O'Connor v. Chicago Board of Education

Filing 144

ORDER: This Court denies Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Count I of Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint 127 . Defendant has 14 days to answer Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint. Signed by the Honorable Sharon Johnson Coleman on 3/9/2018. Mailed notice.(ym, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
VALENTINA O’CONNOR,
Plaintiffs,
v.
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE
CITY OF CHICAGO,
Defendant.

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Case No. 14-CV-10263
Judge Sharon Johnson Coleman

ORDER

Defendant, Board of Education of the City of Chicago (“Board”) moves to dismiss Count I

of Plaintiff, Valentina O’Connor’s Third Amended Complaint, alleging that it is time-barred. For
the reasons stated below, Defendant’s motion to dismiss is denied.
STATEMENT
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal
sufficiency of the complaint, not the merits of the allegations. Gardunio v. Town of Cicero, 674 F. Supp.
2d 976, 983 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (Dow, J.). A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows a court to draw the reasonable inference that a defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged. Id.; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868
(2009). In assessing whether a claim has met the statute of limitations, “dismissal under Rule
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is appropriate if the complaint contains everything
necessary to establish that the claim is untimely.” Collins v. Vill. of Palatine, No. 16-3395, 2017 U.S.
App. LEXIS 23012, at *4-5 (7th Cir. Nov. 16, 2017).
The following facts are taken as true to resolve the instant motion. Plaintiff filed a prior
lawsuit against the Board based on discrimination she experienced in response to asserting her rights
under the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”). This case eventually settled and was dismissed
with prejudice in January of 2013. Plaintiff continued her employment with the Board at Bowen
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High School. On or around March 10, 2014, Plaintiff applied for FMLA leave from March 11, 2014
through June 25, 2014. Her petition indicated that she was requesting leave to care for “Michael W.
O’Connor” and “Valentina L. O’Connor.” (Dkt. 132, Ex. A). On March 20, 2014, the Board
approved the FMLA leave from March 11, 2014 through April 11, 2014. (Dkt. 132, Ex. B). On
April 7, 2014, Plaintiff submitted another FMLA leave request to care for her son, Micheal W.
O’Connor, alone. (Dkt. 132, Ex. C). This second request was denied.
On December 12, 2014, Plaintiff filed a pro se complaint alleging facts to support FMLA
retaliation and interference claims related to requests for leave to care for her son. On July 1, 2015,
upon obtaining an attorney, Plaintiff amended her complaint and similarly alleged that “Defendant
has interfered with [her] right to leave protected by the FMLA” in order to care for her son. On
December 29, 2015, the Board laid off Plaintiff and she filed her Second Amended Complaint,
which raised a claim of FMLA interference based on Plaintiff’s right to take FMLA leave due to her
own serious illness. Finally, on November 28, 2017, Plaintiff filed a Third Amended Complaint and
alleged that Defendant interfered with her right to take leave protected by FMLA in order to tend to
her son’s health.
Defendant now argues that Count I of Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint is time-barred
because it is a “new” claim that filed more than three years after she asserted her FMLA right. The
Court disagrees. This is not a new claim. The FMLA interference claim in Plaintiff’s original
complaint and First Amended Complaint referenced the FMLA leave requests to care for Plaintiff’s
son that occurred between March and April of 2014. Both of these complaints were filed within the
statute of limitations. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(1)(B) provides that an “amendment to a
pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading when the amendment asserts a claim or
defense that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out—or attempted to be set
out—in the original pleading.” The claim alleged in Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint is not
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time-barr because it stems from the same ty of conduc and period of FMLA l
red
t
m
ype
ct
d
leave alleged in all
of the pre
evious complaints. Accordingly, it rel
lates back to the date of t original p
the
pleading that
t
alleged sh was caring for her son. See Meadows v. Popeyes La Kitchen, No 13 C 5659, 2015 U.S. D
he
g
s
a.
o.
,
Dist.
LEXIS 78955, at *5 (N Ill. June 18, 2015)(B
N.D.
Blakey, J.).
Further, this Court finds th Defendant would not be prejudic by preser
F
C
hat
t
ced
rving Count I
because Plaintiff cons
P
sistently asser an FML interferen claim in e
rted
LA
nce
each complain Defenda
nt.
ant
was put on notice of the nature of the claims it would need to defend a
o
t
f
d
against. See C
Childress v. Wa
alker,
787 F.3d 433, 440 (7th Cir. 2015) (finding that to survive d
h
t
dismissal, the complaint n
need only pro
ovide
Defendan with fair notice of wha the claim is and the gro
nt
n
at
s
ounds upon w
which it rests Conseque
s).
ently,
as there was sufficient notice of th type of cla that wou arise, the specific basis of the FML
w
t
he
aim
uld
s
LA
request—
—whether for Plaintiff’s ow care or th of her so
r
wn
hat
on—is inappo
osite at this s
stage of the
proceedin Id.
ngs.
Plaintiff’s claim was timely as it proper related back to the orig
P
m
y
rly
ginal compla that was filed
aint
within the statute of li
imitations. Given the lib
G
beral pleading standard at this stage, th Court find
g
he
ds
that Coun I is sufficient to surviv scrutiny on the limited basis of the statute of lim
nt
ve
n
mitations.
Conclusi
ion
Based on the above analys this Cour denies Def
B
sis,
rt
fendant’s Mo
otion to Dism Count I of
miss
Plaintiff’s Third Amen
s
nded Complaint. Defend has 14 d to answe Plaintiff’s Third Amen
dant
days
er
nded
Complain
nt.
IT IS SO ORDERED
D.

ENTE
ERED:

SHA
ARON JOHN
NSON COL
LEMAN
Unit States Di
ted
istrict Court J
Judge

Dated: 3/
/9/2018
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