there was little
evidence that Martinez had been violent towards Michael in the past, except
for spanking him with a belt, there was evidence that Michael had been
beaten with a cable, and that Martinez was working with a cable that
afternoon. The jury heard evidence of Martinez’s past violence towards
Valerie. The jury also heard evidence that Martinez blamed Valerie’s decision
to put their unborn child up for adoption on Michael. The jury further heard
evidence that Martinez discouraged Valerie from trying to wake Michael
during the afternoon of his death.
Exh. A, Order on Direct Appeal at 9-10. The appellate court considered even more
evidence when analyzing whether a rational trier of fact could have found that
Martinez possessed the requisite mental state for murder, including: the height and
weight disparities between Martinez and Michael; the severity of Michael’s injuries;
and the fact that Martinez blamed Michael for Padin’s decision to put his unborn
child up for adoption. Id. at 10-11. From all of this evidence, the state appellate
court reasonably concluded that Martinez killed Michael with the intent to kill or do
great bodily harm to Michael. See 720 ILCS 5/9–1(a) (identifying the elements of
first-degree murder under Illinois state law). Martinez, therefore, is not entitled to
habeas relief based on his claim that the evidence was insufficient to support his
conviction.
16
C. Claim 2 (Original Petition Claim 3):
Right to Due Process—Prosecutorial Misconduct
Broadly speaking, Martinez’s second claim is that prosecutorial misconduct
throughout the trial violated his right to due process.9 R. 37 at Exh. 1, Am. Habeas
Pet. at 8-13. The crux of Martinez’s second claim concerns statements made by the
prosecution during its closing argument. Martinez asserts that his due process
rights were violated when the state, during closing arguments, referred to Martinez
as a “beast,” misstated the law of involuntary manslaughter, and made improper
comments about defense counsel. Id. Martinez also asserts that the prosecution’s
improper testimonial objections throughout the trial amounted to a due process
violation. Id.
In Darden v. Wainwright, the Supreme Court established a framework to
evaluate “whether the prosecutors’ comments so infected the trial with unfairness
as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” 477 U.S. 168, 181
(1986) (internal quotations omitted). First, the court determines whether the
challenged comments were improper; if so, then the court asks whether the
comments prejudiced the defendant. Bartlett v. Battaglia, 453 F.3d 796, 800 (7th
Cir. 2006); Ruvalcaba v. Chandler, 416 F.3d 555, 565 (7th Cir. 2005); Whitehead v.
Cowan, 263 F.3d 708, 728 (7th Cir. 2001). Darden identified six factors a court
should consider when determining whether the prosecutors’ comments were
prejudicial: “(1) whether the prosecutor misstated the evidence, (2) whether the
9As
with Martinez’s first claim, Martinez raised this claim on direct review to the
Illinois Appellate Court and in his petition for leave to appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court.
Exh. A, Order on Direct Appeal at 11-21; Exh. E, Pet. for Leave to Appeal at 2, 16-20.
Martinez’s second claim, therefore, is properly before this Court on federal habeas review.
17
remarks implicate specific rights of the accused, (3) whether the defense invited the
response, (4) the trial court’s instructions, (5) the weight of the evidence against the
defendant, and (6) the defendant’s opportunity to rebut.” Howard v. Gramley, 225
F.3d 784, 793 (7th Cir. 2000); see Darden, 477 U.S. at 181-82. “These factors … are
not to be applied in a rigid manner, but should be used as a guide to determine
whether there was fundamental unfairness that infected the bottom line.” Hough v.
Anderson, 272 F.3d 878, 903 (7th Cir. 2001).
The Illinois Appellate Court’s legal analysis is consistent with Darden. For
example, when scrutinizing the State’s reference to Martinez as a “beast” during
closing arguments, the appellate court explicitly stated that “improper remarks
generally do constitute reversible error unless they result in substantial prejudice to
the accused … .” Exh. A, Order on Direct Appeal at 13 (emphases added); see also,
e.g., id. at 15 (“In sum, over the course of the trial, the State made improper
comments about defense counsel, but the trial court sustained the objections to
them, curing any improper inferences.”); id. at 21 (“A prosecutor’s closing argument
will lead to reversal only if it created ‘substantial prejudice against a defendant
such that it is impossible to say whether or not a verdict of guilt resulted from
them.’” (quoting People v. Wheeler, 871 N.E.2d 728, 745 (Ill. 2007))). The appellate
court also considered and applied the factors identified in Darden to determine
whether the prosecutors’ comments were prejudicial. See, e.g., Exh. A, Order on
Direct Appeal at 13 (determining that the State’s reference to Martinez as a “beast”
did not amount to reversible error after considering the trial court’s instructions
18
and the weight of evidence against Martinez). The state appellate court’s decision
was not contrary to clearly established Supreme Court case law.
The
question
then
becomes
whether
the
Illinois
Appellate
Court
unreasonably applied Darden. Taking each one of Martinez’s prosecutorial
misconduct arguments in turn, the Court concludes that the appellate court’s
application of Darden was reasonable.
1. Referring to Martinez as a “Beast”
The appellate court held that Martinez’s right to a fair trial was not violated
when the prosecutor called him a “beast” during closing arguments. While
acknowledging that “[t]hese comments were improper, as they merely served to
inflame the jury,” the appellate court also noted that “[t]he trial court overruled the
defense objections to the references.” Exh. A, Order on Direct Appeal at 13. But the
appellate court ultimately found it persuasive that the trial court “instructed the
jury to disregard statements made in closing argument which were not based on the
evidence.” Id. And, after “review[ing] … the record as a whole, including Martinez’s
statements to the police and the evidence of the extensive fatal injuries to Michael,”
the appellate court concluded that the comments were “not a material factor in
Martinez’s conviction, and thus not reversible error.” Id. at 13-14.
Although the Illinois Appellate Court did not apply Darden with precision, it
did analyze whether the comments were improper and evaluated the impact the
comments had on Martinez’s conviction. What’s more, the court’s analysis
particularly focused on the weight of the evidence against Martinez, which the
19
Seventh Circuit has characterized as “the most important consideration” under
Darden. United States v. Morgan, 113 F.3d 85, 90 (7th Cir. 1997); Gramley, 225
F.3d at 793. Accordingly, this Court cannot say that the Illinois Appellate Court
unreasonably applied Darden in holding that the prosecutor’s repeated references to
Martinez as a “beast” did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Martinez,
therefore, is not entitled to habeas relief on this ground.
2. Improper Testimonial Objections
The appellate court reviewed eight alleged “testimonial objections” (also
known as “speaking” objections, that is, when the objecting lawyer goes beyond just
a concise statement of the objection) made by the prosecution, which Martinez
asserts violated his due process right to a fair trial. Here are the first four:
1. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Would the swelling as you say it, doctor, without
if[s] and hypotheticals of increasing the swelling, did the head injuries,
were those the fatal blow to this child?
[THE STATE]: Objection, judge. The doctor has to answer the best she
can. With no medical treatment it would have.
2. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: So it’s your opinion that Valerie Padin had the
sufficient physical strength to inflict these injuries to this child, correct?
[THE STATE]: Objection. I don’t believe Dr. Jones has ever met Valerie
Padin.
THE COURT: Objection sustained.
3. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And then Mr. Martinez talked to Michael again?
[THE STATE]: Objection, judge. That’s not what the report says at that
point in time. Misreading the reports.
THE COURT: The objection will be sustained if it is not in the report.
20
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Judge it is in the report.
4. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: … [I]s that scab consistent with a healing injury
being caused on November 7, 2003?
[THE STATE]: Objection, judge. Dr. Jones said it was a healing injury.
Exh. A, Order on Direct Appeal at 16-17. The appellate court concluded that these
first four testimonial objections were not even improper. Id. This is because in these
instances “the State was not editorializing, but offering a reason to object to … the
[defense’s] question.” Id. at 16; see also id. at 17 (analyzing the third testimonial
objection and concluding that “the State was explaining the basis for an objection to
the attempted impeachment of Valerie.”). This is the fifth objection:
5. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Do you agree with Nancy Jones’s opinion that a
pregnant woman’s tummy would get in the way of causing some of these
injuries? Do you agree with her opinion —
[THE STATE]: Objection, Your Honor. The opinion of Dr. Jones
considered the totality of the injuries that the doctor has testified to.
Id. at 17-18. The appellate court acknowledged that the trial court overruled the
fifth “testimonial objection” identified by Martinez. Id. at 18. Here are the
remaining objections:
6. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Nancy Jones told you what she received, a body,
a blanket, a blanket appeared to have blood stains. And there’s the
blanket.
[THE STATE]: Objection, Judge. The detective testified that there was a
blanket in the closet.
7. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Detective Murray told you it was a very bad idea
and a lot of officers in a crime scene, but he allowed it to happen anyway.
[THE STATE]: Objection, Judge. He never said there was [sic] too many
officers at the crime scene.
21
8. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: You know that’s not true. The paramedic told
you that she checked in on the child at 2:00.
[THE STATE]: Objection; that’s not what the paramedic said. The last
time she saw the child was 2:00.
Id. at 18. These final three testimonial objections occurred during defense counsel’s
closing argument. As for these three objections, the appellate court observed that
the trial court sustained one of the objections and that the trial court and defense
counsel were able to take corrective action in response to the other two. Id. at 18-19.
After considering all of the testimonial objections identified by Martinez, the
appellate court held that “the record does not show that the State crossed into
pervasive, improper behavior … . Moreover, the record shows that the trial court
took corrective action on the occasions where the State’s objections could have been
construed as overly argumentative.” Id. at 19.
The state court’s rejection of Martinez’s “testimonial objection” argument was
not an unreasonable application of Darden. In analyzing the objections, the
appellate court properly evaluated, among other considerations, whether the
objections were improper, and if so, whether the prosecutors misstated the evidence,
whether the defense invited the response, whether the trial court gave corrective
instructions, and whether Martinez’s counsel had an opportunity to rebut the
objections. See Exh. A, Order on Direct Appeal at 16-19; see also Darden, 477 U.S.
at 181-82. What’s more, the appellate court also repeatedly scrutinized another
Darden factor throughout its opinion—the strong evidence against Martinez. See,
e.g., Exh. A, Order on Direct Appeal at 9-10; id. at 10-11. After reviewing the trial
22
court record, this Court agrees with the appellate court: indeed, the objections were
relatively concise statements of the basis for the objection, and likely not even
improper. And, as the appellate court reasonably held, even if some of the objections
were improper commentary, they did not rise to the level of a due-process violation.
3. Misstating the Law of Involuntary Manslaughter
During closing arguments, the State argued that the jury should convict
Martinez of first-degree murder rather than involuntary manslaughter. The
prosecutor characterized the law of involuntary manslaughter as follows:
Now you’re going to get an instruction on what’s called involuntary
manslaughter. … [W]hen you’re reading this just remember this instruction
does not cover anywhere near enough for what [Martinez] did. This
instruction acknowledges you have to find that [Martinez] did it first of all,
but in order for him to get just involuntary manslaughter you would have to
find that when he was punching Michael repeatedly and either hitting him
over the head with something or just banging his head into something as Dr.
Jones said he had to have done, that he was only acting recklessly.
And I don’t want you to be confused when you read this because involuntary
manslaughter does not mean that you don’t think he intended to kill him, it’s
completely different. If you think that he performed the acts intentionally,
intentionally pulling his hand back and punching Michael each time,
intentionally taking his head and banging it up against the wall, if you think
he performed those acts intentionally, then he is not just guilty of involuntary
manslaughter. Involuntary manslaughter applies when you are cleaning out a
gun and the gun accidentally goes off and you shoot somebody. We say, you
know what? You were reckless in doing that because somebody else was
standing around. That’s involuntary manslaughter.
[Defense objection overruled.]
If you find that he didn’t really mean to kill Michael but that his actions were
intentional in inflicting those injuries it’s first degree murder as long as he
knows that those acts create a strong probability of at the very least great
bodily harm. So just to summarize it all, if you believe he intended to … hurt
him when he was hurting him and knew these acts create at least great
bodily harm, he is guilty of murder and not involuntary manslaughter.
23
R. 25-28, Exh. BB, Trial Report of Proceedings Vol. 9 at PP160-162, People v.
Martinez, No. 03-CR-26668 (Cir. Ct. Cook Cnty.) (emphasis added); see also Exh. A,
Order on Direct Appeal at 19-20. Martinez asserts that the prosecutor misstated the
law in describing involuntary manslaughter in this way, and as a result, violated
his due process rights. R. 37 at Exh. 1, Am. Habeas Pet. at 8, 11-12.
After reviewing the prosecution’s statements and the trial record, the
appellate court held—and this Court agrees—that “the State’s passing use of a nonanalogous example in closing argument did not result in substantial prejudice to
Martinez warranting a new trial.” Exh. A, Order on Direct Appeal at 21. Though the
appellate court recognized that the prosecution’s discussion on involuntary
manslaughter was improper (because the prosecutor equated criminal recklessness
to an accident), the court determined that the various corrective measures taken by
the trial court and the prosecution negated any potential prejudice: Not only did the
trial court “properly instruct[] [the jury] on the law, and … instructed that closing
argument is not evidence,” but “[t]he State’s improper example of involuntary
manslaughter was immediately followed by a correct statement of the law
distinguishing murder from involuntary manslaughter.” Id. In addition to these
corrective measures, the appellate court also considered “the balance of the evidence
and the theories of the case presented to the jury”10 before holding that Martinez’s
conviction did not require reversal. Id.
10The
defense’s primary theory was not that Martinez had acted recklessly, but
rather that Padin had committed the murder. Id.
24
To be sure, “a jury is likely to repose greater trust in [a prosecutor’s]
arguments,” and “[a] prosecutor must not abuse that trust by misleading the jury
about the law … .” Hennon v. Cooper, 109 F.3d 330, 333 (7th Cir. 1997). But the
circumstances surrounding the prosecution’s misstatement of the law in this case
refute any argument that a constitutional violation occurred. See, e.g., Hough, 272
F.3d at 904 (holding that the prosecution’s comments did not amount to a
constitutional violation where “the jury was on notice that the arguments were
nothing more than counsel’s interpretation of the evidence,” “defense counsel …
ha[d] an opportunity to rebut at least some of the prosecutor’s questionable
statements,” and “the jury was presented with overwhelming evidence of three
aggravating factors compared to sparse evidence in mitigation.”); Hennon, 109 F.3d
at 333 (reasoning that “[g]iven the strength of the evidence against Hennon, [a due
process violation] was most unlikely, especially since the judge sustained many
objections to the prosecutor’s closing argument and repeatedly reminded the jury
that they must decide the case in accordance with the instructions that he, the
judge, would be giving it.”). Considering the steps taken to correct the prosecution’s
misstatement of the law on involuntary manslaughter—including accurate jury
instructions and a general admonition that lawyer’s statements are not evidence—
combined with the substantial evidence of guilt, the appellate court’s decision was
reasonable. Just as Martinez’s other prosecutorial misconduct arguments have
failed so far, this one fails too.
25
4. Improper Comments About Defense Counsel
In his amended petition, Martinez broadly alleges that the prosecution’s
improper remarks directed at his attorney violated his due process rights. R. 37 at
Exh. 1, Am. Habeas Pet. at 8, 12-13. This argument is not sufficiently specific. “A
habeas petitioner must state specific facts fleshing out each ground for relief so that
the District Court may tell from the face of the petition whether further habeas
review is warranted.” United States ex rel. Santiago v. Welborn, 2002 WL 31600051,
at *12 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 18, 2002), aff’d sub nom., 93 F. App’x 74 (7th Cir. 2004). In
other words, “mere vague assertions and conclusions of a constitutional violation”
are not enough. Id. In United States ex rel. Santiago v. Welborn, for example, the
district court dismissed a due process claim based on a prosecutor’s improper
comments after observing that the petitioner failed to “indicate which specific
remarks at trial amounted to a due process violation … .” Id. at *13; see also United
States ex rel. Johnson v. Sternes, 2004 WL 1427113, at *8 (N.D. Ill. June 23, 2004)
(holding that the petitioner failed to properly allege a constitutional violation given
that “[n]either the Court nor the State was directed to where the prosecutor argued
facts not in evidence or what remarks were designed to inflame the jury.”). Here too,
Martinez fails to provide a single example of an improper comment that violated his
due process rights. Rather, Martinez vaguely asserts in his amended petition that
“[t]he prosecution improperly commented about defense counsel’s assessment of the
facts and evidence at trial,” and “made improper comments about defense counsel
26
that aimed to bolster the credibility of state witnesses.” R. 37 at Exh. 1, Am. Habeas
Pet. at 12.
That Martinez identified which specific “improper comments” the prosecution
made at trial in his original habeas petition, see Habeas Pet. at 11-12, does not
matter. An amended habeas petition supersedes an original habeas petition. See
Newell v. Hanks, 283 F.3d 827, 834 (7th Cir. 2002); Ellison v. Hodge, 2014 WL
222739, at *3 (S.D. Ill. Jan. 21, 2014) (holding that “[a]n amended petition
supersedes and replaces the original pleading, rendering the original petition void.
… Thus, the First Amended Petition must stand on its own, without reference to
any other pleading.” (internal citation omitted)); cf. Gillespie v. Robert, 2013 WL
1339708, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2013) (observing that allegations in an original
pleading, once amended, may only be considered when those allegations are
“specifically incorporated” into the amended pleading). So as presented by the
amended habeas petition, Martinez’s arguments on this issue are not specific
enough.
The Court hastens to add that even if Martinez had properly identified which
comments allegedly violated his due process rights, he still would not be entitled to
federal habeas relief. After reviewing the alleged improper comments as spelled out
in Martinez’s original petition, this Court cannot say that the state appellate court
unreasonably applied Darden in holding that Martinez received a fair trial.
Specifically, in his original petition, Martinez identified three “improper comments”
that the prosecution made during trial. First, Martinez identified a portion of the
27
rebuttal closing argument where the prosecutor stated, “[defense counsel is]
basically saying ignore the facts, ignore the evidence.” Habeas Pet. at 11; see also
Exh. BB, Trial Report of Proceedings Vol. 9 at PP-157, People v. Martinez, No. 03CR-26668 (Cir. Ct. Cook Cnty.). The appellate court ultimately determined that the
comment did not violate Martinez’s right to a fair trial. Exh. A, Order on Direct
Appeal at 14. In so holding, the court questioned whether this comment was even
improper, observing that “the trial court [had] sustained at least three objections to
the defense closing argument for misstating the evidence or referring to alleged
evidence outside the trial record.” Id.
Martinez also claimed that another portion of the rebuttal closing argument
amounted to improper commentary directed at his defense counsel:
Well, it’s a good thing that there is a court reporter taking down everything
that happens here and everything that [defense counsel] said because he
can’t seem to get straight what happened between one day and the next
during the trial and when [he] does it it’s a mistake, it’s an accident. If a
police officer, God forbid should write down the wrong thing on a police
report, then it’s a grand conspiracy against Joseph Martinez. And it’s really
lucky we have [defense counsel] on the case here.
[Defense objection overruled.]
Because [defense counsel] figured out what all of these detectives, all these
police officers with all of their years of experience could not figure out, that
it’s possible that a mother could harm their own child. And I would love to
stand in front of you and tell you they have never seen that before. They have
seen it all.
Habeas Pet. at 12; see also Exh. BB, Trial Report of Proceedings Vol. 9 at PP-149150. When analyzing this comment, the appellate court noted that “[t]he trial court
sustained an objection as to what defense counsel knew, generally curing any
28
improper inference.” Exh. A, Order on Direct Appeal at 15. What’s more, the
appellate court pointed out that “the comments were the introduction to the
rebuttal of the defense argument suggesting that the police did not consider Valerie
to be a suspect, when the record shows that Valerie was also questioned, arrested
and charged.” Id.
Finally, Martinez also contested comments accompanying two objections made
by the State during trial: the State’s request for a sidebar to “clarify [an issue
regarding a report] for [defense counsel] again,” Habeas Pet. at 12; R. 25-25, Exh. Y,
Trial Report of Proceedings Vol. 6 at MM-87, People v. Martinez, No. 03-CR-26668
(Cir. Ct. Cook Cnty.), and the State’s remark that “Just because [defense counsel]
doesn’t remember doesn’t mean he gets to ask it again,” Habeas Pet. at 12; Exh. Y,
Trial Report of Proceedings Vol. 6 at MM-152. Martinez contends that these
remarks “presented to the jury a picture that defense counsel was trying to hide
facts from them and trick them into finding petitioner not guilty, prejudicing and
denying petitioner a fair trial.” Habeas Pet. at 12. As with Martinez’s other
“improper comment” arguments, the appellate court rejected this one too, reasoning
that “the record shows that defense counsel stated that he might have misheard
prior testimony, which prompted the State’s comment during the objection.” Exh. A,
Order on Direct Appeal at 15.
The Court concludes that, even if Martinez presented this issue specifically
enough, he would not be entitled to relief. The Illinois Appellate Court properly
analyzed whether the remarks were improper and the extent to which the remarks
29
prejudiced Martinez at trial. The appellate court adequately applied Darden,
determining that in each instance defense counsel had invited the prosecution’s
alleged “improper comment,” and reasoning that where “the State made improper
comments about defense counsel, … the trial court sustained the objections to them,
curing any improper inferences.” Exh. A, Order on Direct Appeal at 15. To be sure,
perhaps some of the comments were presented with more sarcasm and exasperation
than ideal, but the appellate court reasonably determined that they were either not
improper or were not so egregious as to deprive Martinez of due process.
D. Claim 3 (Original Petition Claim 4):
Right to Due Process—Trial Court Error
Broadly speaking, Martinez’s third claim is that the trial judge violated his
due process rights.11 R. 37 at Exh. 1, Am. Habeas Pet. at 13-17. He claims that the
trial judge made three errors: first, the trial judge refused to recuse himself after
having referred to Martinez as a “beast” during Padin’s sentencing hearing. Id. at
13-14. Second, the trial judge prematurely gave a deadlock instruction to the jury.12
11This
claim is properly before the Court on federal habeas review. Martinez raised
it on direct review to the Illinois Appellate Court and in his petition for leave to appeal to
the Illinois Supreme Court. Exh. A, Order on Direct Appeal at 22-25; Exh. E, Pet. for Leave
to Appeal at 2-3, 20-21. The Court notes, however, that although Martinez identified the
transcript issue in his petition for leave to appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court, he did not
provide any legal argument as to why the trial court’s failure to give the jurors transcripts
for the defense’s final two witnesses constituted reversible error. See Exh. E, Pet. for Leave
to Appeal.
12Martinez attempts to allege yet another error in conjunction with his deadlock
instruction argument, namely, that the trial judge improperly instructed the jury on the
definition of “great bodily harm.” R. 37 at Exh. 1, Am. Habeas Pet. at 14. The Court need
not address this argument, however, because Martinez failed to assert this ground for
habeas relief through one complete round of state court review. Martinez asserted this
ground for habeas relief in his direct appeal to the Illinois Appellate Court, see Exh. B,
Appellant’s Opening Br. on Direct Appeal at 33-34, 36-40, but did not raise this argument
30
Id. at 13-15. And finally, the trial judge gave the jury transcripts of some, but not
all, witnesses’ trial testimony. Id. at 13, 16-17. To evaluate Martinez’s third claim,
the Court will address whether the Illinois Appellate Court decision as to each
alleged error was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, Supreme
Court law.
1. Failure to Recuse Due to Personal Bias
Martinez asserts that the trial judge should have recused himself after
calling him a “beast” at Padin’s sentencing hearing. R. 37 at Exh. 1, Am. Habeas
Pet. at 13-14. When sentencing Padin, the trial judge stated, “I do believe Ms. Padin
had knowledge that she was the one who brought the beast into the house … I don’t
think you were there to stand between the beast you brought into your house and
your son.” Exh. B, Appellant’s Opening Br. on Direct Appeal at 34. This excerpt,
according to Martinez, proves that the judge had a personal bias that he contends
should have disqualified the judge from presiding over his trial. R. 37 at Exh. 1, Am.
Habeas Pet. at 13-14.
Remember that under AEDPA, the first issue is whether the Illinois
Appellate Court applied the correct legal rule to Martinez’s challenge. Broadly
speaking, “[t]he Due Process Clause guarantees litigants an impartial judge.”
Montgomery v. Uchtman, 426 F.3d 905, 910 (7th Cir. 2005); In re Murchison, 349
U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (“[N]o man is permitted to try cases where he has an interest
in the outcome.”). Though courts presume “that judges are honest and impartial,”
in his petition for leave to appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court, see Exh. E, Pet. for Leave to
Appeal at 2-3. This argument, therefore, is procedurally defaulted, without any excuse, and
the Court need not address it further.
31
this presumption may be rebutted. Montgomery, 426 F.3d at 910. In Tumey v. Ohio,
273 U.S. 510 (1927), the Supreme Court held that a judge’s “direct, personal,
substantial pecuniary interest” in convicting defendants warranted disqualifying
the judge from presiding over the defendant’s trial. Id. at 523, 535. The Court
concluded that bias could be presumed from the judge’s pecuniary interest in
collecting fines. Id. at 523; see also Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 824
(1986) (presuming bias where a judge’s decision had the “immediate effect of
enhancing the legal status and the settlement value” of another lawsuit in which
the judge had a personal interest); Ward v. Vill. of Monroeville, Ohio, 409 U.S. 57,
59-60 (1972) (presuming bias where the judge also served as the mayor of a
municipality and fines collected by the court provided a substantial portion of
municipality funds).
Here, the Illinois Appellate Court applied the correct rule in considering
whether “the alleged bias or prejudice … stemmed from an extrajudicial source and
result[ed] in an opinion on the merits on a basis other than what the judge learned
from the case.” Exh. A, Order on Direct Appeal at 22. The appellate court recognized
that in order for the duty to recuse to arise, a judge must have a “‘personal bias or
prejudice for or against a defendant.’” Id. (quoting People v. Neumann, 499 N.E.2d
487, 492 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986)). Surely, a “direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary
interest,” Tumey, 273 U.S. at 523, would constitute a “bias or prejudice … stemmed
from an extrajudicial source, Exh. A, Order on Direct Appeal at 22. Martinez,
32
therefore, cannot claim that the court’s decision was contrary to clearly established
Supreme Court law.
Nor can Martinez claim that the state appellate court unreasonably applied
Tumey in determining that the trial judge was not required to recuse himself.
Though the appellate court acknowledged that “[r]eferring to Martinez as a ‘beast’
w[as] injudicious,” the court also noted that the reference “[wa]s not a declaration
that [the trial judge] believed Martinez to be guilty of murder, or even involuntary
manslaughter.” Exh. A, Order on Direct Appeal at 23; see also Franklin v.
McCaughtry, 398 F.3d 955, 960 (7th Cir. 2005) (“To prove disqualifying bias, a
petitioner must offer either direct evidence or ‘a possible temptation so severe that
we might presume an actual, substantial incentive to be biased.’” (quoting Del
Vecchio v. Illinois Dep’t of Corr., 31 F.3d 1363, 1380 (7th Cir. 1994)). In other words,
the appellate court concluded that any alleged bias the trial judge had was simply
“too speculative and insubstantial to overcome the presumption of his impartiality.”
Montgomery, 426 F.3d at 911. This Court agrees: Martinez’s failure to point to
anything other than what the judge learned at trial as a source of the alleged bias
precludes his recusal argument. Martinez has not met the second prong of AEDPA
and therefore is not entitled to habeas relief on this ground.
2. Premature Deadlock Instruction
On the second day of deliberations, after having deliberated for over eight
hours, the jury sent the trial judge the following note: “We feel we are at an impasse
on the verdict. We are unanimous on guilt, however, divided on which charge. We
33
ask for your instruction/guidance.” Exh. A, Order on Direct Appeal at 7. The judge
then issued a Prim instruction—that is, a deadlock instruction—to the jury. Id.
After further deliberation, the jury found Martinez guilty of first-degree murder. Id.
Martinez now asserts that administering a deadlock instruction only eight hours
after the jury began deliberating “pressured the jury to reach a verdict for the sake
of complying with a judicial admonishment rather than with the intention to decide
the matter based on an adequate application of the law to the facts proven.” R. 37 at
Exh. 1, Am. Habeas Pet. at 15.
The trial judge’s decision to give a deadlock instruction after the jury had
deliberated for over eight hours was not constitutional error warranting habeas
relief. When reviewing an allegedly improper instruction in a federal habeas
proceeding, “the proper inquiry … is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that
the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way that prevents the
consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence.” Boyde v. California, 494 U.S.
370, 380 (1990). The instruction must be examined “in the context of the
instructions as a whole and the trial record.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72
(1991). A federal court may not grant habeas relief then unless “the ailing
instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates
due process. Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147 (1973); id. at 146 (“Before a
federal court may overturn a conviction resulting from a state trial in which this
instruction was used, it must be established not merely that the instruction is
undesirable, erroneous, or even ‘universally condemned,’ but that it violated some
34
right which was guaranteed to the defendant by the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
Significantly, “[u]nder federal constitutional standards, the timing of a deadlock
instruction is within the trial court’s discretion.” United States ex rel Cowan v.
Thieret, 1986 WL 11681, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 9, 1986), aff’d sub nom., 826 F.2d 1068
(7th Cir. 1987).
One final note on Supreme Court law concerning improper jury instructions:
“[T]he Supreme Court, as well as [the Seventh Circuit], has been resolute in ruling
that errors of state law, especially errors based on a trial court’s evidentiary rulings
or jury instructions, do not, in and of themselves, violate the Constitution.”
Neumann v. Jordan, 84 F.3d 985, 988 (7th Cir. 1996) (emphasis added) (citing
Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67). So while a petitioner may be entitled to habeas relief where
a jury instruction “so infused the trial with unfairness as to deny due process of
law,” Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 228 (1941), “the fact that the instruction
was allegedly incorrect under state law is not a basis for habeas relief,” Estelle, 502
U.S. at 71-72.
The Illinois Appellate Court’s analysis is consistent with the legal principles
set forth in these cases. The appellate court observed that administering a deadlock
instruction is within the trial court’s discretion in light of “the length of time
already spent in deliberation and the complexity of the issues before the jury.” Exh.
A, Order on Direct Appeal at 24. After examining the entire trial record—including
the amount of time the jury had deliberated, the length of the trial, the number of
witnesses the jury heard, and the legal issues the jury had to consider—the
35
appellate court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it
administered the deadlock instruction. Id. at 25. This review of the entire trial
record shows that the appellate court took a holistic approach in assessing whether
the deadlock instruction coerced the jury into rendering a verdict that deprived
Martinez of his due process rights. To be sure, the appellate court did not cite any
federal law concerning constitutional challenges to jury instructions and its cursory
analysis leaves much to be desired. But “[a] state court need not even be aware of
Supreme Court precedent ‘so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the
state-court decision contradicts them.’” Charlton v. Davis, 439 F.3d 369, 374 (7th
Cir. 2006) (quoting Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 16 (2003)). That is the case
here: particularly given that “the timing of a deadlock instruction is within the trial
court’s discretion,” Thieret, 1986 WL 11681, at *2, this Court cannot say that the
Illinois Appellate Court unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent. Therefore,
Martinez has failed to show that the trial judge’s decision to administer a deadlock
instruction violated his due process rights.
3. Failure to Give Transcripts of Defense Witnesses’ Testimony to Jury
During deliberations, the jury asked for transcripts of the witnesses’ trial
testimony. R. 25-29, Exh. CC, Trial Report of Proceedings Vol. 10 at QQ-3, People v.
Martinez, No. 03-CR-26668 (Cir. Ct. Cook Cnty.). At first, the jury specifically
requested transcripts for two witnesses: Dr. Nancy Jones (a medical examiner) and
Padin. Id. at QQ-4-5. The jury then requested the rest of the transcripts after the
trial judge had provided Dr. Jones’s and Padin’s uncertified transcripts. Id. at QQ-6.
36
Over the defense’s objection, the trial judge provided the rest of the witnesses’
transcripts, save for two of the defense’s witnesses—the defense’s expert, Dr. Spitz,
and a paramedic, Robert Sisson. Id. at QQ-9-10, QQ-23. Martinez now contends that
the trial judge’s failure to give the jury transcripts of two key defense witnesses,
while providing transcripts of all other witnesses, “deprived [the jury] of equal[ly] …
assess[ing] the validity and credibility of all the witnesses during their
deliberations.”13 R. 37 at Exh. 1, Am. Habeas Pet. at 16-17.
Under federal law, the question “whether to comply with [a] jury’s request for
the transcript of a witness’ testimony is one ‘purely within the trial court’s
discretion.’” United States v. Howard, 80 F.3d 1194, 1202 (7th Cir. 1996) (quoting
United States v. Guy, 924 F.2d 702, 708 (7th Cir. 1991)), amended (May 2, 1996).
Given this, it is exceedingly difficult to establish that a trial court’s decision to
provide the jury with witnesses’ testimony constitutes a due process violation. Guy,
924 F.2d at 708; see e.g., United States ex rel. Brooks v. DeTella, 1997 WL 47451, at
*2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 30, 1997) (holding that trial judge’s refusal to provide a trial
transcript to the jury was not fundamentally unfair given the trial court’s inability
to reach the court reporter).
With this in mind, the Court also hastens to point out that in order for
Martinez to obtain relief for this alleged error—as with Martinez’s other alleged
13The
Court notes that while Martinez identified this issue in his petition for leave to
appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court, he did not address the issue substantively or make
any legal argument whatsoever as to why the trial court’s decision to give the jurors
transcripts of some, but not all, witnesses constituted reversible error. See Exh. E, Pet. for
Leave to Appeal at 2-3, 10-11. For completeness purposes, the Court will nevertheless
address the issue on the merits.
37
errors—he must identify established Supreme Court precedent and show that the
Illinois Appellate Court’s decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of
that precedent. Martinez has failed on both accounts. (Perhaps this is because there
is apparently no Supreme Court decision directly analyzing how a trial court should
handle a jury’s request for transcripts.) Without any precedent to go on, this Court
cannot conclude that the Illinois Appellate Court unreasonably applied clearly
established federal constitutional law. See United States ex rel. Blakemore v.
Grounds, 2010 WL 3257939, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 16, 2010) (providing a jury with a
partial transcript in response to a request for a complete one did not violate the
petitioner’s right to a fair trial given that “[Supreme Court] case law furnishe[d] no
answer to the question at issue”).
E. Claim 4 (Original Petition Claim 5):
Cruel and Unusual Punishment—75-Year Sentence is Excessive
In his fourth claim, Martinez asserts that his extended-term sentence
violated his right against cruel and unusual punishment. R. 37 at Exh. 1, Am.
Habeas Pet. at 17-18. According to Martinez, the trial judge improperly relied on his
own personal bias and prejudice, and failed to consider any mitigating factors, when
he sentenced Martinez to 75 years in prison. Id.
This claim is procedurally defaulted. As discussed earlier, a habeas petitioner
must fully and fairly present his federal claims through one complete round of the
state appellate review process before filing a federal habeas petition. O’Sullivan,
526 U.S. at 845. If a petitioner has failed to properly assert his federal claims at
each level of state review, then his claims are procedurally defaulted. See McDowell,
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737 F.3d at 482. As the State correctly points out, although Martinez asserted this
claim on direct appeal to the Illinois Appellate Court, Exh. B, Appellant’s Opening
Br. on Direct Appeal at 47-50, he did not raise it in his petition for leave to appeal to
the Illinois Supreme Court, see Exh. E, Pet. for Leave to Appeal at 2-3. Nor did
Martinez assert this claim in any state court collateral proceeding. See Exh. II,
Postconviction Common Law Record at C10-16; Exh. NN, Successive Postconviction
Common Law Record Vol. 1 at C26-39; Exh. M, Pet’r’s Opening Br. at 19-30; Exh. Q,
Postconviction Pet. for Leave to Appeal at 5-19. Based on this record, this Court
cannot reach the merits of Martinez’s excessive-term claim given that Illinois state
courts did not have a full and fair opportunity to review it. Nor has Martinez argued
that there was cause and prejudice, or a miscarriage of justice, that would justify
disregarding the default. Crockett v. Hulick, 542 F.3d 1183, 1193 (7th Cir. 2008).
Claim 4, therefore, is rejected.
F. Claim 5 (Original Petition Claim 6):
Right Against Self-Incrimination—Custodial Statements Were Coerced
Martinez’s final claim is that the trial judge improperly admitted his
allegedly coerced custodial statements as evidence at trial in violation of his right
against self-incrimination and due process of law. R. 37 at Exh. 1, Am. Habeas Pet.
at 18-21. Martinez alleges that his custodial statements were coerced because the
police obtained the statements while detaining him for over 48 hours without a
probable cause determination. Id. In support of this claim, Martinez points to a
class-action settlement notice he received in October 2010. Id.; Exh. NN, Successive
Postconviction Common Law Record Vol. 1 at C42-44.
39
This claim too suffers from a procedural default. Here, the state appellate
court rejected Martinez’s coerced custodial statement claim on an independent and
adequate state law ground. Martinez first raised this claim in a motion for leave to
file a successive postconviction petition filed in the Circuit Court of Cook County.
Exh. NN, Successive Postconviction Common Law Record Vol. 1 at C26-39. The
Circuit Court observed that in order to file a successive postconviction petition, a
petitioner must “‘demonstrate[] cause for his or her failure to bring the claim in his
or her initial post-conviction proceedings and prejudice result[ing] from that
failure.’” Id. at C157 (quoting 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f)). On appeal, the Illinois Appellate
Court affirmed the lower court’s judgment, holding that Martinez failed to satisfy
the requisite cause and prejudice test under Section 5/122-1(f) for filing a successive
postconviction petition. Exh. P, Order, 2014 WL 1281696, at *6-7. Where, as here,
“a state court declined to address a prisoner’s federal claims because the prisoner
had failed to meet a state procedural requirement,” procedural default kicks in to
bar federal habeas relief. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729. And Martinez failed to argue
that the cause-and-prejudice or miscarriage-of-justice exceptions apply to his fifth
claim. So, as with Claims 1-4, Claim 5 is also rejected.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, Martinez’s amended habeas petition [R. 37
at Exh. 1] is denied. If Martinez seeks to appeal the denial of his habeas petition, he
must first obtain a certificate of appealability. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2253, “an appeal
may not be taken to the court of appeals from the final order in a habeas corpus
40
proceeding in which the detention complained of arises out of process issued by a
State court” unless the circuit justice or judge first issues a certificate of
appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). A certificate of appealability may issue only
when “the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To make a substantial showing, a
petitioner must show that “reasonable jurists could debate whether … the petition
should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were
adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537
U.S. 322, 336 (2003) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). For the
reasons discussed above, Martinez has not made a substantial showing of the denial
of a constitutional right; reasonable jurists would not debate whether the challenges
in his habeas petition should been resolved differently or determine that Martinez
deserves encouragement to proceed further with his habeas claims. See Rutledge v.
United States, 230 F.3d 1041, 1047 (7th Cir. 2000). The state courts’ decisions on all
of Martinez’s claims were well within the deference owed to state courts under
AEDPA. The Court therefore declines to issue a certificate of appealability.
ENTERED:
s/Edmond E. Chang
Honorable Edmond E. Chang
United States District Judge
DATE: June 29, 2016
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